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An exploration of Labour Party policy and debates on 
national newspaper ownership from 1972-2002, with 
regard to models for achieving pluralistic and democratic 
ownership of the media 
Abstract 
This thesis analyses how Labour Party discussions and policy development between 1972 
and 2002 considered problems posed concerning political democracy and British press 
ownership and control. By examining the Labour policy formulated, and the surrounding 
debates, the thesis considers the extent to which policy corresponded to models for 
creating a pluralistic and democratic media that the first chapter outlines. The work also 
analyses to what extent the policy developed by Labour considered some of the 
difficulties with those models. It finds that the policy alternatives put forward in the 
earlier period considered in the thesis do not fully answer those difficulties. However, it 
is indicated that this does not provide sufficient explanation as to why, as happened, the 
policies were progressively abandoned. 
To explain why earlier commitments were jettisoned, firstly, the work analyses how press 
ownership policy was created within the Labour Party in this period, in the context of 
changes in party policy more generally. It identifies how the sectors involved in press 
policy creation changed. This is then considered in relation to various `classic' theories of 
Labour Party power relations. It concludes that an alternative Marxist analysis of party 
power relations provides an approximate explanation of policy creation. Secondly, the 
work posits that the pressure for Labour representation provided a tension with policies 
providing for press diversity and participative democracy. Moreover, it argues that this 
tension existed throughout the period from 1972 onwards. It considers the role of Labour 
representation in explaining the later thrust of Labour press policy within a hierarchy of 
influences, particularly the effect of going with the grain of economic globalisation. 
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Introduction 
Neil Kinnock was caught in a dilemma. He supported the Campaign for Press and 
Broadcasting Freedom, a New Left pressure group committed to press democracy. But he 
knew he needed the support of the one daily title that had provided consistent support and 
representation of the views of the Labour Party, the Daily Mirror. And now his closest 
political allies were telling him that for this to continue he had to support Robert 
Maxwell, the latest would-be media autocrat. What was he to do? 
This work is the story of 30 years of Labour party policy. It considers how the party had 
found itself in a position where Kinnock had limited choice but to welcome this 
`monster' who he had secretly plotted against. And it will describe how later shifts in 
press ownership policy related to Tony Blair famously attending a Rupert Murdoch- 
hosted conference a decade later, followed by the Sun, ̀ wot won it' previously for the 
Conservatives, coming out for Labour. 
WHAT THIS WORK WILL ARGUE 
Chapter 1 of this thesis will explore what a democratic model press model might look 
like, by considering various theorists' models to provide for a democratic and diverse 
media. To put such a model into practice is a tall order. Yet, in the following chapters, it 
shall be argued that, for all their faults, some Labour Party discussions at least attempted 
to consider some of the complex, but important, aspects of a democratic press model. 
Groups and individuals, tending to be left/radical, attempted to provide answers to the 
problems identified with models outlined, which were stifled by forces that were more 
often on the right of the party. The undoubted difficulties with the alternatives developed 
in the party do not mean that they should just be dismissed out of hand. As we shall see in 
the first chapter, political democracy is still short-changed by the British press, where 
domination is by a few hierarchical conglomerates. 
There are many examples where, in the slow process of policy implementation, problems 
have been ironed out. Curran gives an example of the Scandinavian press schemes where 
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this is the case. ' There are also examples in other areas in British policymaking. 2 It is 
only through implementation that the power of groups such as journalists and/or pressure 
groups could have been assessed and adjusted, for instance, if this was required. Such 
difficulties provide a reason why there were disagreements in the Labour Party over 
implementing a democratic model that went beyond liberal pluralism. However, the 
problems were not a justification on their own for why no such system was implemented. 
Instead, what will be suggested here, following the argument of Des Freedman when 
discussing broadcasting policy, is that this left/right divide punctuated policy debates and 
ended up marginalising attempts to answer the problems we identified. This is of 
overwhelming importance. Also, however, it will be suggested that a consideration of 
Labour's recent history indicates a hitherto relatively unexplored difference of emphasis 
among those formulating the party's policies. 
As we shall indicate, political democracy requires a diverse and democratically 
accountable press. However, it will also be argued that it necessitates press representation 
of different political and cultural viewpoints. This work suggests another factor involved 
in the non-implementation of Labour Party policies. It is related to the idea that the 
demand for diversity, democracy and, especially, broader representation was entwined 
with the anxiety that the Labour movement be represented in national newspapers. At the 
same time as the policies for structurally changing the press market to provide Labour 
movement representation through increased diversity and democracy became seen to be 
redundant, some forces placed a renewed emphasis on other methods to promote the 
Labour Party's voice in the existing press market. 
In order to place the influence of this alongside other factors, the work will consider press 
policy within the context of the broader development of Labour policy. Two works 
considering media history have considered this wider context. Yet, Curran and Freedman, 
1 Author interview with James Curran, May 9 2001. 
2 Hall, Phoebe. 1975. Change, choice and conflict in social policy. London: Heinemann Educational. 3 Freedman, 2000. He identifies this divide in television policy as between the ̀ democratizing left' and the 
`conservative right'. But, as with this work, he emphasises this is not a comprehensive division. (Freedman, 
2003: 200-1). 
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as remarkably perceptive and important writers, have downplayed or consciously avoided 
the question of media management in their accounts of British press policy and Labour 
Party broadcasting policy, respectively. 4 However, it is this author's view that the related 
pressure for Labour representation in national newspapers needs to be considered when 
assessing the tensions in Labour press ownership policy, not just from the time of 
Kinnock onwards, but also in the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
The tension between policies for diversity and democracy and those for Labour 
representation to counter perceived press bias has become more evident since the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, this work explores how these different emphases displayed themselves in a 
relatively disguised form in the 1970s. 
It looks at how the tension became more pronounced after the election of Neil Kinnock. 
Evidence will be explored to show how the party leadership's relationship with Robert 
Maxwell meant that it was prepared to shift its position on press ownership in order to 
maintain newspaper support and representation. It considers the effect that failed attempts 
at a mass circulation Labour movement newspaper had on enthusiasm to increase Labour 
representation in press content through structural reform. It outlines how the decreased 
emphasis on representation through structural reform combined with a stronger emphasis 
on representation through political communications and press management. Furthermore, 
it considers how this increased the tensions between policies for representation and those 
for diversity and democratic control. From this, it considers how the changing emphasis 
of those forces seeking Labour representation within the British national press can shed 
light on newspaper ownership and cross-ownership policy under New Labour, alongside 
other factors, such as the pressure to go with the grain of globalisation. 
One way to consider this dynamic is to analyse the progress of Labour Party press 
ownership policy within the context of power relations within the party. The influence of 
° In fact, despite explicitly stating this, Freedman does actually refer to political communications with 
regard to News International and New Labour and elsewhere. (Freedman, Des. 2000. The television 
policies of the British Labour Party: 1951-2001: University of Westminster.: 223-6, Freedman, Des. 2003. 
Television policies of the Labour Party: 1951-2001: London: Frank Cass: 118,157-9). 
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different sectors of the Labour Party has been more pronounced at different times. 
Indeed, even the idea of there being a single Labour Party policy has been implicitly 
contested. 5 At various points, there has been a separate policy of the party, the leadership, 
and at times, the Labour government. And media reporting has further blurred these 
distinctions. 
This study will discuss the sources of power and influence on the formation of Labour 
Party policy regarding press ownership regulation since 1972, with an emphasis on extra- 
parliamentary party policy formation. It will attempt to explain the period when reform 
was dropped from Labour's agenda. The complexly related issue of the implementation 
of policy will be discussed in relation to this, but will be of decidedly secondary 
importance. In order to put this into a context, Appendix 1 to Chapter 1 will consider the 
approaches of some political scientists' `classic' works on the Labour Party. A key aspect 
of this work is that it is a theory-testing dissertation - testing how these more general 
theories can be applied in the specific area of press policy formation. 6 
The thesis will attempt to test these classic theories of power relations in the Labour Party 
using a triangulation approach, involving case study analysis of primary documentary and 
related sources, combined with in-depth interviewing. 
In the sense that this work looks at one particular area of Labour Party policy over time, it 
is a historical case study using qualitative analysis. 7 As Charles Ragin defines it, as 
distinct from the comparative method: "Most historical, single-country analyses fit 
squarely within the domain of case-oriented studies because they are predicated on the 
idea that the interpretation of a specific case as a meaningful chronology is valuable. "8 
s See Minkin, L. 1980. The Labour Party conference: a study in the politics on intro party democracy. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.: 318. 
6 For a discussion of theory-testing dissertations see Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to methods for 
students ofpolitical science. Ithaca, N. Y. ; London: Cornell University Press.: 29,90. 
7 Ragin Charles, C. 1987. The comparative method : moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. 
Berkeley ; London: University of California Press.: esp. 70-3, Van Evera: esp. 30, Harry Eckstein, ̀ Case 
Study and Theory in Political Science' in Greenstein, Fred, I., and W. Polsby Nelson. 1975. Strategies of 
inquiry. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.: esp. 85. 
8 Rägin: 73. See also Eckstein: 85, Van Evera: 30. 
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Yin advises that such studies should employ different sources of information for its 
conclusions to be more convincing and accurate .9 This work employs that 
form of 
triangulation. 
The theory testing employed is more than of abstract academic interest, however. By 
considering the role of different actors, the thesis aims to draw out fresh insights in 
understanding how the party's newspaper policy developed. The final stage of this study 
will draw some conclusions concerning policy formation with regard to these approaches. 
WHAT THIS WORK WILL CONSIDER 
What this work will analyse is how Labour Party discussions and policy development 
looked at the problem to be posed in the first chapter concerning political democracy and 
British press ownership and control. It will examine the discussions and the policy 
formulated, within the development of broader Labour Party policy. The information 
collected will be utilised to provide conclusions as to what extent this corresponded to the 
models for a pluralistic and democratic media that will be outlined in Chapter 1. This 
work also analyses to what extent the policy developed has considered the problems that 
the discussion of those models also indicate. It chronicles the shifting nature of the 
sources creating press ownership policy within the party. 
This information will be used to form conclusions as to the sources of policy formation, 
with regard to the approaches considered in Appendix 1 to Chapter 1. Centrally, the work 
explores the contention that Labour's determination to gain press representation provided 
a tension with policies to provide diversity and democracy. It considers the pressure for 
Labour representation as a factor in considering the thrust of Labour press policy within a 
hierarchy of influences, particularly that which has been understood as economic 
globalisation. 
9 Yin: 8,92-93. 
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From this outline of what the work will entail flow a number of questions, which it will 
consider: 
1. Has Labour Party policy provided for a pluralistic and democratic system of press 
ownership and control? 
2. Have discussions and prescriptions in the Labour Party considered and answered the 
problems indicated concerning the various models for providing democratic 
ownership of the control of the media, as already outlined? 
3. Was there any tension between Labour movement representation and press ownership 
diversity and democratic control in Labour Party thinking? 
4. Did Labour consider the link between the press and political democracy? 
5. Have there been differentiations in policy between the Labour Party and the Labour 
government in the period from 1972 to the present day? 
6. Has economic globalisation dictated Labour Party policy on press ownership? 
7. Have shifts in the extent of influence on policy creation of different sectors of the 
Labour Party since 1972 affected press policy on ownership and control? 
The first chapter will consider the problems with British newspaper ownership that earlier 
Labour policy attempted to address. Those problems that will be assessed are the 
relationship between political democracy and the press; that between ownership, 
diversity, concentration and control; the state of the British national press; cross- 
ownership; the effect of advertising on Labour representation in the press; and democratic 
participation in the newspaper industry. Chapter 2 will outline further the methods and 
reasoning underlying the study as a whole. 
Chapter 3 will assess the period from 1972 until Labour entered government in 1974. It 
will explore the rise of the NEC sub-committees and their influence on policy creation, 
the models for a plural and democratic media considered by The people and the media 
report, which will inform later chapters, and the publication's effect on Labour Party 
policy. 
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The next chapter explores press ownership policy creation and debate within the Labour 
Party during the 1974-1979 government. It will explore any distancing between the 
policies of the Government and the party as to the question of democratic media 
ownership, as evidenced by the different attitudes of both to the 1977 Royal Commission 
on the Press. It will also explore the influences on party policy during that period, 
including the pressure for Labour representation. 
The turbulent period from 1979 to 1983 will be considered in Chapter 5. Themes 
analysed here will include the role and policies of the Media Committee, as part of 
demands for `leadership accountability' in the Labour Party. Its influence on the 1983 
manifesto will be considered as well as a consideration of the relationship of policies 
developed to the various models for pluralism and democracy outlined in Chapter 1 
Chapter 6 analyses the changes in policy on ownership and control during the Kinnock 
years. It explores relationships between this and shifts in party media presentation, 
associated with the renewed emphasis on press management, as a bid for Labour 
representation. Within this, the chapter will explore the changes within the party 
regarding the sources of policy creation and the decreasing emphasis on policies to 
structurally alter the press. 
The seventh chapter will have as its subject the time of Smith and Blair as leaders of the 
party. The short-lived changes heralded by Smith in both policy creation and media 
relations will be briefly assessed. It will be argued that, with the general shift towards a 
pro-market agenda in all areas, the further emphasis on press management strategy to 
provide representation led to a further downplaying of newspaper policies that would 
provide for political democracy. The work will conclude in Chapter 8 by analysing the 
argument made within the context of other work that consider the question of Labour's 
press ownership policies. 
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1. Problems and Perspectives 
"A newspaper is an individual piece of private property which has public responsibilities 
expressing the views of those people who are running it. " (National Publishers' 
Association chair Lord Goodman, 1976)10 
"Unless we can return to the principles of public service we will lose our claim to be the 
Fourth Estate. What right have we to speak in the public interest when, too often, we are 
motivated by personal gain? " (Rupert Murdoch, 1961)" 
"Personally, I'm in favor of democracy, which means that the central institutions of 
society have to be under popular control. Now, under capitalism, we can't have 
democracy by definition. Capitalism is a system in which the central institutions of 
society are in principle under autocratic control... [I]t has tight control at the top and 
strict obedience has to be established at every level - there's a little bargaining, a little 
give and take, but the line of authority is perfectly straightforward. " (Noam Chomsky, 
1988)12 
THE PRESS AND POLITICAL DEMOCRACY - THE FIRST PROBLEM 
British democracy has a problem. Labour policy in the earlier period we are considering 
grappled with this problem. It does not have the press that it needs to function adequately. 
Only a few theorists of political democracy have considered what practices and principles 
10 Newspaper Publishers' Association, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, November 30 
1976: 14-5. Goodman was one of the ̀ great and the good', with close connections to the Labour leadership. 
He had served on a Royal Commission and the Arts Council and been director of such bodies as the Royal 
Opera House. (1979. Who's who an annual biographical dictionary. London: A. & C. Black). 
11 Quoted in Schultz, Julianne. 1998. Reviving the fourth estate : democracy, accountability and the media. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.: back cover. 
12 Otero, C. P., and Noam Chomsky. 1988. Language and politics. Montreal ; New York: Black Rose 
Books.: 162. 
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the press and mass media should adopt to provide for democracy, according to John 
Street. 13 However, these provisions have concerned media scholars. 
Philosopher Jurgen Habermas has provided an influential notion in providing democratic 
communication. In his idea of a public sphere, we get an outline, however abstract and 
idealised, of the media needed. We can take from this that a role of the press and media is 
to provide a space where discussion and differences in political debate can be aired. The 
press is explicitly ideological, providing `lines' and viewpoints. This makes possible 
rational-critical public debate of political issues. '4 
From this, it follows that newspapers need to provide a platform for different politicians 
and interest groups to make plain their complaints and concerns - offering a dialogue for 
diverse views and political viewpoints. 15 Thus, titles need not be free from `bias' or 
necessarily balanced. A public sphere requires a lively range of views. 16 Democracy 
requires diversity and pluralism in the press and media. There should be a number of 
differing political positions. Without this, the right to receive and impart information may 
be excluded for individuals and groups. 
But it also necessitates representation. In political terms, the interests of democracy are 
served when a range of viewpoints are represented. It has been suggested that democracy 
requires there to be an allocation of newspaper and media resources for the persuasion of 
13 Those that have include John Keane and Judith Lichtenberg (Keane, J. 1991. The media and democracy. 
Cambridge, MA: Polity Press., Lichtenberg, Judith. 1990. Democracy and the mass media :a collection of 
essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ). 
14 Habermas, Jurgen, Thomas Burger, and Frederick Lawrence. 1989. The structural transformation of the 
public sphere : an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. Cambridge: Polity Press.: esp. 57-72. It is 
important to note that the idea of Habermas that this public sphere operated in the late 17`h and 18th 
centuries is debateable, however. A range of radical and liberal historians have challenged Habermas' 
historical interpretation. Of particular note is the criticism that Habermas downplayed the overt political 
controls that existed and the development of the radical press. (Curran, J. ̀ Rethinking the media as a public 
sphere' in Dahlgren, P. and Sparks, C. 1991. Communication and citizenship : journalism and the public 
sphere in the new media age. London: Routledge.: 39-46, Pusey, M. 1993. Jurgen Habermas. London: 
Routledge.: 90,111, Wheeler Mark, C. 1997. Politics and the mass media. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.: 35). 15 Michael Gurevitch and Jay G. Blumler, `Political Communication Systems and Democratic Values', in 
Lichtenberg: 269-89,270, Street, John. 2001. Mass media, politics, and democracy. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave.: 253. 
16 On this point, see Street: 258. 
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views that is roughly the same as the distribution of opinions in society. '7 This is a point 
we shall consider in the course of this work. At the very least, parties should have forums 
where their ideas are published. Culturally, newspapers need to represent minorities and 
marginal voices. Citizens and voters require this in order to effectively exercise 
citizenship. 18 The press and media operate to provide opportunities for citizens to learn 
and become involved. 19 
As we shall see, this notion of representation has its problems 2° More particularly, the 
question of it was entangled in the Labour Party with a concern to have Labour's 
viewpoint represented in the press. This is a key subject of this thesis. 
What is important to register at this stage, however, is that political democracy requires, 
at the least, press and media plurality providing wide and diverse representation. It has 
other requirements that we will deal with later in this chapter. 
17 Arblaster, Anthony. 1987. Democracy. Milton Keynes: University of Minnesota Press.: 94-6. 
18 Werner A. Meier and Josef Trappel, ̀ Media Concentration and the Public Interest', in McQuail, Denis, 
Karen Siune, and Group Euromedia Research. 1998. Media policy : convergence, concentration and 
commerce. Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London: Sage Publications.: 38-59,42-3, Doyle, Gillian. 2002a. Media 
ownership : the economics and politics of convergence and concentration in the UK and European media. 
London: Sage, 2002.: 11-2,170-1, Lively, Jack. 1975. Democracy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.: 35. 
19 Gurevitch and Blumler, Democratic Values: 269-89,270. 
20 See Street: 258-9. 
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DOES OWNERSHIP MATTER? 
If we are to consider Labour policy on ownership, diversity and concentration, then we 
need to consider the relationship between them. The relationship between concentration 
and diversity is not simple. There is surprisingly scant research evidence on the effects of 
concentration? ' It has been disputed that ownership diversity aids political democracy. 
22 
There are those who argue that concentration brings diversity of content and little danger 
to democracy. 23 Research into the Canadian press has questioned the notion that 
diminished competition leads to less information diversity, for instance. 24 However, other 
US research showed that papers in competitive markets have been superior to monopoly 
titles. 25 
It can be theoretically argued that concentration means that firms can take advantage of 
their size to use their resources more effectively; so a greater output range can be 
provided and loss-making titles can be subsidised. Also, some consider that firms have to 
be large to survive and compete internationally in a world allegedly dominated by 
economic globalisation. Only such companies can maintain their independence from 
interest groups. 26 However, as Doyle indicates, most of these assertions are by no means 
automatically true. The savings made need to be invested. 27 Moreover, these are all 
arguments to the advantage of the large newspaper concerns, rather than the more general 
public interest and that of the reader. Indeed, the last point on independence can be turned 
on its head to suggest that press conglomerate accountability to diverse interest groups is 
what is required. We shall consider this point later. 
21 Doyle, Media Ownership: 177. See also Meier and Trappel, 38-59: 39-40. 
22 Entman Robert, M. 1989. Democracy without citizens : media and the decay of American politics. New 
York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
23 Compaine Benjamin, M., and Douglas Gomery. 2000. Who owns the media? : competition and 
concentration in the mass media industry. Mahwah, N. J. ; London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates., 
Compaine, Benjamin, `The myths of encroaching global media ownership', 8 November 2001, Benjamin 
Compaine, ̀A world without absolutes', 9 May 2002, opendemocracy. net 
24 Maxell McCombs, `Concentration, monopoly and content', in Picard Robert, G. 1988. Press 
concentration and monopoly : new perspectives on newspaper ownership and operation. Norwood, N. J.: 
Ablex Pub. Co.: 129-37. also cited in Meier and Trappel, 38-59: 55. 
25 Bagdikian, Ben H. 1992. The media monopoly. Boston: Beacon Press.: 129. 
26 Meier and Trappel: 38-59: 44-5. 
27 Doyle, Media Ownership: 13,17,25. 
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Instead, writers have argued that media ownership concentration is deleterious to political 
democracy. 28 Media concentration leads to fewer information sources. Output becomes 
increasingly uniform. As is indicated by Meier and Trappel, the large press corporations' 
dominance can drive out smaller firms. This supremacy is strengthened by the nature of 
the newspaper market as a dual market, where advertising revenue can add to the 
domination of certain titles. 29 We shall consider this point further later. 
As concentration increases, so does power in society and political power. In capitalist 
economies, this has meant business dominance. 30 What is of a large concern is that 
concentrated ownership leads to the political viewpoints and values of the dominant 
media owners, managers and firms being represented, in preference to other positions. 
The press can be used as vehicles for owners, managers and editors. Contrary political 
ideas can be squeezed out. Doyle identifies research on the media in France, Germany 
and Italy, which confirms that direct and indirect editorial interference is not confined to 
Britain - to the detriment of media diversity. 
31 This may be for commercial or political 
reasons. 
One effect, Peter Humphreys' research identifies, is that owners and managers can use 
their media to influence public policy. 32 This is important for how this work will consider 
New Labour's evolution. Recent research has pointed to dominant media corporations' 
use of political influence to relax regulatory obstacles to expansion. The rise of Silvio 
Berlusconi is the most notorious case in point. 
28 Bagdikian, The media monopoly, Herman Edward, S. and McChesney Robert, W. 1997. The global 
media : the new missionaries of corporate capitalism. London: Cassell. Herman Edward, S. and Chomsky, 
N. 1994. Manufacturing consent : the political economy of the mass media. London: Vintage., McChesney, 
Robert W. 1997. Corporate media and the threat to democracy. New York: Seven Stories Press., 
McChesney Robert, Waterman. 2000. Rich media, poor democracy : communication politics in dubious 
times. Urbana: University of Illinois Press,. 
29 Meier and Trappel: 38-59: 46. 
30 See, for instance, Bagdikian, The media monopoly. 
" Doyle, Media Ownership: 13,18-22. 
32 Humphreys, Peter. 1996. Mass media and media policy in Western Europe. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. Also cited in Meier and Trappel: 38-59: 47. See also Dores Cardusi and James Winter, 
`Monopoly and Content to Winnipeg` in Picard: 139-145. 
16 
Whether it can be proved in all instances that media firms want some political opinions or 
types of cultural output to dominate, the risk exists. The greater the concentration there is, 
the greater the risk of abuse. It is true that other factors, such as the size and wealth of 
market, the extent which newspaper firms share resources, such as newsgathering 
through agencies, are important factors in gauging plurality. The extent that pluralism is 
affected by cross-media ownership, which we will consider in a moment, is partly 
dependent on whether consolidation promotes this same joint use of resources. 
Nevertheless, as Doyle indicates, though diverse press ownership does not guarantee 
plurality, it is a prerequisite. 33 Without diverse ownership, political democracy is 
compromised. 
I 
33 Doyle, Media Ownership: 13,18-22,25,27-8. 
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OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL - ARE THEY LINKED? 
In order to consider Labour Party policy on press ownership and control we also need to 
consider the relationship between the two. The foregoing discussion assumes that the two 
are linked. But are they? Pluralists have questioned this. Similarly, firstly, Colin 
Seymour-Ure argues that ownership has become more complex as chief executives of 
British newspapers in the recent past have not been extensive capital owners and 
individual owners have not exercised control. 4 The notion that professional managerial 
control had become divorced from ownership was a well-known one in the Labour Party; 
advanced by the post-war revisionists and, particularly, Tony Crosland. Crosland argued 
that such managers had different interests than the profit-seeking owner of old. 
Capitalism, in this sense, was dead. 35 This Managerial Revolution saw managers as a 
separate class, from the ̀ capitalists proper', not dependent on private ownership. 36 
However, this idea was also effectively challenged. Economist Paul Mattick argued that 
in large corporations, the diffusion of share ownership meant that for the majority of 
owners, ownership and control were separate. Instead, this diffusion meant that less 
stockholding was needed for control over a corporation. Concentrated minority 
shareholders combined with managers and directors, who were usually shareholders also, 
to control the companies. Managers might have autonomous interests in areas such as the 
distribution of profits. But the concerns of large shareholders and managers were the 
same when it came to maximising profits in a competitive economy. Without this, the 
firm would be in peril 37 Later research was sceptical of broader claims of writers such as 
Mattick. Nonetheless, it confirmed that company directors tended to own significant 
34 Seymour-Ure, Colin. 1994. "Who Owns the National Press? " Contemporary Record 8.: 266. 
34 Crosland, Anthony. 1957. The future of socialism: London.: esp 14-18, Thompson, Noel. 1996. Political 
economy and the Labour Party : the economics of democratic socialism, 1884-1995. London ; Bristol, Pa: 
UCL Press.: 150-1, Seymour-Ure, National Press: 266. 
33 Crosland: esp. 14-18, Thompson, Political economy: 150-1. 
36 Burnham, James. 1942. The managerial revolution : or what is happening in the world now. London: 
Putnam.: Chapters 6,7 and 8 
37 Mattick, Paul. 1971. Marx and Keynes : the limits of the mixed economy. London: Merlin Press, 1971.: 
302-5, Mandel, Ernest, andJoris De Bres. 1978. Late capitalism: Löndön: Wrsö.: 243 5. 
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shareholdings and had a shared origin in a propertied class of major shareowners that 
maintained "... participation in strategic control... " 38 
Thus, across industry, control has been dispersed between senior management and 
owners who share the same profit-seeking motives. With press firms, the tension is the 
age-old one between profit and political power, with the large minority shareholders and 
managers facing the same dilemma as the press barons of old. Commercial considerations 
were always there, along with political ones. It is still as true that even the most 
dictatorial of owners have commercial considerations to consider in a capitalist market. 
Any political motives would have to be fused with powerful pro-capitalist instincts. 
Many writers have quoted Lord Beaverbrook telling the 1947 Royal Commission that he 
ran his papers for `propaganda and for no other purpose'. But he went on to tell the 
commissioners that: "No paper is any good for propaganda unless it has a thoroughly 
good financial position. "39 So, in fusing these motives, managers have acted like owners 
on a day-to-day basis; examples on Fleet Street being Lord Stevens, Lord Matthews and, 
more recently, Lord Hollick. 40 
Secondly, it has been argued that editors have assumed greater control. However, most 
importantly, the owners and chief executives make the hire and fire decisions. They 
choose the editors and senior managers. They set the financial parameters of individual 
newspapers and make the final `bottom line' decisions, deciding whether newspapers live 
on or die. The editors operate within these ̀ bottom line' dictats, as the 1975 Royal 
39 Scott, John. 1985. Corporations, classes and capitalism. London: Hutchinson.: Chapter 5,175. 
39 Royal Commission on Press 1947-49 Minutes of evidence 26`h day, 18.3.48, HMSO cmnd 7426, 
paragraph 8660, quoted in Richards, Huw. 1997. The bloody circus : the Daily Herald and the left. London: 
Pluto Press.: 3. 
ao For the latter, see Appendix 3 to Chapter 7. It is true, however, that managers are potentially beholden to 
directors who can oust them. This famously happened to Cecil King after he penned an article calling for 
Harold Wilson's resignation in 1968. (Bruce Hanlin, `Owners, editors and journalists' in Belsey, Andrew, 
and Ruth Chadwick. 1992. Ethical issues in journalism and the media: Routledge.: 33-48,38-9). Simon 
Jenkins makes play of the fact that Matthews was the representative of the late 1970s Fleet Street company 
heads who did not have a controlling interest and was responsible to a board and directors. (Jenkins, Simon. 
1979. Newspapers : the power and the money. London: Faber.: 110). Yet, it was Lord Matthews who 
announced that: "By and large, the editors will have complete freedom as long as they agree with the policy 
I have laid down. " (quoted in Baistow, Tom. 1985. Fourth-rate estate: an anatomy of Fleet Street. London: 
Comedia.: 5). 
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Commission on the Press was told 41 For the media moguls who have existed in 
newspaper ownership, such as Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black, Tunstall's research 
shows that in fact, they have built "... their acquisitions around their personal 
management... ". Their managers have been important in how their firms operate. But 
they have intervened personally and relied on regular contact with managers and 
editors. 2 
Jeremy Tunstall's survey notes that some editors have seen their control increase since 
the 1980s. But this has happened as they have become `editor managers' and 
`entrepreneurial editors' - more integrated with the commercial management of the titles. 
So the prototype `entrepreneurial editor' David English was a director of Associated 
Newspapers and David Montgomery was also managing director for part of his time as 
Today editor. Kelvin Mackenzie at the Sun and Andrew Neil at the Sunday Times were 
given increased editorial power by Murdoch after showing their profit-making ability on 
their respective titles. Both were "... vigorous editorial promoters of Murdoch and News 
International interests". 43 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that editors have become divorced from the owners and 
chief executives. Despite Tunstall's description of Neil and Mackenzie's power as 
`untrammelled', Neil himself chronicles his regular discussions with Murdoch and 
emphasises the mogul's political influence on the Sun. 44 Tunstall describes the clearest 
example of the rise of editorial power on a broadsheet was that of Max Hastings on the 
Daily Telegraph. Yet, Hastings has written of the regular criticism Black subjected him 
to. He states that he "... never held the view that I could expect editorial freedom to be 
41 "The editor... has to produce a newspaper which the management can sell and if he cannot do that, he has 
to go. He may produce a beautiful paper, loved by the staff, praised in every bar in Fleet Street, spoke well 
of in university departments and at dinners attended by statesmen. But if sales are going persistently down, 
the editor cannot be kept in office. " (Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, submitted by Mirror 
Group Newspapers Ltd., April 1975, (1) 31). 
42 Tunstall, Jeremy. 1995. Newspaper power : the new national press in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.: 85, chapter 5. 
43 Ibid.: 125. 
44 Neil, Andrew. 1997. Full disclosure. London: Pan Books.: esp. 215-7. 
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absolute". 45 Tunstall, himself, also notes that the entrepreneurial archetype English talked 
on the telephone every day with Lord Rothermere 46 
Thus, although control is now diffused with `entrepreneurial editors' and senior 
managers, they still tend to share similar motives to the leading shareholder owners. In 
this sense, ownership and control tend to still be related, with the demands of business 
and the market as a crucial force. The most important exception to this is on the 
Guardian, where there was a history of editorial sovereignty. The Scott Trust, which had 
journalist members on the board, controlled ownership. 7 We shall also examine the 
question of editorial and senior journalist autonomy on the Mirror Group Newspapers 
later in this work. 
as He thought it was reasonable that he should be constrained, along with readership wishes, by "... the need 
to maintain the broad confidence of the board and... Conrad" For his part, Black attacked the self-avowed 
Conservative Hastings for allowing pieces in the Daily Telegraph to be supposed penned by writers of 
"... some pinko journalism school administered by the John Pilger-Christopher. Hitchens Trust for the 
propagation of liberal mendacity... ". (Hastings, Max. 2002. Editor :a memoir. London: Macmillan. esp.: 
81,250). 
46 Tunstall, Newspaper power: 114. 
47 Ayerst, David. 1971. 'Guardian': biography of a newspaper. London: Collins. 
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THE BRITISH NATIONAL NEWSPAPER MARKET48 
So political democracy requires press pluralism and pluralism needs diverse ownership 
and control. If we are to consider the Labour Party's policy on the press, we need to 
know whether the British national newspapers provide this. It may be argued that the 
British newspaper market has been able to deliver a relatively diverse output, if 
considered overall. (Though this is less true if we consider it as a segmented market, as 
we shall see in a moment). It has also been suggested that the press market's vitality is 
indicated by the rise in pages produced and the creation of new titles as others have 
folded 49 
However, the number of newspapers has considerably decreased. Launching a new title is 
still an expensive and risky business. 50 The introduction of new technology and defeat of 
the British print workers has not resolved this. 51 
Moreover, ownership is not diverse. One method of assessing whether a market is an 
oligopoly is to apply a concentration ratio. In a media market, this assesses the audience 
" This work does not include the exclusively Scottish titles, the limited-circulation Morning Star and the 
sports dailies, which have not been regarded as part of the national press. (Williams, Kevin. 1998. Get me a 
murder a day! :a history of mass communication in Britain. London: Arnold: 215) 
49 John Tulloch, `Managing the Press in a Medium Sized European Power', in Bromley, Michael, and Hugh 
Stephenson. 1998. Sex, lies and democracy : the press and the public. New York: Longman.: 64-5. 
50 Doyle, Gillian. 2002b. Understanding media economics. London: Sage Publications.: 126. Contrary to 
the claims of one editor writing about Fleet Street in the 1970s, using the gendered vocabulary of the time, 
it was not the case that "... any form of ownership and editorship is possible, and almost anyone with 
something to say can get it printed if he cares enough about it, and can find a few like-minded people to 
help him". (Wintour, Charles. 1972. Pressures on the press : an editor looks at Fleet Street. London: A. 
Deutsch.: 105). 
51 Since the introduction of the technology, new newspapers, such as the Correspondent and Sunday 
Correspondent floundered; still faced with high start-up and running costs. (McNair, Brian. 1999. News 
and journalism in the UK :a textbook. London: Routledge.: 161-2,216-7). The Independent only survived 
after being bought out by the Mirror Group, before being sold on another multinational newspaper 
corporation. The other entrant Today was eventually bought up by News International, before being laid to 
rest. The pattern of entry has continued as it was when Sparks was writing. It has been ".. either for an 
exiting large-scale publisher from outside this market to buy an existing title or for genuinely new entrants 
to fail and be taken over by existing large companies". (Sparks, Colin. 1999. "The Press. " in The media in 
Britain : current debates and developments, edited by C. Stokes Jane and Anna Reading. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1999.: 188-9, Sparks, Colin. 1995. "Concentration in the UK National Press. " European 
Journal of Communication 10: 179-206). 
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or readership share of the top four or five firms in the sector. 52 Press concentration has 
been a feature of international media ownership - both in western Europe and the world- 
dominating United States. 53 But the concentration ratio of the UK national press is among 
the highest in western Europe. 54 The top four firms account for more than 80 per cent of 
circulation - and the top five have more than 90 per cent of the total. 
55 Concentration has 
significantly increased since the last Royal Commission on the Press, where there were 
concerns that there were nine nationals - each with a separate owner. 
56 There are 
important economic reasons for this. 57 There is an incentive to increase market share, as 
long as there are not government restrictions on this. 58 Labour has considered this area of 
ownership legislation. Without these restrictions, the press marketplace is an example of 
market failure. And, by implication from what we have noted, it is also an instance of 
democratic deficit. 59 
52 Doyle, Understanding: 8-9. 
53 For Europe see Els De Bens and Helge Ostbye, `The European Newspaper Market' in McQuail, Denis, 
Karen Siune, and Group Euromedia Research. 1998. Media policy : convergence, concentration and 
commerce. Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London: Sage Publications.: 7-22,8. For the United States see Herman 
and Chomsky: 4-8, Bagdikian, The media monopoly, Herman and McChesney, and McChesney, Robert W. 
1997. Corporate media and the threat to democracy. New York: Seven Stories Press. 
sa Meier and Trappel: 38-59: 50. The dominance of the national newspaper market is unusual in Europe. 
(Doyle, Understanding: 125, Sparks, The Press: 44). 
ss See Table 1, Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation. 2002. National Newspapers - Sixth Monthly Report 
for the audit period: June 2002 to November 2002, www. abc. org. uk 
56 Great Britain Royal Commission on the Press. 1977. Royal Commission on the Press. Final Report. 
London: HMSO.: 73,185. 
s' Tendencies to ownership concentration have been prevalent in the British press since the eighteenth 
century. Although press mogul determination to amass perceived political power from ownership has 
affected the degree of concentration, there is also an economic reason for this. Economies of scale are very 
prevalent in the press and other media markets. Fixed costs, such as administration and editorial are high. 
Variable costs, such as newsprint, are relatively low. The marginal spending involved in providing an extra 
newspaper to an extra customer is low compared to average costs. Each extra copy costs little more than the 
price of its ink and paper. So there is a huge profit incentive to increase sales. (Doyle, Understanding: 14, 
27,123, Doyle, Media Ownership: 38,59, Collins, Richard, and Cristina Murroni. 1996. New media, new 
policies : media and communications strategies for the future. Cambridge: Polity Press.: 8). Imperfect 
competition theory suggests that the cost advantages, which come from exploiting economies of scale, will 
determine whether the industry becomes an oligopoly. There is a pressure towards horizontal expansion 
where markets concentrate as newspaper firms acquire more titles. (Doyle, Understanding: 33-3, Doyle, 
Media Ownership: 13, Meier and Trappel: 38-59: 41-2). 
58 Doyle, Understanding: 9,126. For reasons why the `hidden hand' of the market has not corrected this 
see Sparks, Concentration. 
59 The trend to oligopolisation is part of a wider, if uneven, process of concentration of ownership within 
industry -a process that has developed in Britain since the latter part of the nineteenth century. (Baran Paul, 
A. and Sweezy Paul, M. 1968. Monopoly capital : an essay on the American economic and social order. 
New York ; London: Modern Reader Paperbacks.: 225, Engler, A. 1995. Apostles of greed : capitalism and 
the myth of the individual in the market. Halifax, N. S. ; London: Fernwood : Pluto. : 36, Mandel, E. 1968. 
Marxist economic theory. London Merlin-Press.: 394). A ligureTike Karl Marx in-the 1860s mäy well have 
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Table 1: British national daily newspaper ownership by circulation 
Group Title Circulation Share 
News The Sun 3,626,262 34% 
Corporation The Times 689,382 
Daily Mail and The Daily Mail 2,435,038 19% 
General Trust 
Trinity Mirror Daily Mirror 2,118,405 17% 
Northern and Daily Express 989,549 13% 
Shell Daily Star 731,182 
Hollinger Group The Daily 991,465 8% 
Telegraph 
Pearson Financial Times 454,154 3% 
Guardian Media The Guardian 399,185 3% 
Group 
Independent News The Independent 224,165 2% 
and Media 
Total 12,658,787 > 99% 
overemphasised the tendency towards concentration. He pointed out how competition between capitalists 
leads to the monopolisation of capital in a process where "... [o]ne capitalist always kills many. " (Marx, K. 
and Engels, F. 1954. Capital: a critique ofpolitical economy. Löndön: Lawrence and Wishärt.: 714, 
24 
CROSS-OWNERSHIP AND SYNERGY 
Aside from concentration, in the latter period, Labour Party battles have also been fought 
over another strategy in which press firms have engaged. This is `diagonal' 
concentration, where companies diversify across different media in cross-media 
expansion or when non-media firms expand into the press or other media markets. 
60 It is 
thus important to explore these at this stage. An example that Labour was particularly 
concerned with was newspaper expansion into television broadcasting cross-ownership. 
Cross-media expansion might have a number of motives. Economies of scope can be 
achieved if two dissimilar products share some component, making it cheaper for them to 
be produced or marketed by the same firm. There is immense potential for economies of 
scope both for newspaper ownership and cross-ownership. Publishers of a range of titles 
can combine in such areas as advertising sales. A potential of cross-ownership is that a 
product created for one market, for instance a newspaper feature, is repackaged to be 
used in a television report. It can be argued that such expansion can lead to efficiency 
gains for business. 1 Again, firms justify expansion to internationally compete. However, 
as Ben Bagdikian, among others, argues, synergies provided for by cross-ownership can 
reduce the range of content and diverse ideas. This is due to the same material from the 
same corporate source getting recycled into different forms 62 
How much synergy is realised in the British context is more open to debate. Cross-media 
ownership can achieve synergies. 63 However, how much this is possible is dependent on 
how much content can and is repackaged into different formats. According to Doyle's 
research, there is much scepticism among media companies and little positive proof that 
this is possible for press and TV cross-ownership. Instead, the only advantage of cross- 
Miliband, R. 1969. The state in capitalist society. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.: 12-3). 
60 Doyle, Understanding: 33-3, Doyle, Media Ownership: 13, Meier and Trappel: 38-59: 41-2. 
61 Doyle, Understanding: 14-15,28-9, Doyle, Media Ownership: 38-40. 
62 Bagdikian, The media monopoly: xii-xiii, 243-4. 
63 So specialist business newspaper owner Pearson can provide synergies by exploiting economies of scale 
and scope across different media products, i. e. the FinänciätT<mes newspaper, FT business magazines etc. 
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ownership has been the opportunity to cross-promote products between different media. 64 
However, there is the potential for conflict with editorial integrity, as the press sacrifices 
potential impartiality for intra-corporate promotion. Newspaper firms have also promoted 
synergy to maximise profits, but not necessarily economic efficiency. They viewed that 
being in broadcasting could provide a more stable long-term profit. 65 This consideration 
will become important when we consider justifications given for relaxing cross- 
ownership legislation under the Blair government. We shall consider whether such 
policies are have been aimed at profit maximisation rather than plurality, economic 
efficiency rather than expanding democratic discourse. 
ADVERTISING AND LABOUR REPRESENTATION 
Another important feature of the newspaper market for considering political democracy 
and Labour representation is the effect of advertising. Newspaper finances are atypical 
within business. Like other media, newspapers operate in two markets simultaneously. 
The `dual product' market is for both content and readers. Readers consume the 
newspapers in one market. The readers are sold to advertisers in another. Advertising is 
the main source of revenue for many newspapers. 66 
This leads to an important division in the national newspaper market. The wealthier have 
greater demand for newspapers. But there is also a far greater pressure for supply, as 
there is competition among publishers to provide high-income readers to advertisers. In 
1998, the top 21% by income had more titles aimed at them than the bottom 50%. 67 
The broadsheet titles aimed at the wealthier gain a much larger percentage of their 
income from advertising, especially luxury goods and classifieds. The mass circulation 
64 The Sun could be used to promote BSkyB, for instance. A company could use this to increase cross- 
sectoral dominance. 
65 Doyle, Media Ownership: 68-72. See also Hesmondhalgh, David. 2002. The cultural industries : an 
introduction. London: Sage Publications.: 141. 
66 Doyle, Understanding 12, Sparks, The Press: 51. 
67 Doyle, -Undersiänding: 121. 
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press raise a great deal of their revenue from their cover price. 68 According to advertising 
industry figures, in 1999, of the £1.04 average revenue from each ̀quality' UK daily sold, 
74p came from advertising. Only 16p of the average 37p revenue from the ̀ populars' was 
derived from that source. 69 The cost per reader of the Daily Telegraph has been 
calculated at more than four times that of a popular title like the Mirror. 
70 
This effect of the advertising market has been termed bifurcation. 7' This means that for 
broadsheets, it is possible to be competitive on a much lower circulation than that for the 
`populars'. Thus, News Corporation closed Today as a loss-maker, with a circulation 
larger than three of the surviving `quality' titles. The pressure of the advertising market 
means that for the tabloids, there is a pressure for huge sales. 72 There has been an attempt 
to sustain a mid-market sector among the nationals, making for a tripartite market. 
However, as Sparks indicates, the trends of the three sectors have been towards 
bifurcation. 73 
This has a significant implication for democracy. Lower income readers do not simply 
have to pay a larger percentage of their income to obtain their newspaper of choice. They 
are completely excluded from having the same range of press aimed at them as their 
richer counterparts. It has been claimed that the newspaper market, without an industry 
regulator, has been more effective than television at providing output aimed at diverse 
interest groups. 74 However, as Sparks notes, it is only in the elite newspaper market that 
there is any degree of ownership diversity. In the rest of the market, which is much 
larger, there is not the same plurality. 75 
68 lbid.: 121-2. 
69 Advertising Association 2000,13 cited in Doyle, Understanding: 122. 
70 Sparks, The Press: 52. 
71 Sparks, Concentration: 192. 
72 Sparks, The Press: 53. See also Tunstall, Newspaper power: 12-14. 
73 Sparks, Concentration: 192-7. 
74 Doyle, Understanding: 121, citing Hughes, Gordon, David Vines, and Institute David Hume. 1989. 
Deregulation and the future of commercial television. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989.: 44. 
"Sparks, Concentration: 195-7. 
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If democracy is dependent on receiving a range of information from different sources, 
then this means there is an inequality based on income. It pays to have quality journalism 
for the business community - hence the historically high quality journalism in the 
Financial Times, for instance. There is an important space in the broadsheets for 
information, debate and discussion on politics and economics. There are not the same 
pressures in the tabloid sector. In the populars, there is less space for such debate because 
of the compulsion to deliver a huge readership. The market demand is to fill the paper 
with accessible popular topics, such as sport, over informed discussion on current 
affairs. 76 This bias against low-income readers also affects the United States press, for 
instance. 7 But the UK press is unusual, in that bifurcation is so focused on the national 
dailies. 78 
Equally importantly, in each segment there are smaller circulation titles, which lose out in 
the economies of scale. They have to produce a similar paper but because of both sales 
and advertising, the market leaders will raise significantly more revenue. This puts the 
number two titles and so on, at a significant disadvantage, which has been exacerbated by 
the effect of advertising. The market leaders can typically charge more for advertising, 
such as the Daily Telegraph did in the early 1990s. 79 This operates as a barrier to entry 
for potential new competitors in markets. 80 But it also provides for a negative ̀ circulation 
spiral', where advertisers are attracted to the more successful newspapers, in a mutually 
reinforcing spiral of success. 
Thus, the question of advertising is key. This, as we shall see, heavily influenced Labour 
Party discussions on diversity and representation. For many, this was a bias against 
76 For a discussion of this, see Sparks, The Press: 53-4. See also McChesney, Robert W. 1997. Corporate 
media and the threat to democracy. New York: Seven Stories Press.: 24. An example possibly contrary to 
this is that of the Mirror in the period leading up to and during the Iraq war. However, the attempt to buck 
the market trend saw readership levels fall, albeit with rivals facing similar problems. It is also the case the 
Mirror kept up a large quota of celebrity news and sport, along with the more serious coverage. (Peter 
Cole, `Have the 20p tabloids shot themselves in the foot? ', 19 May 2002, Ciar Byrne, ̀ Mirror sales hit all- 
time low', Guardian, September 6 2002). 
77 Bagdikian, The media monopoly: esp. Chapter 6. 
78 Tunstall, Newspaper power: 8-9. 
79 Ibid.: 14-17. 
80 Sparks, Concentration: 190-1. 
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Labour representation. This could mean the Labour Party or the Labour movement; that 
is Labour and the trade unions. Importantly, in the earlier period of the time we are 
considering, these were seen as synonymous in this context. The most notable victim of 
this was the last title with direct connections with the Labour movement, the Daily 
Herald. Some in the Labour Party has been concerned about this from the end of the 
Second World War onwards, at least. 81 
We have seen that democracy requires press diversity and representation. Narrow 
newspaper ownership hampers diversity. Democracy also requires a platform for 
different ideas. Representation requires that a major party, such as the Labour Party, has 
its view articulated in the press. The work will indicate that Labour representation has 
been possible without the problem of ownership being tackled. The two are separate. (In 
addition, how advertising skews the market does not automatically bias it against the 
Labour Party, but is a problem for low-income readers). 
As we shall see, although it appeared to those concerned that the demand for 
representation was synonymous with ownership diversity, later events showed they were 
not. This was not at all apparent to those involved. A range of party actors placed 
differing emphases on representation as opposed to diversity. Nonetheless, it can be 
argued that one division in the Labour Party policy in the period from 1970s could be 
defined by the underlying tension between these two demands. This was also entangled 
with another concern. 
g' It may be true that the Herald's fall in readership was significant, as Negrine suggests. But this does not 
deny that, as Negrine himself writes, that it had the `wrong' sort of readership. (Negrine Ralph, M. 1994. 
Politics and the mass media in Britain. London: Routledge.: 69-70). See James Curran, `Advertising and 
the Press', in Curran, The British Press: 250-53, Williams, G. and Campaign for Press and Broadcasting 
Freedom. 1996. Britain's media : how they are related: media ownership & democracy. London: 
Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom.: 66, Curran, J. and Seaton, J. 1997. Power without 
responsibility: the press and broadcasting in Britain. London ; New York: Routledge.: 299-300, Allaun, F. 
1988. Spreading the news :a guide to media reform. Nottingham: Spokesman.: 20-8, Robertson G., `Law 
for the press' in Curran, The British Press: 223, Seaton, J., `Government policy and the mass media', in 
Curran, The British Press: 304, Baistow, Fourth-rate estate: 60, Snoddy, R. 1992. The good, the bad and 
the unacceptable : press standards in the 1990s. London: Faber.: 88-91, Hayward, R., `Foreword' in 
Basnett, D., Goodman, G., Great Britain Royal Commission on the Press and Labour Party 1977. Royal 
Commission on the Press : minority report.: 1, Panitch, L. and Leys, C. 1997. The end of parliamentary 
socialism : from new left to New Labour. London ; New York: Verso.: 170-1, quoting Cripps, F. `The 
British Crisis - Can the Left Win?, New Left Review 128, July-August 1981: 96-7, Williams, Get me a 
murder a day: 215-8. 
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THE PRESS AND POLITICAL DEMOCRACY -A SECOND PROBLEM 
We have seen that political democracy has a problem. The British national press has 
failed in the requirement that it has diverse ownership. However, as an influential 
UNESCO report concluded, democratisation also requires participation in decisions over 
the mass circulation press by both those working in the media and newspaper readers. 
82 
As one noted democratic theorist has argued, democracy is to do with political equality - 
equality over decision-making, of which access to the media is a part. And, in order to 
guarantee that access for equality, it necessitates control by citizens. 83 There needs to be 
democratisation of the media, as well as democratisation through the media. 84 This is not 
such a strange idea. It follows on from the notion of representation, which will be so 
important in this work. 
How can representation of different interests and political positions be achieved? Merely 
calling for press political and cultural representation is to take a narrow view of 
representation. It ignores which individual or organisation is providing this 
representation. Such a call is for representation without democratic control over that 
representation. It is to demand representative democracy without the democracy. As the 
UNESCO report made clear, citizen groups need both access to and participation in 
media systems -a right to communicate by citizens - dialogue rather than top-down 
monologue. S 86 5 As Hagen notes, communication implies a two-way process. The logic of 
calling for representation without democratic control is that there is no problem for 
82 Lively: 35. 
82 As the UNESCO report suggested, there needs to be public involvement in the media management. 
(MacBride, Sean, and Problems International Commission for the Study of Communication. 1980. Many 
voices one world. - communication and society today and tomorrow: towards a new more just and more 
efficient world information and communication order: report by the International Commission for the 
Study of Communication Problems. London: Kogan Page.: 174,267). It has also been argued that this 
demand for democratic communication was key to the `New World Communication and Information 
Order, which UNESCO advocated. (Hagen: 22). 
s' Lively: 35. 
s" Hagen: 23,25-6. 
85 MacBride: 172-4. It is instructive that the one signatory to the report who sought to underplay this notion 
was the Soviet Union's representative. Such an oppressive regime would hardly wish to emphasise the right 
to communicate. (Ibid.: 172,279). 
ägen: 21. 
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representation, as opposed to diversity, with there being one owner of the whole British 
national press, say the News Corporation, just as long as a representative number of 
newspapers articulate the views of the different major parties, for instance. Of course, 
that conglomerate moved from supporting the Conservatives to more recently over- 
representing the major party of the left; the Labour Party in the period being considered. 
This is a key theme of this work. The problem remains, nevertheless. Political democracy 
requires democratisation of the press. 
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MODELS FOR OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
Now that we have considered some requirements of political democracy, it is possible to 
examine how Labour policies fared in providing for a press required to enhance this - to 
deal with these problems of ownership, diversity, representation and democratic control. 
To do this, it is important to map the media models that have been put forward, so we can 
compare Labour's policies with them. Such a survey will also help indicate what models 
have influenced Labour Party thinking in the period being considered. A useful review of 
the models on offer for providing a diverse press has been made elsewhere, so we shall 
not consider this question in such depth. 87 This work will concentrate on mapping the 
models specifically to provide democratic ownership and control of the press to associate 
with these diverse media. 88 
A Classical Liberal Pluralist Model 
There is the liberal pluralist model. Liberal pluralists regard the market as playing a 
pluralist role. It enables anyone to publish any opinion they want. Independence from 
state control means that the press can operate as an effective watchdog. Classical liberal 
pluralists view that there is no democratic deficit as citizens already control newspapers - 
through the market. State attempts to interfere more than minimally with this process are 
explicitly undemocratic. However, it is consistent with such a position to call for some 
minimal anti-monopoly constraints. Liberal pluralists adapt the traditional `fourth estate' 
argument, by suggesting that, through the market, the press reflects the views of those 
who buy it and therefore can act as a legitimate public mouthpiece. 89 
However, there are problem with these arguments. The British press market, as we have 
seen, is not diverse - ownership is concentrated. There are significant financial 
87 See Curran, James. 1995. Policy for the press. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.. 88 Recent notable attempts to provide a democratic model for the media as whole have been by John Street 
and James Curran. (Street: Chapter 12, Curran, J. `Mass Media and Democracy Revisted' in Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. 1996. Mass media and society. London: Arnold.: 81-119, Curran, J. `Rethinking Media and Democracy' in Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. 2000. Mass media and society. London: Arnold.: 120-154). -89 Curran, Democracy Rev-1st-id83-98, Cütran, Rethinking: 29. 
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restrictions to market entry90 Also, proximity to business can act as a deterrent to 
investigating corporations 91 The `bottom line' mentality works against investigative 
reporting which is costly and unattractive to advertisers 92 
As for the market as a democratic device, this assumes that the exclusive elite of press 
owners and controllers automatically subordinates its own views to provide an 
information service demanded by the consumers, in order to sell its product. However, as 
we have already seen, editors have chronicled how proprietors have taken an active role 
in influencing their titles. For instance, the assumption that press consumers dictate 
content ignores the fact that companies have wider business interests, which would be 
served by cross-promotion, for example. Also, corporations can use their newspapers to 
lobby for legislation readers have not demanded. James Curran and Jean Seaton outline 
how Rupert Murdoch has taken a hands-on approach to guiding the policies of his 
newspapers, on occasion in opposition to the views of a majority of the papers' readers. 
Murdoch is understood to have occasionally hand picked his editors for their views and 
bombarded inherited or caretaker editors with advice. 93 
In addition, as we shall refer to later in this work, the market itself is a relatively blunt 
instrument for expressing individual wants and desires. Choices are limited to those pre- 
existing. Supply creates its own demand as much as the other way round. One relatively 
recent survey of the American media considered that markets do not give people what 
they want but more "... what they want within the range of what is most profitable to 
produce and/or in the political interests of the producers". 94 As Curran and Street 
95 indicate, readers do not have the ability, via the market, to influence media content. One 
90 Curran, Rethinking: 93-4. See also Golding, P. and Murdock, G. `Culture, Communications, and 
Political Economy', in Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. 1996. Mass media and society. London: Arnold. 
91 Bagdikian, The media monopoly. 
92 Curran, Rethinking Media: 123-4, also cited in Street: 262. 
93 Curran and Seaton quote a series of recollections of former Murdoch paper editors backing up this claim. 
However, it not always clear as to the sources of these. (Curran and Seaton: 72-5,86-8). Neil, in his 
recollections, says this move was personally enacted upon by Murdoch, who "... was impatient to create a 
Sunday Times in his own image". (Neil: 27-34). 
94 McChesney, R. W. Robert W. 1997. Corporate media and the threat to democracy. New York: Seven 
Stories Press.: 45-6. 
95 Curran; Rethinking Media: 262. 
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cannot denote one's preferences for particular parts of the `bundle' that make up 
newspapers. It is the market's flaws as a democratic tool that requires marketing devices 
to be used to discern consumers' unsatiated desires, as we shall see in Chapter 6. 
Moreover, importantly, the free market's view of `one dollar, one vote' provides for 
plutocracy, not democracy. People neither voted for Rupert Murdoch nor Conrad Black. 96 
This problem of inequity is particularly the case in the press market. As earlier indicated, 
it is heavily shaped and structured by advertisers, stripping lower income readers of the 
possibility of exercising their own preferences, even if they are prepared to spend the 
same cash as their richer counterparts. 
Nevertheless, any attempt to influence press ownership legislation faces the historically 
prevalent liberal pluralist notion in Britain that freedom of the press means ownership 
freedom from any government control 97 Yet, as Curran identifies, the key contradiction 
at British media regulation's heart is that it has been assumed that the press should be 
organised as a free market and broadcasting is to be publicly regulated. This led to the 
contradictory situation where policies regarded as harmful for the press were propagated 
as worthwhile for broadcasting. 98 
96 McChesney, Corporate media : 45, Frank, Thomas. 2002. One market under God : extreme capitalism, 
market populism and the end of economic democracy. London: Vintage: 86-7,97,93,366-9. 97 See, for instance, Harrison, Stanley. 1974. Poor men's guardians :a record of the struggles for a democratic newspaper press, 1763-1973. London: Lawrence and Wishart.: chapter 10, esp. 218,232. 98 Curran, Policyfor- the press: 1. 
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The Public Service Model 
To extend this latter theme, the public service model also attempts to answer the liberal 
pluralists' contradictions by applying the broadcast model to newspaper ownership and 
separating the press and media from business and advertiser domination. Although, as we 
shall see, it provides a potential for diversity, it does not guarantee it. The radical models 
for the press flowing from it were associated with a left social democratic ideal within the 
Labour Party. 99 These concentrated as much on providing balance and increasing 
representation, as developing diversity. 
The public service model regards communication as operating as a decommodified 
`public good', based on universal access and democratic equality. '00 Communication is 
not regarded like any other economic good in a market system. Instead, reflecting 
Habermas's idealised public sphere, the notion "... is not that of maximising customers in 
a market but of serving citizens in a democracy... ", providing a realm for democratic 
discussion. 101 
Here democratic control is primarily exercised by the state on the behalf of the people, 
who elected its representatives. In this sense, it shares elitist conceptions with the liberal 
pluralist model. Its advocates suggest that the public service model requires media to be 
separate from the state. 102 However, this independence is by no means automatic. The 
emphasis is on state regulation as the form of control. 103 
99 Curran, James, ̀ The different approaches to media reform' in Curran, J., Campaign for Press and 
Broadcasting Freedom. 1986. Bending reality: the state of the media. London: Pluto in association with the 
Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom.: 99, Curran and Seaton: 338. 100 Scannell, P., Schlesinger, P. and Sparks, C. 1992. Culture and power :a media, culture & society 
reader. London: Sage Publications.: 139-141, Scannell, P. `Public Service Broadcasting: The History of a 
Concept' in Goodwin, A. and Whannel, G. 1990. Understanding television. London: Routledge.: 25-6, 
Tracey, M. 1998. The decline and fall of public service broadcasting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.: 26. 101 Tracey: 11-13,26, Scannell, Public Service Broadcasting: 11-29. 
102 Tracey: 30-1. 
1°3 Scannell, Public Service Broadcasting: 14-18. 
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A difficulty with this is, again, state control. ' 04 Those in the Labour Party who advocated 
a radicalised adaptation of this model for the press supported extensive state 
involvement. 105 In less radical versions, it still faces the danger of state censorship and 
dominance over appointments and funding. State regulation can be used for party 
political advantage. It runs the danger of paternalistic elitism. '06 Particularly, like the 
liberal pluralist model, it can exclude democratic accountability by press workers and 
newspaper readers. 
Marxist Models 
This latter point has been a concern for a series of Marxist blueprints for democratic 
ownership and control of the press and media. Marxists, in tandem with other thinkers, 
have tended to emphasise that the British press, is not characterised by diversity and is 
controlled by a small, unelected sector of society. 
Revolutionary Marxists believe that creating democratic media requires a societal shift. 107 
They have strained to break free from the association with the Soviet Union, with its 
party and state domination of the media. 108 Some that have, have advocated an initially 
more promising model based on democratically-elected workers' councils. Such a notion 
is in the heritage of the powerful criticisms Jean-Jacques Rousseau made of 
parliamentary representative democracy, which limits the involvement of citizens to an 
infrequent vote. The Marxists see this as insufficient to ensure that the majority have 
influence over all the decisions that affect their lives. 109 These elected councils would 
make society's decisions and those regarding the press in the same way. The 
104 Keane: 94-114,116, Curran, Rethinking: 48. See also Williams, R. 1966. Communications: Chatto & 
Windus. 
105 RD 2222, Michael Meacher, ̀Reform of the Press', March 1982, NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of 
the 6th meeting', 19 January 1981. 
106 Keane: 119-124, Curran, Rethinking: 48. 
107 Sparks, C. 1985. ̀ The Working Class Press: Radical and Revolutionary Alternatives'. Media, Culture 
and Society 7: 133-46., Curran, Rethinking. 36. 
'os Curran, Rethinking: 36. 
109 Held, D. 1987. Models of democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell 
Publishers.: 130, Lenin Vladimir, Li. 1965. The state and revolution : the Marxist theory of the state and 
--the frisks öf the prole1ärTaf in the revolütiön. Möscöw: Isrögress PübIishe- s:: 4 5=6. 
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revolutionary Marxists have also advocated a national public printing corporation, where 
there would be access for citizens to print their own papers, enabling diversity and 
participation. ' 10 
However, radical liberals and others view the operation of council-based direct 
democracy as hostile to diversity. It is based on a notion that there would be an end of 
interest differences and all disputes would be resolved. "' Thus, there would be no need 
for mechanisms to protect and mediate a plural press. As Street suggests, there is a 
pressure under such a system to create press and media that aims to create collectivity by 
guarding against dissent. 112 
Clearly, this is utopian and potentially harmful. Differences would still persist. 113 The 
`end of politics' notion is unrealistic and deterministic. "4 The danger is that, despite the 
best of intentions, the state could dominate, as happened in the East European states. 
Propaganda could overpower discourse. "5 
There are those in the Marxist tradition who have rethought this notion to answer this 
classic `end of politics' problematic. 116 Nevertheless, the whole conception assumes a 
very'different society from that which Labour is operating in. Any democratising solution 
would need to consider very carefully replacing representative institutions, rather than 
supplementing them, by participative devices. 
110 V. Lenin, First Congress of the Communist International in Lenin about the Press, cited in A. Mattelart 
`For a Class and Group Analysis of Popular Communication Practices' in Mattelart, A. and Siegelaub, S. 
1983. Communication and class struggle. New York: International General.: 39-40, T. Ali, `Culture, the 
media and workers' democracy' in Gardner, C. 1979. Media, politics and culture :a socialist view. 
London: Macmillan.: 158. 
1" Pierson, C. 1986. Marxist theory and democratic politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.: 27-9,188-9, 
Devine, P. J. 1988. Democracy and economic planning : the political economy of a self-governing society. 
Oxford ; Cambridge: Polity in association with Basil Blackwell.: 146-7. 
112 Street: 267. 
113 Devine: 147. 
114 Pierson: 188-9, Devine: 147. 
115 Street: 267. 
116-Devine. 
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Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to reject this approach entirely. Participatory 
democratic theorists argue representation is not sufficient for democracy. Citizens need to 
be involved in other spheres including the press and media, as we saw earlier. 
Participative democracy's strength, as one advocate indicates, when considering both 
political and media democracy is that "... it relies on the ability of citizens to make 
informed decisions rather than choose between elites to make decisions for them". "7 
A further model of democratic ownership and control of the media comes from a neo- 
Marxist New Left source more open to reforming and transforming institutions under 
capitalism. Raymond Williams' proposals would be for the state to fund independent 
self-managed institutions providing newspapers run by "... the only people capable of 
guaranteeing ... [press] ... 
freedom: the working journalists themselves". 118 
A problem with this system is the idea that democracy equals pure producer democracy - 
that journalists should have sole ownership and control over production. While Tom 
Baistow's solution to put editors into the dominant position, would be more autocratic, 
Curran and Seaton and the Marxists consider sole journalist control as elitist and 
implicitly undemocratic! 19 Such a system would at least require further checks and 
balances. 120 There would need to be a role for civil groups and parties, as well as readers 
- those that democracy requires be represented in newspapers. 
121 
117 Hagen: 18,25. 
118 There would be the same arms-length relationship to the state as happens with research awards in higher 
education, with a communicator-controlled administration handing out grants to media producers. 
(Williams, Communications: 170). 
19 Baistow, Fourth-rate estate, Curran and Seaton: 347, G. Sheridan and C. Gardner, "Press Freedom': A 
Socialist Strategy', in Gardner, C. 1979. Media, politics and culture :a socialist view. London: Macmillan.: 
124-5. 
120 Curran and Seaton: 346-7. 
121 For a broader argument concerning economism and industrial democracy see Bobbio, Norberto, and 
Richard Bellamy. 1987. Which socialism? : Marxism, socialism and democracy. Cambridge: Polity.: esp. 
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Radical Alternatives 
When considering political democracy, some authors, many from the New Left, have 
appeared to transcend the divide between critical Marxism and radical pluralism. 122 One 
example of this evolution comes from the work of the important liberal pluralist writer 
Robert Dahl. 123 An important New Left thinker who has advocated participatory 
democracy is Carole Pateman, who argues that it is precisely through involvement that 
citizens `learn' democracy. 124 A similar evolution has also happened for those 
considering political democracy and the press and media. Habermas, for example, comes 
from a critical eclectic Marxist perspective, but is influenced by classical liberal 
conceptions of the media. 125 
It might be thought that Habermas, and his notion of a public sphere, would provide a 
useful model for diversity and democratic control. As we have indicated, he considers 
that for political democracy the public sphere needs to be separate from the state and the 
market. However, he is less concerned with the democratic ownership and control of the 
media. He later answered his critics who saw his original account as painting a picture of 
an inaccurate golden age contrasted with an incorrectly analysed distopian present. 126 
However, frustratingly, he did not conceive of how the media should be organised in this 
revised account. 127 
Instead, in order to avoid the problems of traditional direct democracy, Street identifies 
with a revised version. He looks to `associative democracy', advocated by radical 
122 Held, Models: 210-212, Chap. 9, Pierson: 189, Curran and Seaton: 345-7. 
123 His later work sees capitalist ownership and control, including over information, as providing an 
important source of political inequality. He advocates self-government within enterprises as part of a 
system that combines representative democracy with some direct participative strands. (Dahl Robert, A. 
1985. A preface to economic democracy. Cambridge: University of California Press.: 54-5,74-5,111,112- 
6). See also Held, Models: 200-1, O'Leary, B. and Dunleavy, P. 1987. Theories of the state : the politics of 
liberal democracy. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education.: Chap. 6, Devine: 149-50. 
124 Pateman, Carole. 1970. Participation and democratic theory: Cambridge.: 29, Hagen: 22. 125 Curran, Rethinking Media: 135. 
126 Habermas, J. `Further reflections in the public sphere' in Calhoun Craig, J. 1992. Habermas and the 
public sphere. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: M. I. T. Press.: 432-445, Curran, Rethinking 39-46, Curran, 
Rethinking Media: 135-6, Pusey, Habermas: 90,111. 
-427 Clurrän; Retlking: -136. 
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democrat writers, such as Paul Hirst. Here power is devolved to autonomous associations. 
For Hirst, democracy is defined in terms of communication - this enables associations to 
coordinate and identify their demands. The state's role is to facilitate this. This would 
provide a more pluralist basis than direct democracy, as Street indicates. Different 
positions could be expressed as a way of resolving conflicting demands through 
dialogue. 128 A question mark, however, would remain concerning the role of the party, as 
with direct democracy. 129 
Also, a difficulty with Hirst's definition of associative democracy is that he emphasises 
the role of consumer and civil groups as agents of this new democratising impetus in both 
the private and public sectors. He puts little stress on the role of employees or unions. 
The version of associative democracy advocated by Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers 
envisages a reinvigorated union movement as an important `secondary association', 
which would represent workers on works councils, for instance, and would have some 
participatory involvement in the companies they worked in. Nevertheless, they envisage 
this within a framework where some of the state's functions would be devolved to these 
secondary associations and participation would involve the union enforcing state 
regulation and regulating its workers, traditionally associated with corporatism. 
130 They 
also see the need for more broadly defined arenas than those indicated by workplace 
democracy. 131 Street associates this notion of associative democracy with two further 
models of democratic ownership and control, which this work has also considered. 
128 Street: 267-8, citing Hirst Paul, Q. 1994. Associative democracy : new forms of economic and social 
governance. Polity Press. 1994.: Polity Press. 
29 This is a point Peter Mair considers (Mair, Peter. 2000. "Partyless Democracy. " New Left Review, 
March April 2000,21-35). 
130 Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, ̀ Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance' in Cohen, 
Joshua, Joel Rogers, Olin Wright Erik, A. E. Havens Center for the Study of Social Structure, Change 
Social, and Project Real Utopias (Eds. ). 1995. Associations and democracy. London ; New York: Verso.: 7- 
98. Cohen and Rogers later distanced themselves from a traditional corporatist framework. (Joshua Cohen 
and Joel Rogers, `Associations and Democracy', in Cohen and Rogers: 236-267. However, various 
commentaries on their work, both positive and negative, see this corporatist connection. (See, for instance, 
Jane Mansbridge, `A Deliberative Perspective in Neocorporatism' in Cohen and Rogers: 133-147 and 
Andrew Levine, ̀ Democratic Corporatism and/versus Socialism' in Cohen and Rogers: 157-166). 
-1311 oshuaCohen and7oeIRogers, 'Associations andl) -emocräcy , ih öhen and löers, 236267: 252. 
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In the first, the radical pluralist John Keane sees the present capitalist media system as 
dominated by the market, bringing oligopolisation, which has excluded minority media 
representation. He suggests that to counter this concentration, his `modified public 
service model' would enable a diversity of non-market institutions independent of the 
state, but state-enabled. These would include, as with the Marxist conceptions, publicly 
owned printing facilities. 
Ownership and control of such entities would be mixed. Keane regards the application of 
direct democracy in the media as limited. He outlines instances where one person's 
freedom of expression could curb another, indicating that freedom and equality of 
communication cannot be definitively realised. 132 (Nevertheless, there would be public 
accountability and toughened regulation of ownership structure, rather than direct 
nationalised state control). 133 
Despite his anti-statist rhetoric, it should be noted that what Keane describes as a 
"... carefully spun spider's web... " of intervention and regulation, along with extensive 
public subsidies and market suspension, would require state intervention. 134 Also, such a 
model, based on a radically transformed "... post-capitalist civil society... " and not 
dominated by commodity production and exchange, but publicly funded and self- 
organising, appears utopian without societal change. 135 Nevertheless, where Keane's 
model is particularly useful is in emphasising the need for a combination of regulation 
and other forms of control and ownership, under a significantly decommodified system. 
A direct attempt to address the problem of providing the diversity which liberal pluralists 
desire, but which the market on its own has shown to be incapable of providing, comes 
with the social market model or radical market model. 136 Other examples of this form of 
interventionism have been successfully applied in other European countries, as we shall 
see in the appendix to Chapter 3. For the press, intervention has taken the form of 
132 Keane: xiii, 124,155. "' Ibid: 68-91,152-4,158. See also Curran and Seaton: 346-7. 
134 Keane: 154, Curran and Seaton: 347. 
135 Keane: 152. 
136 Curran, Policy: 13.14. Curran, Different approaches: 91. 
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attempts to redistribute advertising revenue and subsidy to provide for new start-ups to 
diversify the newspaper market. This model can be more clearly considered as providing 
diversity for democracy, rather than democratic control. 
Nevertheless, Curran has more recently developed a social market model, which borrows 
from the European initiatives, with a plethora of different forms of control and 
ownership. In doing so, it provides one answer to the problem identified of journalist 
domination over broader citizen control. A sector where there could be journalistic 
control would be just one component of the system. It would have a public service core, a 
`civic media section' for parties, interest groups and social movements to be supported. 
In addition, there would be a private enterprise sector where the editorial independence of 
journalists could be protected. It would also contain a social market sector of minority 
media, which could include organisations with consumer or community representation. 
Also included would be self-managed enterprises, which would include some journalist 
control, and a `professional media sector', where there could be staff control. Thus, there 
would be a combination of areas with journalist control and others with community 
representation. 137 
Again, Curran envisages this system for broadcasting and publishing and it would need to 
be adapted. ̀Independence from the state' needs to be more clearly defined. Such a model 
would be idealistic in the context of a capitalist democracy. 138 It requires some clarity 
about the economic and political structure that would be associated with it. However, 
such a notion has the merit of going beyond merely journalistic democracy and purely 
party representation to consider broader community representation. While such a model 
may again appear utopian, it mainly borrows from existing European media systems; 
therefore indicating that it is at least possible. 
Thus, this survey indicates that no definition of a press required for political democracy is 
entirely free from problems. However, some strands of the alternative systems can be 
highlighted which fuse aspects from the social democratic, Marxist and radical 
"' Curran, Rethinking Media: 120-154, Street: 268-270. 
38Street: 270: 
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democratic traditions. A democratic model of ownership and control would need to 
represent a diverse range of opinions, including those of minorities and temporary 
majorities. Such a model would need to avoid market domination and censorship as well 
as paternalistic, bureaucratic and authoritarian state control. This would require some 
form of democratic control of, and participation in, the running of the media industries 
both by the workers in those enterprises and by the wider community. 
So, this chapter has explored some problems for political democracy with the British 
press. It has also considered some of the media models outlined to deal with such 
problems. To see how this work will compare Labour's policies with these media models, 
it is worth indicating what are the methods and reasoning underlying this thesis. That will 
be the subject of the next chapter. 
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3. Methods: How this work will consider Labour's press policy 
and why 
Why the press? 
The first question to consider is regarding the legitimacy of studying the British national 
newspaper market at all. In a multimedia world, why should policy on the national press 
and its ownership still be regarded as an important area of study? After all, it is assumed 
that most British people now receive information about the news and politics 
predominantly from the broadcast media, rather than the newspapers. 
As we shall see, the press has had a particular importance in the period we are 
considering. Unlike other mass media, there was not the same pressure for `balance' in its 
output. Thus, it has had the scope to be more obviously politically weighted in its 
coverage. It was precisely for this reason that it attracted the attention of the Labour 
movement as a whole, which perceived the press as predominantly partial in its reporting, 
at least for the earlier period we are studying. 
A related reason is the British national newspapers' relationship to the broadcast media. 
The study of media influence on voters is contentious and inconclusive. It has its own 
methodological problems. 139 Nevertheless, some writers have tentatively suggested that 
television could have some long-term influence on voter behaviour. 140 Equally, studies of 
the 1980s and early 1990s, for instance, have pointed to the influence on news values that 
19 Many studies have concentrated on elections. But this may be too short a time to register influence, may 
ignore media campaigns outside elections and ignore longer-term socio-political influences on voters. It is 
also difficult to separate media effects from other influences, and it may be that different social and 
demographically-differentiated groups interpret information in different ways. (Franklin, Bob. 1994. 
Packaging politics : political communications in Britain's media democracy. London: Edward Arnold.: 
216-7, Harrop, M., `Voters' in Seaton, Jean, and Ben Pimlott. 1987. The media in British politics. 
Aldershot ; Aldershot: Avebury : Dartmouth.: 46, Heath, A. F., Roger Jowell, and John Curtice. 1985. How 
Britain votes. Oxford: Pergamon. ). 
140 Miller William, L. 1991. Media and voters : the audience, content, and influence ofpress and television 
at the 1987 general election. Oxford ; Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press : Oxford University Press.: 
165, Miller William, L. 1990. How voters change : the 1987 British election campaign in perspective. 
Oxford: Cfare ndon Press.: -23x=2-, Fran klin, Tarkdging pö7itics: 219-20. 
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the Conservative press had on broadcasters. It was perceived that there were areas where 
the press focused and the broadcasters followed. '4' In defining the news agenda for 
broadcasters, the press still played a significant part. 
What is more, those in the Labour Party interested in the media conceived this to be case, 
as we shall see. In the earlier period we are considering, when the focus was more on 
ownership, national newspapers were considered important. Later, as Kinnock's 
leadership concentrated more on press and media management, Labour strategists 
focussed on contacts in the broadsheet press, whose output, it was believed, affected the 
political agenda of what was perceived to be the more influential broadcast media. More 
latterly, there has been an emphasis on managing the tabloid press, following Kinnock's 
experience in the 1992 election. Thus, some studies have indicated the continuing 
significance of the press on British political communications and, more importantly, so 
has the Labour Party. In all this time, when considering the national press, the Labour 
Party focussed its attention on the mass circulation broadsheet and tabloid daily and 
Sunday newspapers covering all of Britain. So shall this work. 
Party policy and power 
There are two pressures weighing on this type of historical research. One is that too great 
an awareness of epistemological issues can deter creative investigation. 142 The other is 
that a writer can stay mired in empiricism. A methodological problem to be confronted is 
that of demarcating the study area and its analytic boundaries. There are a number of 
ways to consider Labour Party policy on press ownership. Some work on media 
ownership and regulation policy makes changes in national and international regulatory 
law its broader canvas. 143 Other work has considered it in the context of British 
141 Negrine: 178, MacArthur, B. `The national press' in Crewe, Ivor, and Martin Harrop. 1989. Political 
communications : the general election campaign of 1987. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.: 97, 
McKie, D. "Fact is free but comment is sacred'; Or was it The Sun wot won it? ' in Crewe and Harrop: 124. 
142 Minkin, Lewis. 1997. Exits and entrances : political research as a creative art. Sheffield: Sheffield 
Hallam University Press.: 196,208. 
143 For example, Humphreys, Western Europe and Sanchez-Tabemero, Alfonso, and Alison Denton. 1993. 
Media concentration in Europe : commercial enterprise and the public interest. [Manchester]: European 
Institute for the Media. 
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government media and newspaper policy, more generally. '44 Also, it has been situated 
within social democratic policy internationally, to some extent. 145 This work's emphasis 
is different in that it is mainly written from the perspective of modern Labour Party 
history. It considers press ownership policy within the context of power relations in the 
Labour Party and the changes in party policy more generally. Its context is modern 
political history rather than just media history. 
Within this, one needs to specify Labour Party policy. Following Lewis Minkin, this 
work regards the Labour Party's conference as pivotal. 146 It will define party policy as 
that decided by the conference. When one set of actors - usually the leadership - 
designates that the party's policy is different to this, the thesis will make this clear. 
Another related problem is the relationship between decisions made by the Labour Party 
and those of the Labour government. The work shall deal with this in some detail, when 
considering the Blair government in Chapter 7. 
As Appendix 1 to Chapter 1 notes, there are a series of classic texts on power relations in 
the Labour Party. As we indicated, this work is partly a theory-testing dissertation. Such 
dissertations may involve large-n analysis. However, they can also take the form of a case 
study, as with this work. 147 The work uses empirical evidence in one area of Labour Party 
policy to evaluate the pluralist, Marxist and elitist theories outlined in the 'classics'. 148 In 
doing so, it seeks to consider changes in power relations with regard to those theories. It 
assesses how these theories apply to the development of press policy. 
The author of one of those theories, Minkin, considers that a key aim in his research is 
not just to analyse power distribution, but also to assess what have been the variations in 
144 For instance, Negrine and Curran and Seaton 
145 For example, Curran, James. 2000. "Press Reformism 1918-98: A Study in Failure. " in Media power, 
professionals and policies, edited by Howard Tumber. London ; New York: Routledge. and, to a lesser 
extent, Allaun, Spreading the news. 
146 Minkin, Labour Party: xiv. 
147 Van Evera: 29,90. 
148 The criticism of case studies - that they cannot be generalised - might be applied to this work. (Van 
Evera: 53). However, Yin argues that case studies can be generalised into theory. (Yin Robert, K. 1994. 
Case study research : design and methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1989.: 3 6-7). More importantly, that 
--is-not the tasic ofthis work- 
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distribution over time and why they have happened. 149 This work has the same goal. It 
also considers how the different press ownership policy responses relate to the aim of 
newspaper diversity and the various models of democratic ownership. Case studies can 
be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory! 50 This research uses empirical evidence to test 
the classic theories and, in this sense, it is descriptive. But, in trying to identify why there 
have been power shifts, it also aims to be explanatory. 15' 
One classic definition of power is that of Bertrand Russell - "... the production of 
intended effects". 152 This work follows Minkin's adaptation of this notion of power when 
considering Labour conferences as "... the ability to affect policy". 153 However, research 
involving the nature of `power' and ̀ influence' is beset with problems. It is difficult to 
test such phenomena. 
One problem was uncovered when a classic pluralist study of power was famously 
criticised for its behaviourist approach. By considering the decisions that could be clearly 
observed, Robert Dahl's work was said to ignore `nondecisions' - the power to exclude 
issues from debate. Power was exhibited when a person or organisation created or 
reinforced social and political values and practices that barred public discussion on issues 
harmful to that person or institution. Power was displayed when bias was mobilised. 
From this, Steven Lukes considered the way that political agendas have been 
controlled. '54 Nelson Polsby has criticised this approach as it entails the "... raising of 
possibilities... ", which does not "... substitute for competent empirical investigation... ". 155 
It is clearly easier to document decisions actually taken. Equally, this work may be 
criticised for taking sides in a debate, which relates to the theories it is testing. Yet, this 
149 Minkin, Exits: 69. 
150 Yin: 4, Minkin, Exits: 61. 
151 Minkin, Exits: 61. 
ist Russell, Bertrand. 1995. Power: a new social analysis. London: Routledge, 1995.: 25. 
153 Minkin, Labour Party: xi, 380. 
154 Dahl Robert, Alan. 1961. Who governs? : democracy and power in an American city. New Haven 
London: Yale University Press., Baratz Morton, S., and Peter Bachrach. 1962. "Two Faces of Power. " 
American Political Science Review 56: 947-52., reprinted in Russell, Bertrand. 1995. Power: a new social 
analysis. London: Routledge, 1995., Chapter 1, Lukes, Steven. 1974. Power :a radical view. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
iss Polsby Nelson, W. 1980. Communitypower and political theory: a further look at problems of evidence 
and Inference. -New Haven ; Londd Yale University Fress, -I980.: 218,189-218. 
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work only attempts to assess the area of `nondecisions' to the limited extent of those that 
are, to some degree, ̀ tangible'. It addresses areas which were previously included in 
party debates and explores why they were dropped from deliberation. The work considers 
why areas of debate on press policy in the Labour Party became excluded from 
discussion, for example. 
A related problem is that of `anticipated reactions'. That is, groups and individuals 
modify their aspirations according to the political environment. They "... anticipate the 
reactions of those who are affected by their actions". '56 One factor, which indeed may 
influence decisions, is anticipation of press reaction. Yet, there are no means to measure 
the extent of influence that anticipated reactions make on decisions. 157 Also, to indicate 
that actor A's reaction influences actor B, one must prove that B is convinced of A's 
power capacity and changes her behaviour accordingly. The press is seen to have power 
when it can be proved that policy is not enacted in anticipation of newspaper reaction. ' 58 
It is a relevant problem in analysing power relations that groups modify their behaviour 
in anticipation of other actors' reactions. It may be that writers identify this as a capacity, 
yet then ignore it by only considering the actual exercise of power. This work at least 
aims to register such behaviour when actors directly express it as a reason for their 
actions. In this limited sense, the work accepts the reputational method against the 
decisional method. It, thus, again takes sides in a discussion that relates to the theories 
being tested. The claim of the defenders of the decisional method is that considering the 
reputation of power is too subjective. '59 Against this, this thesis aims to consider the 
actors' stated anticipated reactions in relation to the actual exercise of power by the actor 
considered powerful, such as, say, Rupert Murdoch. 
A further traditional problem with power is intentionality. Power often has little meaning 
without the consequences of that power being attributable to a person or grouping. Yet, 
156 Friedrich, Man 1963,199, chap 11, Minkin, Labour Party: 46-7, Scott, John. 2001. Power. Cambridge: 
Polity.: 4. 
151 Scott, Power: 206. 
158 Wrong Dennis, Hume. 1979. Power : its forms, bases and uses. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.: 7-8. 159-Ibid.. 8-9. 
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intentionality, especially in such a potentially politically contentious area as press policy, 
is difficult to prove. 160 One point that the pluralists and their critics agree upon, and one 
that provides a potential problem, is that power is not static. It changes over time. 161 
However, as we have seen, our analysis attempts to provide a dynamic analysis of the 
variations of power. 162 
Sources 
The work combines the use of documentary analysis and interviews, as primary sources, 
with a range of secondary material to do this. The work also engages in a small amount of 
comparative research. The criteria used for assessing all the data include scrutinising its 
authenticity, credibility and representativeness. 
The primary sources it employs are documentary analysis and interviews. Much of the 
data, as with many contemporary histories, comes from key institutional sources. These 
include the minutes of Labour's NEC and the submitted internal policy papers collated by 
Labour's research department, the minutes of the Parliamentary Labour Party and shadow 
cabinet, Labour Party and trade union annual conference transcripts, Hansard records of 
parliamentary debates, public inquiries, such as the Royal Commission on the Press, 
Green and White Papers and Government Bills. 
This' is essentially a work analysing Labour Party policy in the period from the early 
1970s. Therefore, the key sources it uses are policy decisions and policy documents, as 
much as they are available. This might be thought to be a comparatively easy task. Up 
until 1991, it was. Labour produced a conference report, which outlined discussions and 
decisions made. It might not have been a complete verbatim report. 163 However, it 
accurately reported motions, conference decisions and some discussions. But in 1991, 
160 Scott, Power: 2 and Ibid.: 4. 
161 Baratz Morton, S., and Peter Bachrach. 1962. "Two Faces of Power. " American Political Science 
Review 56: 947.52., reprinted in reprinted in Russell, Bertrand. 1995. Power: a new social analysis. 
London: Routledge, 1995.: 5. 
162 Minkin, Exits: 69. 
163 Minkin, Exits. 
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Labour decided to stop producing these reports. This termination had an added advantage 
for the leadership. One of the considerations of this work will be Labour's use of media 
management techniques. Abandoning conference reports gave the leadership the potential 
to present the conference as more ̀ on-message' than it actually was. Future assessments 
of the conference would now rely on the copious press releases produced by the Labour 
Party centrally and media reports of the conferences. 
The importance of this, of course, is much larger than its effect on this work's 
methodology. However, it forces the author to rely much more heavily on press reports of 
subsequent party conferences than the source material. It makes it more difficult to 
analyse the conferences, save from information coloured by either Labour ̀ spin' or that 
of different sections of the media. 
This refers to a more general point about the use of press reports as secondary sources. 
This work considers the question of press bias in reporting the Labour Party. It would be 
remiss not to recognise the same problems with academics uncritically sourcing press 
reports. Any scholar should be aware of the political colouration of the reporter involved, 
the editorial line of the paper and the newspaper group of which the title is part. Thus, 
this work attempts to verify such information using different sources. 
Internal party documents are a useful source of primary material, also. The period from 
1974 to 1983, particularly, saw the rise in NEC's influence in policymaking, for reasons 
we will consider in Chapters 3 and 4. The various study groups and sub-committees, 
which it set up to formulate press and media ownership policy, provide a key resource in 
this regard. Although the minutes of the NEC and the Home Policy Committee record 
only simple summaries of often-complex debates, they give some sense of the policy 
formation process. However, this is less true further up the decision-making chain. The 
author had access to minutes of the Parliamentary Labour Party in the period up to 1976 
and the shadow cabinet for the time up to 1974. Yet, the report of debates in these is 
limited to the decisions made. This, to some extent, reflects the nature of the minutes as a 
whole. But it also indicates the relatively low importance placed on newspaper ownership 
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policy, for a party contending with more pressing issues such as EC membership and 
economic downturn. The records of parliamentary debates in Hansard were useful, in this 
and later periods, in contextualising the debates and illuminating the decisions. 
As Freedman indicates with regard to broadcasting policy, the sub-committees betray 
slightly more detail. Even here, however, they do not detail the minutiae of the debates 
that probably took place. The most detailed source is the documents submitted to the 
groups' discussions, which have been used to enumerate positions. ' 64 The debates' 
complexity is often only indicated in the policy papers. Thus, these different sources' 
interrelationship provides the debates' context. Union and academic submissions to the 
committees have been particularly useful. The later period saw party policy formation 
more centralised around the leadership, as we shall see. Gaining access to Neil Kinnock's 
personal papers yielded unpublished information about the party's internal discussions 
regarding press ownership and media management policy. This illuminated decisions 
made. Their use also provides new insights into the relationship between the party 
leadership and the press owners. 
Alongside those submitted to the party discussions, useful union documents included 
TUC conference and committee reports and those of the media unions, particularly their 
journals. However, one problem is that the control of the latter has been the subject of 
political battles. One aspect of this is that the NUJ's Journalist, which was a particularly 
fruitful source, has an elected editor. This is relevant to one of the thrusts of this work on 
press democracy. But it also has a methodological aspect. Other union journals have been 
assumed to articulate the line of the union leaderships generally. Yet, the Journalist, in 
the 1970s at least, occasionally questioned the `top table'. This is one aspect of a wider 
point regarding Labour movement journals to be made in a moment. 
To augment and contextualise these internal discussions, the author conducted a series of 
interviews with contributors. He also considered diaries and memoirs of various 
164 Freedman, - 2000.21. 
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participants. 165 However, the use of such sources has its own problems. One is the time 
elapsed. As Freedman notes, there is a major difference between providing a 
contemporaneous diary record and recalling events many years later for a memoir. 
Memories fade, leading to fallibility; questioning credibility. This problem is greatly 
increased since press policy is rarely a central interest for politicians, for whom other 
areas may have been of a more direct or immediate relevance. Also, both memoirs and 
diaries can reflect the desires and political positions of the authors. Politicians are often 
involved in politically charged debates, which are likely to shape how they chronicle 
events. 166 Also, they can make claims for their own influence and importance, which can 
be coloured by self-aggrandisement, for example. Another problem of accounts by 
politicians and press insiders is that the pressure to appear entertaining and to sell may 
affect what is written. So, in analysing these, considerations of the memoirs' authenticity 
as well as their credibility come into play. The work attempts to establish their veracity 
by checking them against official minutes. 167 
A further potential difficulty comes with media cross-ownership. As has been noted, 
News Corporation's publishing arm, HarperCollins, has a history of spending large sums 
buying senior politicians' memoirs and has intervened to stop the publication of one such 
account. 168 This no more than highlights the possibility that what politicians write in their 
165 Of the latter, of particular note are two sources provided by figures at different ends of the Labour Party 
spectrum. For those concerned with chronicling press policy and the Labour Party, the diaries of media 
activist, former cabinet minister and long-time NEC member, Tony Benn, are an important resource. 
Equally, numerous insights on press and media management, which are interwoven into this account of 
press ownership policy, have been gained from Phillip Gould's memoir and political tract The Unfinished 
Revolution. (Benn, Tony. 1989. Office without power : diaries, 1968-72. London: Arrow, 1989., Benn, 
Tony. 1990. Against the tide : diaries, 1973-76. London: Arrow Books., Benn, Tony. 1991. Conflicts of 
interest. diaries 1977-80. London: Arrow Books., Benn, Tony, and Ruth Winstone. 1992. The end of an era 
: diaries 1980-90. London: Hutchinson., Benn, Tony, and Ruth Winstone. 2002. Free at last!: diaries 
1991-2001. London: Hutchinson., Gould, Philip. 1998. The unfinished revolution : how the modernisers 
saved the Labour Party. London: Little Brown. See also Freedman, 2000: 21). 
: 166 Freedman, 2000: 21. See also Wickham-Jones, Mark. 1996. Economic strategy and the Labour Party 
politics and policy-making, 1970-83. New York: St. Martin's Press.: 9. 
167 Wickham-Jones, Economic: 9. 
168 The book, thought to be controversial about the China government, was by Hong Kong governor Chris 
Patten. The Daily Telegraph published a News Corporation memo that revealed that it had ordered that the 
book rights be relinquished because there were fears concerning the book's "... negative aspects". (Quoted 
in Jones, Nicholas. 2000. Sultans of spin : the media and the new Labour government. London: Orion, 
2000.: 200. See also Anon., `Publisher to the Powerful', Mother Jones, May-June 1995, McChesney, Rich 
media: - t 16). 
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memoirs could be influenced by the awareness of their publishing company. For all these 
reasons, such sources in this work normally are used to express contrasting political 
positions in debates. 169 
An exception to this is when considering the highly contentious issue of the relationship 
between Tony Blair and Rupert Murdoch. When analysing this, one source the work uses 
is the little-cited diaries of Lord Wyatt. 170 Here the potential problem of self- 
aggrandisement and political bias are heightened. '7' Nevertheless, there are reasons to 
regard Wyatt's diaries as a legitimate insider source to consider the relationship between 
the Conservative Party and News Corporation. Wyatt had high-level connections among 
the Conservative establishment. 172 He had acted as a go-between for Murdoch in the 
past. 173 He was highly paid by News Corp. What is striking about the journals is that they 
are wonderfully indiscreet. 174 One possible reason for this openness was that Wyatt 
always wanted them to be published after his death. The other is that he was settling old 
scores from beyond the grave. However, although he felt let down by Murdoch, he was 
still loyal. 175 The diaries may well be coloured by Wyatt's own sense of importance. Yet, 
it is precisely because he was not so significant that important figures felt safe in 
imparting important information to the erstwhile Murdoch fixer. 
Newspapers also provide a fruitful source of information about policy creation. The work 
draws on them extensively to chronicle New Labour's press policies. Ministers, 
spokespeople and advisers regularly brief journalists concerning forthcoming policies. 
176 
169 Freedman, 2000: 21. 
170 Wyatt, Woodrow, and Sarah Curtis., 2000. The journals of Woodrow Wyatt. London: Macmillan. One 
later work that does cite Wyatt extensively is Greenslade, Roy. 2003. Press Gang. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
However, Greenslade uses little of same information as this work 
"' By the end of his life, Lord Wyatt of Weeford may have been seen as a joke figure, no more than in his 
unstinting support for the failing John Major. (Wyatt) This, among other aspects, showed that he could 
make inaccurate assessments. He was, rightly, regarded as an establishment figure from another age. 
172 Major needed all the friends he could get and Wyatt was still relatively close to Margaret Thatcher. 
(Wyatt) 
173 This was particularly the case during the Wapping dispute. (Neil: 121). 
14 They provide an absorbing glimpse of the workings of the British political elite. Wyatt details deals 
made at secret meetings at country retreats involving members of the select few. 
175 He was agrieved by Murdoch's decision to support Blair and by the fact that his column's importance 
had been downgraded. Yet, this did not stop him supporting his employer and friend. (Wyatt). 
176 Freedman, 2000: 22. 
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Nevertheless, these could be subject to `spin', including from advisers. The work has 
concentrated, therefore, on directly attributed interviews with elected Labour personnel to 
elaborate such policies. It has not relied on those sources for assessment of the effect of 
them. In addition, the work has considered Labour movement and left political 
periodicals from Labour Weekly to the New Statesman to Tribune. It has also utilised 
such journals that have particularly considered politics and the media, such as New Left 
Review, New Socialist and Marxism Today. 
However, again, Labour movement journals have been used to represent differing 
political positions, rather than as representative of the Labour Party view or as presenting 
`objective facts'. Any indications of representativeness have been judged by their 
authors' proximity to the main advocates of a particular position. Following Minkin, this 
work maintains a distrust of such sources. Authors and journals have been judged in 
terms of their history of accuracy and understanding of issues. In order to assess the 
validity of views expressed, again triangulation has been used - employing documentary 
analysis of official documentation and in-depth interviewing. 177 
The author interviewed politicians and Labour Party leaders involved with press 
ownership policy, former press policy advisors, civil servants involved in both press 
policy and media management, working journalists, media union officials and media 
academics and activists involved in Labour press policy formulation. Interviews lasted 
between one and two hours. He informally followed up of some points raised with some 
interviewees and some information from earlier interviewees was discussed with later 
correspondents to aid data validation. 
All the interviews were useful. Yet, academics who were involved in debates on policy 
creation provided some of the most fruitful information. Interviews with leading Labour 
figures were as revealing for the assumptions that they made as for the information that 
was given. A problem with interviewing in this area, where the question of power and 
177 Wickham-Jones, Economic: 9, -Minkin, Exits: i22 3. 
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influence is involved, is that of access. Some politicians involved refused to be 
interviewed. Others have been forthcoming. 
Problems as to whether interview texts `truly' represent events, beliefs and actions have 
been debated. 178 There is a concern with self-aggrandising interviewees; wanting to 
appear knowledgeable. In order to consider this, the same responsibilities of 
observational vigilance apply to interviewing. This work has attempted to locate 
interviewees in their political and historical context; to go beyond their self-idealisation 
to establish the validity of their information. 179 One way of achieving this was to conduct 
most interviews in the latter part of the research process, when much the groundwork and 
writing on the context and subject had already been done. Such a method had its 
drawbacks as well as advantages. The interviewer had to be open to considering a range 
of possible perceptions, so he was not mired in pre-conceived notions. Thus, because he 
was open to ideas from interviews, which challenged initial notions based on 
documentary sources, this led him to rewrite original completed drafts. 
Also, taking Minkin's advice, the author was aware that the political area was sensitive 
when conducting interviews, prompting the need for imaginative research. 180 The 
interviewer, for instance, consciously attempted to create a neutral non-judgemental 
mood throughout the interviews. There was also an attempt to solicit politically 
contentious information through indirect questioning. Nevertheless, overall, the possible 
fallibility of interviews, with problems of memory lapse, for instance, was noted. Thus, 
again, triangulation has been employed with the data gained. Often interviews have been 
used to articulate opinions in the debates explored. 
Generally, this work has not involved comparative research, although this is not to deny 
its benefits, especially in considering difference and diversity in policy creation between 
"$ May, Tim. 1997. Social research : issues, methods and process. Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1997.: 128. 
179 Minkin, Exits: 124,165. 
180 Ibid.: 139,167. See also Dexter Lewis, Anthony. 1970. Elite and specialized interviewing. Evanston, Ill: 
Northwestern University Press. 
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different countries and in developing general theories. 181 However, there has been some 
comparative research on press ownership policy among European social democratic 
governments to illustrate and contextualise the phenomenon of `policy transfer' in 
Labour Party policy. However, in doing so, there has been an awareness of the 
differences in society and culture between different countries, making any simple policy 
transfer extremely problematic. 182 As in the work's scepticism concerning some of the 
more extreme claims made for globalisation theory, it identifies the particular and 
specific, as well as the general. So, for instance, the author considers whether there are 
counter-tendencies to economic globalisation in other European states. 
Selection And Objectivity 
All historians are selective. Indeed, they act as editors. They cannot embrace more than a 
fraction of the facts available. 183 Some of the selections in this work have been down to 
common sense. 184 For instance, it has not concentrated so heavily on internal party 
discussions around press policy while Labour was in government in the 1970s. This is 
because the key forum where new policy was often first debated, the NEC's media 
subcommittee, was not meeting. Nor has it analysed in such detail decisions of forums 
such as the NEC in the years of the Blair leadership because, as we shall see, this 
committee had less influence over party decision-making. 185 
This indicates a further problem, which compounds difficulties. That is that this work 
deals in such modern history. This means that certain sources are unavailable or have not 
been discovered. Moreover, it implies that such work occupies an uncertain space 
181 May, Tim. 1997. Social research : issues, methods and process. Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1997.: 186-9. 
182 Even language can bring problems of selectivity and thus bias. (Ibid.: 192). 
183 To use the gendered vocabulary of E. H. Carr's popular and influential book What is History?: "The 
historian distils from the experience of the past, or from so much of the experience of the past as is 
accessible to him, that part of which he recognises as amenable to rational explanation and interpretation, 
and from it draws conclusions, which may serve as a guide to action. " (Carr Edward, Hallett, and R. W. 
Davies. 1987. What is history? Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987.: 104). 
184 Freedman, 2000: 19. 
185 This was a more important consideration than the question of access under a 10-year-rule placed on such 
documents. Albeit partial and rather one-sided reports were available from elsewhere - i. e. Tribune and 
Labour-Left Brießng. 
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between journalism and history. If, as it has been famously judged, it is too soon to assess 
the effects of the French Revolution, then how can any sense be made of an area that is so 
contemporaneous? The only defence on this point is that this work is inevitably partial 
and incomplete, but seeks to use the sources available to trace a shift in the Labour 
Party's ideas and the balance of power in the party in a time that has seen great change. A 
contemporary historian has one advantage, which the work has sought to exploit - she 
can contextualise written sources by interviews with living participants. 186 
Another complexity, which has been pointed out by Minkin, discussing Labour 
movement policy creation, is the tension between chronological and thematic narrative. 187 
Although there is some attempt to `tell a story' chronologically, there is a thematic strand 
also. Themes that are revisited through this thesis include the relationship between 
diversity and Labour representation, the conflict between left and right, the party's 
relationship to both of its constituent parts, especially the trade unions, and to external 
forces, such as the Conservative Party and business. Nevertheless, in order to make the 
account more readable, a chronological approach provides the overall `architecture' of 
the work, whereas the consideration of power relations and the relationship of Labour 
policy to media models has been summed up at the conclusion of chapters and is revisited 
in the concluding chapter. 
Thus, the motive for selection is press policy's relationship to such issues, rather than 
such determinants as press coverage or the frequency of references in Parliament to such 
questions. 188 More latterly, the work has delved into the area of press management and 
political communications to test the theory that to consider press policy one needs to 
consider the question of Labour representation. However, press management is not the 
subject of this thesis and thus is not a continuous theme of it. 
186 Freedman, 2000: 17-18. 
187 Minkin, Exits, Minkin, Labour Party: xv. 'as Freedman, 2000: 19. 
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In making such selections, the work tentatively sees some causal relationships in the 
development of Labour's policy, which may be seen as over-imposed by the author. 189 
Nevertheless, as Carr puts it, to "... describe something as a mischance is a favourite way 
of exempting oneself from the tiresome obligation to investigate its cause... ". To look for 
causality, is not to accept complete inevitability, but neither to reduce history to an 
explanation of what Carr describes as the "... 'might-have-been' school of thought... ". 190 
This is accepted here, notwithstanding what has been noted regarding ̀non-decisions'. 
This work has attempted to treat all sources with a combination of empathy and 
detachment. However, the objectives of research can be coloured by one's political 
stance. One major problem with this is that "... understandings become embedded in an 
unquestioned frame of reference", as Minkin puts it. 19' Employing a range of formal 
research methods that are clear and open is one way of challenging embedded 
understandings. Nevertheless, again following Can, an objective historian is not 
somebody who just gets his or her facts right or someone who believes in total 
objectivity. Indeed, as he argues, such a scholar is one who rejects the possibility of such 
a concept. Instead, to approach objectivity partly depends on being self-consciously 
aware of one's own position in society and one's relation to the history that is being 
written. 192 In that sense, seemingly paradoxically, openly accepting that one has ̀ biases' 
and commitments is one aspect of seeking objectivity. 
The next chapter will attempt to employ the methodology outlined when it considers the 
debates over Labour's press policy in the early 1970s. 
S91bid.: 23. 
190 Carr: 96,102,107. 
191 Minkin, Exits: 21,136-7. 
192 Carr: 123,139. 
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3. Concerns and Study: Party Debates Up to 1974 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson strongly rejected calls for further Government 
intervention to preserve press diversity. He told the 1967 Granada Television Awards that 
"... there would be the most appalling risks in Government intervention... It is not only a 
question of what would be done but of what some might think was being done. " 93 
Nevertheless, by 1974, the Labour Party had produced a document which explicitly 
identified the "... need for intervention... ". It advocated a "... radical restructuring... " of the 
press market to aid diversity and provide some industrial democracy within 
newspapers. '94 
What had happened in the interim? Appendix 2 to Chapter 1 outlined the prelude to the 
period we are considering. The time from 1945 saw radical party pressure for reform to 
deal with press market failure ameliorated by the Labour leadership. This occurred in 
struggles where the pressure for increased diversity was linked with, but at times in 
contradiction to, Labour representation. This chapter will argue that this tension between 
diversity and Labour representation was less clear in the debates on the press in the early 
1970s. Yet, divisions were still apparent. The chapter will look at the political 
background and the first direct consideration of the mass media conducted by the party 
by its Communications study group. It will argue that the rising Labour new left 
combined with representatives of a resurgent trade union movement and sections of a 
more hesitant right on that body to push for structural press reform, facing a reluctant 
Labour Party leadership. What brought them together were concerns for Labour 
movement representation, particularly to give the unions a fairer press. The trade 
unionists and some others saw this as an end in itself. However, the chapter shall argue 
that other forces centred primarily around the Labour new left on the working party were 
193 Quoted in Thomas, Harford, and Institute International Press. 1967. Newspaper crisis :a study of 
developments in the national press of Britain 1966-67. Zurich: _ 
International Press Institute.: 67-8. 194 Labour Party. 1974. The people and the media. London: The Labour Party.: 24-5. 
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also heavily concerned with broader diversity and democratising ownership of the press. 
The chapter will conclude by exploring the influence of unions, MPs and academics in 
the creation of the radical discussion paper The people and the media, produced by the 
Labour Party in 1974. 
As we shall see, in this and other chapters, some of the policies Labour considered were 
adaptations of those enacted by other states. This is particularly true of those to aid 
diversity. `Policy transfer', or as Richard Rose tends to describe it, `lesson-drawing' is a 
feature of state policy-making. Such policy transfers can happen over time and space. We 
can adapt this idea to consider Labour Party policy adoption. We are considering national 
government policy transfers over space. Factors to consider before attempting such 
transfers include assessing whether the policies would be acceptable in their new national 
climates. In our adaptation, we are going to consider their acceptability by the Labour 
Party in its policy formation. The theory suggests that proximity is expected to define 
policy transfer, but this proximity is variable. Such factors include similarity in values, 
which would be expected to be a key factor for political parties. Among other transfer 
considerations are whether they are seen to be politically acceptable and technically 
feasible. 195 The appendix to this chapter shall put this policy transfer into context by 
exploring some of the European schemes which Labour thinkers looked to, which 
showed how the possibilities they were considering were turned into reality. 
195 Rose, Richard. 1993. Lesson-drawing in public policy: a guide to learning across time and space. 
Chätliäin, 'N. J.: Chatham House. 
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New Pressures on Labour: The Labour new left and union radicalisation 196 
By the late 1960s, the post-war settlement was collapsing and, with this, there was a crisis 
of Keynesian demand management, which the Labour Party had increasingly relied on, to 
the exclusion of public ownership. 197 There was also an explosion of industrial militancy, 
as hostility to Labour government wage restraint grew. This combined with a wave of 
community action. The Labour government was ejected from office in 1970.198 While 
this crisis provided for a new right reaction that we will consider later, it also led to a 
Labour new left advance and union radicalisation. 
The British New Left's most organised element was formed in 1956.199 With Raymond 
Williams at the forefront, it was concerned with the media from the outset. While some 
original participants refused to become involved in the Labour Party, a sympathetic 
internal current helped fill the policy political and economic vacuum created by the 
Keynesian crisis and the Wilson government's failure. 200 
Politically, the New Left wished to democratise the state. It wanted to transform the party 
and make the conference sovereign as a prelude to that. Tony Benn was the tribune of 
this new movement 201 Extending political democracy through press reform was part of 
this same process. 
196 In considering this, this work is influenced by the notion of Leo Panitch and Colin Leys of a Labour new 
left, also considered by writers such as Callaghan. (Panitch and Leys, Callaghan, J. 2000. The Retreat of 
Social Democracy. Manchester: Manchester University Press.: esp Chapter 3). 197 Wickham-Jones, Economic: 34-8. 
198 Panitch and Leys: 1,5,19-2 1. 
199 The uproar following the publication of the Khrushchev speech was a catalyst. For various assessments 
of the British New Left see Kenny, Michael. 1995. The First New Left. London: Lawrence & Wishart., 
Chun, Lin. 1993. The British New Left. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press., Widgery, David. 1976. 
"The Double Exposure: Suez and Hungary. " in The Left In Britain 1956-68, edited by David Widgery. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin., McCann, Gerald. 1997. Theory and History: The Political Thought of E. P. 
Thompson. Aldershot: Ashgate., Anderson, Perry. 1980. Arguments Within English Marxism. London: 
Verso., Archer, R. (Ed. ). 1989. Out of Apathy, Voices of the New Left 30 Years On. London: Verso. and 
Young, Nigel. 1977. An Infantile Disorder? The Crisis and Decline of the New Left. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
200 Panitch and Leys: 2-4, Wickham-Jones, Economic: 42-3. See also Kenny: 42,133-4. Defining this 
current as new left indicates its diversity, in a similar fashion to how Wickham-Jones latterly defined it. 
(Wickham-Jones, Mark. 2004. `The New Left', in Plant, Raymond et. al. eds., The Struggle for Labour's 
Soul. London: Routledge, 24-46: 25). 
Z°r Panisch and Leys: 39. 
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Economically, while some of Labour right had looked to the Scandinavian system and 
were reluctant to nationalise, the New Left answered the Keynesian failure by calling for 
public shareholding. They demanded a national enterprise board, which had a resonance 
in the national printing corporation we shall consider later. 202 Their argument echoed the 
critique of oligopolisation in Chapter 1. The British economy was now dominated by 
oligopolistic concentration. Keynesian solutions were thus largely ineffectual in 
controlling the economy, faced with multinational domination. 203 This gave a renewed 
impetus to critiques of press monopolisation. 
However, like the original New Left before it, the Labour new left also saw that a 
problem of state control of `Old Labour's' past, to use the modem terminology, was the 
lack of industrial democracy. 204 Leading Labour new left economist Stuart Holland 
advocated this as a counterbalance to a potentially overweening state. 205 Discussions on 
involving those in the newspaper industry were part of this debate. 
Support for workers' control had enjoyed a renaissance in the 1960s and early 1970s both 
outside and in the party. 206 New inspiration for this came from `work-ins', which 
202 The board would act as a state holding company channelling public investment and overseeing planning 
agreements with private industry. This was a feature of both Labour's Programme 1973 and its manifesto 
the following year. (Wickham-Jones, Economic: 5,61-4,66-8, Thompson, Political economy: 233). For the 
argument that this did not represent simple nationalisation, however, see Holland, Stuart. 2004. 
`Ownership, Planning and Markets', in Plant, Raymond et. at. eds., The Struggle for Labour's Soul. 
London: Routledge: 163-186. 
203 Wickham-Jones, Economic: 55-9,79-80,126, Thompson, Political economy: 198-9,231, Callaghan, 
Retreat: 58-9. This concern with monopoly power was widespread within the party, and shared by some of 
the now defensive revisionist right. Roy Jenkins was one who conceded the need for an extension of public 
ownership at this point. But he did not envisage it to be embarked on on the same scale as did the left. 
(Thompson, Political economy: 219-222,226). This analysis provided the left with a critique of what 
became known as globalisation long before the Labour right adopted the term. A similar point has been 
latterly made by Wickham-Jones. (Wickham-Jones, New Left: 36). 
204 Wickham-Jones, Economic: 41-2,83. 
205 Thompson, Political economy: 203,209. As one speaker who to become an prominent left MP, Brian 
Sedgemore, told the 1971 party conference, the mistake of 1945 was that the nationalised industries were 
"... centralised bureaucracies ... [with] managements responsible neither to workers, consumers or Parliament. " (Quoted in Panitch and Leys: 73). 
206 Industrial democracy had been supported in party conference and TUC congress resolutions in the 1960s 
and had been the subject. of a party report. (Hatfield, Michael. 1978. The house the Left built : inside 
Labour policy-making, 1970-75. London: Gollancz.: 54, Wickham-Jones, Economic: 68-9). 
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provided positive proof of workers' capability in managing their own enterprises. 207 
While the demand for industrial democracy became policy, commitments made in Labour 
documents were mostly vague. The Labour left were not clear where workers' autonomy 
ended and state planning began. 208 
The Labour new left was bolstered by another important development. Union militancy 
continued growing in the 1970s, developing a new left-wing trade union leadership, 
which backed industrial democracy. 209 This increased New Left influence in the party. 
The new union leadership challenged `social democratic centralism', which had 
strengthened post-war right-wing rule. It also created an opening for the dissenting New 
Left voices. 10 
Community-based New Left activists joined local parties as control by right-wing cliques 
collapsed. The left also used its increasing presence on the National Executive 
Committee (NEC) from the mid-1960s onwards as a power base. Its sub-committees 
became part of the policymaking process after 1970. The left concentrated its energy on 
these 80-plus committees. 211 Outside co-optees, including academics, had equal status 
with the PLP members on the committees. And NEC members, not the Shadow Cabinet, 
chaired them. One co-opted academic, Holland, was the main architect of the left's 
207 This had been preceded by a rise in grassroots trades union confidence. (Thompson, Political economy: 
207). For the more radical proponents around the Institute for Workers' Control (IWC), this would lead to a 
planned system of worker self-management as a basis for a socialist economy. The IWC was an 
organisation that had set up in 1968 and was associated both with the New Left and the Labour left. 
(Thompson, Political economy: 207,212). For Labour right thinkers this meant letting workers have some 
influence on how enterprises were run, but not control of them. Programme 1973 called for direct worker 
representation on new company supervisory boards and joint control committees composed of worker 
representatives and management. (Thompson, Political economy: 222-4,226). 20 Wickham-Jones, Economic: 69-70,185-7. There was also a concern that planning proposals should 
originate from the bottom up. (Ibid.: 68). A slightly more harsh assessment of this is provided in Wickham- 
Jones, New Left: 42. One aspect of this new approach was that decisions on which firms to be nationalised 
would reflect discussions among the companies' workers. (Panitch and Leys: 80). 209 Although those associated with the Labour new left went beyond the union leader's conceptions. 
(Panitch and Leys: 21-2,56-9, Thompson, Political economy: 209-12. See also Wickham-Jones, Economic: 
117-8). 
210 There was now the "... view that radical socialist activists were part of the labour movement's family 
rather than its enemies, as the revisionists and right-wing leaders had for so long insisted". (Panitch and 
Leys: 21-6). 
211 Panitch and Leys: 26-38,66. 
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economic strategy. 212 As we shall see it was a New Left academic who had most 
influence on press policy. 
THE COMMUNICATIONS STUDY GROUP 
The Communications subcommittee was established in 1972 with press representation - 
of the unions rather than the party - much on the mind of radical activists. Sections of the 
Labour movement had become increasingly hostile to what they regarded as a sustained 
press assault on the more militant unions. 213 The study circle built on the discussions on 
media reform that the Labour Party had periodically conducted and also the interest in 
media policy among left academics, which had blossomed in the 1960s214 This is not to 
say, however, that media reform was the most pressing concern for those in the Labour 
Party at this time. 215 
Concerns about press oligopolisation and barriers to market entry had been raised in an 
Advertising sub-committee, which had reported in 1971216 However, it had counselled 
against extensive intervention. Nevertheless, the report indicated that "... drastic action... " 
might be needed in the future. 17 Demands for just this sort of action came from some 
involved in the Communications study group set up by the NEC's Home Policy in May 
218 1972. 
212 Wickham-Jones, Economic: 118-22. 
213 Curran and Seaton: 299-300. 
214 See O'Malley, Tom and Soley, Clive. 2000. Regulating the press. London: Pluto Press.: 72. 
2's The pages of Tribune only saw sporadic articles or letters indicating any concern with press ownership 
in this period, although there was more prominence given to this question in Labour Weekly, where its 
journalist Martin Linton was vocal on this question. The minutes of the Shadow Cabinet also reveal nothing 
in the way of discussion. 
216 Home Policy Sub-Committee Advertising Report, December 1971, Labour Party Research Document 
RD 201: 52-3,62-4. 
217 This would be needed for "... the survival of a vigorous and independent press". (Labour, Party. 1972. 
Advertising. London: Labour Party.: 49, Home Policy Sub-Committee Advertising Report, December 1971, 
Labour Party RD 201: 67). 
218 A direct example of this call to action was from one key participant in the Communications study group, 
chairman of the Labour Newspaper Group Eric Moonman. He described the report on advertising as 
"... very disappointing". The former MP said of its discussion on ̀ drastic action' that: "Such pious hopes are 
not enough; the Labour Party must now produce definite policy and some concrete proposals on this 
subject. " (Moonman. Eric. 1972. ̀ Future of the-Press - does anyone care? ' Labour Weekly June 9 1972. ). 
See also Home Policy Committee Communications: Final Report Background Note, RES 59/1974,: 1. It 
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The working party was set up to guide media policy creation. But it did not do this 
directly. Its report was never voted on. However, it was significant in that it influenced 
later policy development and, perhaps more importantly, it prefigured a host of debates 
that were to rumble on in the party for years afterwards. 
Like other committees, its membership included MPs and trades unionists and 
sympathetic academics, but in this case, it also incorporated journalists219 Labour's 
research secretary Terry Pitt, who was not on the left, initiated the committee. 
20 The 
formal basis for serving on this committee was that these were "... people in the 
movement whose interest in communication is known". 21 James Curran describes the 
political character of the people Pitt brought together as generally supportive of the 
Labour leadership. 22 Yet, a pointer to the direction it was going to take was that the man 
who was becoming the figurehead of the revolt, Tony Benn, chaired it for most of its 
existence. 
From its start, the working group debated policy on how to expand plurality and 
democracy in the newspaper industry. The study group's overwhelming emphasis, if not 
that elsewhere in the Labour Party, was to provide a press required for political 
democracy. The less openly-contested debate, but a question nonetheless evident in 
was, indeed, the first direct study of its kind by the party. (Labour Party NEC Home Policy Committee: 
Communications, RD 324/April 1972: 1). 
219 Home Policy Committee Communications: Final Report Background Note, RES 59/1974, Home Policy 
Committee Note on Communications Meeting, RD370/June 1972, Minutes of the Second Home Policy 
Committee on Communications, 10 January 1973, Minutes of the Fourth Home Policy Committee on 
Communications, March 8 1973, Minutes of the Fifth Home Policy Committee on Communications, 10 
May 1973, Minutes of the Seventh Home Policy Committee on Communication, 3 April 1974, Minutes of 
the Eighth Home Policy Committee on Communications, 30 April 1974, O'Malley and Soley: 72. 
220 Pitt's attitude to the New Left has been disputed. Wickham-Jones identifies Terry Pitt as sympathetic to 
the left. (Wickham-Jones, Economic: 121). Curran sees that Terry Pitt "... was actively involved in stopping 
the left. But what he was absorbing was that the culture of the Labour movement at that time, which was 
pro-industrial democracy and pro-social democratic of the conventional sort which was taking place in 
Scandinavia. Indeed, Terry Pitt actually gave me a book which was about the Swedish press at that time 
and was very impressed by it. And he also gave me another book about post-war nationalisation, which was 
a sort of social democratic argument that you didn't nationalise the companies, you nationalised their 
functions. " 
221 Home Policy Committee: Communications, RD324/April 1972: 1. Curran suggests that, aside from 
those who "... had to be_on... " others invited were friends of Pitt. (Curran interview). 221 Curran interview. 
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papers submitted to the committee, was over what emphasis to place on Labour 
representation. We shall consider this first. 
LABOUR REPRESENTATION IN THE PRESS 
According to one of the participants, James Curran, the concern to develop a Labour 
movement press and a left press "... was always the subtext... " on the committee 223 
Another, then Labour Weekly journalist Martin Linton remembers that: "... the issue of 
what we could do about it was one everyone wanted to explore'. 224 
Some of those more associated with the New Left academics were calling for a left press. 
Others, particularly those connected with the Old Left trade unionists, were more 
forthright in voicing the demand for Labour movement papers 225 They saw the Labour 
movement - and the unions in particular - under attack. The National Union of 
Journalists (NUJ) general secretary Ken Morgan described the TUC annual congress as 
conducting an "... annual swipe at the media... " at this time 226 And media union 
223 "So in as far as The people and the media was trying to restructure the market, it was in order to create a 
space where these sorts of publications could be launched and have the chance to survive. Diversity was a 
code. But it was a libertarian code. It was saying we want more left publications, but also that they should 
be publications of all different hues. So it was genuine. It was genuine in the sense that it was committed to 
diversity. But was also a code for saying left publications. " (Curran interview). 
224 "There was only one argument and that was we were put at the huge disadvantage by the 
overwhelmingly Conservative nature of the press. " (Author interview with Martin Linton MP, Wednesday 
July 18 2001). Linton was a journalist on the Daily Mail and Financial Times, before joining Labour 
Weekly in 1971. He left Labour Party newspaper in 1979 and worked on the Daily Star, before becoming a 
journalist on The Guardian, where he remained until 1997. He has been a Labour MP since then. He is the 
half-Swedish author of a book on Swedish socialism and the work Was It The Sun Wot Won It?, among 
other publications. Anon. 2000. Dod's parliamentary companion. Roth, Andrew, and Byron Criddle. 2000. 
1997-2002 parliamentary profiles. London: Parliamentary Profiles.: 1311-1313). 
223 Curran confirmed that the trade unionists tended to be more concerned at this time about specifically 
promoting a Labour movement press. The new left academics were, in the main, pressing for publications 
which would be to the left of the official Labour Party press. (Curran interview). 
226 Trades Union Congress. Annual, Conference. 1972. Report of the 104th annual Trades Union Congress 
: held in The Dome, Brighton, 4th-8th September, 1972. London: T. U. C.: 533. Morgan was more sceptical 
about more general claims of bias than were other speakers at the congress - arguing that the standards of 
reporting of industrial affairs were "... higher than in any other country in the world... ". Yet, he was in a 
minority. (Trades Union Congress. Annual, Conference. 1971. Report of the 103rd annual Trades Union 
Congress : held in the Opera House, Blackpool, 6th-10th September, 1971. London: T. U. C.: 594. See also 
National Union of Journalists, 1972. National Union of Journalists Annual Report 1971-2. London: 
National Union of Journalists.: 21 and 'Mass media ̀ bias' probe: a warning', The Journalist, October 1971: 
4). 
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representatives themselves were taking the swipes 227 Richard Briginshaw, general 
secretary of the printers' union NATSOPA, in 1972, was typically forthright. He saw 
newspapers had the "... ultimate interest to bash the unions and make them the scapegoats 
for every political, financial and economic ill the country suffers". 
228 The response of the 
1971 congress was to call for a public inquiry into media ownership and control and 
resolved to set up machinery to monitor the union's treatment in the media. 
229 
The discussions in the Labour Party echoed this bias claim. 23' At the study group's first 
meeting, a majority of trade unionists on the working group saw newspaper anti-union 
bias as the major policy problem. 231 One participant, who was particularly concerned 
about this question, Linton, rejected universal subsidies to the press that we shall consider 
in a moment, out of a concern for Labour representation. These would only help the more 
profitable and predominantly anti-Labour press, he suggested, merely "... feeding the 
mouth that bites you". 232 Nevertheless, reflecting an underlying tension between diversity 
and Labour representation, this viewpoint did not go unchallenged. The future Arts 
minister, MP Hugh Jenkins, argued that the general approach to media should be to put 
diversity uppermost. 233 
227 For instance, R. T. Hutchings, of the Association of Broadcasting Staff (ABS), particularly singled out 
newspapers for attack. He argued that: "The Press clearly is totally unbalanced against the trade union 
movement... In many papers editorial opinions are entirely predictable, and in the process of editing some 
editors use scissors that seem totally incapable of travelling along balanced lines. " (TUC 1971: 592). 
228 Anon. 1972. ̀Briginshaw bashes trade union bashers', Labour Weekly, August 11,1972. 
229 It passed a motion that noted the "... serious criticisms made from time to time of the way in which the 
activities of the trade union movement and of individual unions are described and represented by the Press 
and in radio and television broadcasts... " (Trades Union Congress Economic Committee, ̀ The Newspaper 
Industry', December 13,1972: 1). 
230 See, for instance, Geoffrey Goodman, ̀Quality and Diversity In The Press' RD 651/February 1973: 3. 
231 Home Policy Committee Note on Communications Meeting, RD370/June 1972: 2. 
232 Martin Linton `Policies for the Press', RD 536/January 1973: 2. 
233 "The strategy should have as its first and main objective the maintenance and, where necessary, the 
creation, of variety of outlets. That is to say, the object should be not to maintain the pretence of that 
objectivity and fairness is possible, but to create the genuine basis for a wide variety of sources, some of 
which may maintain a pose of objectivity but many of which will be openly biased and partisan. The 
strategy should not be to encourage socialist media but to create a framework within which such media can 
and will emerge. " (Hugh Jenkins ̀ A Framework for a Communications Policy' RD 597/February 1973: 1). 
Hugh Jenkins was MP for Putney from 1964-79, a member of the Arts Council from 1968-71 and Arts 
minister. from 1974-76. He was created a peer in . 1981. (Baron HughJenkins archives, London 
School of 
Economics, Anon. 2002. House of Lords Biographies, London: PMS Publications). 
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Outside the working group, it was more clearly argued that the main aim of any new 
ownership legislation would be the promotion of a Labour movement press - and 
diversity and democracy was a secondary, if important, consideration. This was a 
unifying theme of both right and left. 234 Labour Weekly, a newspaper produced by the 
Labour Party that had been set up in 1971, was running a campaign ̀ The Case For A 
Labour Press' to push for newspapers directly linked to the Labour and trade union 
movement, similar to those in Norway and Sweden, as we shall note in the appendix to 
this chapter. 235 
As part of that, Linton argued for a Labour press on the basis that, unlike the then 
Labour-supporting Sun and Daily Mirror, a Labour press would actively campaign for 
radical policies, along with enhancing diversity. Reflecting a view which would influence 
discussions on Labour representation by the means of press management in 1990s, he 
viewed that the press was involved in agenda-setting - "... it does not pick the winner but 
it picks the battlefield". A Labour press would help shift politics on to a more radical 
agenda, with a more left wing consensus, as there was in Norway and Sweden 236 It was 
argued in the newspaper that the working group's interest in enabling groupings to have 
access to the media would mean promoting Labour papers to broaden choice. 237 
234 "There was a rhetoric, which was mobilised by right and left -a kind of ritualistic rhetoric. How best 
could you appeal to the common denominator of the Labour Party in public speeches? You could by 
attacking the capitalist press, because if there was one thing the left and right had in common, there was a 
feeling that they had a bad press. They were faced by, essentially, a conservative enemy. So Roy Hattersley 
would routinely attack the press, just as speakers from the left... So it was part of the ritual of the Labour 
movement. " (Curran interview). 
235 A double page spread in Labour Weekly in June 1972 attested to this. (Linton, Martin. 1972. ̀The Case 
for a Labour Press', Hansen, Bjorn. 1972. ̀Where Labour has a good press', Labour Weekly, June 9 1972, 
Anon. 1972. ̀ Case for a Labour Press: Where the dream is a reality', Labour Weekly, June 30 1972). 
Linton, in the newspaper, expressed concerns regarding the narrowness of press ownership, both in terms 
of the numbers of firms involved and in the politics of the chairs of those companies. Interestingly, for what 
was to follow, Rupert Murdoch was the only proprietor with sympathies that were thought by some in the 
Labour Party to be left-of-centre at the time. (Linton, The Case). It should be remembered that in this 
period, as it would be again, the Sun was a Labour-backing paper. Labour regarded it as important to keep 
its support. The Sun had been created on the death of the Daily Herald and had been Labour-supporting. It 
came out for Labour in 1970, before switching to support the Conservatives in the 1974 election. 
236 Linton, The Case. It can be debated whether the basis of the radical agenda in these countries was so 
solely directly determined by the social democratic press. 
237 Anon. 1972. ̀Case for a Labour Press: Where the dream is a reality', Labour Weekly, June 30 1972. 
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A Press for Democracy 
Few on the committee had so exclusive a commitment, however. A major concern for 
many on the group at this stage was also to provide a press required for political 
democracy. 
The background paper, produced for the group's first meeting, had identified 
dissatisfaction with the media on precisely this count. It identified many of the concerns 
we saw in Chapter 1 as affecting political democracy. That is, newspaper ownership was 
becoming more concentrated, the number of newspapers was shrinking and advertising's 
operation led to bifurcation. 238 The committee's most influential contribution also made 
this concern explicit. Its author was an academic associated with the New Left, who 
would have a crucial influence on Labour press policy throughout the 1970s and into the 
1980s - James Curran. 
239 
As for ways to provide for political democracy, the study group identified ownership 
concentration and commercial domination as key areas to be tackled at its first 
meeting. 240 Those involved would dispute how these problems would be confronted. At 
the working group's second meeting, the discussion divided on the methods to provide 
press plurality, a debate that set the tone for subsequent gatherings. The divisions were 
between those wanting more statist structures to provide for this and those advocating 
less direct government involvement - with some entwining them with demands for 
238 Home Policy Committee: Communications, RD324/April 1972: 2-3,5. 
2" Curran's aim was to : "... create a free press, independent of both political censorship and the market 
distortions that have led to monopoly contraction and discrimination against minority interests; a varied 
press because greater diversity is essential if the cross-section of conflicting views, tastes and interests in 
the community is to be adequately represented and catered for; and a democratic press, democratically 
managed by workers within the industry and rendered more accountable to the community it serves. " 
(James Curran, ̀ The Newspaper Press: Salvage or Save? ', RD662/March 1973: 1). 240 Those involved were concerned that the public didn't appreciate the "... the extent to which the country 
was denied a free communications industry... ", for instance where a small number of proprietors owned the 
vast majority of the press. (Home Policy Committee Note on Communications Meeting, RD370/June 1972: 
2). Another concern being expressed in the Labour Party press at this time was that distributors were 
hampering diversity by excluding `underground' papers on commercial grounds. One senior MP, Tom 
Driberg, saw this as censorship by other means. (Driberg, Tom. 1972. 'Burying-the Underground', Labour 
Weekly, April 7 1972). 
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Labour representation. 241 The different views can be reduced to four basic positions on 
how to advance plurality. We shall return to a discussion on the merits of some of the 
various schemes in Chapter 4. 
PLURAL VIEWS: DIVERSITY AND PLURALITY 
The State Solution 
The state solution advanced called for a National Printing Corporation as a government 
holding company. This was of the sort associated with models of public service, those 
advanced by some Marxists and also Keane and similar to other non-media statist 
schemes Labour and the New Left supported at the time. This solution was backed by the 
National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants (NATSOPA) union, a TUC report 
considered it favourably and one influential study group member Geoffrey Goodman 
consistently advocated it. He argued that the market on its own could not provide the 
range of newspapers for a democracy and the state should intervene directly. 
242 
This National Printing Corporation would discriminate in favour of weaker newspapers 
by giving state aid. It would buy printing plant - at minimum the presses and assets of 
newspapers set to merge or close. 
243 In the variant proposed to the working group, it 
would contract out the production of newspapers. Indeed, some on the working group 
241 Minutes of the Second Home Policy Committee on Communications, 10 January 1973: 2. 
242 Trades Union Congress Economic Committee, 'The Newspaper Industry', December 13,1972: 16-7, 
Geoffrey Goodman, `Quality and Diversity In The Press' RD 651/February 1973: 3. Geoffrey Goodman 
had worked on the Manchester Guardian and the News Chronicle. He had been industrial correspondent on 
the Daily Herald and the pre-Murdoch Sun before becoming the Daily Mirror's Industrial Editor in 1969. 
He was also appointed Assistant Editor on the newspaper in 1976. He headed the government's Counter- 
Inflation Publicity Unit from 1975 to 1976. He also served on the 1977 Royal Commission on the Press 
where he was the co-author of the Minority Report, which advocated this solution. He had previously been 
a member of the Labour Party Committee on Industrial Democracy. (Anon. 1979. Who's Who. London : A. 
& C. Black.: 967, Morgan Kenneth, O. 1997. Callaghan :a We. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University 
Press.: 627). 
243 Linton, Policies: 2, Eric Moonman, ̀ Saving The Press', RD 532/January 1973: 1. 
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saw this operating in a similar way to how commercial broadcasters were subject to 
contract, in a public service-style model. 244 
One proponent, Linton, saw that dealing with the "... two problems - of access and 
finance... " were key to Labour policies on the press. To combat these twin difficulties, 
the corporation would make it easier for new publications to enter the market and it 
would prop up smaller circulation newspapers' finances. 245 Subsidy and contract renewal 
would be dependent on circulation. If the newspaper failed to rise above a certain 
circulation, its contract would not be renewed. If it achieved a higher circulation, the 
subsidy element would be cut. 246 
However, two key problems with such a proposal were that, firstly, it was a costly way of 
addressing a problem of press print capacity shortage that did not exist. 47 Also, it did not 
deal with a major barrier to newspaper market entry. The obstacle was not production 
costs, which a National Printing Corporation would effectively subsidise. It was 
advertising. As we shall consider further in the next chapter, such a scheme failed to deal 
with bipolarisation. 
Moreover, press dependence on state funding left it prone to government control. A key 
problem was that of a public service press. A printing corporation, by deciding between 
different leases, would be exercising an explicitly political judgement. Unlike in 
broadcasting, it is accepted that the press editorialises. Thus, by choosing one newspaper 
for subsidy over another, the corporation would be affecting the newspaper industry's 
whole political alignment. It was unclear who should make such political choices, which 
would also entail the use of public money. The NUJ was among opponents of a National 
Printing Corporation for this reason at this time. 248 This question would also be entwined 
with the question of Labour representation. There would be a potential pressure to 
244 Moonman, Saving: 1, Linton, Policies: 2, Geoffrey Goodman, ̀ Quality and Diversity In The Press' 
RD 651 /February 1973: 3. 
245 Linton, Policies: 2-4. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Sixth Meeting on Communications, ̀Communications: Draft Report': 25-6. 
249 George Vifer, `NUJ Policy on Concentration of Ownership', RD 647/February 1973: 8. 
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support those newspapers favourable to Labour. We shall see in Chapter 5 that this 
problem re-emerged when more radical public service models were considered after 
1979. 
Newsprint Subsidy and Advertising Tax 
An interventionist alternative to this, which would be less explicitly statist was across- 
the-board control of newsprint prices, possibly financed by an advertising levy. The NUJ 
advocated this scheme, where a central agency would sell it at a subsidised rate. The 
TUC's report on the newspaper industry also favourably regarded this scheme, which 
was similar to that which operated during World War II. The report thought that it would 
stop newspapers going out of business, reducing diversity, and it would encourage new 
entrants deterred by the cost of newsprint 249 The problem with such a scheme, however, 
was that it would either be costly and subsidise the most profitable companies or be 
ineffectual. 
Alternatively, many on the study group preferred an advertising tax on all media to 
provide a newsprint subsidy that favoured less profitable publications. The advertising 
tax would seek to tackle the problem of bifurcation. Such a tax commanded broad 
support among those interested in media reform, who were not necessarily on the New 
Left, including some whose interest was primarily in Labour representation. A key 
member of the committee, Eric Moonman, in an example of policy transfer, looked to 
other European states, particularly the Scandinavian countries, for inspiration. He saw a 
similar system was in operation to challenge concentration, as we shall see in the 
appendix to this chapter. 250 The former MP, after the second meeting of the group, felt 
249 Minutes of the Second Home Policy Committee on Communications, 10 January 1973: 2, W. R. 
Richardson, ̀Proposals On The Press', RD 632/February 1973: 3, George Viner, `Comments on RD 324, 
RD 529/January 1973: 2, Viner, NUJ Policy: 3, Viner, George. 1973. ̀ Primary need ̀ to link all research', 
Journalist, February 1973, Trades Union Congress Economic Committee, `The Newspaper Industry', 
December 13,1972: 18. 
250 Eric Moonman was a lecturer in industrial relations and a researcher and writer on management. He was 
a MP for Billericay from 1966-70 and for Basildon from 1974. He defected from the Labour Party in 1984. 
(Anon., 1979. Who's who, London: A. & C. Black.: 1762, Stenton, Michael, and Stephen Lees. 1981. 
Who's who of British members of Parliament :a biographical dictionary of the House of Commons based 
on annual volumes of 'Dods parliamentary companion' and other sources. Brighton: Harvester Press.: 
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that committee's majority supported his proposal, which was for a newsprint subsidy 
financed by a cross-media tax251 Advocates indicated that such a levy would have to be 
on all advertising so that advertisers would not switch to other media not bound by the 
levy. Moonman was among those who viewed such aid as subject to a number of 
conditions. Subsidies would have to be based on technical and financial, rather than 
cultural or political, grounds. 252 The aid, again, would reduce as profits were made. 
Publications aided had to be in genuine need, be technically efficient and primarily 
composed of news and opinion, as opposed to entertainment. Papers that were part of a 
group would receive a reduced subsidy. 253 
In addition, the advocates of this scheme called for a separate launch fund for new 
publications, which would have to fulfil the same criteria as those seeking the newsprint 
subsidy. Its object was to advance diversity. 254 A board independent of the state, which 
included a broader range of representatives, would oversee this. 55 
However, a key question would be how such a scheme would be funded. Reducing 
funding as paper sales increased was objected to because publishers wanting to save 
money could deliberately cut off distribution to more costly areas. Those deprived of 
their newspapers would blame the Labour government. 256 Yet, this could have been dealt 
with by having a medium cut-off point for subsidy, because of the low marginal cost of 
extra sales. Another suggestion was to allocate on the basis of the ratio between 
advertising and editorial content. This was Moonman's preferred option. 257 Some of the 
scheme's provisions were also open to the objection that its criteria were subjective, such 
263, Roth, Andrew, and Byron Criddle. 2000.1997-2002 parliamentary profiles. London: Parliamentary 
Profiles.: 1527). 
251 Moonman, Future, Eric Moonman, `The Press: A Draft Programme', RD 655/March 1973: 3-4., Linton, 
Policies: 2. 
252 W. R. Richardson, ̀Proposals On The Press', RD 632/February 1973: 9. 
253 Moonman, The Press: 4. See also Richardson, Proposals: 3. 
254 Moonman, The Press: 4. 
255 This did not necessarily mean democratic participation. While Moonman and Richardson saw the body 
as comprising of representatives from the industry, unions and newspaper publishers, as well as such bodies 
as the TUC, CBI, universities and women's groups, they did not stipulate how such a body would be 
selected. In fact, the only indication of this is that Moonman suggested that the government would appoint 
the ̀ independent' chair. (Moonman, The Press: 4-5, Richardson, Proposals: 9). 
256 James Curran, ̀ The Newspaper Press: Salvage or Save? ', RD662/March 1973: 30-2. 257 Moonman, Saving: 2, Moonman, Future. 
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as the stipulation concerning news and opinion. 
258 However, they were mainly 
determined by objective criteria elsewhere in Europe and could have been exclusively 
(see the appendix to this chapter). 
Use of government advertising 
The third suggestion canvassed to advance diversity was to spread government 
advertising more widely, as has been the case in Norway (see the appendix to this 
chapter). Press qualifying for a newsprint subsidy could automatically also have 
advertising placed with it from government, nationalised industry and local government. 
All organisations and businesses benefiting from government subsidies could also face 
this stipulation to diversify advertising. 259 But such a scheme would require, at the least, 
to be kept at arms length from the state. Otherwise, it had the potential to increase 
political patronage. 260 It was open to manipulation to increase Labour movement 
representation. 
The Advertising Revenue Board and Curran's Solution 
The disagreement between these different notions came to a head at the fourth meeting of 
the working party in March 1973, when the debate was between Moorman and Curran. 261 
Both saw scope for some ̀ arms-length' state intervention but dismissed the explicitly 
statist printing corporation, which did not figure prominently in the discussion. To some 
extent, the debate concerned tactics, not strategy. Both sides' strategy was to provide a 
258 Minutes of the Second Home Policy Committee on Communications, 10 January 1973: 3. See also 
Viner, NUJ Policy: 8-9, Richardson, Proposals: 3. 
259 Richardson viewed that a system of this sort would be simple to administer, as the subsidised press 
would complain if advertisers flouted the rules. (Richardson, Proposals: 8). 
260 James Curran, ̀ The Newspaper Press: Salvage or Save? ', RD662/March 1973: 24. 
261 Minutes of 4th Home Policy Committee on Communications, March 8 1973: 1. A Cambridge-educated 
academic, Curran stood for the Cambridge parliamentary seat in 1974. Curran went on to become an 
academic advisor to the Royal Commission on the Press, that shall be discussed in Chapter 3. Since 1989 
he has been Professor of Communications at Goldsmith's College, University of London. He is author and 
editor of numerous books on the press. As a journalist, he was founding editor of New Socialist from 1981 
to 1984 and was a Times columnist from 1982 to 1983. (Griffiths, Dennis. 1992. The Encyclopedia of the 
British press, 1422-1992. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.: 180). 
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more diverse press. The debate was on how much state control was needed to achieve 
this. 
An Advertising Revenue Board or, in Curran's variant, a Media Advertising Corporation, 
provided an answer to the problem of bifurcation and diversity. This would be more 
extensively interventionist. MP Hugh Jenkins initially advocated it on the committee and 
Curran vigorously supported it. 262 Though, again, a policy transfer with Scandinavian 
inspiration, it was more explicitly state interventionist than the Scandinavian schemes, 
reflecting what was perceived as the more concentrated nature of the British national 
press. It can also be argued that it was a product of New Left enthusiasm for greater state 
involvement, as there would be effective nationalisation of part of the advertising 
function. 263 
The corporation would collect all revenue for press publications directly from advertisers; 
charging market rates. It would redistribute this predominantly back to publishers, 
proportionate to circulation. The revenue would thus be distributed on the basis of the 
number of readers, not, as with advertisers, on the composition of the readership. There 
would be an incentive element in this payment to encourage the most effective promotion 
of advertising space. Such a scheme would reduce the economic distortion of advertising. 
The advertising value of each consumer would become the same, thus undermining the 
bias against lower-income readership publications. 264 
In addition, the corporation would keep a proportion of funds to subsidise newsprint costs 
of newspapers in inverse proportion to their circulation and to provide a launch fund for 
new publications. The newsprint subsidy would offset the problem that, without it, the 
scheme could close some of the broadsheet titles. It would also start to cancel out the 
advantages that accrued due to economies of scale. Although there was much greater 
262 Hugh Jenkins, ̀ Communications and Advertising', RD 530/January 1973: 1-3, Minutes of the Second 
Home Policy Committee on Communications, 10 January 1973: 1-3. 
263 For a discussion of this see Curran, Different approaches: 112-3. 264 James Curran, ̀ The Newspaper Press: Salvage or Save? ', RD662/March 1973: 2,35-7. 
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state involvement in this scheme than in those on which it was based, Curran argued that 
his suggestion had little potential for political manipulation and censorship 
265 
Curran's extensive work heavily influenced the Communications study group. The March 
1973 meeting agreed that providing a newsprint subsidy "... was in effect only a safety 
net... ", although we should add that it would have been an important one. The meeting 
plumped for a Media Advertising Corporation, where redistribution was based on 
circulation. However, not everything went Curran's way. Benn, from the chair, still 
called for more discussion on a public service concept of the press, which Curran had 
explicitly dismissed. 266 
OWNERSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 
Discussions regarding the involvement of those in the newspaper industry were part of 
that ongoing debate in the Labour movement on industrial democracy, mentioned earlier. 
By the 1970s, other subcommittees, involved in discussing policy for industry as a whole, 
were developing policy on worker participation. 67 But workers' involvement in 
newspapers raised particular questions because of the nature of media influence, the 
hegemonic position of the liberal classical notion of press freedom and the relationship 
between media workers and wider community involvement. These were some of the 
areas contested by those on the Communications group - with union representatives, 
individual journalists and leading MPs viewing the question of democratising ownership 
differently. 
The campaign for worker participation was a concern of some newspaper staff and their 
union, the National Union of Journalists. By the 1970s, several newspapers had forged 
agreements with the NUJ, agreeing to increased consultation on policy and staffing 
matters. One commentator viewed that "... the spread of participatory ideas has involved 
265 lbid.: 3,35-40,41. 
266 `Minutes of the Fourth Home Policy Committee on Communications', March 8 1973: 3. 
267 One example of the consideration of economic democracy by a NEC subcommittee is provided in 
Capital Sharing Study Group ̀ Final Draft of Green Paper', RD: 846/July 1973: 49-50. 
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Fleet Street in an incipient and important crisis of authority". 268 An indication of this was 
that when a prominent editor wrote a book in 1972 on the national press, he felt the issue 
merited two chapters. 269 
At the forefront of these demands was the short-lived Free Communications Group 
(FCG), with its journal The Open Secret. 270 Reflecting the New Left interest in industrial 
democracy, it had worked with NUJ chapels in making demands for increased 
involvement. 
The NUJ participated in helping shape changes made on the Daily Express in 1973 - the 
first time this had happened in Fleet Street. 271 The concept of worker participation had 
272 become union policy in 1972. By 1974, the Times had a monthly Editorial Consultative 
Committee. The Daily Mirror's owners had agreed to monthly meetings between the 
management and the NUJ chapel. 273 We will consider other collective decision-making 
structures for those working on the title in Chapter 6. The Guardian saw a campaign, 
which was eventually unsuccessful, for democratically elected journalist representation 
on the Scott trust board, that ran the paper, and a staff veto on senior appointments. 74 
However, the FCG's aims were broader. The first pamphlet in its In Place of 
Management series identified a range of demands to be placed on newspaper firms. These 
ran from a call for news teams, through consultation and the sharing of editorial and 
268 Smith, A. 1974. The British press since the war. Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Littlefield.: 283-4. 269 Wintour, Pressures on the press: Chapters 7 and 8. 270 Smith, The British press: 290, Wintour, Pressures on the press: 78. 271 The union had produced a document on policy within the paper, which the Father of Chapel saw as 
echoed in changes made to the paper. He considered that it had become more liberal and more open to 
union views. Nevertheless, he thought it impossible to say what influence the document had on the 
changes. Yet, he saw the participation as important "... at a time when, on the other side of the Street, 
Rupert Murdoch is seeking to turn it into a bogey word and denouncing the very idea as little short of red 
revolution". (Ross, David `Staff help to shape a paper', The Journalist, May 1973). 272 National Union of Journalists. 1973. National Union of Journalists Annual Report 1972-3. London: 
National Union of Journalists.: 49. 273 Smith, The British press: 302. 274 Smith, The British press: 302-8, quoting Free Communications Group, The Open Secret, No. 7,63-5, 
Taylor, Geoffrey. 1993. Changing faces :a history of The Guardian, 1956-88. London: Fourth Estate.: 
303-4. 
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managerial control to culminate in 
demands to share ownership with management 275 
Inspiration and policy transfer came from France and 
Le Monde 276 
The Communications working party had a remit to consider journalists' democratic 
involvement within the media from the start. A background paper produced for the 
committee saw the need for this 277 The paper highlighted alternative forms of media 
organisation to be considered. For the press, it flagged up the possibility that the study 
group could consider creating structures for both self-management of new titles and 
participation in existing ones, as opposed to community participation. 
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Despite its involvement in practical initiatives, the NUJ leadership wanted only limited 
journalist participation and a rigid separation between participation and workers' control. 
This reflected the Labour right's views, and a mixture of some liberal pluralist and 
European social market ideas. Asked to summarise its position at the start of 1973, the 
committee was told that the NUJ leadership was wedded to the view that press freedom 
rested "... upon theoretical individual proprietorship... ". Yet, it was possible "... to mitigate 
its effect... ", by separating the owners from editorial policy. The union's research officer 
George Viner indicated that this was based on a view that: "Newspaper proprietors do not 
want to be cast in the villainous role of manipulators of public opinion. " They could, in 
fact, play a positive role as a bulwark against external takeovers. 279 Viner accepted that 
existing TUC proposals for supervisory boards, which included workers and would have 
veto powers over management, should include the newspaper industry. But he viewed 
that "... workers' control... could be calamitous in the newspaper industry". 280 
275 Free Communications Group, In Place of Management, No 1- Free the Press - the Case for Democratic 
Control, 6-15, quoted in Smith, The British press: 290-4. 
276 As one hostile commentator put it, "... many English journalists have been led astray by their admiration 
for that distinguished newspaper Le Monde". From the 1950s onwards, the staff had controlled part of the 
stock of Le Monde, giving them a veto on major decisions (Wintour, Pressures on the press: 88). See 
appendix to Chapter 2. 
277 Home Policy Committee: Communications, RD324/April 1972: 6. 
278 Home Policy Committee: Communications, RD324/April 1972: 6. For some discussion on industrial 
democracy in the Labour Party in this period, see Wickham-Jones, Economic. 68-9. 
279 Viner, NUJ Policy: 1-2. 
280 Anon. 1973. ̀Our ̀ special' role in industrial democracy', Journalist, August 1973. 
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Yet, the union's view was not the only sway on Labour Party thinking on the working 
group. More influential was the demand by other journalists on the committee for 
workers' involvement. Geoffrey Goodman called for measures to democratise press 
ownership. 8' And it was the approach outlined by the journalist Neal Ascherson, from 
the FCG, which the group explicitly agreed to in March 1973.82 
While the NUJ leadership had divorced the two questions, Ascherson argued for the same 
range of demands as the FCG outlined, from participation to sharing control. Control 
ranged from the right of access to company information, through staff strategic editorial 
control, where the editor was in charge of tactical decisions, to the launch of press co- 
operatives. 283 
Reflecting the debates outlined in Chapter 1, while the emphasis was on worker 
participation, Ascherson was among those on the committee who wanted broader 
democratic control than just by journalists. This reflected the view of others in the Labour 
Party and the left of the NUJ, who wanted the involvement of other communication 
workers. 284 Ascherson saw the need for other workers to be included with journalists as 
majority owners in staff co-operatives. But he went beyond syndicalist views to support 
increasing public access and participation. He envisaged that outside interests, not just 
unions, could have a non-controlling stake in newly-launched co-ops. 
285 
281 Geoffrey Goodman, ̀Quality and Diversity In The Press' RD 651/February 1973: 3. 
282 ̀Minutes of the Fourth Home Policy Committee on Communications', March 8 1973: 3, Neal 
Ascherson, ̀ Internal Press Freedom: Notes on Democratic Control in the Newspaper Industry, March 
1973', Curran interview. The award-winning journalist and author Neal Ascherson started as a reporter and 
leader writer for the Manchester Guardian before working for the Scotsman and then moving to the 
Observer in 1960. Among other posts on the title, he was the Eastern European correspondent from 1968 to 
1975. He was a columnist and associate editor from 1985 to 1989. In 1990, he became a columnist on the 
Independent on Sunday. From 1998 onwards, he has been an assistant lecturer in the Institute of 
Archaeology at University College London. (2002. Who's who 2002: an annual biographical dictionary. 
London: A. & C. Black, 2002. ) 
283 Ascherson, Press Freedom. 
284 An indication of the more radical solutions being bandied about at this time came from the Benn 
confidant Ken Coates writing in Tribune. The leading light in the Institute for Workers' Control argued that 
democratic representative bodies in the press industry would need to include others than just journalists and 
incorporate all other workers which helped produce newspapers. (Ken Coates, `Workers' control: 
democratising newspapers', Tribune, December 15 1972), The NUJ left's view was aired in Anon., `Our 
`sfecial' role in industrial democracy' Journalist, August 1973. 
28- Ascherson, Press Freedom: 4-5. 
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Benn, as the working group's chair, was also committed to public participation. Typically 
entering the lion's den, he made the demand for greater participation to a conference of 
the Guild of British Newspaper Editors in April 1972. Yet, this was not reported in 
anything like the same detail as the attack on media power he made in his chairman's 
address at the end of the 1972 Labour Party conference, which the press strongly 
condemned. 286 He followed this up with a paper for the Shadow Cabinet paper, that was 
not submitted, but which envisaged a combination of citizen and worker participation. - 
However, this was mitigated by his concern for Labour movement representation - to 
reduce anti-Labour movement bias. So, he wanted to strengthen union power and provide 
only limited public participation. He visualized the election of newspaper worker 
committees, which would adjudicate on complaints from the public on examples of bias. 
Such a body would have no more power than that to make a report. It would not provide 
the right of reply that we shall consider in later chapters. Yet, Benn envisaged that the 
report would build up a policy that would influence future news production. 287 
The study group did not consider Benn's scheme. Instead, although the Newspaper 
Proprietors' Association was "... fanatically hostile... " to broadening involvement in 
newspapers as a threat to `press freedom', as Ascherson, put it, the committee supported 
his approach. 288 
286 ̀The Ethics of Circumstance' Tribune October 1 1972, Labour Party, Conference. 1972. Report of the 
seventy erst Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Blackpool, 1972, October 2-6. London: Labour Party.: 
348-9, Linton, Policies: 1. 
287 Benn, Tony. 1974. Speeches by Tony Benn.: 173-5, Panitch and Leys: 59-60. 
288 ̀Minutes of the Fourth Home Policy Committee on Communications', March 8 1973: 3, Ascherson, 
Press Freedom, Curran interview. 
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THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE WORKING PARTY: DELAYS, DIVISIONS AND 
DECISIONS 
It had been originally aimed that the report of the committee would be published as an 
opposition Green Paper by the end of 1972. However, this underestimated the 
discussion's contentious nature and the scale of the task involved. Even at the first 
meeting of the committee, the minutes record "... a measure of scepticism as to whether it 
would ever succeed in agreeing [a policy]". 289 After the 1972 deadline passed without 
agreement, another date was set to settle on recommendations for Labour's Programme 
for Britain 1973, to be completed by April of that year. 290 As it was, the party policy 
document - agreed after meetings of the NEC and a joint meeting with the Shadow 
Cabinet - baldly stated that "... more work would be necessary... " on the committee 
before any decisions could be made. 291 The study group delayed deciding on policy 
repeatedly and divisions emerged between the right and left as to what strategy to adopt. 
This question of delays was to dog Labour media policymakers in the future, as we shall 
see. 
Nevertheless, Labour's Programme gave important pointers as to the party's position on 
the press. It explicitly took a New Left position. It supported diversity and regarded press 
and media internal industrial democracy as "... essential... ". It was both a guarantor of 
independence and a goal in its own right; allowing "... greater freedom for those working 
within the media both to express their views and to share in the decision-making 
process". 92 
Yet, the working group could not agree on either industrial democracy or diversity. On 
the former, although Ascherson's position had been agreed, sceptical voices had been 
raised during the discussion. MP Christopher Mayhew made a last ditch attempt to stop 
289 `Home Policy Committee Note on Communications Meeting', RD370/June 1972: 1. 
290 `Minutes of the Second Home Policy Committee on Communications', 10 January 1973: 1-2, See also 
`Home Policy Committee on Communications Final Report Background Note', RES 59: 1. 
291 Benn, Against the tide: 35-43. 
292 The document also expressed concerns about concentration and cross-ownership. This was seen to lead 
to possible conflicts of interests between diff_erent_parts of media businesses. (Labour Party, Conference. 
1973. Labour's programme for Britain : annual conference 1973. London: Labour Party.: 87-8). 
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the policy. 293 He supported some workers' participation but was against journalist, union 
or staff dominance. He believed that media worker control could be a recipe for a "... left- 
wing takeover"294 However, Benn recalls that Mayhew was in a minority at the meeting 
that discussed the draft in January 1974 295 
The other division was on whether to adopt a public service or strongly interventionist 
social market model to bring diversity. Pressures for Labour representation were 
entwined with a public service model, as was mentioned earlier. The chair Benn 
summarised the objectives of the working group thus far, in May 1973, as supporting a 
"... public service framework of supervision... ", which would include public ownership of 
printing facilities. His diaries recall that this position was broadly accepted on the 
committee 296 However, the minutes indicate that this was not the case. There was a 
division. Benn advocated that the Labour Party set up a commission to govern the media, 
promoting a public service model. Supporters saw it as the most effective way to 
implement the committee's agreed objectives. However, despite Benn's assurances that 
such a commission would have no control over content, those against setting up a 
politically-appointed body to regulate the media thought it would be open to political and 
state influence. 297 As it was, the committee eventually placed its emphasis on a social 
market model. 
As has already been indicated, the plan was for the committee's draft to be written into a 
report, which would be published to provide for further discussion. Yet, crucially, despite 
what had been written in Labour's Programme for Britain 1973, the February 1974 
293 Mayhew was a former junior defence minister and MP for South Norfolk and Woolwich East. He - 
resigned from the Labour Party in 1974 to join the Liberal Party (Benn, Tony, and Ruth Winstone. 1995. 
The Benn diaries. London: Hutchinson.: 653, Curran interview). 
294 Christopher Mayhew ̀ Note on Draft Report', RD 961/December 1973: 1. 
295 Benn, Against the tide: 98. 
296 Minutes of the Second Home Policy Committee on Communications, 10 May 1973: 1-2, Benn, Against 
the tide: 31. 
297 Ibid. 
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election manifesto included no input from the working party and provided no press or 
media policy. 298 
THE FINAL REPORT: THE PEOPLE AND THE MEDL4 
The eventual production in 1974 of the study group's report, The people and the media, 
was Labour's first-ever public document dealing with the mass media. 299 It is important 
to again remember that it represented the position of the committee, not Labour Party 
policy. 300 An indication of this was that it was presented as a discussion paper aimed at 
promoting further debate 301 
Reflecting the study group's New Left emphasis, the report made a powerful case for 
intervening to extend ownership plurality and was less concerned with explicitly 
promoting a Labour movement press. As Tom O'Malley perceptively indicates, it 
focused less on the relationship between government and the press and more on the 
responsibilities of the press to the public. 302 This was indicated in the title of the report. It 
also called for increased democratisation in the press, although was less specific on 
policies to achieve this than Ascherson had been, for instance. 
However, the relationship with Labour representation was evident. So, The people and 
the media argued that the tendency to concentration was intertwined with bias, 
particularly pronounced against the unions 303 The "... basic conservatism of the Press... " 
was "... also reflected in the tight pattern of ownership in the press industry". 304 
Nevertheless, it was the latter that was emphasised. Political democracy required a press 
298 Labour, Party. 1974b. Let us work together - labour's way out of the crisis : the Labour Party manifesto, 
1974. London: Labour Party., Harrison, Stanley. 1974. Poor men's guardians :a record of the struggles for 
a democratic newspaper press, 1763-1973. London: Lawrence and Wishart.: 242-3. 
299 Curran, Different approaches: 129. 
300 Labour Party, The people and the media: 3. 
301 Freedman, 2000: 135, Freedman, 2003: 90. 
302 O'Malley: 89-90. 
303 Labour Party, The people and the media: 20-2, Sixth Meeting on Communications, ̀Communications: 
Draft Report': 20-1. 
304 Labour Party, The people and the media: 5,6, Sixth Meeting on Communications: 2-3. 
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as a guarantor of free expression, not just to inform, but also "... to express the views and 
interests of different sections of the community". 305 
The method to achieve this again highlighted the tension between a public service model 
and a social market one. Despite the objections of Curran and others, the first principle 
the report stated was to entrench the media within the public service model and public 
funding framework. 306 It supported the setting up of a state-funded Communications 
Council, which would oversee "... the operation, development and interrelation... " of the 
media, including the press. However, its role did not appear so all-embracing as the body 
Benn envisaged. Its main task would be to oversee a right of reply, which we will discuss 
in later chapters. It would also review and publicise the press's operation. 307 In addition, 
although the final report draft had rejected calls for a National Printing Corporation, the 
final report left this possibility open. 08 But, as Frank Allaun suggests, this proposition 
was given less prominence. 09 
Instead, the overall emphasis was towards the social market model. The report identified 
advertising and bifurcation as a key threat to diversity. Following the insistence of some, 
most notably Curran, the group agreed on an Advertising Revenue Board to deal with 
these problems. 310 The board would administer advertising revenue. How this would be 
achieved was more clearly outlined in draft proposals than in this final report, but 
followed a similar pattern. 11 The advertiser would still be free to choose what media to 
advertise in and the newspaper to take as much of whatever advertising it wanted 312 
Some surplus revenue would be withheld to set up a fund to launch new titles. 13 This 
305 Labour Party, The people and the media: 16,17, Sixth Meeting on Communications: 15,16. 
306 Labour Party, The people and the media: 8. 
307 Ibid.: 12-3. 
308 Ibid.: 30. 
309 Allaun, Spreading the news: 86. Frank Allaun was the industrial correspondent for the Daily Herald, 
before becoming the MP for Salford East. He was elected to the National Executive in 1967 and was chair 
of the party in 1978-9. (1983. Dods parliamentary companion.: 342) He was a member of the media study 
coup in the period from 1972 to 1974 and chaired the group between 1979 and 1983. 
10 Labour Party, The people and the media: 26-7, Sixth Meeting on Communications: 28-9. 
31 1 Labour Party, The people and the media: 27-8, Sixth Meeting on Communications: 29. 
312 Labour Party, The people and the media: 27. 
313 Allaun, Spreading the news: 85-6, Labour Party, The people and the media: 26-9,31-2. See also 
O'Malley: 89-90,94, Curran, Different approaches: 112-3. 
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launch fund would require those newspapers involved reaching a certain circulation 
before all funds were made available. On top of this, as with Curran's proposals, the 
report also called for newsprint subsidies to provide further economic support for 
publications. Yet, in addition, The people and the media advocated diversifying the 
advertising of all "... government and semi-government bodies... " to include all smaller 
publications, despite Curran's fears 314 
The report saw that the radical restructuring of the press would also entail extending 
industrial democracy, although it was less explicit than Ascherson had been on this. As 
for democratic input from both workers and from the community as a whole, it made a 
general statement of intent, but did not provide a clear policy as to which group was to 
have the greater influence. Media workers would have a chance to participate in decisions 
at all levels and influence the general emphasis of the product with which they were 
involved. 315 Any publication that received public financing would need to operate some 
form of industrial democracy. However, the report did not specify the mechanics of 
this 316 
Later critics have pointed to the prediction in The people and the media that there would 
only be two or three newspapers by the 1980s. Researchers who influenced early New 
Labour thinking used this to damn what they see as all `Old Labour' work on the press 
and media. 17 While such over-apocalyptic crystal ball gazing was flawed, the vision of 
newspaper concentration has some validity. While there are not three newspapers, three 
firms dominate. The claim is certainly more well-founded than the widely-held later 
predictions that introducing new technology and curbing union influence would see new 
entrants provide a diverse press. 
314 Labour Party, The people and the media: 29-32. 
315 Ibid.: 6, Sixth Meeting on Communications, ̀Communications: Draft Report': 2-3. 
316 Labour Party, The people and the media: 26-9,31-2. See also Allaun, Spreading the news: 85-6, 
O'Malley: 89-90,94, Curran, Different approaches: 112-3. 
31 Richard Collins and Cristina Murroni are so emphatic about this `flawed prediction' that they mention it 
twice. (Collins and Murroni: 4,11). - 
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At the time, The people and the media faced major opposition from the newspaper 
industry and the Labour leadership was distanced from the proposals. 
Firstly, newspaper industry anger centred on plans for an Advertising Revenue Board. 
We will consider this further in Chapter 4. Charles Hamilton, former chair of Times 
Newspapers, saw that it gave the state the role as creator and prop of the press. This 
compromised the newspapers' watchdog role. 18 However, as we saw, though more statist 
than analogous schemes abroad, the revenue board's funding criteria was politically 
neutral. The liberal pluralist fears Hamilton harboured were also levelled against the 
analogous Scandinavian schemes and have been shown to be unfounded in practice. (See 
this chapter's appendix). Also, as was argued in the Chapter 1, his claim that the market 
could operate as an effective watchdog was flawed. 
Where Hamilton's critique was potentially more powerful was regarding the launch fund. 
The report stated that this could be rationed on the basis that it was proved that such 
publications met a `community need' 319 The basis for this would have to have been 
carefully crafted to avoid political manipulation. However, again, as the operation of 
similar systems in other parts of Europe showed, this could have been possible. (Again 
see this chapter's appendix). A more telling criticism of the board scheme was that it was 
complicated and lacked sufficient political support across the Labour Party. It would have 
been the case, as Curran has more recently considered, that an advertising levy would 
have garnered more support. 320 
Nevertheless, it appears likely that any form of state intervention would have incurred the 
wrath of the newspaper businesses. It would have had to challenge the historically 
prevalent liberal pluralist notion in Britain that freedom of the press means ownership 
freedom from any government control. Frederick von Hayek had provided a classic 
critique of extensive market intervention earlier in the 20th century, echoes of which were 
heard in these criticisms of the revenue board scheme. Such an analysis would later 
318 Hamilton, Charles Denis, and Birkbeck College. 1976. Who is to own the British press? London.: 15-6. 319 Labour Party. The_ people and the media,, 29-34. 
326 Curran, Bending: 113, Curran interview. 
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become fashionable with the arrival of Thatcherism, influenced heavily by Hayek's work. 
Hayek rejected claims that individuals could have a complete knowledge of the world 32' 
No central collective authority could centralise individuals' knowledge and be aware of 
all the factors involved in a decision, such as those required for Labour's plans. 22 
Instead, it was with the operation of the market that the major section of knowledge was 
developed - the fleeting `knowledge of time and circumstance', developed through 
entrepreneurial competition. 323 This knowledge was decentralised and dispersed and the 
market co-ordinated it. From this concept of social epistemology, Hayek suggested that 
the market, as the unforeseen outcome of experiment, might not provide the optimum 
result. But it was less imperfect than any attempt to centralise knowledge 324 State 
intervention, such as that envisaged by those in the Labour Party would be detrimental. 
However, this critique of interventionism can be challenged. Commentators have 
indicated that the assumption behind Hayek's theory was that the market operated on the 
basis of a series of independent, self-employed producers who owned their means of 
production and exchanged their products freely. 325 This "... veneration of the figure of the 
entrepreneur... " led Hayek to see monopolies as a threat to this spontaneous order. 326 
However, as we have seen with the press industry, oligopolies have developed out of this 
spontaneous system. In this sense, the system "... carries the seeds of its own 
destruction". 327 
321 Gamble, Andrew. 1996. Hayek : the iron cage of liberty. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in association 
with Blackwell.: 11-13. 
322 Hayek: 77-8, Wainwright, -Hilary. 1994. Arguments for a new left : answering the free-market right. 
Cambridge, Mass., Blackwell, 1994.: Blackwell.: 50. For those wanting to direct the market, for Hayek: 
"The problem ... [was] precisely how to extend the span of our utilization of resources beyond the control 
of any one mind... ". The idea that all knowledge could be centralised, for state intervention to be effective, 
was an example of constructivist thinking - "... the main source of intellectual error in the modern world. " 
(Hayek: 88, Gamble: 67-8). 
323 Hayek: 80, Wainwright, New left: 50, Lavoie. 
324 Any attempt to interfere with it would derail a natural process and would have negative consequences. 
The role of the state must be hands-off- to protect this spontaneous order. (Wainwright, New left: 50,53-4, 
Gamble: 69). 
325 Gamble: 72. 
326 Tomlinson, Jim. 1990. Hayek and the market. London, Pluto, 1990: Pluto Press.: 112. 
327-Wainwright, 
-New left. 54. 
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What is the particular relevance of this to Labour's press schemes? The precise problem 
that Labour's plans wanted to address was that there was a concentration of ownership in 
few hands. The `invisible hand' had not produced decentralisation. Therefore, it can be 
questioned as to how Hayek's decentralised knowledge operates in this situation 328 The 
contrary seems to be true in this case - the market has concentrated ideological power, if 
not knowledge, in very few hands. Hayek does not satisfactorily solve this conundrum. 
He recognises that monopolisation is a problem. 29 Yet, he argues that large firms will be 
constrained by competition 330 However, the comparatively static oligopolised newspaper 
market challenges this assertion. Thus, this classic defence of the need for an unsullied 
market is refuted. Instead, what appears to be required, at minimum, is intervention to 
provide for competition and diversity, as the study group's plans sought to do. We shall 
return to this point in the next chapter. 
Secondly, the distance between the proposals of the group and the position of the 
leadership was reflected in the fact that it failed to form the basis for the second 1974 
election manifesto in October. A joint meeting of the cabinet and the NEC in June 1974 
discussed a draft manifesto that had some minimal commitments on the media, calling for 
them to be "... shielded from political and commercial pressures... ". The media were also 
to be encouraged to become "... more responsive to the needs of the community so that 
they can play an active part in strengthening our democracy". 331 Yet, the manifesto made 
no mention of specific press and media policy. 332 Indeed, the party's press and broadcast 
spokesperson John Grant later distanced the leadership from The people and the media. 
He wrote to the Times that it was a discussion document and "... in no sense was it 
Government policy... ". 333 
328 Tomlinson poses a similar question. Tomlinson: 146-7. 
329 Wainwright, New left: 55. 
330 Gamble: 72-3. 
331 Joint Meeting of the National Executive Committee and Cabinet, 'Revised outline of a manifesto', RES 
130: July 1974.: 36. See also Freedman, 2000: 143. 
332 Labour, Party. 1974a. Labour Party manifesto, October 1974: Britain will win with Labour. London: 
Labour Party. 
333 Grant, John. 1975. ̀ Letter: Press Freedom', Times, April 16,1975. Also quoted in Freedman, 2000: 
152, Freedman, 2003: 100. John Grant was a Daily Express journalist before becoming an MP in 1970. He 
-Ted the Läboür Part' änd jö-in3 tIie-DPYietöre Gecöming the heö üblic refätions for the controversial 
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CONCLUSION 
So, the development of discussions in the Labour Party's committees showed a marked 
shift from the views that Harold Wilson outlined at the start of this chapter. Yet, although 
the discussions in the party had moved on, by the time of the two 1974 elections this was 
not reflected in leadership statements or party policy. 
Nevertheless, a clear outline had emerged, which can be identified in relation to the 
approaches developed in the Chapter 1. Firstly, with the New Left media activists' 
primary impetus, parts of the party accepted increased government intervention. Some 
were prepared to advocate explicitly statist solutions with a National Printing 
Corporation. This, with its plans to contract out facilities, looked to a social democratic 
public service model. In addition, the idea of a 'state printing press accessible to working 
people also echoed the conceptions of Marxists and Keane. Others identified with clearly 
interventionist social market solutions - such as the advertising tax and newsprint subsidy 
solution and the scheme to diversify government advertising. 
The combination finally agreed upon was of the social market type. Nevertheless, it was 
one influenced by New Left notions of increased state involvement. It would include an 
Advertising Revenue Board, which would also operate a new launch fund. There would 
be a supporting role for a newsprint subsidy and diversified government advertising, 
together with the possibility of a National Printing Corporation. The corporation was 
associated with a public service model and there was an attempt to denote the whole 
approach as such. But it was not. 
The package as a whole did have potential problems. Despite denials at the time, such a 
combination provided for the possibility of political patronage, although the experience of 
such schemes elsewhere shows that this is not automatically the case 334 Along with fears 
regarding government advertising, the study group's report did not identify the basis on 
right-wing union, the EEPTU. (Pearse, Edward. 2000. `Obituary: John Grant', The Guardian, October 4 
2000). 
3a Labour Party. 
- 
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which members of an Advertising Revenue Board would be appointed or elected. Yet this 
board would select which publications would be subsidised by a launch fund. 
Secondly, this links with the question of Labour representation in the press. Outside the 
group - in the party and among the `Old Left' unions - the question of Labour 
representation was of more importance. This consideration was involved in the concern 
for solutions to advertising bifurcation, as well as diversity, per se. There was the 
potential of a politicisation of the revenue board consciously bringing about increased 
representation, with the justification of achieving balance. Such a board would have had 
to have been entirely separate from government patronage, at least. This does not damn 
intervention to provide for diversity, nevertheless. It is difficult to see how meaningful 
policies could be formulated to challenge press oligopolisation, and indeed bipolarisation, 
without significant government intervention. The debate was on what shape this 
intervention would take. 
Thirdly, a number of different positions on democratic ownership were outlined in the 
course of the debate. The NUJ leadership's position shared elements of the classical 
liberal pluralist and European social market models, with a whiff of Tom Baistow's 
position. Ascherson's majority view had echoes of the models of some of the 
revolutionary Marxists and of Williams. Nevertheless, it was clearly separate from those 
conceptions, not least because it was not conceived as a revolutionary doctrine. Its 
demand that there should be wider worker involvement than simply that of journalists ill_ 
democratic ownership particularly touches on similar themes as those of the Marxist 
approaches. The emphasis of Ascherson and Benn on there being some popular 
involvement shared elements of the radical democratic approach and Curran's social 
market notion. However, it was not as developed. The emphasis was still, 
overwhelmingly, on substituting workers' control for wider community and interest 
group involvement. The position finally agreed on by the working party, while less 
specific, also shared some aspects of all these models. 
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Fourthly, regarding policy formation, little can be said conclusively at this stage because 
party policy had little changed. The study group's report provided recommendations 
rather than policy. Nevertheless, there were indications of a division between the 
leadership and other party policymaking forums. The provisions of Labour's 1973 
programme did not make it into either manifesto. 
Also, a preliminary point can be made regarding the `classic positions' outlined in the 
Chapter 1. It was not the positions associated with the unions that were most dominant in 
the study group, if we consider the question of democratic ownership or promoting a 
Labour movement press. Nor were the positions of the MPs particularly decisive overall. 
Instead, the two figures who most prominently influenced the study group's direction 
were an academic and a journalist, James Curran and Neal Ascherson. Their influence 
indicated the extent of the New Left upsurge on the back of the reinvigorated trade 
unions. 
The people and the media group's proposals formed the basis for the Labour 
Party submission to the third Royal Commission on the Press, which had been set up by 
prime minister Wilson soon after Labour returned to office in 1974 335 The working 
group had welcomed this commission in its report, but it had been set up independently 
of the study forum's work. The forum report's first draft confidently predicted that "... it is 
unlikely that the Commission will reach a conclusion radically different from our 
" 336 own However, this bold assertion was left out of the group's final proposals. As the 
next chapter explains, this prediction proved to be more a case of wishful thinking than 
an effective assessment of the commission's direction or the Labour leadership's view. 
335 Allaun, Spreading the news: 85. 336 Sixth Meeting on Communications, ̀Communications: Draft Report': 25-6. 
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4. The Party, the Government, the Commission and its 
Minority: Labour from 1974-1979 
INTRODUCTION 
In the first stage of the new Labour government, the party and key figures in the 
administration appeared agreed. They publicly shared the view that a problem existed 
with the newspaper industry. They concurred that there was a powerful pressure towards 
press concentration that was "... socially undesirable... "; that there was press bias against 
the left; and that newspapers' fate should not be "... determined by market forces ...... 
337 
Implicit in their assessment was a consideration that the press played an important role in 
democracy; aiding debate and identifying alternatives for discussion. 
However, there was no consensus about how this would be achieved and the motives 
behind what was being demanded. Those who had pushed for the original proposals in 
The people and the media desired diversity and some measure of access and control over 
the press. Those who spearheaded Labour's submission to the Royal Commission on the 
Press wanted this, but their main motivation was to provide for an official Labour 
movement press. For them, as for the minority of the commission, supported by the party, 
Labour representation was at the heart of the need for structural change. In addition, the 
Labour leadership came to have little enthusiasm for intervening in the press market to 
increase diversity. Although, as we shall consider in later chapters, traditional Labour 
marketing techniques were out of vogue, Wilson was primarily concerned to gain Labour 
representation and, this, eventually, precluded structural reform. 
By the end of its time in office, the Labour administration had done little to deal with the 
problems with the British press. It had avoided acting on proposals made to it by the 
Royal Commission on the Press to tighten up monopoly legislation. And it had refused to 
337 The quotes are from trade minister Peter Shore, who oversaw the press industry for the Government, 
during a House of Commons debate on the press. (Great Britain Parliament House of, Commons. House of 
Commons Hansard. Cambridge, England: Chadwyck-Healey. (hereafter HOC) 14 May 1974 Vol. 873, col. 
[I3 1,1 T46-1. 
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implement proposals for promoting plurality that some members of the commission put 
forward - despite the fact that the administration's own party regarded these as more 
limited than the measures the party called for. 338 
This chapter will explore why this happened. It will consider the interventionist reforms - 
partly modelled on the Scandinavian social market schemes previously discussed - which 
were adopted by the Labour Party and discussed by the Royal Commission. 339 The last 
chapter concerned itself with policy creation. This section will also discuss the attempt to 
have these policies approved by the Labour government. Using original evidence, it will 
consider the motives behind the Labour administration's dismissal of those proposals. It 
will outline the huge opposition of the press businesses and editors to the proposals - and 
the divisions in the trade union movement over them. It will look at the divide on the 
commission between the majority, which rejected state intervention, and the minority, 
which agreed with the party that providing plurality required more government direction. 
In addition, the chapter will look at how the party's proposals for democratic ownership 
of the press fared under the Labour government. It will outline how the Labour 
administration, under pressure from the unions, defied press businesses to enact laws on 
newspaper closed shops. And it will identify the effect of the newspaper firms' 
ideological onslaught on the party's union plans. 
On coming into office, the Labour government rejected the party programme's general 
thrust and the manifesto that had been agreed. Benn led attempts to provide the NEB with 
powers to have a substantial stake in profitable firms. Yet, the Labour leadership 
confined the body to bailing out failing lame-duck firms and reduced planning 
agreements to voluntary codes, which private industry could ignore. Thus, the NEB was 
likely to fail before it started. 340 Eric Shaw has questioned whether the Labour leadership 
were ever prepared to see their own party's plans come to fruition, facing the backlash of 
38 Basnett and Goodman. 339 See the appendix to Chapter 2. 
'"o Callaghan, Retreat: 46-7, Shaw, Eric. 1996. The Labour Party since 1945: old Labour : new Labour. 




business. Subsequent evidence suggests that businesses were prepared to rise up to 
oppose the Labour programme 341 
Instead, while the left was denounced, the dog days of the Labour government saw the 
disintegration of revisionism. An IMF loan and the subsequent public spending cuts, 
together with the reluctant embrace of monetarism, saw Keynesianism off. Various 
interpretations can be put on this 342 Whichever is accepted, the case is that the Labour 
government's determination to tackle inflation led it to turn its back on the party 
programme and stray from the goals of traditional social democracy. 343 By the time the 
Labour government considered the proposals from the Royal Commission, the dictats of 
business and the IMF had led the Labour government to abandon these goals. It was also 
battling to preserve itself as a minority government. Its attempt to sustain its strategy by 
means of a social contract with the unions was failing, as members balked at continued 
pay restraint for seemingly little reward. The Bullock Inquiry proposals on industrial 
democracy, already watered down from those of the TUC, were further diluted by the 
341 Shaw, 1945: 122-5. 
342 It has been questioned as to whether Keynesian demand management was responsible for the economic 
boom in the first place. (John Callaghan, Globalisation: The End of Social Democracy?, Essex Papers, 
2002: 14-15). Shaw argues that the ineffectiveness of Keynesianism to deal with recession was exaggerated 
by those on the political right, aided by capital, for their own ends. (Shaw, 1945: 127-158). Another 
'-- assessment is that Keynesian-style techniques to sustain accumulation required the growth of a state that 
did not directly produce a surplus. Its practice worked to arrest the tendency of profit rates to fall. By 1973, 
4, this period of accumulation was ending and Keynesianism could not cope with a crisis where inflation 
and unemployment - stagflation - occurred together. (Coates, D. 1980. Labour in power? :a study of the 
Labour Government, 1974-1979. London: Longman.: 179-86, Pilling, Geoffrey. 1986. The crisis of 
Keynesian economics :a Marxist view. London: Croom Helm.: esp. 186-88). 
34' Traditional social democracy had adopted policy targets from the Keynesian framework. It aimed to 
provide welfare reform and a redistributive tax policy. (Marcel Liebman, ̀ Reformism Yesterday and Social 
Democracy Today', in Socialist Register, 1986: 10-11). Another commitment was to full employment, 
(Radice, Giles, and Lisanne Radice. 1986. Socialists in the recession : the search for solidarity 
Basingstoke: Macmillan.: 7-27). Those defending the Labour government's record point to welfare gains 
made, including a significant increase in pensions, and argue that Labour brought down unemployment to 
the OECD average. (Radice and Radice: 124-5). However, the deflationary government policies the Labour 
administration pursued in response to the end of the boom and the dictats of the IMF contributed to the 
creation of unemployment, inequality and the deterioration of welfare state provision. (Callaghan 
Globalisation: 17-18). The Labour government presided over welfare cuts with social services, benefits aqd 
health care hit. (Radice and Radice: 124-5, Coates, Labour in power?: 30-50, Clarke, Simon. 19g8 
Keynesianism, monetarism and the crisis of the state. Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield, Vt., USA: E. 
Elgar : Gower Pub. Co.: 316-8, Lawrence Wilde, Lawrence. 1994. Modern European socialism. Aldershot, , Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994.: 24). Resources going to education fell. (Radice and Radice: 124_5' 
Shaw, 1945: 158). Impoverishment increased, with more than six million people in households at or belo 
the-official poverty line. And unemployment almost tripled from 1974 to 1977, when the figure was 
million, before fallinjb ck: (Coates; Labour in power?; 83-4, Wilde: 24). 
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Government's 1978 White Paper. Legislation was delayed until after the next election - 
an election Labour lost 344 It had done little to deal with the British press's problems. 
PARTY PLANS 
Yet, by 1975, the party had shown that it wanted change. That year, the party conference 
passed a momentous and groundbreaking motion. The proposal so reflected party 
thinking at the time that even those who opposed parts of it did not do so openly, but 
merely questioned the thinking behind the segments they found objectionable. The 
resolution welcomed The people and the media document. It directed itself to the Labour 
government and called for an advertising revenue board, a differential newsprint subsidy, 
a launch subsidy, a national printing corporation, overseen by a reconstituted and 
representative Press Council. 345 
Thus, by agreeing to this resolution, the party backed the main demands of the media 
sub-committee, and, if anything, exceeded them. As before, the Scandinavian social 
market systems, already being developed, heavily influenced these proposals for 
diversity. A key consideration, however, was that there were major differences between 
the problems facing the Scandinavian and the British press. Any subsidy system would 
need to take this into account (as was indicated in the appendix to Chapter 3). 
i" Panitch and Leys: 128-130. 
345 The motion called for: 
"(a) establishment of an advertising revenue board with powers to set advertising rates in press 
publications, to collect all advertising revenue, and to redistribute it by setting aside a proportion of total 
receipts in a special fund; 
(b) the fund to be used by the board to provide: 
(i) a differential newsprint subsidy to aid small circulation publications in each section of the market, 
conditional upon agreed forms of worker participation in any assisted publication; 
(ii) a launch and establishment subsidy for new publications which are owned by non-profit making 
trusts managed democratically on a co-operative basis by all those employed on the publication; 
(c) establishment of a national printing corporation with powers to bring existing printing plant into 
public ownership, and to provide printing capacity on lease, especially to new publications; reconstitution 
of the Press Council as a communications council, with responsibility for all the media, its membership to 
be genuinely representative of the community at large and of workers at all levels in the industry ... ". It 
also supported a right of reply, the whole issue of which will be dealt with in a later chapter. (Labour Party. 
Annual, Conference. 1975. Report of the seventtfourth annual conference of the Labour Party, Blackpool, 
1975, September 29-October 3. London: The Party.: 330). 
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The motion also entwined both motivations for Labour policy that we discussed. It 
considered diversity both as an aid to the functioning of political democracy and as way 
of bolstering Labour representation. By considering expression as a `democratic right', 
the conference reflected the concern to provide a press that aided the functioning of 
different types of democracy, from representative to participative. However, as we shall 
see, the party did not explicitly consider this later. Discussion developed little along the 
lines of public sphere notions 346 Instead, speakers in the conference debate again 
highlighted what they considered as press bias and emphasised that Labour representation 
was crucial. It was considered that "... increasing diversity [was]... the key... " to solving 
this problem of Labour movement hostility. 347 
As well as promoting diversity, the motion also considered what this work considered to 
be the second problem for political democracy - that of citizen participation, control and 
ownership of the press. However, again, the position taken concentrated on the press 
industry's workforce. It made it a stipulation that any newsprint and launch subsidy 
would be dependent on there being a form of industrial democracy. The motion's 
proposer saw the notion of worker participation as being key in the launch fund proposal. 
But he made the same awkward substitution of the press workers for all citizens, which 
had been made before and would be made again 348 Nevertheless, the motion went 
beyond internal industry democracy to consider broader community democratic 
participation in decision-making when it considered the body overseeing the industry. 
Yet, little was indicated regarding the institutional framework for bringing this about. It is 
worth noting that the influence of workers' participation can be indicated by the fact that 
the representative of the NEC, summing up the debate, echoed such sentiments. The chair 
346 Habermas, Transformation. 
347 Labour Party, Conference 1975: 331. 
aas The proposer implied that this, in effect, would substitute itself for a broader representation of the wider 
society than merely the workers in the industry. He argued that: "... if newspaper workers at all levels had 
some part in laying down the general tone and editorial line of papers, the Press would be a lot more fairly 
reflective of our community as a whole than it is at the moment. " (Peter Hildrew, Labour Party, Conference 
1975: 332). 
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of Labour's Press and Publicity Committee, Lena Jeger, linked calls for press diversity 
and worker participation with the party's wider industrial democracy policy. 349 
THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE PRESS 
The motion expressed a pressure to challenge concentration that played on the newly 
elected Labour government. And, at this stage, the Government provided some indication 
that it was, at least, reflecting these concerns, if not the solutions. The Government 
announced it was setting up a Royal Commission on the Press, within months of coming 
into office after the February election. 350 In a Commons debate in the weeks following 
the announcement, trade minister Peter Shore, charged with overseeing the newspaper 
industry, recognised bifurcation and saw the powerful pressure to concentrated 
ownership. 351 This he considered, "... might be judged correct by purely economic 
criteria... ", but "... would almost certainly be socially undesirable". 352 And the same 
debate saw the Prime Minster Harold Wilson question the classical liberal conception of 
press freedom. 353 He argued that journalists operated self-censorship when faced with 
press business dictat 354 Nevertheless, generally, Wilson was less clear about a cure for 
this. 355 
349 Lena Jeger, Labour Party, Conference 1975: 334-5. Jeger was a former Ministry of Information and 
Foreign Office civil servant. She was an MP from 1953 to 1959, before becoming a Guardian journalist 
from 1959-64. She was again elected to the House of Commons in 1964 and was an MP until 1979 when 
she retired and was given a peerage. She was a member of the NEC from 1960-1 and from 1968. (Stenton, 
Michael, and Stephen Lees. 1981. Who's who of British members of Parliament :a biographical dictionary 
of the House of Commons-based on annual volumes of 'Dod's parliamentary companion' and other 
sources. Brighton: Harvester Press.: 190). 
350 HOC 2 May 1974, Vol. 872, col. 1322. 
351 Peter Shore was a Cambridge-educated political economist and former head of Labour's research 
department. He was PPS to Prime Minister Harold Wilson before becoming a minister under Wilson. He 
was made secretary of state for trade in 1974, before becoming an environment minister in 1976. He was a 
shadow minister until 1984. (2000. Dod's parliamentary companion.: 283) His hostility to the EEC became 
less fashionable in the Labour Party in the 1980s. He was raised to a peerage in 1997. (2000. Dod's 
parliamentary companion.: 283 ) 
52 HOC 14 May 1974, Vol. 873, col. 1140-1. 
's' He noted that there were "... some who even say... " that the proprietors threatened press freedom. " 
(HOC 14 May 1974, Vol. 873, col. 1232). 
354 If a new position was taken ̀ on high', "... [w]hat happened was that no one bothered to write an article 
which was contrary to the newspaper's new line. " (HOC 14 May 1974, Vol. 873, col. 1233-4). 355 It was "... easier to describe it than prescribe for it without getting into deep questions of newspaper 
ecönömics as well as press freedom. " (HOC 14 May 1974, Vol. 873, col. 1234). 
97 
Wilson and Labour representation 
Harold Wilson was primarily concerned with Labour representation in the press, but he 
was, at this stage, at least prepared to consider acting upon it. There was a tension here 
with diversity and democracy, but there was also a tension within the interest in 
representation. How could any structural change be achieved to increase representation 
without further alienating the existing press against a Labour government? This was 
Wilson's dilemma. 
Wilson had become increasingly hostile to the press. Many commentators saw this as a 
product of paranoia. Yet, in hindsight we can see he had some justification 356 Academic 
and media activist Tom O'Malley dismisses any suggestion that the commission was 
merely set up to deal with Wilson's 'paranoia'. 57 He cites Wilson's biographer Ben 
Pimlott as seeing the reasons were deeper. Nevertheless, Pimlott's account considers that 
the commission was a form of `punishment' for the newspapers, following the eclipse of 
a long honeymoon period. 358 Wilson wanted to admonish the newspapers after their role 
in two controversies involving Marcia Williams and Lord Ted Short, the latter later 
shown to be part of a ̀ dirty tricks' campaign, which the press recycled. 359 
356 Writer Stephen Koss shares the view prevalent among Wilson's contemporary opponents regarding this 
`paranoia'. (Koss, Stephen. 1984. The rise and fall of the political press in Britain. London: Hamilton.: 
666). 
357 O'Malley: 89-90,94. 
358 Pimlott, Ben. 1993. Harold Wilson. London: Harper Collins.: 404,443-8,694. See also Greenslade, 
Press Gang: 235. On his deteriorating relationship with the press lobby see Seymour-Ure, Colin. 2003. 
Prime ministers and the media. Oxford: Blackwell: 184-6). 
359 The first saw the press try to implicate the Labour leader in an attempt by his former office manager and 
brother of his secretary Marcia Williams to profit by selling a slag site as land for an industrial estate. In the 
latter the media attempted to link the Labour Lord President Ted Short and the notorious T. Dan Smith, 
associated with corruption in the North East. Proof that money had been deposited in a Swiss Bank account 
linked with Short was later shown to be a smear, possibly orchestrated by MIS. Other `dirty tricks' 
campaigns were being waged on Wilson, some which the newspapers picked up on. Pimlott, therefore, 
suggests that any `paranoia' was on behalf of the media who were prepared to countenance the conspiracist 
fantasies. (Pimlott: 625-9,631-2, Dorril, Stephen, and Robin Ramsay. 1992. Smear! : Wilson and the secret 
state. - London: Grafton Books., 'Comment', -Labour Weekly, -April 12 1974). 
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Commentators and insiders have seen the commission as the product of the strong belief 
within the Labour Party that the press was biased against it 360 As we have seen, many in 
Labour's ranks shared this concern. It was exacerbated by the February 1974 election 
which saw the bulk of Fleet Street support the Conservatives. Only the Daily Mirror, in 
the words of one Labour member "... reflected the aspirations of the people... ". 361 Wilson 
passionately echoed this theme 362 He considered that the newspapers only articulated the 
anti-Labour stance on issues such as EEC withdrawal 363 
Nevertheless, at least publicly - for it is true that the premier was known for tailoring his 
words to fit his audience - Wilson also called the inquiry in response to Labour 
backbench fears over concentration and cross-ownership. However, the inquiry's basis 
provided little echo of the policies contained in The people and the media. Anxieties 
expressed by Labour MPs and the trade unions about concentration had been heightened 
by the closure of the Scottish Express newspapers, with the loss of nearly 2,000 jobs. The 
ending of the Beaverbrook operation in Scotland provided a backdrop to the inquiry, 
which the Labour leader referred to more than once. 364 The Prime Minister also indicated 
his unease that the readers' choice of newspapers had narrowed. 365 
Nonetheless, Wilson's cross-ownership concern centred on Labour representation. He 
suggested that without `outside interests' it would be much more difficult for a paper to 
financially survive. However, the problem with these interests was that they could 
possibly bias newspaper coverage. His concern was that it would prejudice the attitude of 
360 Robertson G., 'Law for the press' in Curran, The British Press: 223, Seaton, J., ̀ Government policy and 
the mass media', in Curran, The British press: 304, Baistow, Fourth-rate estate: 60, Snoddy, The good, the 
bad and the unacceptable: 88-91, Hayward: 1, Greenslade, Press Gang: 281. 
361 The member was loan Evans, HOC 21 March 1974, Vol 870, col. 1320-1321. A similar point was made 
by him to the House in April. (HOC April 11, Vol 831, col. 632-3. ) 372 See Baistow, Fourth-rate estate: 60. It was consistently held. Wilson told the Royal commission that: 
"In its editorial opinions, and, often, by its treatment and presentation of the news, the Press in Britain is, 
largely, hostile to the Labour Party. " He indicated that most Labour supporters would agree with that 
assessment. (Wilson, Harold. 1977. Evidence submitted by the Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson to the Royal 
Commission on the Press. London.: 2-3). 
363 HOC 14 May 1974 Vol 873, col. 1234. 
364 See HOC 21 March 1974 Vol 870, col. 1321, HOC 2 May 1974, Vol. 872, col. 1323 and HOC 14 May 
1974 Vol 873, col. 1133-4. 
365 HOC-2 May 1974, 
-Vol. 
872, col. 1329. 
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a newspaper firm against the Labour Party if Government nationalisation threatened the 
company's wider interests 366 
Wilson's ambiguity towards the Royal commission reflected this tension between the 
concern for structural change to answer this problem and his anxiety not to alienate the 
press businesses. So, on the one hand, the intellectual driving force behind Labour's 
communications committee, Curran, advised Wilson. He revealed to the author that he 
redrafted the initial inquiry terms and that Downing Street appointed the original chair, 
the left lawyer Mr Justice Finer, following his advice. (However, Finer died within 
months of being appointed and his succeeding deputy, Oliver McGregor was more 
conservative in outlook). 67 Going along with this assessment, former editor and media 
campaigner Tom Baistow indicates that Wilson had expressed some interest in 
"... economic intervention that would encourage the founding of new papers" 368 
In the end, however, Wilson justified his critics' fears that he saw the commission as a 
way of diffusing concerns 369 The Prime Minister had already indicated that he shared 
Conservative concerns about subsidies. 70 As the then Labour Weekly journalist and now 
Labour MP and leadership supporter Martin Linton put it: "Wilson... could see that if 
anything he threatened to do to the press.. . would immediately provoke hostility, he 
would reckon it wasn't worth doing. It would be simply like pulling the tiger's tail. 9071 
366 HOC 14 May 1974 Vol 873, col. 1234 367 Curran's indication had been to get Finer, as a top left lawyer, as with such a chair "... it may be that 
something will come out of this commission". Curran says the experience of the 1962 Royal Commission, 
where a seasoned conservative lawyer as chair had diffused the left, had convinced him that a radical 
lawyer such as Finer could have the opposite effect. (Curran interview, Linton interview). 368 See Baistow, Fourth-rate estate: 60. 369 It was in the ̀ classical tradition' described by one commentator, as "... an Establishment device designed 
not so much to provide radical critiques as to diffuse controversial situations by long-drawn-out 
deliberations that come to anodyne conclusions after the problem has subsided. " (Baistow, Fourth-rate 
estate: 60, Curran interview, Linton interview). Tom Baistow was a journalist who worked for five national 
newspapers. He was the foreign editor and special writer on the News Chronicle. He was deputy editor of 
New Statesman for 12 years. He was a long-time commentator on the press. (Baistow, Fourth-rate estate). 370 HOC 2 May 1974, Vol. 872, col. 1330-1. 
371 Linton interview. The tension among Labour leaders is described by Curran thus: "So one part wanted to 
kick the press issue into touch and the Royal Commission was a nice way of doing that. But another part of 
them felt that something should be done and if there was a commission, this could build up a consensus for 
some kind of reform. And this would enable them to act without completely souring their relationship with 
-the press. " (Curran interview). -- 
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Wilson's own evidence to the commission combined this reluctance to challenge the 
press with his concerns to improve Labour representation. His "remarkable document" 
detailed the newspaper smears. 372 But what is significant is that, instead of wanting to 
tackle the question of press ownership head-on, Wilson identified the problem more 
narrowly as one of newspaper tactics. His solution was to tighten the laws on privacy, 
contempt and defamation. He saw that the national press companies should put `their own 
house in order'. 373 
v 
THE LABOUR PARTY SUBMISSION TO THE ROYAL COMMISSION 
The party's submission to the commission also reflected this insistence on Labour 
movement representation. However, its suggestions on how to achieve this were 
different. Those selected from the NEC to represent it were likely to be concerned about 
representation. The five representatives included Jeger, who headed the party's Press and 
Publicity Committee, which oversaw Labour campaigning and thus the party's 
representation in the media. Another was Donald Ross, who edited Labour Weekly, a 
relatively limited circulation paper which represented the party and which had 
concentrated its coverage on press ownership in calling for a Labour press. The others 
were two research department officials and Eric Moonman. Thus, only one from the 
study group, and none of the majority that looked to the New Left proposals, was 
involved in this key delegation. 
The party representatives made central the demand for a newspaper doing for the Labour 
movement "... what the Times does for the establishment". They linked this with 
bifurcation. They assumed that such a paper would have a high proportion of lower- 
income readers than the existing broadsheets. They argued that it would be financially 
impossible to produce a daily Labour movement newspaper with a million readers like 
372 Wilson, Dorril and Ramsay: esp. 315-6. 373 Wilson: 10. 
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the Daily Telegraph 374 It was partly based on this concern that they wanted the 
advertising market transformed. 
Nevertheless, this concern was intertwined with creating a press that aided political 
democracy - so that "... every section of the community has an equal opportunity to 
express its views and interests". In order to challenge this, the NEC representatives saw 
the need to go beyond free-market solutions towards the "... radical redistribution of 
advertising revenue... ". 375 They provided similar solutions to those the party would 
follow. There would be ari Advertising Revenue Board, financing new launches and a 
differential newsprint subsidy, and the universalising of government advertising. 376 A 
National Printing Corporation was also mooted. But this was not required to directly 
reduce the high entry costs. 77 Instead, the representatives saw it as a way of providing 
for the expected shortfall in printing capacity, which would come with the establishment 
of the new newspapers envisaged. 78 
These proposals showed a clear separation between the party and the Labour government 
in their approaches. It was true that the NEC's proposals were not party policy when they 
were put forward; because they were submitted ahead of the party's conference in 1975. 
This ambiguity was reflected in the fact that the NEC document was not entirely 
committed to one approach for achieving diversity. The NEC put forward its proposal for 
an advertising revenue board for consideration. Instead, the submission was based on 
some of the ideas contained in the study group document The people and the media. 
However, it was not directly based on that document. The NEC, instead, submitted this 
374 Labour Party, Oral Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 11 March 1976: 7-10. 
375 Labour Party, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 83 E1, April 1975: 1,4,10. 
376 The Advertising Revenue Board would also finance new launches and a differential newsprint subsidy. 
The launch fund would be subject to controls, which guaranteed that the less successful publications would 
be forced to close. The newsprint subsidy would encourage minority publications. The NEC also proposed 
to the commission universalising government advertising "... regardless of editorial content". (Ibid.: 6-7,8- 
9, Labour Party, Oral Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 11 March 1976: 14-16). 
377 Martin Linton was one advocate of a printing corporation on the basis that it would reduced the high 
start-up costs, as one way of changing "... the rules of the game. " (Linton interview). 
37$ Labour Party, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, -83 E1, April 1975 : 7. 
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separately "without commitment". 79 Nevertheless, by the time the party's representatives 
spoke to the commission, the 1975 conference policy had been passed. 380 Thus, by then, 
party and Government policy were at odds. 
Not surprisingly, this seeming ambiguity was a source of some confusion to the Royal 
Commission. The commission concluded from the NEC's evidence that it was not firmly 
committed to the revenue board proposals and wished the commission would consider 
other alternatives. This blunted the impact of Labour's demands. 
However, this was not the only barrier facing the party's plans. Instead, the main 
opposition to the proposals came from the press businesses and editors in evidence to the 
commission, where the plans were given a rough ride. In addition, though, the unions 
were divided on the proposals. Some gave the ideas on offer a cold reception. 381 Even the 
TUC did not wholeheartedly support all the proposals. Let's look at these aspects in turn. 
The Advertising Revenue Board 
The advertising revenue board proposal attracted a particularly hostile reaction from a 
range of right-wing interests. The businesses, in the guise of the Newspaper Publishers 
Association (NPA), 382 the Guild of British Newspaper Editors and the Conservative 
leadership all questioned whether the proposals might act as a disincentive. It would deter 
some publications from raising circulation or the number of pages they produced. 83 The 
publishers argued that the role of a board in fixing advertising rates would be a 
`considerable intrusion' into the newspapers' overall operation. This, the press firms 
379 Ibid : 11, Labour Party Home Policy Committee, Royal Commission on the Press, RE: 55/ February 
1975: 1. 
380 Also, internal documents advising the party's NEC on giving evidence treated The people and the media 
document as if it were party policy. (Labour Party Publicity Committee, Notes for those giving oral 
evidence, RE: 472/February 1976: 3,10,11,14,16). 
381 A number of unions we will mention cold-shouldered the proposals. The printers union SOGAT 
supported considering the advertising revenue board, but favoured an advertising levy and subsidies. 
382 This represented all the national press owners, with the exception, at the time, of the Mirror Group and 
the Morning Star. (Newspaper Publishers' Association, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 
July 1975: 51). 
383 Ibid., The Guild of British Newspaper Editors, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 7 
February 1975: 17, Speech by Edward Heath, HOC 14 May 1974, Vol. 873, col. 1129. 
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implied, would hinder competition. 84 In the words of the editors' association, the board 
would "... subsidise inefficiency... ". 385 A key Labour activist has subsequently argued 
that Labour's plans were open to this criticism 386 
The publishers and the Conservative leadership argued that advertising redistribution 
would not help economic viability, because ̀ overmanning' was one of the major 
economic problems. The Guild of British Newspaper Editors saw new technology as the 
solution. The printers' union, the National Graphical Association (NGA), also shared the 
NPA's concern that advertising revenue would not be large enough to finance such 
ambitious plans. 87 The NPA rejected a key assumption of bifurcation behind both the 
advertising revenue and any levy proposal, in addition. It argued that a disproportionate 
amount of advertising was not spent on attracting those with high income. It noted, for 
instance, that many ̀ quality' newspapers had lower social class readers. 88 
Finally, the publishers and the advertising industry saw that the board would imperil 
editorial independence. The publishers questioned both the ability of the board and the 
criteria by which it would subsidise some publications. It would have "... the power to 
bring about the closure of publications... ". 389 The Advertising Association, in its evidence 
to the commission, feared that editors would sway their views towards those of the board 
in order to stay in business 390 
Were these criticisms of the advertising board justified? Firstly, there was the question of 
inefficiency. A point to make about this is that it took a narrowly market-driven view of 
384 Newspaper Publishers' Association: 46. 
385 The Guild of British Newspaper Editors, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 7 February 
1975: 17 
386 ,1 could certainly foresee most political difficulties there because essentially you're taxing successful 
newspapers to redistribute the money to less successful ones. And you can just imagine the Tory line of 
attack that could produce; that you were taxing success or that you were subsidising uneconomic 
newspapers. (Linton interview). 
387 Newspaper Publishers' Association: 6,44, National Graphical Association, Evidence to the Royal 
Commission on the Press, 24 March 1976, The Guild of British Newspaper Editors, Oral Evidence to the 
Royal Commission on the Press, 7 February 1975: 17. 
388 Newspaper Publishers' Association: 42-44. 
389 Ibid.: 48-9. 
390 Advertising Association, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, October 27 1975 
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the provision of publications. It ignored the arguments justifying diversity on the basis 
that it had been needed for information and to facilitate debate, required in different 
democratic systems. Thus, it can be argued that the cost to the community of the 
externalities that have come with market provision - the lack of press choice - is a larger 
expense than that of some marginal increase in inefficiency. Importantly, the charge of 
inefficiency is a similar one to that which had been levelled against the Scandinavian 
subsidy systems and have been found to be largely unproven (see the appendix to Chapter 
3). If such an argument had been made about market-led provision of the arts in Britain, 
then the Arts Council would have been disbanded. 
As for the charge that the revenue board did not address the real problem of 
`overmanning' to be solved by new technology, this was to miss the point. The board 
proposals aimed to redress inequality in the industry. They neither helped nor hindered 
dealing with `overmanning' and did not automatically preclude the introduction of new 
technology within the press. The most that could be said was that it made some 
publications more viable at the expense of others. It was, at best, unconvincing that 
`overmanning' provided the primary obstacle in the way of diversity. The subsequent 
failure of the introduction of new technology to greatly broaden the range of titles did not 
bear out these claims. 
Further, it cannot be disputed that bifurcation has been a factor in the British press and 
that a large proportion of advertising revenue has been targeted at high-income readers, 
as was indicated in Chapter 1. And regarding the claim that the broadsheets had lower 
C/D/E social class readers, this, in itself is not surprising. The more important aspect is 
whether these papers attract a larger percentage of A/B readers, which they do 39' If it 
were otherwise, then what would be the attraction to advertisers in paying premium rates 
to newspapers that had a lower circulation than their tabloid counterparts? 392 
391 See Tunstall, Newspaper power: 12-4. 
392 In arguing this to the commission, on the key point of what percentage of advertising was spent on the 
`quality' press as opposed to the ̀ populars', the publishers merely indicated that "... a considerable amount 
of advertising money [was]... directed at attracting volume. " (Newspaper Publishers' Association: 42-44. 
My emphasis). 
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Newsprint subsidy, launch fund and advertising 
More significant were the criticisms of the sizeable extent of state intervention involved 
in the Advertising Revenue Board and of the question of independence. In one dramatic 
claim, some press firms suggested that they were so hostile to subsidies that they might: 
"... prefer that their papers should close rather than that they should run the risk of the 
freedom of those papers being limited... " 393 There was also the consideration of whether 
the scheme's costs could be sustained by advertising. 
Experience from abroad has shown that for tax and levy schemes, the fear of editorial 
independence being comprised has been dispelled. Also, at least tax and levy schemes 
have been shown to be completely financially viable. (See the appendix to Chapter 3). 
Broader support for the differential subsidies section of the Labour Party proposals 
existed, when separated from the revenue board plan. This prompts the question: was 
there a stronger argument for the Labour Party to have adopted proposals for a cross- 
media advertising levy and differential subsidy and launch fund? An advertising tax has 
had a controversial history in this country, before having been unjustly applied before 
being abolished in 1853.394 Yet, the influential proponent of a revenue board, Curran, 
now admits that an advertising duty scheme would probably have got the support of the 
right wing of the Labour Party. He has questioned whether it might have been better if 
the duty scheme had won out in the internal Labour Party discussions. 395 The TUC also 
supported versions of the tax and levy system. 396 
The press firms also rejected launch funds. They considered that if a group wanted to 
start a newspaper with a different political stance than those on the newsstands, for 
instance, the existence of a customer base would be enough to ensure the paper's success. 
393 Ibid.: 29. 
394 See, for instance, Curran and Seaton: Chapters 2 and 3. 393 Nevertheless, it should be said, he still believes the flexible application of a revenue board scheme 
would have been more effective in broadening diversity. (Curran interview). 
396 Royal Commission on the Press: 121. 
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They suggested that: "The national newspapers would in no way resent a newcomer 
which aimed to give, what it believed to be, a different political emphasis. "397 
Yet, the arguments made against launch funds can also be challenged. Such economic 
objections ignore democratic grounds for intervention. There is a tendency to oligopoly 
and high barriers to newspaper market entry. The businesses' claim that a new entrant 
would not be resented ignores the possibility that this newcomer might well indicate what 
it believed were the biases and shortcomings of the existing press. This might not be 
received too well. More importantly, it would be competing for the readers of the existing 
publications and therefore would be treated as competition for the existing market. 
In addition, the press businesses and advertisers opposed universal advertising by the 
Government, the former calling it a `dictatorial' and expensive intrusion into the 
operation of advertising agencies. 98 However, this also took a narrowly economic stance, 
which neglected other considerations. In addition, it ignored which organisation was the 
agencies' paymasters in this situation and thus should have had the ultimate power over 
where advertising was placed. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Labour's plans for 
universal advertising neatly side-stepped a dilemma. This conundrum was that such plans 
would potentially mean the state advertising in legally-available far-right publications, 
that Labour supporters would be likely to deem racist, and perhaps pornographic 
publications, which would be likely to offend a range of supporters. 
397 Turner 15. 
39' Newspaper Publishers' Association: 47-8, Advertising Association: 32-3. 
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DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
As has been argued, another facet of providing a press required for political democracy 
was to have some form of democratic control over it. In a similar fashion to The people 
and the media proposals, the Labour Party did not heavily emphasise the question of 
democracy within the press in its proposals to the commission. This reflected the earlier 
assessments of key activists that they were not achievable in the short-term. 399 It is 
significant, for instance, that this theme did not feature in the party's oral evidence to the 
commission aoo When it was mentioned, it was mainly equated with industrial democracy. 
This reflected the ideas of those such as the New Leftist and Marxist Raymond Williams 
and other Marxists. Significantly, there was less emphasis on participation and 
involvement of citizens as a whole in the existing titles. As with The people and the 
media, the party's proposals were rather ambiguous on how to achieve this democratic 
control. Press industrial democracy would be advanced by the use of the launch fund. The 
fund would only be available to publications owned and controlled by profit-making 
trusts. Apart from this, the party would introduce into the press the industrial democracy 
proposals that it was seeking to put in place in other sectors. 40' 
In calling for industrial democracy, the Labour Party was backed by the TUC, which had 
produced reports in 1973 and 1974 calling for joint decision-making across industry. 402 
The TUC's press proposals also emphasised the involvement of press workers and tended 
to ignore wider community participation. Its proposals were also hazy and tentative. It 
envisaged developing a structure of supervisory boards or trusts. 403 
399 Curran interview. 
400 Labour Party, Oral Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 11 March 1976. 401 Labour Party, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, April 1975 : 9. For proposals on 
industrial democracy in other areas see Wickham-Jones, Economic: 68-9. 
402 Wickham-Jones, Economic: 68-9. This reflected the influence of both left social democratic ideas, 
which were also being developed in parts of Europe - particularly in Sweden and France - and the input of 
New Left conceptions, promoted by the Institute for Workers' Control. (Callaghan, Retreat). 
403 Trades Union Congress, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, May 9 1975: 27,33, `, TUC 
calls for press reform', Tribune, May 30 1975. 
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As for the media unions, the printers' union NATSOPA also backed the supervisory 
board proposal involving press workers 404 The politics of the NUJ had been shifting on 
aos this and other issues after 1974 This manifested itself in a more concerted push both at 
a grassroots level and among certain prominent activists for a measure of workplace 
democracy. 406 It was also evident in demands for a closed shop, which we will consider 
later. In submissions to the commissioners, the NUJ emphatically rejected its previous 
insistence on proprietorial dominance, outlined in the last chapter. But it mainly restricted 
its calls for journalistic democratic participation to areas such as involvement in selecting 
editors 407 
However, the newspaper businesses and editors emphatically rejected even these limited 
demands. The Guild of British Newspaper Editors viewed that the involvement of 
journalists in selection of the editor amounted to a popularity poll, not away to select the 
best person for the job, which presumably the management was uniquely qualified to 
assess. It suggested that such an election could become ̀political', as if this was not the 
case when a management decided on editorial appointments. It was said that such 
elections could only operate if new editors were selected from within the paper's existing 
staff. This would mean there would not be the injection of new ideas from outside. The 
editors, it appears, assumed that the journalists, unlike the management, would not be 
able to assess someone who they did not know intimately. This was despite it being 
pointed out that they could achieve this through journalist networks 408 
404 National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants, Graphical and Media Personnel, Oral Evidence to 
the Royal Commission on the Press, 8 March 1976. 
405 The headline of the June edition of its newspaper, the Journalist, which had a left-wing editor, may have 
been overstating the general picture when it crowed over seeing when describing the recent elections to the 
union's NEC. Nevertheless, as both those on the right in parliament and those on the left in the union 
indicated, the NUJ was moving leftwards. (Anon., ̀ Militants in Power', Journalist, June 1974). 
406 See, for example, Anon., 'Chapel seeks say in choice of boss', Journalist, June 1974. 
407 National Union of Journalists, Topics for Consideration: Answers to Questions submitted by the Royal 
Commission on the Press, 13 March 1975: 3. 
408 The Guild of British Newspaper Editors, Oral Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 30 
October 1975: 20-4. 
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In turn, the publishers employed liberal pluralist notions to defend their right to have a 
privileged role in public debate based on private ownership 409 The NPA accepted that a 
newspapers' management controlled many things including editors' budgets, staffing 
levels, salaries, the number of specialist reporters there could be and the percentage of 
editorial space. Indeed, the newspaper firms' representatives admitted that: "These 
inhibitions might be said, of course, to prove the validity of the radical proposition that 
press freedom is a chimera under a free enterprise system. " But they argued that the same 
was true under a state-run structure, as was the case at the time in Eastern Europe 410 
But this was not the point. What the Labour Party proposals were attempting to achieve 
was to successfully ameliorate management domination. Indeed, an argument for 
industrial democracy was that it went beyond state or market control and answered some 
of the problems associated with both. 
An assumption behind the opposition to Labour's schemes was another liberal pluralist 
one - that state intervention could not effectively replace the market. The employers and, 
latterly, the Royal Commission itself shared this argument. It was even echoed by the 
NUJ representatives, who were concerned at the inability of the state to replicate the 
unseen hand of the market. 11 We have already considered a response to Hayek's claims 
on this. However, there is an argument for industrial democracy, which concerns both 
state involvement and the effectiveness of market domination, and can be applied to the 
press. 
As Hilary Wainwright argues, an important source of knowledge in Hayek's terms is 
ignored by the operation of the market and top-down state control, such as that in 
Labour's schemes, if not complemented by industrial democracy. She indicates that in 
developing his idea of knowledge, which cannot be centralised and was ephemeral, 
409 As indicated at the start of this work, the NPA's chair Lord Goodman put it thus: "A newspaper is an 
individual piece of private property which has public responsibilities expressing the views of those people 
who are running it. " Newspaper Publishers' Association, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 
November 30 1976: 14-5). 
ago Newspaper Publishers' Association, Evidence November: 14-5. 
411 National Union of Journalists, Topics for Consideration: Answers to Questions submitted by the Royal 
Commission on the Press, 13 March 1975: 1. 
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Hayek only concentrated on the knowledge developed by entrepreneurs and commercial 
agents. He ignored the knowledge developed by waged workers. The implication was that 
knowledge in Hayek's schema only came in one of two ways. It was either developed 
through competition and was thus narrowly based. Or Hayek implicitly assumed that 
entrepreneurs could codify all of the knowledge developed by the workers. This would go 
against his general view that all knowledge could not be centralised. 
12 Tomlinson also 
questions this individualist notion, arguing that cognition is socially constructed 
413 With 
this, it can be asserted that, through social cooperation, people can increase the 
understanding of their actions and can influence society, subject to trial and error. 
414 
Wainwright makes the important assertion that a kernel of Hayek's ideas - that not all 
knowledge can be centralised - is both true and is part of the reason for the popularity of 
the Austrian's schemes. If this is combined with the assertion that cognition is socially 
constructed, then a conclusion becomes evident for interventionist schemes, such as 
Labour's press plans and for the operation of the press market. If Labour's plans did not 
explicitly involve the workers in the industries, which was being intervened into, 
including the papers' marketing workforce, they would, at the very least, be ignoring this 
huge knowledge resource. The application of this knowledge would provide a check and 
balance on statist solutions 415 As importantly, an argument for democratic control in 
private press operations is that, without it, the creative knowledge of all those in the 
industry is not as effectively utilised and involved as it could be. 
Nevertheless, industrial democracy can only be a partial method of securing participative 
democratic control of the press. One notable democratic theorist has isolated three criteria 
by which any democratic system can be tested. These are the extent to which: all 
constituent groups are involved in decision-making; decisions are open to democratic 
control; and ordinary citizens are involved in administration. 416 The emphasis on 
412 Wainwright, New left: 57-60. 
413 Tomlinson: 111-2. 
414 Wainwright, New left: 60,262-3. 
415 Strengthening democratic participation in the newspapers themselves would provide an effective power 
base to protect the independence of newspapers from state interference. 
416 Lively, Jack. 1975. Democracy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.: 51. 
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industrial democracy excludes other constituent groups, such as the wider community 
who consume the press or are affected by it, for instance. These would need to be 
involved in decision-making. The democratic theorist Norbeto Bobbio notes, in another 
context, that such an emphasis refuses to accept that there are no problems relating to the 
citizen that are distinct from those pertaining to a worker. 417 
Discussing the mechanism for extensive community control is outside the scope of this 
work. Nevertheless, it should be indicated that the operation of democratic control in the 
press is replete with difficulties. Writers have pointed to problems with participatory 
democracy in decision-making, which would be applicable to such democratic 
involvement in newspapers and organisations such as an advertiser revenue board. Not 
least of these is the size and complexity of society. This means that any simple 
extrapolation from Athenian democracy to present-day situations would be inappropriate. 
A key problem is the decisions the workforce representatives and readers would make are 
complex and not understandable by ordinary citizens. Only experts could make them. 
Direct democracy is said to be better suited to making either/or decisions than multiple 
choices. Non-mandated representatives are said to be more capable of handling these. 418 
Thus, the level of participation of the citizenry who wished to take an active interest in 
newspaper control would be limited. However, David Held and Anthony Arblaster 
indicate that new technology has made a re-examination of different forms of 
participatory democracy possible. An example of this is, for instance, where citizens 
decide on proposals made by elected representatives. "' 
As we shall see, the involvement of the Labour government in the issue of the closed 
shop indirectly highlighted the problems of identifying press democracy with industrial 
democracy. As important in the evolving history of Labour Party and press democracy 
was the involvement of the Labour government in another episode in the early years of 
41 Bobbio identifies this problematic with economistic variants of the Marxist tradition, but it could be 
eually associated with other economistic trends. (Bobbio: 84). 
419 See, for instance, Bobbio: 71-2, Garnham N., `The Media and the Public Sphere' in Calhoun Craig, J. 
1992. Habermas and the public sphere. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: M. I. T. Press.: 366. 
419 Held, David. 1995. Democracy and the global order : from the modern state to cosmopolitan 
governance. Cambridge: Polity Press.: 280-1, Arblaster, Anthony, and University Open. 1987. Democracy. 
Milton Keynes: University of Minnesota Press.. 
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the 1974 administration. Its participation in financing a practical example of industrial 
democracy in the newspaper industry would not strengthen the case for democratic 
control and would bolster the Labour leadership rationale in seeking the existing press's 
support to improve representation. 
Scottish Daily News 
As has already been indicated, one of the issues that lay behind the setting up of the 
Royal Commission was the closure of the Scottish Express operation, with huge job 
losses. After it closed, some among Labour ranks called for the Government to support 
plans for a newspaper to rise from the ashes as a workers' co-operative to aid diversity. A 
trust board drawn from the workforce would control the title but it would secure some 
state funding. 420 
While there were divisions within the Labour government's senior ranks from the start, it 
responded to the request for aid and backed the co-operative Scottish Daily News to the 
tune of £1.75 million - half the estimated launch costs. 
21 The Department of Industry 
and the NEB, presided over by Tony Benn, provided the money. 422 The workers' own 
redundancy payments, public subscription and the publisher and former MP Robert 
Maxwell supplied the rest of the cash. 423 For the first two months, the News ran on co- 
operative lines. It was a beacon of light for those who considered that most British 
newspapers were dominated by autocratic management. But after this short interlude, 
Maxwell took over as Chief Executive and the experiment effectively died. The paper 
limped on, but, within months, it had ceased production. 424 
420 HOC 24 March 1974 Vol. 871, cols. 393-5,399-401. 
421 Labour Weekly, August 2 1974 
422 Wickham-Jones, Economic: 137-143. 
42' Allaun, Spreading the news: 51, John Hodgman, ̀ A new paper is born', Journalist, April 1975, Kelly, 
Stephen Kelly, `Outlook is grim for the `miracle' paper that Glasgow workers started', Tribune, October 
17,1975. 
424 Allaun, Spreading the news: 51, Hodgman, Kelly, Outlook. 
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There were a number of reasons for its failure. Most important for our considerations was 
that the Labour government was divided on backing the venture 425 This reflected 
rightwing ministers' strong opposition to such co-operative initiatives. 26 When a Labour 
backbencher first made calls for state aid, the Government's initial response was hostile. 
This was later reflected in the fact that it refused to cover an early financial shortfall, 
which would have meant financing from Maxwell would not have been needed. 427 The 
significance of this was that the publisher came to dominate the inexperienced co- 
operative and after financial difficulties adopted control. He was said to have ignored any 
works' council decision after this, ending democratic involvement 428 Under his 
management, the price of the newspaper was slashed, which merely lost revenue. 29 
When problems worsened, despite claiming he would save the title, Maxwell instead 
offered to buy the building and plant in order to set up his own non-co-operative 
newspaper. 430 
However, Government reluctance and Maxwell's involvement were not the only reason 
for the failure. Like many of the NEB's funding recipients, the paper was based on a 
failed enterprise. The press democracy advocate Ascherson believes that with the original 
failure, the best journalists had flown to more solvent titles. Those left produced a 
"miserable" title 431 According to one employee, it became "... a really cheap, nasty, 
425 Hodgman. 
426 Wickham-Jones, Economic: 143. 
427 Minister Eric Deakins, representing the Government, faced with concerns that the closure would leave a 
monopoly of evening titles, suggested that: "Some people may ... 
feel that it is better that there should be 
one strong newspaper, given editorial freedom, than two ailing local newspapers. " The minister for trade 
believed that a workers' co-operative would be a "... risky undertaking". (HOC 24 March 1974 Vol. 871, 
cols. 418). This unease in senior Labour government ranks was reflected in the fact that despite Benn's 
remonstrations, his colleagues refused to finance a shortfall from the amount needed to get the co-operative 
up and running. Wilson himself cancelled a last-ditch meeting with Benn to discuss the amount, said to be 
£40,000. (Benn, Against the tide: 335,358, Kelly, Outlook, Personal interview with former Scottish Daily 
News employee and NUJ official, Tim Gopsill, October 1 2002. 
428 Anon., `Why I quit the SDN', Journalist, October 1975. 
429 Kelly, Outlook, Anon., `Why I quit the SDN', Journalist, October 1975. 
430 Gopsill, Tim. 1975. `SDN sinks', Journalist, October 1975. 
431 Though the better printers were still there when the new paper was launched, Ascherson noted that: 
"... under the strain the journalists did not always ... all live up to the commitment of the manual workers. No amount of money from Mr Benn could make mediocre journalists into good ones. " (Neal Ascherson ̀  
Newspapers and Internal Democracy' in Curran, The British press: 135-6. See also Labour Weekly, August 
2 1974. 
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tabloid rag". 432 This failure also reflected the fact that an independent report 
commissioned in the wake of the Express titles' closure considered it not feasible to 
launch a new paper, because its circulation would be too small 433 There was also a poor 
take-up of advertising. Yet advertisers later admitted that they were reluctant to advise 
the News on this area, in which management experience was lacking. 434 
Unions, aside from the TGWU, provided limited backing to the venture, despite 
expectations that they would contribute to the start-up funds. Among the media unions, 
the NUJ's national executive at first barred its Glasgow branch from investing in the co- 
operative and even debated whether to carry on paying unemployment benefit to those 
preparing to be involved in the project. Part of its reluctance to give the paper 
wholehearted support was the involvement of Maxwell. National print union officials 
were said to be unconvinced that the paper would be successful 435 
What the Daily News episode indicated was that newspaper co-operatives needed more 
than just financial support; they required advice and training back-up. Such ventures also 
needed safeguards. It was an essential prerequisite for there to be a properly-costed 
scheme, where it was independently assessed whether a market existed for the 
publication. That assessment also needed to carry sufficient weight with those providing 
launch funds for such an enterprise. The launch of the co-operative venture also showed 
that the pressure from the Labour rank and file, the NEC and the unions, meant that there 
was support for newspaper industrial democracy at the heart of the Labour government, 
at this early point in the 1974-1979 administration. However, there was also opposition in 
the Government on this from the start. The refusal to find more money, despite calls from 
the left of the party for this, also indicated that any support was reluctant, (leaving aside 
the question of whether such a course of action could be justified, given the problems 
outlined). As it was, one prominent advocate of newspaper democracy noted that the 
Scottish Daily News' failure "... unquestionably set back the cause of internal democracy, 
432 Gopsill interview. 
433 Labour Weekly, August 2 1974, Gopsill interview. 
434 Advertising Association: 8-10. 
435 Benn, Against the tide: 226, Labour Weekly, August 2 1974. Kelly, Outlook, Hodgman and ̀ NEC ban on 
£200 cheque bounces', Journalist, April 1975. 
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spreading disillusion among both politicians and press workers" 436 It was "... very 
demoralising" 437 
The Closed Shop 
The Labour government also involved itself in the press democracy debate in the saga 
over its repeal of the ban on closed shops (including those for journalists). The 
Government was responding to huge union pressure from the movement in repealing the 
law. 438 Joint opposition to the act brought the two closer. It became part of the social 
contract 439 
Yet, the Government faced huge pressure from press businesses and editors "... united in a 
way ... " not "... seen before... ", articulated in hostile press coverage 
440 This was despite 
Fleet Street containing both closed shops and workplaces where there was 100% union 
membership, by agreement. 441 Some on the right of the Labour Party also expressed 
profound misgivings. All opponents were particularly hostile to the NUJ, which changed 
its position on closed shops more than once in the course of the debate. 
436 Ascherson, Internal Democracy: 135. 
437 Gopsill interview. 
aas The opposition to the legislation brought in by the previous Conservative administration had been large 
and represented a considerable radicalisation of the TUC. There was a boycott of the associated National 
Industrial Relations Court and a campaign to `Kill the Bill', including a one-day general strike. (Bames, 
Denis, Eileen Reid, and Institute Policy Studies. 1982. Governments and trade unions : the British 
experience, 1964-79. London: Heinemann Educational Books.: 140-45, Martin Ross, M. 1980. TUC: the 
growth of a pressure group 1868-1976. Oxford: Oxford University Press.: 305). 
39 Ross, TUC: 305. The TUC Labour Party Liaison Committee agreed that repeal of the act was central. 
(Pelling, Henry. 1976. A history of British trade unionism. Harmondsworth ; New York: Penguin Books.: 
283). On Labour's return to power, one of its promises to win the support of the TUC was to repeal the 
closed shop legislation. (Barnes and Reid: 197,199, Pelling: 285). Repealing the act was seen as a key 
indicator of the effectiveness of TUC policy. (Ross, TUC: 361). 
440 James Prior, HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, col. 421. It was estimated by one key opponent of the 
move that: "... one could form a book of the articles and letters written on the subject. " (HOC 12 February 
1975, Vol 886, col. 421). Indeed, later, a book on the subject was produced. (Beloff, Nora. 1976. Freedom 
under Foot : the battle over the closed shop in British journalism. London: Temple Smith. ) The press 
businesses backed Conservative amendments. (See, for instance, Brivati, Brian. 1999. Lord Goodman. 
London: Richard Cohen). 
441 HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, col. 439-536, Greenslade, Press Gang: 284. Although there is a 
difference between these two sorts of agreement, depending on whether union-membership was demanded 
pre-entry or post-entry, I shall treat these two sorts of agreements as synonymous. 
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Objections to the original Trades Union and Labour Relations Bill were manifold, but 
three stand out. Firstly, the law was accused of strengthening journalists' power to 
influence newspaper editorial policy. The anxiety was that editors would be forced into 
the NUJ and would have to abide by the chapel agreements. 442 Opponents saw "... only a 
short step to election of editors by chapels ...... 
443 Moonman and some ministers were 
among those in the Labour Party who were concerned about editorial interference. 44 Yet, 
the senior minister involved in the legislation slyly questioned this view with typical wit. 
Former NUJ activist and editor Michael Foot was now Secretary of State for 
Employment and piloted the law. He suggested that the main threat to editors being 
sacked or deposed had always come from the newspapers owners who were now 
concerned over others muscling into their territory. "William Hazlitt said that regicide 
was quite a respectable affair as long as it was only done by kings and queens but it was 
when the common people took a hand that a different view was taken of it. The same 
principle seems to be applicable to the alarm now spread... ". 445 
The NUJ, in fact, rescinded its position that editors should be compelled to be part of the 
closed shop in a right-left tussle and agreed to give assurances that it would not attempt to 
instruct editors on editorial policy matters 446 This was despite fears among members of 
the NUJ executive that this cut across demands for workers' participation, as indeed it 
did. 447 Under heavy pressure, an opportunity for the union to push for some measure of 
press industrial democracy was spurned. Instead, the publishers' campaign succeeded in 
442 NUJ union branches are known as chapels. 
443 The Guild of British Newspaper Editors, Oral Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 25 
March 1976: 13. The Guild of British Newspaper Editors, Oral Evidence to the Royal Commission on the 
Press, 7 February 1975: 20-4. See also HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, cols. 427-428,432-433,439,493, 
504-5. 
444 HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, col. 442-3 and 464. 
445 HOC 20 November 1974 Vol 881, col. 1318. On a more internationalist note, Greenslade also cites him 
as arguing that the appointment of the editors was like tsars' coronation: "... in which the newly appointed 
autocrat would march in procession preceeded by his father's murderers and followed by his own. " 
(Greenslade, Press Gang. 283). 
446 'Freedom: our hands are clean' and `Nowhere has the NUJ set out to inhibit editors' freedom', 
Journalist, May 1975, ̀ Cardiff line rejected in ballot', Journalist, November 1975, Royal Commission on 
the Press: 158. 
447 Knowles, Ron and Roger Protz. 1974. ̀ NUJ, editors and the closed shop', Journalist, July 1974. See 
also Richard Clements, ̀Fleet Street and press freedom', Tribune, February 14 1975. 
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equating journalistic involvement in editorial decision-making with control by the NUJ 
headquarters 448 
A second objection, again shared by a number of Labour backbenchers, including 
Moonman, along with the newspaper firms, editors, Conservatives and Liberals, was that 
a closed shop could threaten outside contributors from having `free access' to the 
press. 49 Nevertheless, double standards were applied on this point. The past president of 
the Guild of Newspaper Editors' Frank Owens, in a remarkable discussion, told the Royal 
Commission that everyone should be allowed to have press access 45° Yet, as one Labour 
MP pointed out, what was being asserted was not free admission but the right of editors 
to determine who had access . 
451 To that we could add, following Foot, that the 
newspapers' senior hierarchy had the final say, not least because of their ability to hire 
and fire editors 452 
The Labour government's response to all this was to assert that the NUJ leadership did 
not wish to use closed shops in order to exclude such contributions. Ministers indicated 
that the requirement that all journalists join the union had operated in much of Fleet 
Street without such exclusion and, indeed, could not be used in this way. 453 It was indeed 
true that most of the concerns expressed were groundless - both in what was being 
demanded at the time and in the way the closed shop was applied after the legislation was 
448 Ascherson, Internal Democracy: 126-9. 
449 Newspaper Publishers' Association, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, July 1975: 24, 
Guild of British Newspaper Editors, March 25 1976: 2,16. Indeed, one key Conservative objector, along 
with a prominent editor, quoted a passage in People and the Media on access of the public to the media 
back at Labour. (HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, col. 430-1, Clements). This objection was backed by 60 
writers, including socialists, who signed a latter to the Times Literary Supplement which expressed the view 
that a closed shop represented "... one of the most serious threats to liberty of expression that has arisen in 
this country in modern times. " (Times Literary Supplement, 25 April 1975, quoted in Royal Commission on 
the Press: 160). 
450 He viewed that: ""... if a man [sic] has something to write that is worth writing you should not deny the 
public the right to read it. It is a natural right that the public should be able to hear the opinions of other 
people. " (The Guild of British Newspaper Editors, Oral Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 7 
February 1975: 17). 
451 HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, col. 507. 
1S2 It was also pointed out by the editor of one of the few low-circulation Labour organs Tribune that the 
proprietors had been poor defenders of press freedom, in their eagerness to close down unprofitable 
newspapers. (Clements). 
453 HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, col. 436-448,522-533. 
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passed 454 However, the policy left open the possibility that outside contributions could be 
restricted. The difficult area of sports journalist contributors indicated this. Here, indeed, 
the union did campaign for the restriction of non-union sporting stars' copy. 455 
That journalists arguing for democratic control could deny wider access to outside 
contributors was a problem for `workers' control'. It pointed to a real dilemma. 
Importantly for what is being discussed, it illustrated the potential problems with the lack 
of clarity in Labour Party thinking. Its proposals on democratic involvement in 
newspapers were mostly restricted to those involved in the industry. The thinking behind 
this was ambiguous on the relationship of these plans to broader direct democracy and 
wider democratic access for all. It can be argued that industrial participation would 
normally present a step forward for those advocating wider participation. However, it 
does not guarantee this, as the closed shop episode showed. The legislation had the 
potential to both advance industrial democracy and, in the course of this, to potentially set 
back community involvement, because journalists could advocate restricting access to 
contributors. 
There was a third, and less prominent objection, which was significant, nonetheless. As 
Moonman viewed it, the "... perhaps most important... " concern was that the Labour 
government was damaging Labour representation by challenging the press. It was argued 
that putting the newspapers' backs up was self-defeating: "The Labour Party does not 
434 Claims widely made that the NUJ's more leftwing branches were calling for contributions by non- 
journalist `experts' be restricted to two a year were vigorously denied by the left-wingers themselves. 
Instead, the NUJ's argument was that the closed shop would deter the use of non-union labour employed by 
proprietors in order to break the union's demands for decent pay and conditions and would be a way of 
upholding reporting standards. (Ron Knowles and Roger Protz. 1974. ̀NUJ, editors and the closed shop', 
Journalist, July 1974, Jeremy Gomm, `Closed shop freedom', Journalist, July 1974, Clements, O'Malley 
and Soley: 73). 
455 Knowles, Ron and Roger Protz. 1974. 'NUJ, editors and the closed shop', Journalist, July 1974. 
Although this was understandable, by doing so, the union was laying itself open to the charge of being 
`anti-democratic'. Two right-wing Labour backbenchers pointed to concerns about the NUJ as a whole in 
their misgivings. As one, Bryan Magee, put it: "[T]he Press is now drastically contracting.... In these 
circumstances the NUJ is almost bound by the logic of this situation to use ever tougher... measures to 
protect the jobs of its members. These are bound to include ... excluding non-union members from writing for newspapers. That is not because it wishes to censor their political views but because it wishes to 
preserve for its members all the paid employment that there is going. " (HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, 
col. 508-511). 
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benefit from antagonism towards the Press. "456 This was an indication that this was 
becoming a more powerful consideration, as someone intimately involved with media 
reform publicly voiced this concern. 
Nonetheless, the Government's view of the legislation was that it was neutral. It merely 
meant there was neither an inducement to provide a closed shop nor a deterrent against 
such a course, if agreed by both management and unions. It saw that, rather than 
legislating, both unions and management should be encouraged to produce a binding 
charter on press freedom, as was being discussed by both sides 457 
The Charter 
Following the passing of the Trades Union and Labour Relations Act, Lord Goodman and 
the newspaper firms proposed that there should be a legally enforceable charter on the 
press. This would have subjected the NUJ to "... an exceptional degree of legal 
restraint... " and was rejected by the Labour government. 458 What followed again 
indicated to the Labour administration the hostility of the press businesses and editors to 
any attempt to interfere with their right to control their titles. 
As indicated, the Labour government proposed the Trades Union and Labour Relations 
(Amendment) Act. This called for a charter, which would have to be agreed by both sides 
and would include `practical guidance' relating to press freedom. 59 Negotiations 
foundered on the terms of this agreement. The draconian nature of the editors' demands 
was indicated by an early draft demanding that employers would be able to check the 
political affiliations of journalists before employing them. 460 Talks broke down when the 
456 (HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, col. 465). This was a view that the insider Curran considers weighed 
on Labour politicians in their deliberations. (Curran interview). 
457 See, for instance, employment minister Albert Booth, HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, col. 437 and 
Foot, HOC 12 February 1975, Vol 886, col. 533. 
ass Royal Commission on the Press: 158,159. 
459 Ibid.: 161. 
460 `Hetherington calls for staff politics probe', February 1975 
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representatives of press firms and editors took the view that such a charter could only be 
agreed if journalists were barred from the closed shops a61 
It was after this that the Royal commission stepped into the breach. Its proposals for a 
charter provided the newspaper firms with a problem. They appeared even-handed and 
were far from advocating widespread journalistic control. They were meant to preserve 
editorial autonomy over outside contributions and union involvement. However, the 
commissioners' first recommendation was that a journalist should be free "... to act, 
write, and speak in accordance with conscience without being inhibited by the threat of 
expulsion or other disciplinary action by his union or his employer' . 462 In other words, in 
a policy transfer from other European countries, a journalist would have similar legal 
rights to those enjoyed in a `freedom of conscience clause' to write what he or she 
wanted - not to be dictated to either by the editor or newspaper business. Commissioners 
also recommended that journalists be involved in the appointment of editors, although 
they did not indicate how they thought this would be achieved 463 
This concern for journalist autonomy by the commissioners should not be overstated. 64 
Nonetheless, the response of the publishers, in the words of Curran, was to go 
"... ballistic, because the whole thing had boomeranged. It boomeranged in that very 
British way when a discussion is taken in a way that hadn't been intended. " The press 
firms were hostile to the charter clause, which implicitly challenged the commissioners' 
own view that press freedom was to be simply equated with employer control abs 
However, what is of overall importance is that the Labour government did not accept this 
charter, under this press business pressure. 466 It is also worth noting that it could not have 
461 Royal Commission on the Press: 158, Ken Morgan, `Editors reject charter', Journalist, March 1975. 
462 Royal Commission on the Press: 163,232-3. 
463 Ibid.: 156. 
464 The commission's report had also baldly stated that they saw that the proprietors were on the side of 
upholding press freedom in their dispute with the NUJ. It also had made clear that internal democracy was 
"... a complex and disputed subject... " on which it was not able to "... express a view... "Jbid.: 160, 
Ascherson, Internal Democracy: 128. 
465 Curran interview. 
466 This was also the case with other legislation the commission called for. 
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helped advance attempts to wrest press control from newspaper business leaders' hands 
that the Labour government had dipped its toe in the press democracy waters, by 
advancing the closed shop legislation, and had witnessed a potential illustration of the 
Labour Party proposals' weaknesses. 
THE ROYAL COMMISSION FINDINGS AND THE MINORITY REPORT 
Overall, as it was, the commission sided with the party proposal's critics. Although the 
majority commissioners accepted the notion that the press was a `special case', which 
was needed for the maintenance of democracy, it rejected any extensive intervention into 
the market. 67 While, as we have suggested, such intervention would have needed to be 
backed up by safeguards, as Curran indicates, its wholesale rejection prefigured the onset 
of Thatcherism. 468 The Labour Party chair, as opposed to the parliamentary leadership, on 
behalf of the party, denounced the report for being "... bland and complacent... " 469 
However, the commission split over its findings. Two commissioners, Geoffrey 
Goodman and David Basnett, provided a Minority Report - and the Labour Party 
promoted this. 70 The two wished for more interventionism. They were shocked by what 
they also saw as the complacent approach of the rest of the body to counteracting 
concentration and increasing newspapers numbers . 
471 Their complaint was that the 
467 Its emphasis was that the existing number of national newspapers should be maintained. Yet, it shied 
away from the party proposals, which, whatever their motivation, were aimed at providing diversity. (See, 
for instance, Royal Commission on the Press: 159-60, also cited in O. R. McGregor, ̀ Royal Commission on 
the Press, 1974-7: A Note' in Bulmer, Martin. 1980. Social research and Royal Commissions. London ; 
Boston: G. Allen & Unwin.: 155, Jeremy Tunstall, `Research for the Royal Commission on the Press, 
1974-7', in Bulmer: 126) 
468 Curran interview. It ignored the role of Government intervention in other areas where the market was 
seen to be deficient in providing goods and services required for enhancing society's well-being, such as 
the Arts Council's subsidy of culture. The commission also rejected a levy and subsidy system, relying on 
the rejection of similar proposals by a previous Royal Commission as sufficient justification for this. In 
addition, the commissioners rejected a scheme for a printing corporation. (Royal Commission on the Press: 
120-2). 
469 Hayward: 1. 
470 David Basnett was General Secretary of General Municipal Workers' Union from 1973 and the General, 
Municipal, Boiler Makers and Allied Trades Union from 1982. He became a member of the TUC General 
Council from 1966 and was chair from 1977-78. He was a member of numerous committees of enquiry. 
(1985. Who's who an annual biographical dictionary. London: A. & C. Black.: 112) 
471 Basnett and Goodman: 3, Allaun, Spreading the news: 72. 
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majority report was timid and that the analysis it contained pointed to the need for more 
radical reform to provide plurality and some democratic control. Nevertheless, for the 
industrial correspondent and Labour government adviser Goodman and the union leader 
Basnett this was again intertwined with the idea that the press was biased and the answer 
was to restructure the market so that an official Labour movement press could flourish (a 
theme that Goodman had already promoted). n 
However, where the Labour Party and commission dissenters differed was on the 
solutions needed to bring this about. The minority argued for a commercially-viable 
National Printing Corporation and a state-financed launch fund to provide assistance to 
new titles 473 A similar scheme had been backed by the TUC. 474 
This was a hybrid between a public service model and a social market solution. The use 
of commercially viable print works was a conscious policy transfer from the 
Scandinavian countries, which operated this as part of a social market system, as we saw 
in the appendix to Chapter 3. Yet, the emphasis on a print corporation and the particular 
way the launch fund was conceived was very much in the public service tradition. Rather 
than a solution that would restructure the market by directly impacting on advertising, 
such as that promoted by the Labour Party, the dissenters saw that any financial 
assistance would be provided by the Government 475 The two commissioners accepted 
that bifurcation was a block on diversity. 476 However, they considered that the solution 
472 Hayward: 1, Curran interview. It is interesting, for instance, that a recent work emphasises the Minority 
Report's attempt to provide balance in a biased press. (Greenslade, Press Gang. 347). 
473 Basnett and Goodman: 11-13,14-5, Benn, Tony. 1979. The need for a free press. Nottingham: Institute 
for Workers' Control.: 4, Allaun, Spreading the news: 72-3, Stuart Holland, ̀ Countervailing press power' 
in Curran, The British Press: 116, Curran, Different approaches: 117,133. 
474 The Labour Party only backed the proposal for a national printing corporation as a back-up, if a rush of 
new entrants led to problems with printing capacity. However, the TUC had backed a similar proposal to 
that envisaged in the minority report, as had the printing union NATSOPA. (Royal Commission on the 
Press: 121-2. See also National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants, Graphical and Media 
Personnel, Oral Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 8 March 1976: 15-17). 
475 So, for instance, Goodman told the author: "The idea of an independent printing Corporation came from 
us really from a number of sources. Examples came from particularly Scandinavian countries where 
printing corporations were run, but on a commercial basis. " Yet he also noted that, in the public service 
tradition: "Our argument, both David Basnett and myself, was that we were using the template of the 
BBC. " (Personal interview with Geoffrey Goodman, August 1 2001). On the latter see Royal Commission 
on the Press: 10,11. 
476 Basnett and Goodman: 5. 
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did not come by altering the advertising market, but by making it possible for newspapers 
to be printed. A printing corporation was needed, despite spare printing capacity, because 
existing businesses might not provide this surplus to new entrants. 
77 The corporation 
would be initially state-funded, through the NEB, but would eventually become self- 
financing. 478 
In addition, in some ways Basnett and Goodman were less vague than the party in their 
proposals on advancing participative democratic control in the press. They also placed 
more of an emphasis on community participation rather than just industrial democracy, 
even if their proposals were less than fully formed. As such, the comment by Hayward 
that the report did not go as far as the proposals put to the commission by the party is 
only true to a degree. 79 
The element of participative democratic control involved in the proposals was that the 
workforce would make up half the board of the corporation, of which many would 
presumably be printers. The authors were less precise in specifying what form of 
democratic control would be developed in the press itself. They called for staff press co- 
operatives, but unlike Labour's proposals, suggested some wider community involvement 
"... possibly with consumer/reader epresentation on a board" 480 Thus, the report was 
prepared to go some distance beyond statist solutions to the problems of the market, 
towards considering participative democratic control. This is one quarter from which any 
protection against state abuse would have come. 
Press firms and the commission majority opposed the minority proposals because the 
state would be involved in selecting which papers got launch funding and printing 
477 Basnett and Goodman: 11. A space needed to be created for a viable lower-circulation newspaper. The 
two authors quote favourably from the majority report that "... we have no doubt that there is a gap in 
political terms which could be filled with advantage. " (Basnett and Goodman: 5-6). 
478 In addition, the state-funded launch fund would supply limited assistance for publications, which 
achieved certain readership and advertising levels. There was intended to be a circulation ceiling, at which 
point subsidy would be cut off. (Basnett and Goodman: 11,14-5, Allaun, Spreading the news: 72-3). 
79 Hayward: 1. 
480 Basnett and Goodman: 17. 
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facilities access 481 Indeed, it is not surprising that the newspaper businesses would not 
welcome those titles' intent on encroaching on their existing market share. Yet, as we 
saw in the appendix to Chapter 3, targeted subsidies have not led to direct government 
interference. 
The crucial difficulty with the proposals, however, was that the key barrier to increased 
diversity was not the availability of commercially-priced print facilities. It was the 
operation of advertising. The Minority Report authors did not address this because they 
felt advertising business opposition was too powerful. 482 There was already excess 
capacity in the printing industry. This is what sceptics such as the printers union, the 
NGA, the editors' representatives and the Advertising Association told the Royal 
Commission - and the commission agreed. 
83 Concern not to antagonise the advertising 
business meant that the proposals would have only been moderately effective. 
481 As the propreitors' representatives put it: "Who would qualify? Would bureaucracy consent to print 
Socialist Worker or Private Eye? " Evidence of the NPA to the RCP 30.11.76, Great Britain Royal 
Commission on the, Press. 1977. Royal Commission on the Press. Final Report. Command 6810 & 
Cmnd. 8810-1.: 122. 
482 "We thought the strength of the advertising lobby was such that you simply weren't going to get very far 
with that. " (Personal interview with Geoffrey Goodman, August 1 2001). 
483 National Graphical Association, Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press, 24 March 1976, 
Advertising Association: 14-5, The Guild of British Newspaper Editors, Oral Evidence to the Royal 
Commission on the Press, 30 October 1975: 5-6. Even enthusiasts in the NUJ saw that it was "... meeting a 
need which is in some degree already met". (National Union of Journalists, Topics for Consideration: 
Royal Commission on the Press: 3). 
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THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT 
The Minority Report was widely supported in the Labour movement 484 After all, it was 
very similar to the position advocated by the TUC and the Labour Party was promoting it. 
But the Labour government did not back it or the recommendations made by its own 
ply 485 
By 1977, when the Royal Commission reported its findings, James Callaghan had 
succeeded Wilson. It is now clear that there were secret meetings with members of the 
cabinet to discuss the Minority Report. Those involved, Roy Hattersley, Peter Shore and 
Meacher, were prepared to set up a ministerial committee to discuss the minority 
recommendations. According to Goodman: "There was a real possibility, and I'm not 
exaggerating ... given the kind of reception that we received. " He remembers Meacher 
and Hattersley to be "... quite strongly sympathetic". However, the politicians were 
concerned about press company opposition, as was the Labour leader. 486 
Callaghan indicated to the author that he rejected such a scheme out of hand partly for 
this reason and also because the minority Labour government was facing concerted 
opposition on a series of fronts. The then head of the government's policy unit, Bernard 
Donoughue, confirmed that the Government had considered the broad themes contained 
within the Minority Report. 87 Yet, Callaghan doubted that any scheme which involved 
giving financial assistance to the press would have been "... ever a runner... " under his 
administration. Reasons for this, he agreed, included that the Royal Commission, which 
had been instituted by the Labour government, had rejected such reforms. Also, it was 
granted, as has been suggested, that press businesses and editors did not support such 
484 O'Malley: 95 
ass Ibid.: 95, Allaun, Spreading the news: 73. 
486 "They were saying: ̀ Well of, of course, you do realise that as soon as the Government put forward this 
kind of legislation there would be a huge outcry from the Conservative press and you would be thrust back 
into a terrific argument about the whole nature of freedom of censorship and state control of the media. "' 
(Personal interview with Geoffrey Goodman, August 1 2001). 
487 Bernard Donoughue (now Lord Donoughue), private correspondence with the thesis's author, June 3 
2001. 
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proposals. 88 He also indicated that the Government's parliamentary position was too 
precarious for such radical reform to be tackled 489 As Bernard Donoughue told the 
author, it was "... felt that with all his problems and without a Commons majority, it was 
prudent not to open ... another front. "490 In addition, Callaghan regarded proposals 
for 
state assistance to the press as simply unviable. 491 The experience in Scandinavia, we 
have seen, challenges this assessment. 
The Government also had the commission's recommendations before them. The 
commissioners recommended tightening up monopoly and mergers law. 492 As we have 
seen, they also called for protection for journalists from editorial and press business 
interference and for journalistic involvement in the election of editors. 
Yet, the Labour government's approach to even these limited demands was to shelve 
them. After taking a year to make a response, trade minister Michael Meacher indicated 
that the question of the press charter was still being dealt with. 493 In addition, Meacher 
merely noted: "The other recommendations are under consideration. "494 With these 
words, the Labour government dismissed years of commission deliberations. 
488 James Callaghan (now Lord Callaghan), private correspondence with the thesis's author, June 12 2001. 
489 On this point see Allaun, Spreading the news: 73. 
490 Donoughue private correspondence. 
491 Callaghan private correspondence. 
492 The onus of proof would be shifted. A merger would be refused unless it were proved that it would not 
operate against the public interest. Commissioners also recommended that the circulation limit of 
newspaper groups that would require investigation when involved in mergers would be cut. (Royal 
Commission on the Press: 135-7). 
493 HOC 4 December 1978, Vol 959, col. 480-1. The government also considered the question of press 
cross-ownership in broadcasting separately in a 1978 White Paper. Although there was less emphasis on 
this question in the Labour Party, the Royal Commission had recommended that no combination of 
newspaper companies should be allowed to control a TV company. The commissioners also called for press 
firms to be stopped from being represented on the boards of independent TV or radio stations which they 
had interests. The Government recommended in its White Paper to tighten up the rules. These merely 
stipulated that it could terminate a TV company contract if it was considered that a newspaper shareholding 
was leading to "... a situation which is contrary to the public interest. " The Labour administration tentatively 
backed the commission recommendations on press firm representation on the boards of broadcasters and 
that press firms should not have overall control of TV stations. (Great Britain Home, Office. 1978. 
Broadcasting. London: H. M. S. O.: 51-3). 
494 HOC 4 December 1978, Vol 959, col. 480-1. The ex-university lecturer and former close ally of Tony 
Benn, Meacher was an industry minister under Benn and health and social security minister in the 1974 
Labour government. He became a trade minister in 1976. From 1978 to 1983, he was the chair of the pro- 
activist Labour Coordinating Committee. After 1979, he was associated with activist backlash against the 
Callaghan government. He stood for deputy leader in lieu of the electorally defeated Tony Benn as the left 
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THE 1979 MANIFESTO 
The Labour election manifesto of 1979 was short and the discussion on the media much 
shorter. There was nothing specifically written about the press. For the media as a whole, 
all the British people were told about Labour's plans was that: "Our aim is to safeguard 
freedom of expression; to encourage diversity; and to guard both against the dangers of 
government and commercial control. 1,9495 It might be felt that these were laudable 
sentiments as far as they went. But that was not very far. The proposals for diversity had 
been reduced to a pious wish. And the method identified for achieving this, involving 
government intervention, was positively disencouraged. All mention of internal press 
democracy was also expunged. 
Why was this? One answer was that discussion on the media in the NEC's Home Policy 
Committee after Callaghan assumed office had tended to concentrate on broadcasting. 
This was in the absence of a media sub-committee. Regarding the press, eyes were 
focussed on the Royal Commission. The do-little response from the Labour government 
evinced little reaction from the NEC's committees. It was left until when Labour was 
back in opposition for this to happen. 
Of overriding importance, however, was that policy agreed by the party conference on a 
whole range of issues had not made it into the manifesto. The way that policy was made 
was that the NEC prepared it based on submissions from groups such as the media study 
group. This went to conference to be voted on. Clause V of Labour's constitution 
candidate. Meacher was elected onto the Shadow Cabinet in 1983. He had split from what is now 
known as 
the `hard left' in 1985, developing a `soft-left' grouping in the Shadow Cabinet. He 
became chief 
opposition spokesman in areas such as health and social security, employment, overseas 
development, 
transport, employment and environment protection. He was Minister for the Environment 
from 1997 to 
2003. (2000. Dods parliamentary companion.: 623, Roth, Andrew, and Byron Criddle. 
2000.1997-2002 
parliamentary profiles. London: Parliamentary Profiles.: 1525-1532). 
495 Dale, lain, and Party Labour. 2000. Labour Party general election manifestos, 1900-1997. 
London: 
Routledge : Politico's Publishing.: 181. 
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stipulated that the NEC and Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet would jointly draw up the 
manifesto from this. 496 
In 1976, the NEC presented Labour's Programme for Britain, which was agreed by the 
party's conference. This was meant to be the basis for the election manifesto. The 1976 
programme did not have a detailed section on the press. Yet, it succinctly reiterated 
Labour's conference policy commitments. 97 For two years before the 1979 election, the 
election sub-committees of the Cabinet and the NEC had been meeting and drafts had 
already been worked out. The media was one of the areas discussed, according to the 
head of the party's research department at the time. 98 Yet, the day after the government's 
defeat in a vote of confidence, which made an election inevitable, officials at No. 10 
revealed their own draft manifesto, which became the basis of discussions. 99 
Callaghan dominated the Clause V drafting committee and insisted that the less radical 
No. 10 proposals should prevail. 500 He, in effect, employed a veto, which the left protested 
had no basis in the party's constitution. 501 Policies previously agreed by party 
conferences were jettisoned or ignored. 502 Commentators have not identified the media 
proposals as key to this process. 503 Yet, in axing the radical commitments and cutting the 
word length, the party's commitment to press reform dwindled. 
496 Seyd, Patrick. 1987. The rise and fall of the Labour left. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Macmillan Education., Benn, Tony, and Chris Mullin. 1982. Arguments for democracy. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin.: 182. 
497 Labour Party, Conference. 1976. Labour's programme for Britain : annual conference 1976. London: 
Labour Party., 105. 
498 Geoff Bish, `The Manifesto' in Barratt-Brown, Michael, Ken Coates, and Control Institute for Workers. 
1979. What went wrong : explaining the fall of the Labour Government. Nottingham: Spokesman Books for 
the Institute for Workers' Control.: 187-195, Seyd: 122, Benn, Arguments for democracy: 182. 
499 This had not been discussed with the Cabinet or the NEC. The document based on years of debate in the 
party was not discussed at the formal meeting of the NEC and the Cabinet, which was meant to agree the 
manifesto. (Bish, Manifesto: 686-7). 
500 Morgan, Callaghan: 687, Benn, Arguments for democracy: 182, Benn, Conflicts of interest:. 480-2. 
501 Benn, Arguments for democracy: 182. 
502 Seyd: 122, Benn, Arguments for democracy: 182. 
503 Morgan, Callaghan: 687-8, Seyd: 122-3. 
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CONCLUSION 
Thus, we have seen there was a clear division between the position of the Labour Party 
and that of its government from the first few months onwards of the administration. The 
Labour Party's plans to facilitate diversity in the press, influenced by Scandinavian social 
democratic and social market practice, were not acted upon by the Labour leadership. 
Leading members of the Wilson government had indicated diversity was required. While 
the administration did not support the party's interventionist plans, there was a tension in 
the leadership's thought as to whether some sort of press reform was possible and 
desirable. This was prompted by a shared belief that the press was biased against the 
Labour movement. These were among the reasons why it set up the Royal Commission. 
Extensive Labour Party policy had been developed in this period. Yet, under the 
Callaghan administration, this was rejected and the 1979 manifesto had little in the way 
of positive commitments either for diversity or for participatory democracy. 
The fact that Labour Party conference supported strongly interventionist proposals yet a 
Labour administration did not implement them, appears to challenge the pluralist 
viewpoint regarding policy formation. The evidence we have amassed suggests that the 
party's plans faced huge obstacles to being accepted by the Labour government. 
Undoubtedly significant was the hostility of influential employers and editors to Labour's 
reforms, which would seem to accord with a Marxist analysis. We have dealt with the 
fallacies behind many of the press firms' objections as they were expressed. 
However, this is not the whole story. What is also important to register at this stage was 
some of these objections were shared by parts of the Labour movement. Many of the 
unions that would have been directly involved in the implementation of the reforms were 
less than enthusiastic about all the proposals. The TUC itself only supported some of the 
plans. We will discuss the theoretical implications of this further in Chapter 4. Equally, 
we have seen that other forms of intervention may have commanded more support within 
the party, rather than a revenue board. 
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The influence of the NEC was also important in the policy that was presented publicly. 
Firstly, the party's position had been primarily formulated under the auspices of one of 
the NEC's subcommittees. Secondly, later, the NEC representatives played a dual role. 
On the one hand, they were prepared to back the party policy. But, also, they did not 
support the party's position wholeheartedly. They gave the impression that the party was 
not firmly committed to a central proposal - the advertising revenue board. They also 
downplayed the role of a printing corporation, which was given more prominent support 
in the party motion. This reflected a lack of confidence in the proposals, which the 
commissioners discerned. 
As it was, a minority of the commissioners outlined their support for interventionism by 
supporting a national printing corporation, funded by the government. The NEC decided 
to back this to the extent of publishing the Minority Report, while indicating that its 
recommendations did "not go as far" those advocated by the party. In one sense this was 
true. Creating a printing corporation would not have dealt as directly with advertising's 
problematic role. 
So, policy formation in this sense seems to also accord strongly with Minkin's 
formulation, where the party conference, the NEC and the unions all played a part. They 
were all involved in pressing for a policy, yet divided over what was needed. 
Nevertheless, it also accords with the position of the elitists and the Marxists; in that the 
leadership was predominant in creating policy, as it spurned the party conference 
proposals. Of these three positions, there is some indication that the Marxists' analysis 
can in some ways explain the facts more fully because of its emphasis on external 
influences on leadership policy-making, particularly capitalism's operation. The 
leadership had distanced itself from the party's proposals. By 1978, when any decision on 
implementing policy would need to be made, the Labour government was also fighting 
for its survival across a number of fronts, as previously indicated. Along with its failure 
to get unions to agree to pay restraint, it was implementing IMF-induced public spending 
cuts. It did not even possess a parliamentary majority. The Government had already 
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witnessed the huge press opposition to its closed shop legislation, which it had enacted 
under union pressure. 
As we have seen, in such a situation, after experiencing the such strong hostility, the 
Government would not have welcomed a battle with the powerful press businesses and 
the advertising industry, which had made their hostility to interventionist plans clear. This 
was especially true, as the Government required the support of newspaper firms, as its 
problems mounted. In addition, the Government-appointed Royal Commission had 
rejected Labour's plans and there was no massive external groundswell of support for any 
soa such measures from the mass of journalists, as opposed to individuals and the NUJ. 
In addition, it was also true that such plans for the press ran counter to the whole 
direction in which the Labour government was moving. As we saw, part of the Labour 
government's retreat had been to abandon Keynesian interventionism. In such a situation, 
it was less likely to adopt a brand of radical interventionism as represented by an 
advertising revenue board or a national printing corporation. In these circumstances, it is 
not surprising that an embattled Labour government did not grab the opportunity to enact 
legislation. 
The emphasis on Labour movement representation rather than diversity also played a 
part. The plans were heavily predicated on the idea that the press was biased against the 
Labour movement. The party's aim was more centred on providing a space for a Labour 
movement press. The question of delivering diversity to aid democracy - associated with 
thinkers such as Habermas, for instance, and New Left advocates in the party - was a 
related, but mainly secondary, aspect. The question of diversity and democracy received 
more emphasis in the party's conference position - formally the party's policy. But it was 
emphasised less by the NEC and its representatives to the Royal Commission on the 
Press. In making the question of creating a space for a Labour movement press more 
prominent, Labour's demands had an element of `special pleading'. Nevertheless, 
whether another emphasis would have affected their reception is debatable. 
504 Curran interview. 
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However, if the plans had been implemented by the Labour government and had been 
successful, along with making a Labour press more achievable, they would have gone 
some way to strengthening democratic life in Britain. Nevertheless, while many 
objections to the plans can be seen to be wide of the mark, their attempt to go beyond the 
Scandinavian social market paradigm meant that there was a potential over-reliance on a 
supposedly all-knowing state. There was less consideration of the role of both workers in 
the press industry and, importantly, the wider community as a potential corrective check 
and balance. 
The demands made by the Labour Party to seek participative democratic ownership of the 
press industry were hazy and not prominently made. They reflected the tensions created 
by the influence that left social democratic and New Left ideas L- including those 
associated with Marxists such as Raymond Williams - had had on social market 
conceptions. The Labour Party conference policy and the Minority Report had gone 
beyond merely stressing the question of industrial democracy to cautiously considering 
broader community democratic participation. This echoed radical democratic notions, 
Curran's later social market conception and, minimally, some Marxist notions, bereft of 
their revolutionary connotations. Yet, this was not generally reflected in Labour's public 
position. The NEC's proposals to the Royal commission, limited as they were, centred on 
industrial democracy within the press. The TUC and some media unions backed this 
emphasis. This accent on workplace democracy, emphasised in Williams' New Leftist 
model and some other Marxist conceptions, excluded the democratic involvement of 
other constituent groups, such as newspaper readers. 
The involvement of the Labour government in the closed shop legislation highlighted this 
gap in Labour's plans. It was shown that greater industrial democracy had the potential to 
lead to a decrease in public democratic participation and access. Importantly for the 
implementation of such proposals by a Labour administration, the Government's 
experience in piloting the legislation indicated the hostility of the newspaper firms and 
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editors to industrial democracy. The Scottish Daily News's failure also stifled enthusiasm 
for this. 
As with the other interventionist proposals, by the time that the Callaghan government 
had the Royal Commission report that called for limited journalistic involvement and the 
Minority Report which went much further, the tide was turning. The corporatist era, 
which had seen the development of the Bullock report on industrial democracy - where 
such ideas as workers' control were considered, if not acted upon - was ending. 
505 Again, 
the proposals for democracy across all industry faced intense employer opposition and 
Labour movement division. 506 It is not surprising that the press democracy plans died 
with them. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see in the next chapter, as Labour went into opposition 
following the 1979 election defeat, two themes we have highlighted here would be 
readdressed. Labour campaigners would consider representation in a new light, as they 
would develop new ideas aimed at providing a press that was more representative of the 
political range of opinions in society. Also, the role of community participation in the 
press and workplace democracy would come further to the forefront as campaigns for the 
right of reply gained momentum. 
505 Curran, Press Reformism: 48. 
506 Gospel Howard, F., and Gill Palmer. 1993. British industrial relations. London ; New York, NY: 
Routledge.: 245-6, Kessler, Sidney, and Fred Bayliss. 1995. Contemporary British industrial relations. 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Business.: 115. 
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5. Flow and Ebb: Labour from 1979-1983 
INTRODUCTION 
The years from 1979 to 1983 saw exciting change within the Labour Party. Press policy 
was no exception. In 1979, Labour made no specific promise to act on the press. Yet, the 
1983 manifesto represented a solid commitment to diversifying newspaper ownership, 
the like of which had not been seen in a Labour election address. 
This chapter will uncover how the failure to include the party's conference policy on 
press reform in the 1979 manifesto was part of a wider development. That included the 
rise of demands for constitutional reforms, the debates on the market and planning, 
democratic control and internationalisation of the economy. 
We shall consider how the period after 1979 saw the party conference consolidate 
positions to promote press diversity previously taken by parts of the party in an attempt to 
aid political democracy. From this, we shall view how key party thinkers went beyond 
these ideas in a failed attempt to apply a public service broadcasting paradigm to 
transform the press landscape. We shall also look at the party's attempts to push for press 
diversity while in opposition. The chapter will analyse how this exposed tensions 
between those in the Labour movement advancing plurality and those more interested in 
promoting a Labour movement press. We shall also consider why the scheme promoted 
by the Media Study Group failed to make it into the manifesto, leaving a gap in policy. 
The chapter will also explore how the demands for constitutional change influenced 
thinking on democratic accountability in the press. It will chronicle how the initial 
pressure for democratic ownership of newspapers was dashed, as concern about a press 
backlash strengthened. Instead, the appendix will consider how, rather than calling for the 
press industry to be restructured to combat bias, demands for democratic control became 
limited to calls for a right of reply. Nevertheless, the chapter shall argue that, on diversity 
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at least, the 1983 manifesto represented a radical departure from the previous one and, if 
it had been implemented, would have transformed the press environment. 
PARTY POLICY FROM 1979-1983 
By 1979, a battle was brewing. A swathe of party activists pointed to a long-term process 
of membership disenfranchisement, which we saw was reflected in the Minority Report's 
rejection and Clause V's failure to deliver manifesto press policies. With their ranks 
swelled by new recruits who did not share traditional labourist deference, they demanded 
increased accountability. 507 The high-profile talisman in this clash was the Home Policy 
committee chair and long-time press policy activist, Tony Benn. 508 The Campaign for 
Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) spearheaded it. 509 
The left, CLPD and the left-dominated NEC championed the demand to give the NEC 
control over determining the manifesto, to avoid a repeat of 1979. The left effectively 
failed in realising this demand. It experienced more success with its proposals for 
mandatory MP reselection and for electing the leader. 510 Pre-empting this latter decision, 
Callaghan resigned in 1980 and Foot replaced him. 511 Although Foot came from the left, 
he had opposed the Bennite New Left project and the constitutional demands. 512 
$07 Shaw, Eric. 1994. The Labour Party since 1979 : crisis and transformation. London ; New York: 
Routledge.: 20. The depth of this sense of betrayal by the 1974 Labour government went was shown by the 
fact that the party's own general secretary Ron Hayward told the 1980 Labour Party conference: "I wish 
our ministers would sometimes act in our interests like a Tory Prime Minister acts in their interests. "
(Hattersley, Roy. 1995. Who goes home? : scenes from apolitical life. London: Little Brown & Co.: 221). 
sos After the joint Cabinet-NEC drafting meeting, Benn felt betrayed and vowed that: "[T]he battle to 
democratise the Party has to start now. " (Benn, Conflicts of interest: 488,489). 
509 Its concerns were predominantly with internal party reform. Set up in 1973, its raison d'etre was to 
organise so that conference decisions would be put into practice. sio Labour Party, Conference (Ed. ). 1979. Report of the seventyeighth annual conference of the Labour 
Party, Brighton, 1979, October 1-5. London: The Party.: 275,455, Labour Party, Conference (Ed. ). 1980. 
Report of the annual conference and special conference of the Labour Party, 1980. London: The Party.: 
143-8, Labour Party, Conference (Ed. ). 1981. Report of the annual conference of the Labour Party. 
London: Labour Party.: 206-212, Denis Kavanagh, `Labour Party Manifestos 1900-1917' in Dale: 4, Seyd: 
123. 
511 Kogan, David, and Maurice Kogan. 1982. The battle for the Labour Party. London: Kogan Page.: 98-9. 
512 Panitch and Leys: 192. See also Kogan and Kogan, Benn, The end of an era: 4. 
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As part of the organisational reforms, Labour revamped the NEC's policy-making 
consultation procedure to encourage wider discussion in the party. But this would involve 
a cumbersome and lengthy process, affecting press policy development 513 
The democratic accountability upsurge interlinked with demands for state intervention 
and economic control from its start. The collapse of Keynesian welfarism as Labour's 
governing ideology had found the party's right temporarily bereft of ideas and 
demoralised. As the leadership's organisational control over the party disintegrated after 
1979, it lost its veto powers over NEC policies, such as those regarding interventionism 
and the AES, which the left had been developing on the NEC since the early 1970s. 514 
Some on the left saw party democratic accountability as part of the wider debate on 
democratising the state. While their influence at this time should not be overstated, two of 
the extra-party groupings vying for ideological influence on the Labour left were 
concerned with both this question and that of the media. Both had a relationship to the 
New Left tradition. One, which we shall consider in the next chapter, was a grouping that 
was known by the British Communist Party journal it produced, Marxism Today. Another 
was the trend symbolised by the group called the Institute for Workers' Control (IWC). 515 
One important aspect to be considered is how the let's concentration on internal 
democratic reform affected the reception of the NEC's radical ideas among the wider 
electorate. Relatively few outside the party knew or understood the left's economic 
analysis. Prior to 1979, the NEC had silenced itself. After 1979, the NEC and party 
513 As before, sub-committees, such as that on the media would be set into motion after a conference 
resolution was passed at the behest of the Home Policy Committee. When it was considered "helpful", the 
NEC would publish a consultation document, which would identify the study's scope and ask for 
information and ideas. This would be sent to all party branches and affiliates. After this, studies by the sub- 
committees were envisaged to take up to two years. Following this, the study document would be 
published. Branches and constituency parties were encouraged to discuss and respond to the NEC, but not 
take formal decisions. On the basis of the responses, the NEC would draw up a draft statement, which 
would be submitted to conference for approval. (RD: 260, ̀ New Consultation Procedure' February 1980). 
514 Shaw, 1979: 6-9. 
sus The figure most associated with it, Ken Coates, was a member of Benn's `kitchen cabinet' after 1980 
(Benn, The end of an era, Panitch and Leys: 190). 
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activists sidelined this policy-propagating role, as the campaigns around internal 
democracy took precedence. 516 
In contrast, after it had abandoned Keynesianism, the social democratic right retreated 
from the ideological debate at the conference and on the NEC. Instead, it saw the press as 
a weapon in its counter-offensive - using its contacts to discredit the left. 
517 This both 
brought the right and some newspapers closer and could not but reinforce the view of the 
importance of gaining Labour representation through the existing press. 
The left's challenge within the national party reached its peak with Benn's narrow defeat 
in his bid to become deputy leader at the 1981 conference. After this, the NEC pressure 
for constitutional reform prompted a TUC leadership backlash. The right also started 
reorganising. This indicated that the union leadership, while publicly supporting the left's 
policies, was also prepared to challenge its organisational influence. 518 Finally, the right 
removed Benn as chair of the important Home Policy committee in 1982 and cohorts like 
Frank Allaun were also ejected from key NEC committees. 519 Although Benn carried on 
chairing the Media Study Group, which we shall consider, his influence on the NEC was 
much reduced. 
By 1983, the left was defeated on policies for industrial democracy and interventionism. 
Labour's Programme 1982 saw an extensive statement of the AES strategy, including on 
democratic planning. However, by 1983, calls for workers' control retreated from their 
influential high point with the Bullock Report. 520 
516 Panitch and Leys: 155,157-60,163. 
517 Shaw, Eric. 1988. Discipline and discord in the Labour Party : the politics of managerial control in the 
Labour Party, 1951-87. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 246, cited in Panitch and Leys: 167. See 
also 145. Really bad news detailed the bias towards the Labour right and against the left in the broadcast 
media. Benn and the left were attacked bitterly in the press. (See Philo, Greg, and Group Glasgow 
University Media. 1982. Really bad news. London ; New York: Writers & Readers., Hollingsworth, Mark. 
1986. The press and political dissent. London: Pluto.: 37-76). 
51" The NEC stood up to an early challenge by a high-level union delegation in 1979. However, between 
1981 and 1982, the trade union right organised a purge of left from the union and women's sections on the 
NEC. The right-wing Solidarity group of MPs also formed to oppose the constitutional changes in this 
period. (Benn, Conflicts of interest: 530-1, Panitch and Leys: 178-80, Hattersley, Who goes home?: 235-6, 
Kogan and Kogan: 107). 
S19 Benn, The end of an era: 247,251, Kogan and Kogan: 153-4, Panitch and Leys: 199-200. 520 The party supported power sharing in industry, rather than workers' control. (Shaw, 1979: 12). 
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The party's retreat on interventionism was more evident by the 1983 manifesto. The 
manifesto was not a wholly Bennite document. Instead, it represented a compromise 
between the Keynesianism of Shore and Foot, and Bennite interventionism. Demands for 
increased state involvement and industrial democracy were more muted. 52' Nevertheless, 
despite the right's NEC dominance, the AES still influenced the document 522 
The influx of left supporters at first obscured this shift to the right. They had been 
recruited in the wake of the Benn deputy leadership campaign. 523 There was also the 
growth of municipal socialism. However, these developments also provided grist to the 
524 mill for a right-wing backlash. 
The left's success in changing Labour's constitution convinced a section of the social 
democratic right that they should split from the party. They were not prepared to see 
constituency members determine policy. This schism was to cost the party dearly in 
electoral support, as former Labour voters were seduced into supporting the new party, 
the SDP. 525 The assault on the left and the battles over the constitution had distracted 
Labour from the task of being elected. 526 As it was, facing a Liberal-SDP Alliance, as 
well as the Conservative Party, which had been buoyed up by the Falklands adventure, 
521 In contrast to demands of the early 1970s, where the left advocated public ownership of key areas of 
manufacturing, the manifesto saw that state regulation would operate mainly within a privately-owned 
economy. Also, the demands for industrial democracy were less radical than had been called for previously. 
(Shaw, 1979: 12-14). 
522 The right-winger John Golding, as the new head of the Home Policy subcommittee, saw that Labour 
was heading for a large defeat. He thought it best that the 1983 manifesto be associated with some left-wing 
ideas, so that the left would be identified with that result. (Hattersley, Who goes home?: 238). Benn 
accepted at face value that Golding pushed forward a manifesto that the right-winger disagreed with. 
(Benn, The end of an era: 286-7). 
523 Panitch and Leys: 200. 
524 Benn, The end of an era: 230-1, Kogan and Kogan: 130-139,144-5 1, Panitch and Leys: 200-3. 
525 Soon after the Wembley special conference in January 1981, which decided the method for selecting the 
leader, those MPs central to forming the SDP made the Limehouse Declaration. Two months later, the 
party was born. 
26 Shaw, 1979: 26. An indication of the dominance of the expulsions was that as late as November 1982 
Benn could note in his diaries of the party's Organisation Committee: "We devoted three hours to 
discipline in the Party considering the cases of Tariq Ali, Peter Tatchell and the Militant Tendency - no 
discussion about the Election at all... ". (Benn, The end of an era: 251). 
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the party ended up polling only 28 per cent. This was a mere two per cent more than the 
Alliance. 
PRESS REFORM, DEMOCRACY, THE AES AND THE 1979 PARTY CONFERENCE 
The concentration on democratic accountability in the Labour Party and the state gave 
discussions on the press, and the media generally, an added impetus. New Left- 
influenced activists saw press reform as an aid to democracy, as well as Labour 
representation. 
This was indicated by the post-defeat 1979 conference. This again called for newspaper 
ownership reform, which was explicitly coupled with the debate on party democracy. 527 
The conference motion was challenging in both analysis and prescriptions. By 
consolidating what had gone before and combining policy transfer with innovation, it put 
forward one of the more radical European social democratic press policies. 528 Alongside 
calls to aid diversity, it demanded a national debate on alternatives for democratic 
control, a right of reply and discussed calls for a Labour movement newspaper - all of 
which we will consider later. It also set in motion the procedure for reassembling a NEC 
media sub-committee to consider these questions. 529 
The Labour left, at this time, also considered this notion of newspaper reform as an aid to 
democracy. One of the original architects of the AES, Francis Cripps wrote in 1981 that 
the press and media operated as part of a system of passive political democracy. 530 
Professional leaders used the media to propose their policies to a passive electorate. The 
S2' The motion's mover, the SOGAT president Bill Keys, on behalf of the union, linked press ownership 
with the constitutional changes. (Labour Party, Conference 1979: 384). 
528 It encompassed both the demand for diversity and increased democratic control with the call for 
increased Labour representation though a Labour movement newspaper. The motion reiterated the positions 
previously taken by the party and incorporated with them support for the Minority Report proposals, as 
well as those from The people and the media. It supported the minority's conception of a launch fund for 
new publications, a National Printing Corporation and Producer Press Co-operatives. It also backed the 
party 's previous position of an Advertising Revenue Board. 
29 Labour Party, Conference 1979: 383-5. 
530 Francis Cripps was economic adviser to Benn from 1974-9. The grandson of former Labour Chancellor 
Stafford Cripps, he was a founder member of the Cambridge Economic Policy Group. (Benn, Conflicts of 
interest: 510,605). 
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media acted as "... as a deeply conservative filter of opinions". 531 We can question this 
view on the enormity of media power. 532 Yet, it should be noted that the press and media 
were seen as a potential aid to different forms of political democracy. However, it was 
viewed that they were being wielded as a weapon for a particularly elitist form of 
political democracy, which denied active participation. 
THE MEDIA STUDY GROUP 
A new study group, as a subcommittee of the NEC's Home Policy committee, was set up 
in the year following the 1979 conference. Chaired by the MP Allaun, its explicit aim 
was to develop policy on diversity and democratic ownership and control. Following the 
frustration with the findings of the majority on the Royal Commission, the committee's 
explicit aim was to prove that public intervention in the press was both practically and 
politically possible. 533 The study group included left-of-centre MPs such as Benn, 
Meacher, Joan Maynard, Ernie Ross, Eric Heffer, Jo Richardson and Stuart Holland. 534 
Only a minority including Philip Whitehead and Austin Mitchell were not clearly 
associated with the left. 535 Trade unionists involved included: from the printing unions, 
531 Panitch and Leys: 170-1, Cripps, Francis. 1981. "The British Crisis - Can the British Win? " New Left 
Review July-August 1981.: 96-7. 
532 After all, if the media was such a conservative filter and had such power to sway opinion then a Labour 
government would not have been elected in 1945, faced with a virulent campaign by the majority of the 
"press. RD409: ̀ Media Study Group Programme of Work', May 1980. 
ssa The economist Stuart Holland was a personal assistant to Harold Wilson while he was Prime Minister 
between 1967-8 and to Judith Hart when she was Overseas Development minister in 1974-5. He became a 
Sussex University lecturer in 1971. He was the author of a series of books on economic planning and the 
role of the state. He became an MP in 1979 and was associated with the left. (1983. Dod's parliamentary 
companion.: 414, Roth, Andrew, Janice Kerbey, Judy Tench, and Commons Great Britain Parliament 
House of. 1984. Parliamentary profiles. London: Parliamentary Profile Services.: 374) He was one of 
Benn's `kitchen cabinet' in this period. (Benn, The end of an era and Panitch and Leys: 190). 
535 Philip Whitehead was a BBC producer and editor of Thames TV's This Week programme in the 1960s, 
before being an MP between 1970 and 1983. (1983. Dod's parliamentary companion.: 514, Roth, Andrew, 
and Commons Great Britain Parliament House of. 1979. The MP's chart. London: Parliamentary Profiles. ) 
He was formerly active in Free Communications Group. (Neal Ascherson, Correspondence with the author, 
24th April 2001). Whitehead was a member of the Annan Committee on the Future of Broadcasting from 
1974-1977. (1983. Dods parliamentary companion.: 514, Roth, Andrew, and Commons Great Britain 
Parliament House of. 1979. The MP's chart. London: Parliamentary Profiles. ). An award-winning 
television producer, he became a MEP in 1994. (Morgan, Robert. 1994. The Times guide to the European 
Parliament 1994. London: Times Books.: 261). A former university lecturer and television journalist, 
Austin Mitchell was the treasurer of the right-wing pressure group Labour Solidarity in the period from 
1981 to 1984. A supporter of Kinnock and then Bryan Gould in the 1980s and 1990s, he was a presenter on 
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Ted O'Brien; from the broadcasting unions, Alan Sapper; from the NUJ, Ivor Gaber; and 
Brendan Barber, who would much later become TUC General Secretary. Academics 
involved included Curran, Nicholas Garnham and Greg Philo. Labour movement 
journalists were also involved, such as Tribune's Chris Mullin and Richard Clements and 
Labour Weekly's Harold Frayman, as well as mainstream journalists such as Baistow and 
Goodman. 536 
DIVERSITY AND REPRESENTATION 
Beyond Diversity: The Independent Press Authority 
A more specific reason why press and media reform was on the agenda, rather than its 
association with democratic accountability, as Cripps envisaged it, was that the Labour 
movement again felt itself under attack. The 1979 election had seen the Sun join the ranks 
of the "... anti-Labour chorus... ", which treated Callaghan's middle-of-the-road 
programme as "... a reworking of the Communist Manifesto... ", as one commentator put 
it. 537 And the Glasgow University Media Group, though concerned with broadcasting, 
had focussed attention on the question of media bias against the trade union movement. 538 
An indication of Labour's attitude to the media was that, according to Benn, the biggest 
cheer in response to his speech to the 1980 special Peace, Jobs, Freedom conference 
BSkyB from 1989-1998. He joined the Left-wing Campaign Group in 1999. (Roth, Andrew, and Byron 
Criddle. 2000.1997-2002 parliamentary profiles. London: Parliamentary Profiles.: 1557-1564). 
536 Chris Mullin was formerly a foreign correspondent, who became editor of Tribune between 1982 and 
1984, associating it clearly with the left. He was a key activist in CLPD and after 1979, he was associated 
with the backlash against the Callaghan government, penning the book How to Select and Reselect Your 
MP. lie was close to Tony Benn, editing two of his books. He became an MP in 1987. Author and 
campaigner on miscarriages of justice, he has also written a series of political novels including A Very 
British Coup. (Roth, Andrew, and Byron Criddle. 2000.1997-2002 parliamentary profiles. London: 
Parliamentary Profiles.: 1613-1621, Benn, The end of an era: 636). He was associated with the left-wing 
Socialist Campaign Group of MPs and campaigned in the 1990s against media monopolisation. Blair 
appointed him a junior environment minister in 1999. (Roth, Andrew, and Byron Criddle. 2000.1997-2002 
parliamentary profiles. London: Parliamentary Profiles.: 1613-1621). He left the government in 2001. 
Harold Frayman was also the founding editor of the Campaign for Press Freedom's journal Free Press and 
became the CPF's treasurer (Anon. `Press On', Free Press, No. 1, February 1980 and CPF AGM and 
Conference May 24 1980 (internal minutes of the campaign). 
s" Greenslade, Press Gang: 359-361. 
538 By 1980, it had produced two books. (Beharrell, Peter, and Group University of Glasgow Media. 1976. 
Bad news. London ; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul., Beharrell, Peter, and Group Glasgow University 
Media. 1980. More bad news. London ; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ). 
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came when he quoted from the academics' work. 539 Equally, in 1980, the TUC published 
the pamphlet Behind the Headlines. It saw the press as distorted. The TUC considered 
that newspaper bias against the Labour movement was a key factor in the 1979 election 
result. 540 
As we saw, Labour Party policy had treated diversity and Labour representation as 
practically synonymous. If you considered one you would be considering the other. 
However, we have seen that this obscured important differences. 
If Labour's schemes for diversity aimed at merely creating greater political parity in the 
press, then it can be argued that they were rather blunt instruments. While it can be 
indicated that the schemes to modify the advertising market would have made a Labour 
movement press more possible, this would not guarantee greater political equivalence. 
Increased diversity could well also entail a greater plurality of right-of-centre 
newspapers, for instance. Such schemes for diversity were unlikely to have a predictable 
political effect. 
Yet, such was the radical confidence at this time, that there was a wish to go beyond the 
existing policies for diversity to provide a press more representative of public opinion. 
This echoed the demands for democratic representation within the party. Two similar 
new schemes went beyond achieving diversity to attempt to use the state to eradicate 
bias. One aimed to do this by imposing balance, the other by orchestrating the 
representation of different viewpoints. In doing so, they indicated some of the complex 
problems of representation. They also illuminated some of the deep difficulties in using 
the state to go beyond diversity. Not least, they indicated the problems with attempting to 
provide balance. 
539 Benn, Conflicts of interest: 600. 
540 The Conservative victory was due "... less to the merits of a monetarist economic policy than to the 
millstone labelled `winter of discontent' lovingly sculpted by the media and then hung round the neck of 
the Labour Government. " (Trades Union, Congress. 1980. Behind the headlines : TUC discussion 
document on the media. London: Trades Union Congress.: 5,6,8). 
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The two schemes for an Independent Press Authority (IPA) devised by committee 
members represented a huge incursion into press business control. Both were firmly 
within the public service tradition; Chris Mullin and Michael Meacher regarded broadcast 
regulation as the model for the press. 541 As they wished to bring the public service 
tradition into a commercial sector, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) 
provided an obvious prototype, which they utilised. 542 Both proposals envisaged there 
being a franchise system similar to that operated by the IBA. Newspaper groups would 
then bid to be part of the system. 
Mullin's 1981 proposals have been rightly identified as the more transformative of 
ownership of the two. 543 His proposals concentrated on providing balance by organising 
the press into a range of viewpoints and had a greater emphasis on industrial democracy 
than Meacher's scheme. His plan required restructuring the press into a plurality of 
franchised groups, each representing a different opinion. In his scheme, franchises would 
be tendered for, with the preference being for companies without commercial interests or 
for ownership groupings in which staff were represented or would wholly own. The 
franchises would be for profitable groups combining both lucrative and loss-making 
titles 544 This `piggy-backing' was aimed at counteracting the effects of advertising 
revenue on newspapers. 545 Mullin's proposal would impose rather stringent norms for 
newspapers under this franchise system, including an imposition on the proportion of 
current affairs reporting, which could have affected the tabloids. 546 
541 Curran, Different approaches: 99, Curran and Seaton: 338. 
saz Curran identifies that the proposal for an IPA originated with Stuart Holland in a book produced as a 
repost to what was seen as the inadequacy of the previous Royal Commission's proposals. However, in 
turn, Holland, in that work, distinguishes Jeremy Tunstall's evidence to the Royal Commission as a 
precedent for his model. (Curran, Different approaches: 99, Holland, Countervailing Press Power: 114). 
43 Curran, Different approaches: 99-100, Curran and Seaton: 338, Curran, Policy for the press: 13. 
544 As we shall see, the Government justified its refusal to refer the News International buy-out to the 
Monopolies Commission by claiming that the Times and Sunday Times were loss-makers. 
sas Curran, Different approaches: 99-100, Curran and Seaton: 338, Curran, Policy for the press: 13. 
546 Mullin called for the Government-appointed body to ensure that a specific, percentage of editorial 
content be allotted to current affairs. Generally, the study group debate was punctuated by calls for a more 
politicised press, which decried the role of entertainment in newspapers. It was portrayed as if entertaining 
was not a legitimate role for the popular press to pursue. The discussion was at times patronising, as 
campaigners decried the role of bingo and `spot the ball' in the press. (RD 1073, Philip Elliot, `Notes on 
Media Policy'). 
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By 1982, in tandem with the shifts happening in the NEC as a whole, a less radical 
scheme was proposed which showed some similarities to Mullin's. Michael Meacher's 
proposals took from the IBA the idea that a regulating authority should maintain balance 
within each press outlet, rather than Mullin's idea to balance up through diversity. Thus, 
Meacher argued for the Press Council to be replaced by an IPA, whose role would be to 
ensure balance in a similar way as happened in broadcasting. 
To do this, the IPA would award franchises to newspapers. Whether it would renew these 
franchises depended on if the newspapers had achieved certain standards. Central to this 
would be that each newspaper would provide a balance of views in their news and 
opinion. This would not be required in every issue, but over a period. This IPA, or a 
revamped Press Council, would also have increased powers to oversee day-to-day bias 
claims. 547 Thus, it would be involved in the area of the right of reply, which we shall 
consider in the appendix to this chapter. 
Problems with the proposals 
These were ingenious schemes. However, they were riddled with potential difficulties 548 
Firstly, the IPA would be imposing what it believed to be a balanced and plural diversity 
of press views. Yet, it is difficult to see on what basis this balance of views could be 
considered. Any other system than to replicate national voting patterns would be less 
democratic. However, this would tie the press to operating on party political lines. 549 This 
indicated another consideration with Mullin's scheme. If the narrower question of Labour 
547 Meacher, Reform: 5-6. 
548 Curran identifies one alleged problem was that the justification for independent television franchising 
was bandwidth scarcity; thus not applicable to the press. (Curran, Different approaches: 100). This can be 
challenged, as barriers to market entry also constrained newspaper numbers. Indeed, we can add, it has 
been precisely technology-led abundance of TV broadcast space, exploding the `useful myth' on which 
public service broadcasting rested, that has been used to justify calls for its abandonment. (Tracey: 53). 
Instead, Meacher defended his scheme on the basis that no other communication medium was as 
unregulated as the press. (Meacher, Reform: 5-6). 
'" This was also Militant's view. "We propose that a Labour government should nationalise the newspaper 
printing plant facilities, radio and TV. Access to these facilities should be given to political parties, in 
proportion to their votes at elections. " (Taaffe, Peter. 1981. What we Stand For. London: Militant, 1981). 
For a critical discussion on this see Curran, Policy for the press: 14-15 and Curran and Seaton: 347. 
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Party representation is considered and we fast-forward to consider the newspaper 
landscape by the time Labour regained office in 1997, then it may be argued that the 
press had been balanced up without any such intervention. The `problem' had been 
solved - with Labour even over-represented. However, then the question of democratic 
control of the press becomes pertinent, if representation requires a democratic input by 
those being represented, as was suggested in Chapter 1. Mullin does at least consider this. 
However, Mullin's solution, like others, was to promote solely worker control, alongside 
a right of reply. 
Secondly, the proposals represented a huge state intrusion into the press. Mullin 
suggested to the study group that the IPA had the advantage that the idea of the IBA was 
already firmly established. The IPA `merely' extended this idea. However, his proposals 
extended it into an area where it was already firmly established that newspapers could be 
created on any political basis; albeit with funding and the operation of advertising being 
huge obstacles to this freedom. His franchise system would determine the political colour 
and the balance between news, current affairs and other topics in individual 
newspapers. 55° They would be forced to either reverse the perceived right-wing bias by 
adopting an editorial line imposed by this state-backed organisation or lose their 
franchise. In Meacher's scheme, sizeable editorial control would be ceded from the titles 
to the new authority - as the newspapers would have to maintain balance and the state- 
linked IPA would oversee this. Those who are concerned now by Labour leadership 
attempts to control the media might be astonished to know that one of the targets of this 
manipulation, the Labour left, called for further control of the press by a state-funded 
source, in the name of balance. 
Thirdly, another objection to Meacher's plans concerns the idea that press regulation 
should be modelled on broadcast legislation's controversial conception of balance. 551 It 
sso NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 6`h meeting', 19 January 1981. 
551 Various writers have disputed the broadcast authorities' provision of balance. (See, for example, 
Beharrell, Peter, and Group University of Glasgow Media. 1976. Bad news. London ; Boston: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul., Beharrell, Peter, and Group Glasgow University Media. 1980. More bad news. London ; 
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul., Philo, Greg, and Group Glasgow University Media. 1982. Really bad 
news. London ; New York: Writers & Readers. ). 
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can be argued that the press should be treated differently. We saw in Chapter 1 that the 
British press was not constrained by ideas of balance. We also saw that this was not 
required for a functioning public sphere, where political democracy could flourishssz 
This meant the press could lead discussion and play an important role in agenda-setting. 
It can be debated whether readers find this to be part of national newspapers' appeal. The 
public would be very surprised if they woke up tomorrow to find no mainstream media 
source existed, apart from the Internet, which could articulate a consistent opinion and 
show a clear viewpoint. While newspapers should be open to a number of opinions, it 
seems important that a space be kept for this. 
As it was, the majority of the study group rejected both schemes. The group did not think 
Mullin's ideas were feasible or that the public would accept the statist implications of 
Meacher's plans. 553 Instead, the study group supported another scheme - the Open Press 
Authority - that more clearly aimed at increasing diversity. We shall consider this in a 
moment. But the particular concern for Labour representation also articulated itself in 
other ways. By 1979, the question of providing a Labour movement press was more 
directly posed. 
Signs of the Times: The Labour movement paper and the News International 
takeover 
An indication of the division between those wanting a broader press and those wishing 
for a Labour movement title was that the Labour Party was far less involved in plans to 
provide a Labour press. After 1979, the Press and Publicity Committee and the NEC 
agreed in principle to facilitate it. Party officials discussed it with the TUC press 
committee. Yet, a 1979 Labour Party conference motion that called for a popular national 
552 Habermas, Transformation: Street: 253. 
553 One view expressed about Mullin's scheme was that such a system would limit diversity to the restricted 
number of profitable franchises already available. It would hold back new launches. Group members felt 
that it would leave control of the press in some of the same hands as it was then. Thus, they suggested, a 
better approach would be to divest newspaper groups with a circulation above a certain level. (NEC Media 
Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 6th meeting', 19 January 1981). The study group rejected Meacher's call on 
the basis that the public would not accept its statist implications. (NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 
21" meeting', 20 September 1982). 
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daily was remitted to the NEC for further discussion. 554 Following this, the study group 
originally had high on its list of priorities facilitating a broad discussion in the party on a 
Labour movement press. In fact, the group's original consultative paper envisaged that 
the discussion on intervention in the press to aid diversity would only be posed within the 
terms of creating Labour titles 555 Yet, the consultative paper was withdrawn. There were 
no hard and fast rules on this, but a division of labour seemed to prevail. The study group 
discussed measures to aid diversity, with a New Left emphasis on enhancing democracy, 
and the TUC assessed the feasibility and organised preparations for a Labour movement 
press. 
As it was, despite the efforts of supporters, most notably Transport and General Workers' 
Union general secretary Moss Evans, the plan foundered. The unions were not prepared 
to provide the cash needed. 556 Despite discussions with the party's treasurer Norman 
Atkinson and formal support from the 1982 party conference, the party contributed little 
to the discussion or to funding the new title. Instead, at that conference, Allaun, on behalf 
of the NEC, was cautious, saying that a title's launch depended on cash being found. 557 
This division between the party and the union leadership also came into play with the 
takeover of the Times and Sunday Times by News International, headed by Rupert 
Murdoch. Discussion on the saga reflected the debate in the party on the alleged 
554 Labour Party, Conference 1979: 385-9, RD409: ̀ Media Study Group Programme of Work', May 1980. 
555 RD498, Media Study Group, ̀ Draft Consultative Paper', July 1980. 
556 In 1980, the TUC published a pamphlet that was lukewarm in its support for a Labour movement 
newspaper. It recognised the advantages of such a title. However, it saw the start-up costs before it got 
sufficient advertising support as running into millions of pounds. (TUC, Behind the headlines). 
Nevertheless, the TUC general council called for a feasibility study at the end of that year. However, the 
unions raised considerably less than was needed in the appeal for the feasibility study itself, questioning 
union commitment to providing the cash required for the title. Despite this, the feasibility study went ahead. 
(Anon., `TUC goes ahead with `national daily' study', Free Press No. 10, November/December 1981, 
McCarthy, W. E. J., and Congress Trades Union. 1983. The feasibility of establishing a new labour 
movement newspaper :a report by Lord McCarthy. London: Trades Union Congress. ). By 1983, the union 
leaders were making clear that they could not afford to fund such a newspaper. (Trades Union Congress. 
Annual, Conference. 1983. Report of the 115th annual Trades Union Congress. London: T. U. C.: 575-7). 
And after a survey of unions, a special TUC committee set up to report on progress later recommended that 
the newspaper should not go ahead because sufficient cash was not available. (Trades Union Congress. 
Annual, Conference. 1984. Report of the 116th annual Trades Union Congress. London: T. U. C.: 346). 557 Labour Party, Conference (Ed. ). 1982. Report of the annual conference of the Labour Party. London: 
Labour Party.: 240,243. 
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inadequacy of the existing legislation to promote diversification. It also indicated that the 
unions were divided when faced with an opportunity to democratise the press by means 
of turning the newspapers over to a trust, with union involvement 558 
In contrast, at this stage it was the Labour Party, including its leadership, which was 
pressing for diversity. This reflected the unstated division. It differed from the attitude to 
Murdoch that later leaderships adopted. Michael Foot persevered in demanding that 
News International's bid be referred to the Monopolies Commission in the name of 
diversity. 559 This decision was backed by the unions' more radical elements in the 
Campaign for Press Freedom (CPF), which we will discuss in a moment 560 
However, the parliamentary party divided itself on the takeover in the ensuing Commons 
debate. 561 This again reflected the tension between those who wanted more press 
diversity and those, some closer to the unions, who were more solely interested iri 
promoting a Labour movement press. The left-wing party treasurer Norman Atkinson 
558 As the Sunday Times' editor Harold Evans' insider account chronicles, former Labour leader Callaghan 
and Bill Keys of SOGAT had agreed that "... they should do everything they could to ensure that The Times 
and Sunday Times did not fall into the personal control of a millionaire or anyone who would wish to use 
them as a source of propaganda or power". However, some of the print unions refused to buy shares in the 
new trust, despite the historic measure of influence this would give in the new title, according to Evans. 
Some were prepared to invest funds in the prospective trust. But others were more reluctant. Evans 
remembers NGA general secretary Joe Wade, "... to Callaghan's displeasure, was discouraging: `flow can I 
put my members' money into something that is going to yield a lower return than the Trustee Savings 
Bank? "' (Evans, Harold. 1983. Good times, bad times. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.: 103). 
559 Labour's frontbench called for referral under the Monopolies and Mergers Act (discussed in Appendix 2 
to Chapter 1) because it felt there would be less diversity if the owners of the Sun and the News of the 
World were now to take hold of the Times group. As the frontbench spokesman, the then Shadow Secretary 
of Trade John Smith put it, it would: "... create one of the greatest concentrations of newspaper power in 
the history of journalism in the United Kingdom". (HOC, 23 January 1981, col. 567. See also Evans, Good 
times: 114-141, Shawcross, William. 1993. Rupert Murdoch : ringmaster of the information circus. 
London: Pan.: 232. As is well known, the legislation had a loophole. It denied referral if the titles involved 
were not commercially viable and would close if an existing press firm did not buy them. The Labour 
leadership put its case for referral based on its assessment that the Sunday Times' was profitable, at least. 
(HOC, 27 January 1981: col. 784-5). 
560 The campaign's policy on this was written by the Times Father of Chapel, and CPF chair Jake 
Ecclestone, CPF, National Committee minutes, February 3 1981. 
561 From the right of the party, David Owen called for the commission to be brought in. (HOC, 23 January 
1981: col. 568). 
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backed the union case for non-referral. He explicitly contrasted the case for a Labour 
press with demands for "... commercial diversity... " which he dismissed. 562 
What both these MPs and union leadership wanted was to advance the Labour movement. 
If it was considered that attempts at securing press diversity got in the way of this, then 
they should be brushed aside. As we shall see in later chapters, it would be this view - 
that what was central was advancing Labour rather than diversity - that would win out in 
the party. Nevertheless, in this period, the party still committed itself to diversity. 
Diversity, The Multinationals and Internationalisation: The Open Press Authority 
To achieve this diversity, instead of the statist proposals associated with the IPA, the 
study group agreed in 1983 with the academic Curran on a more direct method - press 
ownership divestment. He envisaged that this would operate through an Open Press 
Authority (OPA). 563 
The most detailed history of the evolution of Labour Party press policy in this period, 
written by the study group's chair Allaun, wrongly conflates the OPA and IPA. 564 
However, the difference is clear. 565 Curran's scheme promised less state control than 
those of Meacher and Mullin. It would enhance diversity and increase democratic 
ownership. It would divest existing titles but, rather than providing franchises, like the 
562 He argued that the unions were "... not concerned with commercial diversity which means nothing at all 
to us". Yet, he asserted that: "The fact that there is an anti-Socialist monopoly in the national newspapers 
concerns Labour members very much... ". But this would not be affected by referring the matter, he 
reasoned. (HOC, 27 January 1981: col. 816). Atkinson was Labour Party treasurer from 1976-1981. (1983. 
Dod's parliamentary companion.: 346) He was a member of CLPD (Roth, Andrew, Janice Kerbey, Judy 
Tench, and Commons Great Britain Parliament House of. 1984. Parliamentary profiles. London: 
Parliamentary Profile Services.: 35) and was a member of Benn's `kitchen cabinet'. (Benn, The end of an 
era and Panitch and Leys: 190). The NATSOPA-sponsored MP Ron Leighton backed up this view. Along 
with the printing union leadership, he combined supporting radical proposals in the long term with short- 
term expediency. He backed the minority report proposals for diversifying the press. Leighton denounced 
capitalism for producing oligopolisation. Yet, he reiterated the print unions' view that Murdoch's 
ownership provided the only viable alternative. (Ibid.: col. 810-3). 
563 RD 2611: James Curran, `Socialist Plan for the Press', January 1983. He had put forward a similar 
proposal in Curran, The British Press. 
64 Allaun, Spreading the news: 87-8. 
565 Curran later implied that the proposals were counterposed. (James Curran ̀ The road to a reformed press' 
Free Press No. 10, November/December 1981). 
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IPA, it would deliver funding for the titles to be reconstituted as co-operatives. However, 
importantly, the committee did not share this democratic imperative. We shall return to 
this. It is true that the title of Curran's system echoed the Open Broadcasting Authority, 
detailed in a 1978 White Paper, produced while Labour was in government. 566 Yet, the 
policies it employed provided another example of policy transfer. The OPA was in the 
Scandinavian social market tradition, which had been the important fount for earlier 
policy transfers. 
As well as defying the trend to oligopoly, the policies to enable divestment were meant to 
challenge multinational capital's hold over newspapers. Demands for diversity had been 
given added impetus by the AES thinkers' radical analysis of the role played by 
multinational capital. A contrast to Eric Shaw's assessment of this comes from Leo 
Panitch and Colin Leys explicitly and John Callaghan implicitly. 567 They identify that the 
Labour left had seriously considered policies to face the challenge of the world's 
economic internationalisation. Left thinker Stuart Holland's analysis had informed 
Labour's Programme 1973. As we saw, he considered that multinational capital's 
dominance in the British economy meant it was escaping the influence of national 
Keynesian controls. This was a reason why the AES advocated increasing state 
intervention. 568 As we shall see, New Labour used economic internationalisation to 
justify jettisoning policies barring cross-ownership, increasing the multinationals' hold. 
Yet, much earlier, Labour thinkers had seen this as a reason to increase multinational 
divestment. 
Labour's 1979 conference motion had reiterated the concern mentioned as early as 1974 
in The people and the media that multinationals were diversifying into newspaper 
ownership and saw this as another barrier to democracy functioning. 569 That same year, 
Holland, jointly addressing a conference organised by the IWC with James Curran, 
indicated that the previous decade had seen multinational capital buy up a large section of 
366 James Curran ̀ The road to a reformed press' Free Press No. 10, November/December 1981. 
567 Shaw, 1979: 14, Panitch and Leys: 170,311. 
568 Callaghan, Retreat: 58. 
569 Labour Party, Conference 1979: 384, Labour Party, The people and the media: 21. 
151 
the British press. The two alleged that this was directly affecting news and opinion in the 
press and the bias against organised labour. 570 
The study group took up a similar theme when it formulated policy to aid diversity. An 
introductory paper produced for the subcommittee explicitly called on it to consider 
corporate press ownership. 571 And Curran considered increased diagonal concentration 
justified his new scheme for press plurality, adopted by the subcommittee. 572 Study group 
members reiterated concerns expressed in Labour Party documents, going back as far as 
1922, about diversified ownership by corporations. They were concerned that this had led 
to a situation where ownership of wider business interests could threaten editorial inquiry 
into those broader areas. 573 Speakers, including NEC spokespeople, expressed similar 
fears at the 1982 party conference. Delegates considered that these firms were using their 
newspapers to protect their wider interests. They explicitly considered that this countered 
the newspapers' role of providing information to aid democracy. 574 
Curran's policy on divestment concentrated on what we identified earlier as a gap in 
Labour's proposals. This was on competition legislation, which had been associated with 
liberal responses to the problems of diversity. In another example of policy transfer, 
Curran looked to West German legislation to promote demerger. 575 He wanted to bar 
newspaper or magazine publishers from securing TV and radio franchises. 576 
s. o Curran, James and Stuart Holland, `Public Intervention in the Press', reprinted in Workers' Control 
Bulletin, No. 3,1979,3-4. Benn himself reflected this awareness of the increased role of multinationals in 
British media ownership. (Benn, Arguments for democracy: 116-17). 
571 TUC, Behind the headlines: 5,6, S. 
Sn The period since the late 1950s had largely seen the British press become a part of a web of seven 
diversified multinationals, with interests ranging from banking and mining to airlines and North Sea oil, 
according to figures produced by the academic. (RD 2611: James Curran, `Socialist Plan for the Press', 
January 1983: 3). 
s" Labour Research, Department. 1922. The Press: London.: 47, Labour Party, The people and the media: 
21, RD 816, Tom Baistow, `Media Study Group Right of Reply Draft', April 1981, RD 1027, Home Policy 
Committee Press and Publicity Committee `The Right of Reply Draft NEC statement', August 1981, RD 
1112, `Home Policy Committee Draft NEC statement', October 1981, National Executive Committee 
`Statement by the National Executive Committee: The Right of Reply', Labour Party, March 1982. 
574 Labour Party, Conference 1982: 240-2. 
573 He set a figure of 9 million as the maximum circulation figure any publishing group could control. He 
foresaw that, in Britain, similar laws would lead to the sell-off of such titles as the Times, Sunday Times 
and Sunday Mirror, as well as local monopoly titles. Curran combined this with anti-monopoly measures to 
stop cross-ownership. 
576 RD 2611: James Curran, ̀Socialist Plan for the Press', January 1983: 1-3. 
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However, as has been mentioned, Curran went beyond the classical liberal legislative 
response. He combined anti-oligopolistic limits on ownership levels with active policies 
for funding the divested and unprofitable titles under new ownership structures. He again 
justified this on the grounds that press ownership concentration was greater in Britain. 577 
Thus, to solely replicate existing legislation from other states, on its own, would be to 
provide too little too late. 
Curran recognised that setting such limits on their own would be only likely to lead to 
other multinationals buying the mostly unprofitable titles that would be offloaded. In 
order to support these titles' independence, he envisaged that the OPA would provide 
cash loans when newspapers from existing groups were sold. The public purse already 
funded unprofitable titles as their existing owners set the losses against tax, he argued. 
These funds would instead aid diversity. 578 
The OPA model shared important characteristics with the earlier plans. In another 
example of policy transfer, there would be a launch fund modelled on that employed in 
Sweden. This would confront the problem of the high newspaper market entry costs. 
Unlike some previous manifestations, aid would take the form of an interest-free loan and 
it would only form part of the start-up funds needed. 
Yet, the use of state funds and loans meant that the OPA differed from the earlier 
advertising revenue board proposal. Curran explicitly pulled back from the board plan. It 
was an example of a policy transfer that did not have sufficient political backing - 
another example of a retreat in the face of a shifting political climate less confident about 
large-scale intervention in the market. 579 At the time, rather than prescribe on this, Curran 
felt that the OPA could itself examine methods for advertising redistribution. 580 
577Ibid.: 1-2. 
378 This would provide an alternative in a situation such as that when the Times newspapers were put up for 
sale. 
379 Although at the time, he identified technical flaws with the operation of the scheme, more recently he 
has seen the problem was that it lacked political support. The problems he identified at the time were with 
the lack of profitability in the British press. He also saw problems with a tax levy, which, while fairer if 
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It agreed to support Curran's plan for an OPA, with some key provisos. We shall discuss 
the committee's reluctance to support Curran's measures for democratic ownership later 
in this chapter. However, on other issues, the group showed itself to be more radical than 
Curran, even if, again, their arguments were not entirely sketched out. Members of the 
committee were concerned that Curran had set his 9 million ceiling figure for divestment 
too high and agreed a much lower figure. 581 In addition, they agreed that the OPA should 
compensate selected titles that suffered from bifurcation, rather than concern itself with 
advertising revenue -a retreat from the 1982 conference position. 582 Yet, despite this 
commitment to compensation, members also felt that OPA money should be used to fund 
new titles, rather than propping up existing failing ones. 583 Thus, overall, on this key 
point, the study group looked two ways. As for the divisive issue of how it would be 
funded, the following meeting agreed that it would be jointly funded by the state and an 
advertising tax. 
The group agreed that its manifesto proposals would be based on the amended OPA. The 
NEC affirmed this. 584 However, the subcommittee had not agreed on the key issue of 
funding of existing titles. 
paid on net incomes, could be subject to evasion. Also, he indicated that if only newspapers were taxed, the 
scheme faced the danger that advertising would migrate to other media. Curran also raised objections to the 
advertising revenue board. (Curran, Different approaches: 113). His view now is that: "There was a lack of 
support for it. I still think it was an idea that had mileage. So, I went back to a rather more modest 
proposal ... 
[I]t would have been an evolving model. What is interesting about the Scandinavian model is 
that they start off with very simple principles and actually have all sorts of variations to the automatic 
functioning principal... The advertising revenue board would have evolved in the same way as a Press 
Subsidies Board does in Sweden.. 
. There clearly were technical problems with the way it operated that 
could have been resolved, in the way that there had been technical problems with the Press Subsidies 
Board... But it was defensible and is defensible. But its very complexity and its ambition were its undoing. " 
(Curran interview). 
580 He advocated the policy transfer method, flagging up as alternatives the Swedish and French systems. 
The latter, we can add, has been less successful. 581 Tom Baistow identified that News International and the then large owner Reed were the only companies 
that would be divested under Curran's figures. Jake Ecclestone of the NUJ shared this view. He rejected 
Curran's assessment hat aiming for such minimal divestment would appeal to moderate opinion. His 
position was that there would be opposition to any figure. (NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 22nd 
meeting', 18 January 1983). 
582 NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 23`d meeting', 1 February 1983. 583 Ecclestone was vocal on this. (Study Group, 22nd meeting). 584 Study Group, 23nd meeting. 
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Labour Policy: Labour's Programme 1982 and the 1983 manifesto 
However, as Labour policy generally shifted away from confronting business after the 
right regained control, so did Labour's press strategy and instead became mired in 
confusion. By 1982, the study group was reflecting overall policy retrenchment. In 
formulating the media section of the Labour's Programme 1982, the group retreated from 
three interventionist methods for achieving diversity previously agreed by the party. The 
first indicated a shift from more statist methods - the National Printing Corporation was 
dropped. The second was, as indicated, to withdraw support from a revenue board and 
instead restrict the amount of advertising that individual publications could have. The 
third was to abandon a commitment to diversifying government advertising, prominently 
discussed before 1979, but little debated after that. 585 
Yet, more importantly, within weeks of it being rejected by the study group, plans for an 
IPA, similar to Meacher's, became Labour Party policy at the 1982 conference. 586 The 
call was part of a composited motion, which constituencies proposed and seconded. The 
NEC supported it, with the study group chair Frank Allaun, acting as its representative. 
Meacher, himself, also backed the motion. Yet, the discussion on the motion, which also 
supported the rejected national printing corporation, did not explicitly refer to the IPA. So 
the NEC, despite having had passed no motion supporting it, had accepted the new 
arrangement, after the study group had explicitly rejected it. This indicated confusion 
over policy creation. The rules agreed for this, outlined above, had been flouted. This was 
sas The committee did not extensively discuss the idea of a National Printing Corporation, although this was 
party policy. When it came to policy commitments for the manifesto, the group first amended this 
commitment to one that there be ̀ common printing facilities', thus implicitly directly identifying these as a 
state-owned nationalised facility. By the time of the final draft from the study group, the commitment to 
any printing concern was dropped. The group amended a commitment to redistribute advertising revenue to 
one for the "... regulation... " of revenue to reduce the dependence on advertising and to aid publications 
which were discriminated against by advertisers. (RD2165: Media Study Group, `Labour's Programme 
1982 - Media Section', March 1982, RD2239: Media Study Group, ̀ Labour's Programme 1982 - Media 
Section (2"d Draft)', March 1982, RD2288: Special Home Policy Committee, ̀Labour's Programme 1982 - 
Media Section (as agreed by the Media Study Group)', April 1982, NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of 
the 17'x' meeting', 15 March 1982, NEC Media Study Group, `Minutes of the 18th meeting', 31 March 
1982). 
586 The conference explicitly demanded "... the owners of the British daily press to adhere to a strict code of 
impartiality... ". (Labour Party, Conference 1982: 239-40). 
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particularly significant because the conference decisions formed Labour's Programme 
1992, on which the manifesto was set to be based. 
Meanwhile, the subcommittee only developed its own policy by February 1983, after the 
series of false turns identified. This was very late in the day for inclusion in the 
manifesto. The proposals had not followed the intricate procedure, sketched above. It was 
formulated long after the party had produced its Programme. 
It was in this confused situation that neither the OPA nor IPA made it into the manifesto. 
This left a major gap in the manifesto proposals and another retreat from the ideas 
developed in the group and the conference. We shall return to this at the end of this 
chapter. Nevertheless, by 1993, the party was still committed to diversity. The same was 
not true for press democratic control. 
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DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
The party saw an upsurge in interest in democratic control of the press early in the 1979- 
1983 period. This partly reflected industrial militancy. However, despite internal and 
some external pressure from media activists, as the left's strength dissipated, so did these 
demands. 
Two related dilemmas became apparent. A difficulty that we have alluded to before still 
existed. That was of reconciling both producer democracy - that is democratic control by 
those involved in the industry, both journalists and others - and the wider participation 
and democratic involvement of those who read the newspapers and the whole of civil 
society. There was also the relationship between state involvement and democratic 
participation, which will be explored with regard to the right of reply, to be considered in 
the appendix to this chapter. 
By 1979, forces inside and outside the Labour Party were pushing for democratic control 
of the press. 587 It was in this atmosphere that the IWC, which was linked with the left 
both inside and outside the party, held a conference on the media and democracy in 
1979.588 This spawned the media trade union and activist movement, the Campaign for 
Press Freedom (CPF). 589 This would later include Broadcasting in its title (CPBF). We 
shall consider its relationship with the Labour Party at this time in the appendix to this 
chapter. Some Labour Party figures at the conference again reduced democratic control to 
that of the workers. James Curran and Stuart Holland envisaged a Press Co-operative 
Development Agency to provide launch capital for new publications under workers' 
SB7 Those outside the party expressed a radical position, which was one of those outlined in our 
introduction. Some revolutionary socialists put the view that worker's ownership of a plural press should be 
part of the process of worker's ownership across the whole economy and society. (Dave Bailey, 'Workers' 
Control of the Media' in Gardner, Carl. 1979. Media, politics and culture :a socialist view. London: 
Macmillan.: 137-147). 
588 The IWC, as mentioned, promoted democratic self-management of industry. Members were involved in 
the battle for constitutional changes in the Labour Party. 
589 Curran interview. 
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control. 590 The Labour Party adopted this more syndicalist position. The 1979 party 
conference supported Producer Press Co-operatives as part of: 
... the development of industrial democracy in the newspaper industry in such a 
way as to give all employees a voice in major policy decisions, while, at the same 
time guaranteeing autonomy and freedom from interference in... [the] day-to-day 
' work of editorial and production workers. 591 
Perhaps ironically, it was left to the union movement to go beyond this. The 1980 
pamphlet Behind the Headlines, produced by the TUC general council, called on the 
press industry to work with the media unions in developing industrial democracy. But it 
also considered consumer representation. 592 Other Labour Party figures shared this 
broader concern. Two Labour Weekly journalists Harold Frayman and Donald Ross, the 
latter having represented the NEC at the Royal commission, envisaged that any 
government funding for the press would be dependent on the newspapers being trusts. 
But they told the IWC conference that they also felt that trusts should have broader 
representation than just the producers. The journalists envisaged that readers, as 
consumers, should be represented. 593 Frayman carried this viewpoint into discussions on 
the Media Study Group. 
The 1980 Media Study Group programme had also pressed for industrial democracy 
across the media, including in the newspaper industry. 594 However, reflecting the general 
590 Newspaper distribution would also be handled by a co-operative. (Curran, James and Stuart Holland, 
`Public Intervention in the Press', reprinted in Workers' Control Bulletin, No. 3,1979: 3-4). Tony Benn 
shared a similar viewpoint. He called for co-operatives and producer groups to be included in those being 
aided by a printing corporation. (Benn, Tony. 1979. The need for a free press. Nottingham: Institute for 
Workers' Control). 
591 Labour Party, Conference 1979: 384. 
592 TUC, Behind the headlines: 23,28. 
593 Harold Frayman and Donald Ross ̀ A Labour Daily? ', reprinted in Workers' Control Bulletin, No. 3, 
1979,6-8. 
594 An indication of the thinking of the committee came with the 1980 draft consultative paper, that the 
subcommittee was meant to produce under the party's new rules outlined above. The paper was withdrawn 
after members of the Home Policy committee felt that it was too closed in its conclusions. However, it is 
worth considering in order to indicate the thinking of the committee at this time. The study group 
considered newspaper democracy within the narrower framework of industrial democracy. Nevertheless, it 
emphasised that this democracy lay "... at the heart of any acceptable scheme for the reform of the press". 
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party policy retrenchment that followed the radical upsurge, the discussion that followed 
was much more radical in its analysis than in its prescriptions. Fra}man developed the 
more radical analysis, but he refused to provide a policy for the party. The more practical, 
but less radical, prescriptions came from Curran. 
Writing at the end of 1980, Frayman usefully defined democracy in the press in three 
ways. lie described it as the relationship between "... a democratic society and its 
newspapers... "; industrial democracy in the press; and "... the relationship between the 
contents of newspapers, editorial decision-making, and interest groups... ". Within this, he 
saw the interest group of workers as "... the most obvious... ". 595 Frayman concentrated on 
the latter to go beyond what he saw as the party's undeveloped broad-brush support for 
press industrial democracy in The people and the media document. 
Rather than accepting that press business opposition provided a barrier to implementing 
democratic input in both industrial and editorial decision"making, he made a call to arms. 
In another example of policy transfer, Frayman was prepared to learn from the 
Yugoslavian experience, which for a time had provided hope of an alternative in the 
Eastern bloc. This clearly broke from social democratic models and was closer to the 
Marxist positions we considered. 596 The New Left, which William's model sprung up 
from, was particularly inspired by the Yugoslavian workers' control experiments. 59' 
This system combined elements of both representative and direct democracy in its 
operation, which Frayman also fused in the self-management system he supported. What 
attracted him to apply this to a British system aas that it gave non journalist press 
The committee contrasted the experience of France, where the French co-operative Le Alonde indicated that 
newspaper control did "... not have to be conventionally capitalist to ensure genuine press freedom... ", with 
British disinterest in press co-operatives. This was despite the fact that the GLardian and the Observer were 
trust-controlled. (RD498 July 1980 'Draft Consultative Paper': 5. See also RD 557, 'Note on Consultative 
Paper', October 1980). 
59s RD 591, Harold Frayman, 'Democracy and the Press', November 1980: 1. In hindsight, we might 
identify the problem of the relationship between interests group and the wider citizenry. 596 Ibid.: 4-5. 
s" See, for instance, Michael Barraft Brown, 'Jugoslavia Revisited' in New Left Review No. 1 (1960), 
'Workers' Control In A Planned Economy' in New Left Review No. 2 (1960). Royden Ilarrison, 'The 
Congress of Workers' Councils, Yugoslavia' in New Reasoner No. 2 (1957), Ralph Miliband, 'The 
Yugoslav Programme' in New Reasoner No. 9 (1959). 
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workers a real but distant involvement in editorial decisions. 598 They could protest at 
editorial decisions, but not make them, and could be involved in sacking a recalcitrant 
editor, without controlling the editor's actions day-to-day. Thus, this policy transfer 
provided a model to achieve the policy advocated by the 1979 party conference. 
Yet, Frayman also advocated broader democratic representation, going beyond industrial 
democracy, towards community control. This was needed as internal democracy would 
not necessarily be able to represent those he saw as badly treated by the press, including, 
interestingly, the Liberal Party and ethnic minorities. Representation on newspaper 
editorial boards would need to be extended to the %%ider community, not just newspaper 
readers. Nevertheless, although this represented a development from previous 
discussions, Frayman's prescriptions %%-crc vasuc. 599 This point on community control 
does not seem to have been picked up by other members of the committee, more than in 
the limited sense of the right of reply, which we will discuss 600 
Overall, nevertheless, Frayman provided a eery radical analysis. ilow"ever, it had a 
sizeable problem. This immobilised the discussion on democratic reform. It also reflected 
the increasing resistance to intervention in the party's leading circles. Despite the detail in 
Frayman's analysis, he argued that the party should encourage industrial democracy but 
not lay down any extensive prescriptions d01 
A more practical call than Croyman's came from Curran in his proposals for an OPA. 
Like all those considering democratic ownership and control, he was now involved in the 
CPF. "a Curran advocated increased corporatist representation, without state control. He 
planned for the OPA to have a governing board consisting of the major parties, press 
management and unions. And, as we have seen, to promote democratic control within the 
Frayman:. i. S. 
They seemed to relate to a right of reply. Thus. he argued, the powers of the wider community would be likely to be . little more than a chance to right wrongs: but it would be a start. " (Ibid.: 0. 600 This was despite the fact that a more concrete example of a form of community control was developed in same period. The £. aul E "J News's advocates indicated that it was structured as a joint reader/producer 
co-opcrativc, with reaJcrs In the aujurity on the InA ugement committee. (Simon Partridge. 'Towards a Left Alternative Press', Fir' Press 10, No%cmber/Decembcr 1981). i0' NEC Media Study Group. 'Minutes of the 4 meeting', 20 November 1980. 02 One example was RU 548 Tom Ilaistow The 'New' Technology and a More Democratic Press'. 
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newspaper industry, he envisaged reorganising disinvested newspapers either as 
journalist or print worker co-operatives. 603 
However, the main indicator that demands for democratic control were dissipating within 
the party, as the right regained control, was that these democratic demands were not 
among the OPA measures that the study group recommended for the manifesto. Instead, 
all the study group could agree by January 1983 was that the launch fund should require 
reconstituted publications to operate as public trusts or co-operatives only "... where 
appropriate". 604 And even this was left out of the proposals when the group finally 
drafted what it wanted to go into the document that would shape the manifesto in 
February of that year. 605 
Two study group media stalwarts, Philip Whitehead and Austin Mitchell, reflected this 
turning tide in the group. Whitehead had been involved in the Free Communications 
Group and had acted as a bridgehead between it and the Labour Party a decade before. 606 
Now he was reluctant to challenge existing media ownership, because of the pressure it 
could bring to bear. Although more concerned with the broadcast media, along with 
Mitchell, he explicitly counselled that radical proposals would face the wrath of media 
owners and castigated calls for increased media accountability. The duo believed that if 
the party did not go "... with the grain... " this would unleash "... a powerful campaign of 
distortion and to allow public hostility to be whipped up against the proposals... ". 607 
Striking such a conservative note would be music to the ears of the press businesses and 
the party right who considered that the status quo on press ownership, while regrettable, 
could not be challenged. 
Thus, the situation on the study group was this: although a majority supported increasing 
democratic control in the press, the most developed position on this question came from 
603 James Curran, ̀ A Socialist Plan for the Press' RD: 2611/January 1983. 
604 Study Group, 22nd meeting. 
605 Study Group, 23nd meeting. 
606 Neal Ascherson, Correspondence with the author, 24`h April 2001, Curran interview. 
607 RD 2115: Philip Whitehead and Austin Mitchell, `Some Suggestions for Media Policy'. Allaun appears 
to have been referring to Whitehead and Mitchell when he later wrote that there was a minority who 
particularly opposed "... some of the more radical ideas". (Allaun, Spreading the news: 89). 
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someone opposed to Labour imposing such a scheme. A minority on the study group also 
rejected any such moves. The result was stalemate. As with discussions on plans to 
encourage diversity, the extensive and elaborate nature of the decision-making process - 
an ironic problem considering what was being discussed was the extension of democratic 
involvement - added to this situation where few definite decisions were taken. As Allaun 
notes, all the group's proposals were still being discussed by the time of the 1983 election 
and were neither agreed by the committee or the party's NEC. 608 
Without agreement within the media study group on this question, the media historian 
Des Freedman views that a further sign of this retreat came from Benn himself. 609 By 
1981, the leading public advocate of the New Left politics in the Labour Party and the 
keen media reformer had pulled back from advocating democratic control. In a book on 
the question of democracy, Benn's proposed reforms did not refer to press workers being 
involved in decision-making, unlike previously. This reversal of his previous positions 
was even more abrupt when it is considered that it was at odds with the book's 
analysis. 610 The turnaround may have been an acknowledgement, as we have indicated, of 
the problems of democratic control in the media. He could also have recognised support 
for industrial democracy wave was ebbing. 
In the party, the retreat was such that the 1982 conference, which discussed the media, 
the 1982 Programme, and the 1983 manifesto made no mention of press democratic 
control. 
608 Allaun, Spreading the news: 88-9. 
609 Freedman, 2000: 180. 
610 Thus, Benn's assessment in the work was that journalists were forced to be complicit with the line taken- 
by the media proprietors and management. Also, in identifying `The way ahead' for democracy to be 
expanded in the publication, he advocated workers' participation across industry. (Benn, Arguments for 
democracy: 105,150,165-6). 
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Explaining the retreat 
How should we explain this reluctance to support any form of democratic ownership and 
participation in the press? It reflected the left's retreat. 611 However, there is also another 
explanation. In considering the relative pressures on the party's press industrial 
democracy policy-making, Frayman gave important pointers. He looked at the 
contending determination to press forward and resist industrial democracy by the unions 
and the newspaper businesses. As we have seen, the press made clear to Labour that it 
faced a backlash if it pursued this. Frayman saw that newspaper reaction to the 
restoration of the closed shop had chastened some in the party. 612 
In addition, newspaper printers had exercised a limited and narrow industrial militancy. 
On the one hand, Frayman notes that print workers had "... secured as much and more 
control of the work process as workers anywhere in Britain". They controlled work rates 
and those employed, effectively. 613 Curran makes a similar point. He says a trip to the 
Daily Mirror in this period was instructive as to the level of shop floor control the 
printers had. 614 
Yet, this only ineffectively and erratically translated itself into demands in the Labour 
Party for press industrial control. Both Frayman and Curran have given complementary 
reasons for this. Curran notes that this effective workers' control: "... was not articulated 
and justified by the theory... And this gives you an idea for why some of the forms were 
somewhat corrupt. It had not been purified or debated. "615 Also, Frayman and Curran 
considered that the media unions were sometimes more reluctant to embrace industrial 
democracy, when faced with the reality of it, rather than when they could put it forward 
61 This represented both demoralisation and realism as to what was possible to achieve in the more 
chastened circumstances facing the party's policy overall. 
6'z "[W]e should not pretend that their cries of pain fell on deaf ears", as Frayman put it. (Frayman: 2). 
613 Ibid.: 3. 
614 "It was like a foreign country. In order to move from one room to the next we had to pass through 
border controls. The border control was the particular rep for that part of the printing process. And I was 
with the general secretary of the trade union who had to negotiate his way around. Here was an industry 
that was effectively run by the workers... " (Curran interview). 615 Curran interview. 
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as a formal paper aspiration. So, for instance, Frayman shared the view that we outlined 
in a previous chapter that the press closed shop battle represented a missed opportunity 
for the NUJ. 616 Nevertheless, at the same time, the union hierarchy exhibited a 
maximalist approach in party debates; demanding all or nothing. Those on the study 
group were concerned about workers becoming involved in making decisions when they 
did not have full control. The effect of this was that the union leadership passed 
resolutions on paper but did little in practice. 617 
Equally, Frayman indicated another reason why leaderships were reluctant to involve 
their unions in industrial democracy campaigns. They could cut across the more basic 
union demands for pay and conditions. Co-operatives could not guarantee the relatively 
high pay rates negotiated by the media unions with the corporate owners. 618 Rather than 
democratic ownership, a way to achieve control was seen to come through the right of 
reply. However, as the appendix to this chapter indicates, the right of reply shifted from 
one dependent less on worker control and more on legal constraint. 
616 In the outcry of propreitors and editors, the main charge had been that, with such an agreement, media 
workers would interfere with editors' rights. Frayman saw that only a small NUJ minority publicly hinted 
that they rejected the union leadership's response - the union would only `interfere' during industrial 
disputes. Fewer still wanted others in the industry, such as printers, to have their say. He rejected this 
approach. "[I]t is precisely this kind of `interference' in the existing editorial power structure which must 
lie at the heart of any proposal to make the press as a whole more democratic. " (Frayman: 3). 
617 NEC Media Study Group, `Minutes of the 4t' meeting', 20 November 1980. As Curran puts it: "There 
were two absolutes. There was a workers' control which was what was going to be established when the 
Jerusalem was built. And you had the existing system. And anything between fell short of Jerusalem. There 
was a strange combination of confrontation and conservatism... ". (Curran interview). 618 Frayman: 3. 
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WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PARTY'S PRESS POLICY COMMITMENTS? 
The Labour Party policy shift following the right counter-offensive did not concentrate 
on press policies, still regarded as less important. Yet, there was a discernable change in 
the policies compared with what had been agreed by the study group. 
One pressure weighing on the right was that the existing newspapers had been allies in its 
revival, as indicated. 619 This linked with shifts that were to occur in the approach taken to 
political marketing in Labour campaigning, which will be a subject of the next chapter. 
As Dominic Wring explains, in the period this thesis has so far considered, campaign 
innovation stagnated, following Labour's previous engagement in this area, starting with 
universal suffrage's introduction. Hostility had developed to such techniques after 
Labour's 1970 election failure. Subsequent campaigns had been marked by poor 
management and organisation, and an unfocussed strategy. 2° However, this was about to 
change. The right was now again using the press to its advantage and was thus reluctant 
to challenge it. 
Hattersley, who helped set up the right-wing pressure group Solidarity, was more 
concerned about the press than most. As this chapter's appendix indicates, he was a CPF 
sponsor and advocated the right of reply. 621 He, in fact, used a regular Punch magazine 
column to flag up concerns with journalistic quality and the influence of propreitors on 
editorial content. 622 Yet, even he regarded press concentration as something that could 
not be challenged without there being `undue' government interference. He felt that 
intervention going beyond some tightening of anti-monopoly controls, consistent with a 
619 The right used its press contacts to discredit the left by linking it with extremism; "... hence the imager, 
of `bully boys', the analogies with Eastern Europe and the accusations of intimidation and brutality°, 
- (Shaw, Discipline: 246, cited in Panitch and Leys: 167. See also 145). 
620 Wring, Dominic, and Studies Judge Institute of Management. 1995. Political marketing and 
organisational development : the case of the Labour Party in Britain. Cambridge: Judge Institute of 
Management Studies in conjunction with the Engineering Department, University of Cambridge.: 1-12. 
Seymour-Ure rather personalises this point for Labour in office. While, as we have seen, Wilson was 
concerned with public communication, Callaghan "... did not think the effort necessary ... perhaps...,,. - (Seymour-Ure, Prime ministers: 126). 
621 Alan Richardson and Mike Power, ̀ Media Freedom and the CPBF' in Curran, Bending. 209-10, HOC 
Vol. 37,18 February 1983, col. 586-7, O'Malley and Soley: 81, Curran interview. ' 
622 Hattersley, Roy. 1983. Press gang. London: Robson Books.: 61-3. 
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liberal pluralist response, could lead to government censorship. 623 Also, like Mitchell and 
Whitehead on the study group, he felt that only a limited amount could be done in the 
face of press power. Hattersley claimed that party supporters regarded "... the antics of 
the Daily Mail and the Sun as one of the hazards of their existence, for which they must 
make plans in the way that they prepare for snow and the late arrival of railway trains". 624 
Yet, this reluctance does not seem to have reflected the feeling of the party conference. 
The 1982 conference had gone even further than previous gatherings in its hostility to the 
press and media, claiming that the "... most powerful opponents... " of the Labour Party 
in its quest for socialism and equality were the forces of mass communication. It 
denounced the media for its role in fostering "... acceptance of a capitalist social order... ". 
It even took a simplistic similar view to early media theorists, who saw the media had 
overwhelming power to influence all individuals in mass society in a fairly uniform 
way. 625 The readers were subject to "... mass indoctrination... ". As already indicated, the 
conference even called for an Independent Press Authority, as had Mullin and Meacher. 
This reflected a more general mood. One delegate pointed out to the conference that 
almost every debate over the week had castigated press bias. 626 
Nevertheless, with the right back in control of the decision-making forum of the NEC, as 
well as controlling the Shadow Cabinet, Labour's election manifesto toned down the 
position of the study group, which itself had been rather limited in its decisions. In doing 
this, Foot as leader, despite his previous commitment to press ownership reform, with the 
right-winger Dennis Healey as his deputy, consented to the moves. 
623 Curran, Different approaches: 94. 
624 Hattersley, Press gang: 9. Interesting, the Mail staff were said not to always share this resigned attitude. 
Greenslade recounts how the NUJ chapel agreed to call on the editor David English to "... give the other 
parties [apart from the Conservatives] a fair crack of the whip... ". English refused. (Greenslade, Press 
Gang: 452). 
623 Franklin, Packaging politics: 205-6, Miller, Media and voters: 1. 
626 Labour Party, Conference 1982: 239-40,241. 
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The `longest suicide note in history' was rather short on press policy. 627 Freedman notes 
that the four pages in Labour's Programme 1982 had been reduced to a few sentences 
with limited prescriptions. 28 Curran describes some of the `radical-sounding' plans as 
imprecise. 629 
The key omission from what the study group decided was that the commitment to the 
OPA had disappeared. With this departure went any mechanism for supporting discarded 
titles when anti-monopoly legislation forced oligopolies to divest of their holdings 630 
Curran perceptively considers that the effect of breaking up press concentration, on its 
own, "... would probably have been to close papers... ", because the manifesto made no 
further provision to support divested titles. 631 The OPA was in the Scandinavian social 
market tradition. The refusal to include a commitment to intervention was an example of 
a limited policy transfer - constrained by political viability. 
Indeed, it was not clear what bodies would implement any of the plans, since demands 
for an integrated communications ministry had also been discarded. The plea for this was 
one response to the failure of previous press policy to get onto the statute book under 
Callaghan. 632 The study group in February 1983 agreed to back this proposal for an 
integrated ministry to be put into the campaign document, which was set to form the basis 
of the manifesto. Yet, this was ignored, prompting fears that any commitments would be 
buried in the gaps between government departments. 
Also, as we have indicated already, the manifesto provided no commitment to democratic 
ownership of the press, a National Printing Corporation, an advertising revenue board or 
627 As Allaun put it, the manifesto was strong on generalities but contained few specifics. (Allaun, 
Sreading the news: 90). 
6f8 Freedman, 2000: 184-5. See also Freedman, 2003: 126. 
629 Curran, Different approaches: 129. 
630 Dale: 181, Curran, Different approaches: 133, Baistow, Fourth-rate estate: 97,98-100. 
631 Curran, Different approaches: 133. 
632 As we have seen, a key minister Michael Meacher blamed the Labour government's reluctance to 
implement the press proposals of the party and the Royal Commission partly on the fact that there was no 
minister clearly responsible for the media. Meacher campaigned for a ministry of communications in the 
study group and in wider party forums. (Meacher, Reform: 9, Labour Party, Conference 1982: 242-3). 
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a commitment to diversify government advertising, which had so concerned the party 
discussions previously. 
A further reason for the retreat relates to a theme mentioned at the top of this chapter. 
Francis Cripps' analysis of the AES and the media, referred to earlier, provided an 
important lesson, which those propagating the AES on the NEC did not noticeably heed. 
In a notion which borrowed from conceptions of hegemony associated with Antonio 
Gramsci, Cripps indicated that the AES needed to "... establish its own resonance in the 
media... ". It was only then that it would be seen as realistic 633 While Cripps overstated 
the media's power, he made an important point. As indicated, when the NEC was in the 
ascendancy, its members had problems in promoting their policies to the wider electorate. 
This same difficulty faced the study group and the NEC in promoting a strategy on press 
ownership and control. The NEC was not just required to popularise this strategy among 
voters in order to be elected, as important as this was. It also needed to make them 
popular so that the NEC could withstand pressures to ameliorate them in the face of 
media corporation pressure and right-wing backlash. 
The internalised and incomplete development of press ownership policy meant that few 
knew about it. An October 1981 party political broadcast concerning media bias provided 
an isolated exception to this internalisation. 634 A former leading trade union press officer 
and CPBF activist told the author that he had little knowledge of the NEC media 
committee's policy at the time. 635 If this was true of someone in the ̀ inner loop', then it is 
likely to have also been the case for Labour supporters. 
Tony Benn was a prime example of this internalisation, albeit in the face of a severe press 
and media assault. The writers Panitch and Leys suggest that one of Benn's problems was 
that in his determination to get publicity for his cause, he was too prepared to talk to the 
633 Francis Cripps, `The British Crisis - Can the Left Win? ' in New Lej? Review, No. 128, July-August 
1981: 96-7. 
634 Yet, as Labour produced this broadcast in the middle of the discussion on the study group, it was 
tentative about the press reforms needed. (Aldridge, David. `Labour Party broadcast attacks bias', Free 
Press No. 10, November/December 1981). 
635 Personal interview with John Monks, then NALGO communications officer, later UNISON head of 
communications, August 24 2001. 
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press and the media in ways that were used against him. 636 It is a correct commonplace to 
suggest that Benn experienced some of the harshest press coverage ever meted out to any 
senior politician. However, contrary to the assessment of Panitch and Leys, it can be 
asserted that once Benn had decided to travel such a path, he needed to be consistent. But 
he was not. 
Benn complained persuasively that neither he, nor the Labour left, nor the left-dominated 
NEC, could get their position across in an unmediated way to the public, because of press 
bias. 637 Yet, the Guardian and then the Times offered him the chance to pen a regular 
column. 638 Here, he could have instituted a more unmediated relationship with readers. 
However, he spurned these opportunities, the first to spend more time on internal party 
campaigning. 639 Instead, his attitude was to rely on the reporting of his parliamentary 
speeches. Also, at key points in this period when he needed to mobilise support, he 
refused to be interviewed by the British mainstream media. 640 Given the way the press 
treated him, this may have been understandable. But it was nonetheless inconsistent and 
likely to be harmful to his and the Labour left's profile, when the right were enlisting 
press support for a counter-attack. 
636 Panitch and Leys. 
637 Ile wanted the possibility for his speeches to be reported in full. (Benn, Conflicts of interest: 502). 
638 Benn, Conflicts of interest: 503 and Benn, The end of an era: 226. 
639 Benn, Conflicts of interest: 503. 
640 As he put it: "I like the simplicity of making Parliament my main forum and allowing the press to cover 
it or not as they think best... ". (Ibid.: 507). He refused offers to appear on any post-1979 election post- 
mortem programmes. He also rejected offers of BBC interviews at a key point during the 1979 party 
conference. Yet, at the same time he agreed to do the Parkinson show, which just angered the BBC's 
current affairs department. (Ibid.: 494,546,547). He rebuffed an offer to be given five minutes on the 
ITN's News at One -a quarter of the programme's air-time - in 1980. (Anon., 'ITN offers Benn five 
minutes', Free Press, No. 3, October 1980, Gaber, Ivor. 1980. `Benn and ITN' Free Press, No. 4, 
December 1980). Benn proudly announced that he refused all radio and television interviews at the 
Wembley Special Conference in 1981, apart from one for the Soviet labour magazine Trud He also would 




How should this period and Labour's 1983 manifesto be considered overall? We have 
indicated that there were retreats before 1993 from the radical positions outlined at the 
1979 conference and espoused on the study group. The attempt to employ public service 
notions to provide balance was a failure. Yet, the strategy promoted by the group, which 
would have answered some of the previous problems with press ownership policy, did 
not make it into the 1983 election programme. 
Nevertheless, despite this, it should be made crystal-clear that the manifesto was a sea- 
change from that four years previously. It represented the most far-reaching and radical 
manifesto commitment to providing press diversity and thus aiding democracy made by 
the Labour Party. If Labour had been elected and the commitments had been translated 
into government policy, then press ownership would have been transformed. As such, the 
CPBF hailed it, in its `official history', as incorporating "... some of campaign's radical 
proposals... ". 641 The 1983 manifesto committed the party to anti-monopoly legislation 
that went well beyond liberal pluralist notions. It dedicated the party to "... breaking up 
`major concentrations of press ownership"' by setting a ceiling on the number of titles 
which could be owned by one individual or press group. It also pledged the Government 
to prohibit cross-media ownership. As importantly, as a policy transfer from 
Scandinavian-style social market notions, it promised that a launch fund would be set up 
to assist new publications. As the appendix to this chapter outlines, it also committed a 
Labour government to introducing a statutory right of reply. 642 
To conclude, we will consider how well the `classic' positions on policy formation 
outlined in Chapter 1 can explain the events described. At the start of this period, the left 
mobilised for what was seen as greater party democracy, in a challenge to Michels' iron 
law of oligarchy. 643 Some leading figures linked calls for participative democracy with 
demands for both greater diversity and democratic control over the press. The 1979 
641 Richardson and Power: 209. 
642 Dale: 181. 
643 Callaghan, Retreat: 192. 
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conference called for a discussion on how this would be achieved. In a manner that seems 
to accord with pluralist and especially Marxist analyses, the unions provided the engine 
of this radical challenge to press ownership power and it was linked to rank and file 
revolt. 
Different sources provided the input into the manifesto's stance on the press. 
Overwhelmingly, this relatively interventionist policy reflected the radicalisation of the 
earlier period. Here union leaderships allied themselves with constituency activists to 
insist that the policies rejected by the previous Labour government be implemented. By 
the time of the manifesto, many of those commitments remained. 
The development -of a relatively radical policy lends itself to the conceptions of Beer, 
Minkin and, also, the alternative reading of the Marxists regarding party power, outlined 
in the first chapter. Particularly, as with Minkin's conception, the unions prescribed the 
boundaries for the leadership's room of manoeuvre and the NEC and Labour Party 
conference were all involved in policy formation. The predominant reading of the 
Marxists would see the leadership as playing a more influential role than is indicated in 
the earlier period described here. Yet following the alternative Marxist reading, it is 
questionable in Miliband's account as to whether his immutable laws regarding the 
influence of business on the Labour leadership actually govern policy creation, as 
opposed to government implementation. Reflecting the tension between determinism and 
human agency in Marxism, Miliband recognises that the unions have been challengers to 
what is seen as a conservative orthodoxy. In this sense, the policy on press diversity 
reflects this alternative conception. Demands for diversity to aid democracy backed by 
the 1979 conference, and spearheaded by media trade unions, provided a summation of 
what had gone before. These shared and, at the same time, went beyond Scandinavian- 
style social market premises with regard to the need to intervene in what was perceived 
as a failing press market. 
However, the formation of policy on press diversity was more than just a reflection of the 
radical policy. It went through phases. Rather than resting on the laurels of these 
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relatively thought-out formulae, party thinkers decided to go beyond this, towards an 
explicitly public service conception. In doing this, they were replicating the radical 
ferment still manifest in other policies influenced by the AES. Yet, their assumptions 
about government control of the press shared what critics had seen as weaknesses in 
social democracy generally. These included, at best, patronising assumptions about how 
state interference could ̀ improve' political content in the popular press. They also shared 
social democratic notions of the impartial and beneficent role of the state, which could 
not be justified in this context. Although the study group did not support the public 
service advocates, on the back of constituency activist support, the IPA became Labour 
Party policy. This happened via a process that flouted the rules the party had agreed 
earlier. If this had been the outcome, such a process might well have given credence to 
more pluralist conceptions of party policy formation. It certainly shows a process that 
was in disarray. 
Yet, this was not the end of the story. The manifesto finally put forward was less radical 
than the conference policy agreed in 1979. The study group itself plumped for the OPA. 
However, the NEC, with the implicit backing of the leadership, rejected the OPA. It also 
rejected linked methods for achieving diversity proposed by the study group, which had 
been supported at previous party conferences. The study group itself made a retreat from 
interventionism by rejecting an advertising revenue board-style scheme. This reflected a 
political shift away from government involvement in the private sector generally 
prevalent in the party by 1983. Nevertheless, the OPA also identified and plugged up a 
gap in the previous examples of policy transfer from Scandinavian social market practice. 
It went well beyond classical liberal conceptions of anti-monopoly legislation to provide 
a credible policy for divestment of existing titles to create a more plural market. Yet, the 
right on the NEC rejected this in favour of a policy substantially less interventionist than 
that which had been agreed at party conferences. 
The combination of the upsurge of a union-backed radical policy, followed by a 
resurgence of right-wing influence, supported by the leadership, accords both with the 
analysis of Minkin and that of the Marxists. Yet, there is some sign that the Marxists' 
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analysis can in some ways explain the facts more fully because of its emphasis on 
external factors. As indicated, the right were reluctant to support policies that were more 
radical because, again, they believed that press power was too strong to be more 
forcefully confronted. In other words, they acquiesced to business pressures, as the 
Marxists would have it. 
Nevertheless, as for the Times takeover, it can be argued that the actions of the Labour 
leadership would seem to vindicate a pluralist analysis. Once again, Foot, as he had done 
as a Labour minister, was prepared to take on powerful media businesses; in this case, 
News International. And, on this occasion, the trade union leadership was not pressuring 
him to do so. In fact, it was quite the opposite - seeming to counter all the classic 
approaches. Parts of the union leadership predated the move to the right that the unions 
were to make on the broader range of party policies. Union activists wished to oppose the 
takeover. However, the union leadership fell prey to concerns to advance the Labour 
movement, to which press diversity was seen to be an obstacle. Faced with a choice 
between upholding the paper positions of their unions and accepting a market logic, 
which they perceived would better protect their members' terms and conditions, they 
chose the latter. 
Press democratic control demands reflected the earlier mobilisation for party democracy, 
but were rejected for the manifesto. Earlier, the printers' unions had pushed for this and 
some of their leadership tentatively championed it, mirroring their industrial militancy. 
Yet, this militancy was also fractured and limited, as we have outlined. Despite the TUC 
and, especially the print unions, being committed to limited newspaper democracy, the 
unions' official representatives provided very partial support for it in Labour Party 
forums. At the same time, the CPF appeared. This was a media trade union and activist 
movement. It associated itself with democratic reform of the press. Influences on this 
organisation were broader than the Scandinavian-style social market and public service 
conceptions. In the Labour Party discussions, all pressure for press democratic control 
came from figures involved in this organisation, based on the union ranks. Thus, again, 
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there were some demands for more radical reform emanating from union ranks, but no 
concerted pressure from the union leadership to implement them. 
Therefore, the assessment of Dennis MacShane, the former NUJ leader, who later 
became a New Labour minister, is only partly correct when considering the Times 
takeover and press democratic control. 644 He blames the indifference of union members 
to reform, as opposed to the union leaders and activists, as one reason for Labour 
government reluctance to support structural change. 645 Freedman rejects MacShane's 
assertion that union pressure to maintain terms and conditions helped quell the chance for 
Labour to initiate policy. 646 It seems that the reality is more complicated. The unions' 
membership were prepared to face profound hostility in challenging the companies' 
control of editorial policy on occasion with the industrial right of reply (as we shall see in 
this chapter's appendix), a point MacShane underplays. 647 Although print unions 
exercised extensive shop floor control, and those in the union leaderships involved in the 
party discussions advocated a maximalist position on workers' control, there was a 
conservative pressure to defend basic interests. This was at odds with those in the CPBF, 
for instance, more interested in achievable reform. As we shall see in the appendix, the 
unions' CPBF activists were from their middle layers. 
This gives some credence to the claims of those such as Eric Hobswawm writing in `The 
Forward March of Labour Halted? '. In the course the debate promoted by Marxism 
Today, he suggested that the typical trade union limitations of sectionalism and 
syndicalism were at odds with progressive politics. 648 If we consider press diversity and 
644 Dennis MacShane was one of those considered favourably by Kinnock for the role as first Campaigns 
and Communications' director. MacShane worked for eight years at the BBC before becoming president of 
the National Union of Journalists from 1978 to 1979 and Policy Director of the International Metal 
Workers Federation from 1980 to 1992. He was Director of the European Policy Institute from 1992 to 
1994 before becoming an MP. He has been a Foreign Office minister since 2001. (2002. Who's who 2002: 
an annual biographical dictionary. London: A. & C. Black.: 1395-6,2000. Dods parliamentary 
companion 2001: 168th year. London: Vacher Dod.: 231). 
643 Dennis MacShane, `Media Policy and the Left', in Seaton and Pimlott: 231. 
646 Freedman, 2000: 7. 
617 MacShane, Media Policy, in Seaton and Pimlott: 227. 
648 Eric Hobswawm, 'The Forward March of Labour Halted? ', in Hobsbawm, E. J., Francis Mulhern, and 
Martin Jacques. 1981. The Forward march of labour halted? London: NLB in association with Marxism 
Today.: 18-19,21,27,32. 
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participative democracy as analogous to left-libertarian issues, then the fact that unions 
defended particularist interests precluding press diversity would seem to relate to Herbert 
Kitschelt's claims regarding other European social democratic parties. It would affirm the 
idea that the unions inhibited the social democratic leadership in taking a stand on 
`libertarian' issues. 649 It would also counter Freedman's analysis of Labour broadcast 
policy. 
However, this divide was by no means regularly the case. For the most part, Kitschelt's 
assessment would not accord with the situation we are considering. The unions were 
pressing far more readily for programmatic demands for diversity and participative 
democracy than the Labour leadership, as we have seen. Although there were divisions at 
some points, there were other examples where the unions identified themselves at the 
forefront of New Left concerns for press diversity and democratic accountability. 650 In 
addition, as we shall see in the next chapter, those close to the Labour leadership, which 
those around Marxism Today increasingly looked to, became hostile to what they 
considered as a `loony left', which supported the left-libertarian concerns Kitschelt 
alludes to. 65' 
The centrality of the union movement would seem to accord with the analysis of Minkin, 
McKenzie and the Marxists. However, it may again be argued that, of these analyses, the 
Marxists' explanation may have more validity when we consider the counterpressure to 
demands for democratic involvement. Here, the pressure of outside business was key. 
Figures, some associated with the right in the party, argued that it would be 
counterproductive to radically challenge the power of newspaper business. The right did 
'49 Kitchelt, Herbert. 1994. `Austrian and Swedish Social Democrats in Crisis', Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol 27,1, April: 3-39: 23-8. 
6so Nor, incidentally, does Kitschelt's assessment accord with other aspects of Labour power relations and 
decision-making. Hilary Wainwright indicates that there were broader examples of where unions had 
challenged economism. (Hilary Wainwright, `Response', in Hobsbawm, Forward March: 134-6). John 
Callaghan indicates that there are also examples where the unions promoted the new left concern of 
environmentalism. (Callaghan, Retreat: Chapter 4). 
651 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 71. Indeed, in his later hostility to `identify politics', Hobswawm also 
appeared to distance himself from the "... the so-called `new social movements... ", this time for a 
reinvigorated nationalism. (Hobswawm, Eric. 1996. Identity Politics and the Left', in New Left Review, 
May-June: 45,46 38-47). 
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not wish to go beyond certain reforms towards further market intervention in the face of 
press magnate power. 
Instead, the appendix to this chapter indicates that there was a concentration on the 
workerist, fragmented and unformulated demands for industrial democracy contained 
within the industrial right of reply. However, despite its more radical democratic 
emphasis, the undoubted problems with such a strategy had not been confronted. This 
meant that it would be vulnerable to a more legalist variant. This statutory variant gained 
support within the Labour Party and then among the ranks of those who had championed 
a union-based right of reply. With regard to democratic control, therefore, the party had 
gone from hinting at a policy, especially on the right of reply, which had echoes of 
democratic control, which were well to the left of social democracy. And, in the space of 
a few years, it had arrived at a stance that was a policy transfer from the practice of social 
democratic governments and those to their right. 
Freedman compellingly argues in his analysis of Labour's broadcasting policy that this 
1980s study group was different to the previous one. He suggests that, unlike in the 
1970s, when there was a rise of class struggle, this group coincided with a decline of 
workers' confidence and the rise of a left whose power was inside the party. 652 
In seeking to emphasise the relationship with the downturn in class struggle, Freedman's 
analysis may well explain the study group's actions. Yet, it may not be able to entirely 
translate to explain the relatively radical nature of the manifesto press policy. Instead, 
overall, it can be argued that the strength of the left in the early period surveyed in this 
chapter was a political reaction following the militancy of the 1970s. As one survey of 
Bennism probably overstates, when militancy faltered, so a section of trade unionists 
turned their attention to the Labour Party left. 653 Nevertheless, to an extent following 
Freedman, the eclipse of that militancy may well have been a key factor in explaining 
652 He argues that an indication of this difference was that the first group met 10 times in two years, and left 
confidence meant it produced a clear, if unpopular, document. Such was the period of experimentation that 
MPs put their names to People and the media. Yet, the 1980s group met more than 20 times and did not 
produce a public written expression of their work. (Freedman, 2000: 182, Freedman, 2003: 123-124). 
653 Freeman, Alan. 1982. The Benn heresy. London: Pluto.: esp. 109-112. 
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why the left challenge was not sustained. The insularity of the Labour left, which we 
surveyed, could well have been another factor. 
Also, another consideration, which complicates matters, should be taken into account 
when particularly considering the press sector. Countering the overall picture, as we have 
seen, printers participated in a surge of militancy, of which the CPF's launch was a 
political expression. Yet, this was not reflected in Labour policy. But a key reason for this 
was the vulnerability of the industrial right of reply, the major policy goal associated with 
this militancy. 
While the legal right of reply remained a policy advocated by party MPs after 1983, 
Labour moved away from policies to aid press diversity and any form of democratic 
control. We shall consider this in the next chapter. It will explore whether this 
realignment related to sweeping changes in Labour's political marketing in the press. It 
shall analyse how the shifts related to the political climate. However, it will also 
emphasise what can be forgotten; that because of the changes' uneven nature, there was 
first a shift to the left in local government and this was reflected in new press policies 
developed by the municipal socialists. 
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6. Starting to mean business: Labour in the 1980s 
Within a year of becoming Labour leader, former member Neil Kinnock rejoined the 
Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom. He robustly endorsed the organisation 
and its aims, writing: "I strongly believe that Britain's press needs to be more open, more 
diverse and more accountable. We need greater variety of press with a wider range of 
opinion and information. "654 And after standing down in 1992, following his second 
election defeat, the Labour leader bitterly blamed the national newspapers' narrow 
political range. Kinnock openly wondered how Labour could win, facing press distortion. 
He endorsed the claim from the former Conservative Party treasurer that the newspapers' 
intervention had been crucial in Labour's defeat. 655 
However, in between these events what was striking - despite Kinnock's seeming 
support for press diversity - was how this issue dropped further down the political 
agenda. Dennis MacShane commented in 1985 that there had been "... no firm 
commitment from Kinnock or Hattersley, or the rest of the Shadow Cabinet to effective 
media reform... ". 656 This may not have been entirely true for all the time they were 
Labour leaders. However, as was judged in 1989, they did not fight for the agreed 
reforms particularly publicly or effectively. 657 
In addition, the solutions offered became more market-oriented and, for a significant 
time, more nationalistic. We will view how the shift in policy from democratic control 
and a more interventionist diversity strategy towards more market-oriented policies fitted 
in to the more general pattern of Labour power relations and politics. To do this, we will 
first consider Kinnock's broader policy trajectory and how external factors, both national 
and international, influenced this. 
654 Neil Kinnock, `Letter to the CPBF', May 9 1984, Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archive. 
635 Jones, Eileen. 1994. Neil Kinnock. London: Robert Hale.: 189-90, Freedman, 2000: 216, Freedman, 
2003: 157. 
656 Free Press 28, March April 1985. See also Dennis MacShane, ̀Media Policy and the Left' in Curran, 
Bending 218,230-2. 
657 Andrews, J. P. 1989. The failure of the News on Sunday. Brighton: University of Sussex.: 6. 
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We shall also note that two processes proceeded in tandem, nevertheless. Structural 
change, in part to aid Labour Party representation, became less prominent. At the same 
time, the leadership reverted to a previous media-led campaigning strategy and developed 
it. This was considered successful. Some trade unionists who had advocated press 
structural change to advance Labour movement representation, promoted it. However, it 
shall be indicated that the strategy placed plans for press structural change in difficulty, 
as it was counterproductive for those trying to woo newspaper businesses. 
PARTY POLICY FROM 1983-1992 
Organisational changes 
Neil Kinnock faced a huge problem on being elected leader in 1983. Labour had just 
suffered a crushing defeat. 658 The party's election organisation had been seen to be the 
opposite - disorganised. Kinnock, on being elected with support from across the party, 
exploited this need for order out of chaos. The previous chapter had seen an upsurge of 
activist demands for democratic accountability. Kinnock accepted the right's argument 
that the reasons for Labour's defeat included ̀ unrepresentative' activists' influence over 
party policy creation. This was despite the fact that, as we saw, the trade union right had 
organisational control by 1983. 
The leader resolved to remedy this by instituting a series of organisational changes to 
shift power from the activists and the NEC to the centre. Kinnock aimed to aggregate 
policy creation under centralised leadership control. 659 As we shall see, Labour's press 
and media communications was key to this change. 
658 It was Labour's worst defeat since 1900, with regard to votes per candidate. Labour had only polled 2% 
more than the Liberal-SDP Alliance. (Shaw, Eric. 2000. ̀ The Wilderness Years, 1979-1994' in The Labour 
Party :a centenary history, edited by Brian Brivati and Richard Heffernan. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 117). 
639 Shaw, 1979, Shaw, 1945, Seyd: 22-3, Hughes Colin, A., and Patrick Wintour. 1990. Labour rebuilt : the 
new model party. London: Fourth Estate., Panitch and Leys, Callaghan, Retreat. This process also included 
other committee reorganisation and a shake-up at Labour's Walworth Road headquarters. (Shaw, 1979, 
Callaghan, Retreat, Heffernan, Richard, and Mike Marqusee. 1992. Defeat from the jaws of victory: inside 
Kinnock's Labour Party. London ; New York: Verso., Panitch and Leys) Kinnock's justification for this 
stance was that "... the condition of the party made management an obligation - so I got on with it. " 
(Kinnock, N. (1994) `Reforming the Labour Party', Contemporary Record, 8 (3), pp. 535-54,537. Also 
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Central to this reorganisation, the leadership abandoned the NEC study group system, 
which originated much press policy. The loose arrangement with the often-leftish 
academic advisors ended 660 In a prelude to the new press and media strategy, research 
secretary Geoff Bish argued that new policies should predominately be created to support 
campaigns. This was because the party's problem was "... not the detail of policy ... but 
credibility and image". In the study groups' place, came a smaller and more tightly 
controlled system of joint Shadow Cabinet-NEC committees. 661 The Shadow Cabinet 
would now have more power in deciding policy, as all policy would have to have its 
agreement - to the CLPD constitutional reformers' concern. 
662 The insightful 
commentator Eric Shaw identifies that, by 1986, the leader and senior Shadow Cabinet 
members had responsibility for policy determination 663 
Kinnock eventually garnered resources to finance this centralisation. He used the `Short 
money', which provided state aid to opposition parties. As opposed to when the 
Conservatives were in opposition, the frontbench placed the money under its control, so 
that the Shadow Cabinet would not be dependent on research instituted by the party. 664 
Under Kinnock, the large sums involved, together with extra union funding, provided 
cited in Panitch and Leys: 219, Fielding, Steven. 1997. The Labour Party : 'socialism' and society since 
1951. Manchester: Manchester University Press.: 128). 
660 The hard right on the NEC had successfully called for a review of the system before the election to 
"... reduce costs and rationalise the policy formation process... ". It was proposed and seconded at the 
February 1983 NEC by Betty Boothroyd and Denis Healey. (Research Secretary, `Extract from RD 2889', 
1993). Benn quotes Healey tellingly saying that: "[W]e don't want to be controlled by model resolutions 
from CLPs or the LCC... The Conference cannot tell MPs how to vote against their consciences ... 
We want 
more tolerance of the Shadow Cabinet by the Party and the NEC must accept the former's leadership role. " 
(Benn, The end of an era: 303). 
`6' Interestingly, however, one area where he specified more policy work was needed was on press 
regulation. (Research Secretary, `Policy Development: A Further Note', Home Policy Committee, 
RD: 2902, November 1983, Shaw, Wilderness: 119). 
662 This was said to `solve the problem' which notably had arisen with the 1979 manifesto, where the NEC 
and the Shadow Cabinet had not agreed. The `problem' had been resolved in favour of the leadership and 
the senior members of the frontbench, rather than the party representatives on the NEC. (Research 
Secretary, ̀Policy Development: A Further Note' Home Policy Committee, RD: 2902, November 1983, 
Shaw, Wilderness: 119, CLPD Newsletter, No. 46 (Conference Edition), September/October 1992). 
663 Shaw, Wilderness: 119. 
611 Panitch and Leys: 178,219, Heffernan and Marqusee: 109-110, Callaghan, Retreat. 192-3. The 
significance of this was not lost on the left. As a leading reform figure, Benn accorded the battle over this 
money allocation with the same significance as the three constitutional demands of the left that were 
referred to in the previous chapter. (Benn, Conflicts of interest: 497). 
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resources for more full-time policy advisers, whose loyalty was seen to be to the leader, 
rather than the party. For the first time, the leadership had developed a policy research 
and advice wing under its control, with the unions' acquiescence 665 
Meanwhile, the 1984-1985 miners' strike defeat emboldened Kinnock and strengthened 
the Labour right, in a key turning point. For the leadership, the ̀ lost year', during which it 
had been "... very difficult to open up the other ideological challenges... ", was over. 666 
Along with the print unions' defeat, which we will explore later, the strike's collapse had 
a numbing effect on Labour movement radicalism. 667 It undermined the activist left, as 
the pressure from the unions faltered. The strike also provided a catalyst for a division 
between the party's traditional left and New Left and what became known as the `soft 
left'. Dispute over tactics caused division. 668 The Militant supporters' expulsion provided 
a further schism. 669 The realignment, centred on the Labour Coordinating Committee 
(LCC), most notably consisted of the soft left's decision to support Kinnock on the NEC 
665 Shaw, 1979: 112, Callaghan, Retreat: 192-3. 
666 Kinnock's chief of staff Charles Clarke interviewed by Philip Gould, in Gould, The unfinished 
revolution: 42. 
66' Heffernan and Marqusee: 61. 
668 One flashpoint was the failure of left union leaders such as Tom Sawyer to go along with the call of 
Benn and Dennis Skinner for strike action to support the miners' cause. (Heffernan and Marqusee: 68-70, 
Shaw, Wilderness: 122). 
6691f Militant had not existed, there is a sense in which those wanting to divide the left would have needed 
to create this `red bogey'. Opposition could build an alliance, which stretched from the hard right to the 
non-aligned New Left. The latter's opposition could be whipped up because of Militant's blanket 
opposition to Black Sections and women's self-organisation. Militant could be relied on to fuel these 
concerns. Episodes one could consider include the Sam Bond affair, where a Militant supporter was 
parachuted in from London to `represent' black people on Liverpool council. (Wainwright, Hilary. 1987. 
Labour :a tale of two parties. London: Hogarth.: 132). Another was when it organised a demonstration at 
the NEC in opposition to Black Sections. However, attempts to stir up opposition to Militant in order to 
push sections of the left towards an accommodation with Neil Kinnock were deeply compromised. It 
should be remembered that the demonstration against black sections was in support of the leadership on the 
NEC who wanted to oppose self-organisation. (McSmith, Andy. 1996. Faces of Labour : the inside story. 
London: Verso.: 212). On the soft left's view of Militant see, for instance, David Blunkett, `The perils of 
thinking for oneself, Tribune, May 23 1986 and Williams, Ian. 1986. `Left in the middle of a bid to 
tolerate the intolerable', Tribune, May 30 1986. For a critical view, see Heffernan and Marqusee: 68-70. 
Kinnock revived the attack against Militant, following the disciplinary measures taken under Foot, with his 
broadside at the 1985 party conference. (Shaw, Discipline: 259-90, Shaw, 1979: 35-6, Shaw, 1945: 174-5, 
Elliott, Gregory. 1993. Labourism and the English genius : the strange death of Labour England? London ; New York: Verso.: 137, Gould, The unfinished revolution: 44, Hughes and Wintour: 9-10, Anderson, Paul, 
and Nyta Mann. 1997. Safety first : the making of new Labour. London: Granta.: 192, Leapman, Michael. 
1987. Kinnock. London: Unwin Hyman.: 100-104, Hattersley, 'Who goes home?: 274-5). It subsequently led 
to 112 Labour Party members being expelled for being members-of Militant. (Heffernan and Marqusee: 
261-4). 
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in a failed attempt to prise him away from the right 670 At the same time that, nationally, 
Labour politics was shifting to the right, another form of municipal socialism from that of 
Militant had developed at a local level. As we shall see in Appendix 3 to this chapter, at 
its most distinctive, the municipal left, most associated with the GLC, reflected the New 
Left's willingness to reconsider the relationship between local democracy, public 
participation and economic planning. 
The development of this was interlinked with another influence on the Labour Party. This 
was also partly articulated through the municipal socialists. 
Some External Factors: the Soviet Union, Thatcher and the market 
Along with Thatcherism, the inefficient Soviet economies' disintegration provided one of 
the more important external influences on Labour Party thinking in this period. The 
relatively tiny, but influential, Eurocommunist wing of the British Communist Party and 
its journal Marxism Today was a major conduit for articulating the effects of this into the 
Labour Party's ideology. 671 
Despite possible alternatives, a critical, but sympathetic reading of Hayek's ideas 
influenced British left thinkers, when attempting to explain the Soviet economies' gross 
inefficiencies. 672 Economists wanted to introduce markets to regulate planning and 
670 This had been formed in 1978, as what would now be termed a Bennite `think tank'. But its politics had 
shifted. - By 1983, it supported Kinnock's campaign for party leadership. After that, it championed this 
centre-left coalition around Kinnock. (Heffernan and Marqusee: 68-70). 
671 In tandem with other European parties, the 1970s and early 1980s had seen the growth of 
Eurocommunism within the party. 
672 Hayek was most associated with the view that the profound problems with the Soviet economies were 
based on the inability of them to plan rationally, because it was not practically possible to calculate prices. 
His view had been the subject of a huge debate in the 1930s. A Polish economist, Oskar Lange, countered 
Hayek. He considered that planners could use consumer demand prices as the guiding criteria for resource 
production and allocation, creating computational `virtual markets'. To examine this debate, see, for 
example, Taylor, Fred Manville, Benjamin Evans Lippincott, and Oskar Lange. 1938. On the economic 
theory of socialism., Hayek Friedrich, A. von, von Mises Ludwig, N. G. Pierson, George Halm, and Enrico 
Barone. 1935. Collectivist economic planning : critical studies on the possibilities of Socialism by 
N. G. Pierson, Ludwig von Mises, Georg Haim, and Enrico Barone. London: Routledge. and Lavoie. One 
influential book in Britain, which shared the critical but sympathetic view of Hayek and gained a wider 
reading than just among specialists, was Nove, Alec. 1983. The economics offeasible socialism. London ; 
Boston: G. Allen & Unwin. Others had argued that Soviet inefficiency was bound up with the lack of 
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increase consumer choice. 673 The best aspects of the two worlds could be married. 
Market allocation's inequity would be tempered by planning. Efficiency would be sought 
without either market anarchy or planning rigidity. 
Marxism Today championed this new thinking among the Labour leadership both directly 
and through the soft left. 674 Being closer to the Soviet bloc than much of the left, the 
Eastern states' visible collapse led the journal's proponents to become early market 
converts. They gloried in its role as the purveyor of consumer choice and linked this to an 
understandable awe for Thatcherism's theoretical power and proselytising zeal. Thinkers 
in the British Communist and Labour parties considered that Thatcherism would need to 
be contested on its own ground by `learning to love the market', albeit in a limited 
way. 675 
democratic control over Soviet planning. Some of these left critics of the Soviet Union were favourably 
disposed to the idea of virtual markets. For, albeit inadequate, attempts to marry the two traditions see 
Mandel, Ernest. 1968. Marxist economic theory. London: Merlin Press. and Callinicos, Alex. 1991. The 
revenge of history : Marxism and the East European revolutions. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
673 This was because they identified that the Soviet economies were effective in heavy industrial production 
but less so in producing consumer goods. 
674 As the journal's former editor put it in 1990, the magazine made "... much of the intellectual running for 
Labour's Kinnockite revolution". Its role was to be as an "... ideological protagonist against the hard left". 
(Jacques, Martin. 1990. `Requiem for a revolution', Times, September 12 1990). An early indication of the 
separation of the soft left was the transformation of Tribune from its support for Bennism from the start of 
1985. Another landmark came in May of that year when New Socialist published an article `Bennism 
without Benn', which was widely discussed in the national press. (Heffernan and Marqusee: 68-70, Shaw, 
Wilderness: 121-3). Very tentatively at first, the soft left supported leadership calls for the market 
mechanism's implementation. And it explicitly cited the Soviet bloc's failures as its starting point. (LCC, 
`Mailing', June 1984, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archive). An indication of the shift at the 
higher levels of the party was that the leadership-dominated NEC called on the Labour Party conference to 
vote down a demand for a `campaign for democratic public ownership and socialist economic planning' at 
the 1983 conference. (CLPD, `CLPD Newsletter', London: CLPD: 1983). As early as 1984, the LCC 
proposed a statement of aims for the Labour Party, which was to provide a basis for the Policy Review 
conducted after 1987. While still supporting industrial democracy, the market was seen as a tool in 
ensuring decentralisation and local autonomy, to replace democratic control. (LCC, `Draft Long Term 
Aims', passed 17 November 1984: 2-4, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archive). By 1986, the 
soft left was opposing renationalisation of privatised utilities, counterposing to this forms of marketised 
social ownership. (LCC, `Key policies for Labour's general election manifesto' and Macpherson, Hugh. 
1986. `Social ownership wrongfoots the Right', Tribune, September 12,1986). 
675 Two very politically different commentators, Ivor Crewe and Richard Heffernan, are among those who 
note Thatcher's influence on Labour's politics. (Crewe, Ivor, `The Thatcher Legacy' in King Anthony, 
Stephen. 1993. Britain at the polls, 1992. Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers.: 1-28, Heffernan, 
Richard. 2001. New Labour and Thatcherism : political change in Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000). 
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The market would replace democratic control as an effective allocator and distributor. 
Historically, the Soviet bloc had influenced Labour Party thought towards state 
intervention without popular participation and control. As the sun set on the old regimes, 
there was a failure to win an argument that state intervention could have only been 
effective under democratic control. 
In tandem with this, the leadership developed policies more amenable to the market. With 
its organisational domination over policy creation, this became the party's position. The 
Labour leadership pressed for social ownership and away from nationalised control. 676 It 
also discarded party pledges to workplace democracy across industry. 677 Social ownership 
blurred the lines between market hybrids and the public ownership and democratic 
control associated with the AES. While more radical than the top-down nationalisation of 
the past, it was also a significant step towards embracing the market. However, translated 
into the press policy context, it could be easily associated with a social market 
perspective. If support for co-operatives had been applied across the newspaper market it 
would have represented a radical and bold move, in line with the democratising 
alternatives we have explored in past chapters. However, the social ownership 
perspective was only fitfully applied to the press. 
As for intervention in the economy, although there was some continuity, Labour went 
into the 1987 election committed to a form less pronounced than that argued for in 
1983.678 The AES was rejected and the commitment to Keynesianism became more 
ambiguous. 679 By 1987, the Labour leadership justified interventionism primarily to 
676 Social ownership's embrace prompted a prominent advocate to claim this as a "... victory for the soft 
left". Although, how much the soft left was influencing the leadership and how much influence was in the 
other direction regarding this was open to question. (Nigel Williamson, `Whatever happened to the 
realignment of the Left? ', Tribune, 26 September 1986). 
677 It was replaced by a commitment to "... legislation to foster good industrial relations and democratic 
participation... " in the 1987 manifesto. (Shaw, 1979: 12-13,47-50). 
78 An example of the continuity was that in both elections Labour promised interventionism to provide a 
neo-corporate managing of the market, where the state, science and technology would be pitted against 
finance and the City. (Callaghan, Retreat: 120). 
679 One example of this, the importance of which will become clearer in the next chapter, when we discuss 
globalisation in more detail, was that Labour abandoned its policy of exchange controls, following 
Thatcher's financial market liberalisation. (Callaghan, Retreat: 119, Anderson and Mann: 81). 
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bolster market vitality, rather than redistributive justice. 80 In the debates following 1987, 
soft left Keynesian advocates would further emphasise this international market 
competitiveness motivation, both in general policy and with regard to the press and 
media. 
The Policy Review 
The 1987 election failure steered the leadership further on a pro-market course. In the 
period up to 1989, soft left figure Bryan Gould championed Keynesian 
interventionism. 681 Yet, by the late 1980s, the leadership was convinced that financial 
capital, which had been further strengthened when the government freed up exchange 
controls in 1979, was too powerful to challenge head-on. 
The `French lesson' that Labour learnt from Mitterrand's reflationary failure was that the 
international economy more powerfully determined nation states' economic 
management. 682 As the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, paving the way for capitalism's zone of 
influence to be expanded, and as ten years of Thatcher's rule had changed the political 
landscape, so the leadership accepted a new logic. This shift was latterly justified by the 
notion that the threat of capital flight had overwhelmingly weakened nation states in a 
680 Gone was the redistributive pledge to make a "... fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of 
power and wealth in favour of working people and their families". By 1987, following on from the 
`Investing in People' campaign of 1986, Labour informed the electorate that investment in employment and 
skills was needed to "... make our country more efficient, more competitive and more socially just"; in that 
order. (Labour, Party. 1983. The new hope for Britain : Labour's manifesto 1983. London: Labour Party., 
Labour, Party. 1986. Investing in people. London: Labour Party., Labour, Party. 1987. Britain will win : 
Labour manifesto, June 1987. London: Labour Party. ). 
681 He was one influence on Labour maintaining the view that the City of London and the power of 
financial capital should be reined in. (Labour Party. 1989. Meet the challenge, make the change :a new 
agenda for Britain : final report of Labour's policy review for the 1990s. London: Labour Party., Driver, 
Stephen, and Luke Martell. 1998. New Labour : politics after Thatcherism. Cambridge, U. K. ; Maiden, 
Mass.: Polity Press in association with Blackwell.: 17-8, Anderson and Mann: 71-2, Ramsay, Robin. 1998. 
Prawn cocktail party: the hidden power of New Labour. London: Vision Paperbacks, 1998.: 116). Former 
diplomat, Oxford University law lecturer and TV presenter, Bryan Gould was a member of the shadow 
cabinet from 1986 to 1992. He was Labour spokesman on trade and industry, on economy and party 
campaigns, and national heritage, which included press policy. He retired from British political life to 
become vice chancellor of Waikato University, New Zealand. (2002. Who's who 2002 : an annual 
biographical dictionary. London: A. & C. Black.: 836 and 2000. Dod's parliamentary companion 2001 : 
168th year. London: Vacher Dod.: 454). 
682 For any nation state to ignore this was to "... invite disaster as the French discovered". (MacShane, 
Denis, and Society Fabian. 1986. French lessons for Labour. London: Fabian Society, 1986.: 5). 
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qualitatively new way, making national Keynesian intervention impossible. The 
globalisation rhetoric's influence on press and media ownership will become clearer in 
the next chapter. For now, it is important to note Keynesian interventionism's decline. 
In its place came ̀supply-side socialism'. Under this, interventionism across the economy 
would more clearly replicate the manner with which Britain's existing minimalist press 
laws were supposed to have operated. Kinnock outlined in a Policy Review document 
that the state would not directly intervene to reorganise markets, but regulate 
"... commercial behaviour in the interests of consumers... " and restrict "... monopoly 
practices in the interests of competition". 683 Business would "... get on with business". 684 
The state would become more of an `enabler', similar to the Marxism Today's vision, 
now championed by the SDP-Liberal Alliance. 685 These monumental shifts would help 
shape the approach taken to press ownership. 
Despite all these changes, which were meant to aid electability - and the fact that Labour 
went into the election in a lead buoyed up by opposition to the community charge - 
Labour failed once again in the 1992 election. 
683 Labour Party, Meet the challenge: 6. 
684 These were the words of press reformer Austin Mitchell. He viewed that rather than "... owning, 
interfering, regulating, planning... ", the state should "... let business get on with business... ". (Mitchell, 
Austin. 1987. ̀The party of producers and consumers', Independent, July 24 1987). 
685 Meacher, Michael. 1987. `A new vision of socialist individualism', Independent, 16 July 1987, 
Williams, Shirley. 1987. ̀Essential vision of the enabling state', independent, July 29 1987. 
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PRESS OWNERSHIP LEGISLATION 
The municipal left, Labour's early response and the News on Sunday 
As we shall see in the appendix on the cultural industries approach, the municipal 
socialists' legacy was mixed. Both approaches provided a justification for a pro-market 
emphasis on media policy in the party. But their effect on press policy in this regard was 
not as great as that on broadcasting. Both also had a radical edge, with the municipal 
socialists, particularly exploring forms of democratic ownership. 
The municipal left's early influence was to provide a renewed impetus to democratise 
and diversify the press. Labour activists and the unions reacted to what they considered 
as the press's ruthless 1983 election coverage by going on the offensive, rather than 
seeking greater representation by wooing the press. Indicating the same underlying 
tension between diversity and Labour movement representation we saw before, they 
responded in two ways to challenge this bias. One way was with a motion to create a 
Labour newspaper, following on from the discussions culminating in the McCarthy 
report, referred to in the last chapter. 686 The legacy of this will be discussed later. The 
1983 conference also backed policy that went far further than the election manifesto to 
democratise and diversify the press. 
The conference call for diversity included a demand to reinstate the problematic 
Independent Press Authority as party policy. But it also called for democracy both within 
newspapers and among the new bodies that would control them. Influenced by the GLC's 
work, rather than the radical notions coming from the TUC, the conference called for a 
686 The 1983 conference saw a call come from 30 constituencies for Labour and the TUC to jointly to set up 
a daily newspaper. Rather simplistically, this was seen as an answer to election defeat. The proposer of the 
conference motion saw the paper as a direct tool of the Labour movement. It would reverse a situation 
where "... we went into the general election unarmed and, in effect, with workers unprepared". A Labour 
Press Campaign was set up at the conference. (Labour Party, Conference. 1983. Report of the annual 




new body, the National Media Enterprise Agency that would aid new newspaper 
ventures 687 The new body's terminology reflected the cultural industry approach's 
marketised conception. Yet, the conference also envisaged that this body would be 
democratically owned and accountable to both consumers and producers - "... owned and 
operated through accountable, democratic machinery by those they serve and employ... ". 
It also considered that, like the GLC, journalist/printworker co-operatives among the 
nationals would be supported. The conference intended that the NEC would use the 
motion as a framework in order to develop policy, as had the previous subcommittees. 
Instead, the NEC representative, in his abortive call to remit, indicated that the media 
This plea flew in the face of the study group could be relied on to consider the issues 688 
fact that the media study group had been disbanded. 
However, Labour's interest in the press became much more focused on seeking 
representation in the newspapers' pages. After a lull, press hostility continued under 
Kinnock. The Labour hierarchy renewed an interest in political marketing. The failure of 
alternative methods to increase Labour representation, with the News on Sunday, put this 
initiative into sharp relief. 
As we have indicated, in 1992 Kinnock felt that the defeat could be laid at the 
newspapers' door. However debatable this notion was, the press provided brutally biased 
coverage of him, the Labour Party and especially its left. 689 (Kinnock also brought some 
problems on himself. 690 He laid himself open to accusations of windbaggery with his 
gusty, repetitive, sub-clause-ridden rhetoric, evident even in the drafts of his speeches). 
691 
Nevertheless, the miners' strike ended Kinnock's press honeymoon. 692 By 1985, 
Kinnock's press office saw itself as "... under siege... ". 693 
687 The TUC had backed the creation of another new body, the National Press Finance Corporation. This 
would oversee advertising distribution and new launch funding. (Trades Union Congress. Annual, 
Conference. 1983. Report of the 115th annual Trades Union Congress. London: T. U. C.: 327-8). 
688 Labour Party, Conference 1983: 205-6,211. 
689 See Hollingsworth, and Heffernan and Marqusee. On the Sun's treatment of Kinnock see Greenslade, 
Press Gang: 608-610. 
690 One problem was his macho personality, which was exposed when he got embroiled in a fight in Ealing. 
691 Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archive. 
692 From then on, one Kinnock biographer considers that: "The inequality in the battle between the 
Conservatives and Labour in the way the mirrors of the media were used to refract stories ... were such that 
188 
Bias abounded in the lead-up to the 1987 and 1982 elections. The `loony left offensive' 
before the 1987 vote subjected municipal socialists to inaccuracies, innuendo and 
personal attacks. An extraordinary admission by the Bermondsey constituency's defeated 
Conservative candidate, Robert Hughes, demonstrated the biased treatment dealt out to 
Peter Tatchell. He said a newspaper journalist had told him that: "... we had to ignore you 
so as to make sure that we got the result that we wanted and that the Labour Party did not 
win that by-election". 694 
The majority Conservative press famously targeted the party in the lead-up to the 1992 
election. The tabloids gleefully seized on the £1,000 a head tax story concocted by 
Conservative Central Office. 695 The newspapers vented anti-Labour spleen in the 
campaign itself. 696 The debacle around the `Jennifer's ear' broadcast was a subject for 
scorn. The last week saw a particular onslaught. As the SCA's Philip Gould put it, the 
press on the day before the election was "... not so much negative as apocalyptic". 697 
Notable examples, among others, were the Sun's pre-poll nine-page `Nightmare on 
Kinnock Street' special and the paper's witty pre-election day coverage. 698 This concern 
about the coverage Labour received would also be a factor in press ownership policy. 
small mistakes by Kinnock were magnified into huge errors while big mistakes by Thatcher were 
microscopized down into miniscule faux pas. " (Drower, G. M. F. 1994. Kinnock. South Woodham Ferrers: 
Publishing Corporation.: 189-90). 
693 Philip Gould, ` Communications Review', December 22 1985, Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill 
Archive. 
694 HOC February 3 1989, col. 605. Deirdre Wood was another notable victim. 
695 Kenneth Newton ' Caring and Competence: The Long, Long Campaign' in King Anthony, Stephen. 
1993. Britain at the polls, 1992. Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers.: 174-5,189-90, Shaw, 1979: 
136-7, Heffernan and Marqusee: 307-8. 
6% In one of a series of hostile front pages, the Daily Mail led with a "warning" of "... higher mortgage 
payments. There is no doubt about it", it confidently asserted. (Comment, ̀Warning', Daily Mail, April 7, 
1992). 
697 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 153. See also Miller, W. 1992. ̀ I am what I read', New Statesman & 
Society, April 24: 17. 
698 It provided the witty editorial claim that: "We don't want to influence you in your final judgement on 
who will be Prime Minister! But if it's a bald bloke with wispy red hair and two Ks in his surname, we'll 
see you at the airport. " (Sun, April 8 1992). On the election day its editorial proclaimed: "If Kinnock wins 
today will the last person to leave Britain please turn out the lights. " (Editorial, `If Kinnock wins today will 
the last person to leave Britain please turn out the lights', April 9 1992). See also Seymour-Ure, C. 
`Characters and Assassinations: Portrayals of John Major and Neil Kinnock in The Daily Mirror and The 
Sun' in Crewe, Ivor, and Brian Gosschalk. 1995. Political communications : the general election campaign 
of 1992. Cambridge [England] ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.: 137-159, McKie, Fact 
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Diversity, Representation, Democratic Control and the News on Sunday 
Labour's most visible early reaction to this press bias did not originate on the national 
stage. The News on Sunday was originally conceived by the municipal socialists as one 
way of countering the hostile coverage of the `loony left'. In addition, it provided the 
most notable example of the GLEB's strategy to increase diversity and expand producer 
democracy in the press. Kinnock himself was enthusiastic 699 The newspaper was meant 
to rejuvenate municipal socialism. Instead, the title became "... another nail in its 
coffin...  700 
In order to consider the options for funding, the GLEB asked James Curran and others in 
1983 to map out how it should intervene in the press sector. 701 The GLEB also part- 
funded the market research, along with a range of unions, which would be crucial in 
deciding the title's direction. 702 The GLEB stipulated conditions about the structure of the 
company overseeing the title, in return for funding, leading to some democratic control 
based on a Founder's Trust. 703 The most extensive account of the paper blames its 
is free: 121-136, Gould, The unfinished revolution: 153-4, Bennett, C., `Prodigal Sun gives fatted calf to 
Blair' Guardian, March 19 1997. Such was the level of vitriol, that Hugo Young claimed in the Guardian 
at the time that "Mr Kinnock can safely be said to have endured more public insults over a longer period 
than any other figure in British public life. " (Quoted in King Anthony, Stephen. 1993. Britain at the polls, 
1992. Chatham, N. J.: Chatham House Publishers.: 178). Exceptions to this could have included Benn and 
Scargill. 
699 "Alan Hayling used to meet him regularly... He was saying `I have just had a call from Neil and he is 
saying how really important this is, and how he is backing it big time and he really wants to see it work. ' 
fie came to the offices, I think he officially opened them. " (The paper's national regional manager, Tony 
Cook, interview with author, March 23 2002). 
70° This was to be particularly the case with the municipal left, which was already on its last legs before the 
title appeared. (Chippindale, Peter, and Chris Horrie. 1988. Disaster! : the rise and fall of News on Sunday 
: anatomy of a business failure. London: Sphere.: ix, See also Anon. 1988. ̀ Radical left collapse shock' 
Economist, April 30 1988). 
701 Curran, James. 1983. Report on the London press sector. London: Greater London Enterprise Board.. 
702 Chippindale and Horrie, News on Sunday: 15-20,30-33. 
703 The GLEB successfully pressed for there to be a controlling group, which would protect the paper from 
an outside takeover. This became the independent Founder's Trust, which would check that the paper 
stayed true to its original commitments. The Founders were to have a veto over key decisions. Chippindale 
and Horrie, News on Sunday: 30-33,53-4, Anon., `Control Systems', Free Press 39, February 1987. It 
would ultimately oversee the editor, who would have day-to-day charge, along with its `watchdog' a 
product development committee composed of some Founders and staff. The head of the GLC's Popular 
Planning Unit Hillary Wainwright, who had personally helped finance the venture, chaired this. According 
to two of the paper's staff, it had been structured to involve "... as many people as possible in decision- 
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downfall on this participatory democracy aspect. 704 The highly-talented journalist John 
Pilger also considered that the convoluted and muddled decision-making process had 
driven him out. 705 So, it appears clear that democratic participation was the overriding 
problem. Or was it? 
On inspection, it appears that the structure was more labyrinthine and unworkable than 
entirely participative. The insiders Chippindale and Horrie describe the Founder's Trust 
as "... [e]ssentially a self-appointed and unaccountable... " grouping. 706 Another of those 
closely involved accepts that the workforce only elected a small minority. 707 In addition, 
the regional structure to provide readers input into the paper was ineffectual and 
eventually collapsed. 708 As Chippindale and Horrie make clear, in as much as the paper 
provided for participation, it was a self-governing operation that did not include the 
professional journalists in decision-making. 709 This process was not one to judge the 
effectiveness of participative democracy and accountability by. 710 It was substituting 
making... ". Managers were meant to accountable to each other and to the Founders. "All decisions were to 
be made by consensus and committee. " (Chippindale and Horrie, News on Sunday: 15,125,242). 
704 Horrie, as a worker-director and Chippindale, in their popular book on the affair, are particularly 
scathing about the "... unworkable management structure... " with no clear arrangement for decision- 
making. They conclude that: "In so far as there was a central cause ... it was the structure of the company 
that killed the News on Sunday. " (Ibid.: especially 224). 
los John Pilger, `The birth of a new Sun?, New Statesman, January 2 1997. Horrie and Chippindale 
scathingly describe the build-up to the title's launch as mired by this cumbersome arrangement, with its 
unending string of committee meetings. They emphasise that: "Unfortunately, this is not how papers work. 
They are shaped by strong individuals - either editors given a free hand or interventionist propreitors.... ". 
(Ibid.: 122,124). 
706 Ibid.: 53. 
707 The initial investors had agreed the remaining members and plans to rotate these people had been 
dropped. The newspaper did not run as a co-operative, but a private limited company. According to Tony 
Cook, this was decided so that potential investors would not be deterred. (Tony Cook interview). See also 
Allaun, Frank. 1988. Spreading the news :a guide to media reform. Nottingham: Spokesman. 57. 
708 The paper's national regional manager, who was to oversee this, admitted: "The initial research was that 
the absolute core base of the readership had been set up by that national regional network, which had been 
incredibly successful. I mean there were a lot of people who were willing to put a lot of time and effort to 
making sure that the News on Sunday worked. One of the great tragedies is that that was never properly 
harnessed, and was never properly tailored into the paper. " (Tony Cook interview). 
709 As they indicate, not one member of the Founders, the management team or the board of management 
"... had even earned a regular living from national print journalism". (Chippindale and Horrie, News on 
Sunda): 125). 
710 Professional journalists were employed on the paper, on the one side. But inexperienced journalists, on 
the other side, made the decisions. One of those involved who was not a newspaper journalist, and was very 
critical of the journalists, admitted that this "... was part of the problem. A lot of the journalists that were 
hired were not members of the New Left community. Most of the rest of us had known each other for ten or 
fifteen years, or known of each other, being involved in the Labour Party and other organisations; CND or 
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management authoritarianism with a mixture of politically-dominated utopianism and 
admiration for the cult of the British amateur. 
Instead, one can question whether the newspaper's downfall was primarily caused by its 
structure, whatever its undoubted flaws. Different writers have pointed to the newspaper 
market's structure for its failure. 7U The original GLEB report could have backed a more 
upmarket title, with higher advertising rates and lower circulation -a more left-wing 
Sunday Guardian-style title, for example. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, considering the 
problems Curran had identified with a higher circulation title aimed a lower-income 
readers in an unreformed press market, the report advised aiming more in this 
direction. 712 
The News on Sunday took this direction. The feasibility study's market research came up 
with the astonishing conclusion that a newspaper aimed downmarket of the Mail on 
Sunday would have sales of up to 1.5 million. 713 Editor Keith Sutton, who formerly 
oversaw the News International protesters' tabloid parody Wapping Post, pitched the 
paper in a much more tabloid direction than originally planned. 714 The initial issue sold 
whatever it was.... A number of us were journalists but were not newspaper journalists and that was the 
problem. We had ... no real newspaper journalists amongst that community, and so there was a distrust that 
was built up both ways. " (Tony Cook interview). 
711 Andrews, Allaun, Frank. 1988. Spreading the news :a guide to media reform. Nottingham: Spokesman. 
62. 
712 It called for a paper "... politically to the left of the Daily Mirror, while at the same time adopting a tone 
and popular idiom in its entertainment coverage that melds with the political personality of the paper. " 
(Curran, James. 1983. Report on the London press sector. London: Greater London Enterprise Board.: 56- 
8). The assessment to aim for a more tabloid mass-market title was said to chime with that of those in the 
GLEB who were enthusiastic about launching a new national title. (Chippindale and Horrie, News on 
Sunday: 17-21). 
713 This influenced some of the paper's initial advocates, who had originally planned to go for a narrower 
`quality' sector, that space existed for a more mass-market paper. 
"" One insider believes that the actual newspaper was pitched far more in a tabloid direction than the 
feasibility studies suggested: "The research said to aim just below where the initial one had been pitched, 
and we pitched at exactly the Mail on Sunday readership... It is up to you to judge whether you felt the 
issues were way downmarket than the Mail on Sunday, but I would think they were. Keith [Sutton] had a 
particular notion that you could not be a sub-Mail tabloid, that either you were a tabloid or you were a 
Mail... I argued very hard against that and said that you could be a slightly downmarket Mail. " (Tony Cook 
interview). The Founders backed Sutton. The market research was done by RSGB, which had previously 
done the market research that had questioned the viability of the Scottish Daily News, before its launch. But 
its view was contrary to what its research had revealed about the News. (Chippindale and Horrie, News on 
Sunday: 34-39, Andrews: 8-13). A possible subsidiary factor that has been ignored in other accounts was 
the pressure to win backers in the union movement and among the Labour authorities. Other Labour 
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only about a third of the most optimistic estimates and was judged to be of poor 
quality. 715 Within days of Labour's election defeat, the title went into voluntary 
receivership. 
Thus, a key factor in the News on Sunday's downfall was the newspaper market's 
bipolarisation, determined by advertisers. It fed on the inclination of some to go 
downmarket, which the market research bolstered. 716 Andrews, and, from a different 
premise, Chippindale and Horrie, question whether a more upmarket title would have 
been viable. 717 This is indeed worth discussing. Such a title would be an upmarket one to 
attract advertisers. 718 
However, the main conclusion is that such a title as the News on Sunday was conceived 
to be - that is a tabloid aimed a majority lower sociological class readership - was not 
viable. This was unless it garnered a readership on the optimistic side of the RSGB's 
questionable estimates. This was bifurcation's effect. The News on Sunday could only 
have survived this by going upmarket to attract readers with the financial clout required 
by advertisers. Government intervention had altered a comparable situation in other 
councils than the GLC, which had been influenced by municipal socialist ideas, also invested in the project. 
They mainly used their employees' pension funds. These councils included Manchester and Sheffield and 
the London boroughs of Brent, Haringey and Lambeth. However, it was not just the councils associated 
with municipal socialism that put money into the project. One insider notes that the large investors had 
little influence on the newspaper. (Tony Cook interview) Yet, an appeal of the paper was that it was meant 
to be read by those in the union movement. If the paper had been aimed at a sociological composition 
entirely different to the unions' membership, then this may have deterred union funding. 
715 From then on, it wavered between different approaches and styles and the sales never reached those of 
the first edition. Subsequently, disgraced businessman Owen Oyston and the TGWU organised a rescue 
package to sustain it through the 1987 general election. This avoided it becoming a story, with other 
newspapers identifying its failure in order to attack Labour. (Chippindale and Horrie, News on Sunday: 
182-3,196). 
716 Andrews surmises from this that the advertisers determined the market the News on Sunday operated in, 
rather than the readers. Indeed, as for what readers wanted, a space for a mid-market newspaper possibly 
existed. (Andrews: 10-14). 
7'7 Ibid.: 226. 
718 Chippindale and Horrie do not consider advertisers' economic impact. Yet, their suggestion that an 
upmarket title aimed at `caring professionals' at least seems plausible. It was reported that this was the 
newspaper's main readership. (Chippindale and Horrie, News on Sunday: 183,226, Andrews). According 
to one insider, those originally involved had envisaged such a title but had been deterred by the market 
research that had suggested that the more upmarket Sunday sector was too crowded. (Tony Cook 
interview). 
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countries. The way that the market stood in Britain meant that the News on Sunday, on 
the basis on which it was pitched, was bound to fail. 
Other factors contributed to its rapid demise, especially funding. 719 Yet, ultimately, its 
downfall can be ascribed to Labour administrations' failure to have intervened to 
ameliorate the problems of bipolarisation. Importantly, though, its failure added to the 
conviction that it was impossible to get Labour representation through either a Labour 
movement title or increasing newspaper diversity. New methods were needed to provide 
a Labour movement voice in the press. As we shall see, the new press and media strategy 
provided this alternative. 
79 It failed to get City funding that other less left-wing titles, such as Today - launched around the same 
time - received. (Andrews, Curran and Seaton: 103, Chippindale and Horrie, News on Sunday: 99-121). 
The left backers could not afford the amount that was needed to make the title completely viable. One 
problem of going upmarket would have been the cost. Investigative reporting, which was originally 
envisaged by the title, and would almost certainly needed to have been a feature of a `quality' left-wing 
title, is hugely expensive, for instance. Promotion was also under-funded. It was also decided to offer 
newsagents a smaller mark-up than other titles, leading to calls for a boycott by the newsagents' federation 
and bad feeling with those who would be selling the title. (Andrews: 19,22-4, Chippindale and Horrie, 
News on Sunday: 156). Andrews also notes that at there was no libel cover, making individual reporters 
liable. This was unusual on a national title. (Andrews: 24). This would lead to a pressure against good 
investigative reporting. Importantly, the paper could not afford the wages of more seasoned staff. This was 
among the reasons that the staff was inexperienced, which clearly affected the title's quality. (Chippindale 
and Horrie, News on Sunday: 129-137). Other important factors contributed to this. A sizable number of 
applications from experienced journalists were simply lost before the selection process. (Interview with 
Tim Gopsill and Granville Williams, March 24 2002). Some of the journalist staff appointed were not up to 
the task at hand. One example of this was said to be the news editor. (Tony Cook interview, interview with 
Tim Gopsill and Granville Williams, March 24 2002). 
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REPRESENTATION VERSUS DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION - 
Maxwell, Kinnock and journalistic autonomy 
An early indication of this renewed emphasis on representation came with Robert 
Maxwell's takeover of the Mirror newspapers. The influence of Maxwell on Labour 
Party policy has been a matter of controversy. Some of the biographers closest to him 
have regarded his effect on the party as negligible. Maxwell's former editor Roy 
Greenslade is typical. Greenslade distanced the Labour leadership from Maxwell in his 
biography written after the publisher's apparent suicide. Generally, Greenslade makes 
Maxwell out to be a Walter Mitty figure -a posturing buffoon. He disputes claims that 
the former Labour MP was a party paymaster; a prestigious figure; or a backroom wielder 
of influence. 720 Implicitly questioning this, the socialist writer Freedman argues that 
Maxwell was notable among media owners in his influence on the Labour leadership. 
But, as his is a study of television policies, he provides little supporting evidence 
regarding this. 721 So, which argument can be supported? 
Well, to some extent, both. There is evidence to suggest that Maxwell was a ridiculous 
figure who was personally disliked. James Thomas has shown that Maxwell had 
misplaced illusions over his influence over the Mirror. 
722 Yet, there is some evidence to 
suggest that in the process of getting hold of the newspaper group, his very existence 
forced Kinnock to change commitments to journalistic autonomy from proprietor control 
that the leader had held - in order to gain Labour representation. 
720 Indeed, Greenslade notes that the personal relations between Maxwell and the Kinnocks were not warm. 
His relationship with Neil Kinnock was one of `... polite cordiality in public... ', which Kinnock's wife 
Glenys found hard to maintain. She detested the Maxwell `monster'. Also, having Joe Haines as Maxwell's 
political advisor did not help relations, as Haines' role as press secretary to the out-of-favour former Labour 
leader, Harold Wilson, meant he was not regarded well in Kinnock circles. (Greenslade, Roy. 1992. 
Maxwell 's fall : the appalling legacy of a corrupt man. London: Simon & Schuster., 186-187). 
721 Freedman, 2000: 271. 
722 Thomas, James. 2000. "The `Max Factor' -a Mirror Image? Robert Maxwell and the Daily Mirror 
Tradition. " in Northclie's legacy . aspects of the British popular press, 1896-1996, edited by Colin 
Seymour-Ure, Peter Catterall, Adrian Smith, and History Institute of Contemporary British. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan in association with Institute of Contemporary British History.: 201-226. 
195 
Evidence suggests Maxwell's pressure on Kinnock meant that the Labour leader was 
prepared to consciously revise his own position after initially demanding that no single 
proprietor could own the Daily Mirror. Why was this important? Nothing that was 
written in Chapter 1 concerning the relationship between ownership and control denied 
the potential that editors, and even senior journalists, could maintain a level of autonomy 
from majority shareholder control. In the case of the Daily Mirror, for fifty years before 
the Maxwell takeover, there had been no single proprietor. In 1931, Lord Rothermere 
traded his shares in the Daily Mirror to individual shareholders. 723 Rothermere's nephew, 
Cecil King, later operated as an old-style press baron. Yet his ignorance of the fact that he 
was not the owner but the chairman of the International Publishing Company (IPC) 
helped lead to his famous downfall. 724 In 1970, IPC merged with Reed to form Reed 
International. 725 Tony Miles moved from being the Daily Mirror's editor to become 
editorial director and later also became Mirror Group chairman. 726 
Importantly, there was a level of autonomy from Reed and the chairman did not solely 
make policy decisions. 727 Instead, a five-person team including senior journalists, Miles 
and the editor Mike Molloy decided political policy. 728 The editor's job was "... more of a 
consensus position than an arbitrary dictatorship... " where the paper's political stance 
723 Edelman, Maurice, and Publications Periodical. 1966. The 'Mirror': apolitical history. London: Hamish 
Hamilton.: 20, Curran and Seaton: 56. 
724 He penned an editorial calling for Harold Wilson's resignation. Yet, King's weakness was that, again, he 
was not the owner, but the chairman, responsible to directors, who sacked him. (Hanlin: 38-9, Brendon, 
Piers. 1982. The life and death of the press barons. London: Secker & Warburg.: 205,206,221, Edelman: 
100-106,115). 
725 Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, 'The structure, ownership and control of the press 1914-76' in 
Boyce, D. G., James Curran, Pauline Wingate, and Group Acton Society Press. 1978. Newspaper history 
from the seventeenth century to the present day. London: Constable etc. for the Press Group of the Acton 
Society.: 138. 
n6 Author interview with Geoffrey Goodman, January 2 2003, Stott, Richard. 2002. Dogs and lamposts : 
secrets behind the headlines from Fleet Street's number one editor. London: Metro.: 130-1,186. 
727 The Mirror Group told the Royal Commission on the Press in 1975: "There was a time when the 
Group's central policy was imposed by the Chairman. This is no longer the case. The Chairman behaves 
towards editors like a constitutional monarch. He may encourage and warn. " (Answers to questions on the 
`points 
raised by the Royal Commission on the Press, Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., August 1975: 5). 
Z8 "There was the assembly of the five of us. This was engrained in the character of the paper. "(Author 
interview with Geoffrey Goodman, January 2 2003). 
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came "... more from editorial consensus than any single person's directive, " as the Royal 
Commission on the Press was told in 1975.729 
This was very far from journalistic control or democratic control. Yet, it was a degree of 
autonomy, which went beyond being held by a single editor into some collectivity. As 
one of the five, industrial editor Geoffrey Goodman told the author: "It was a more 
democratic situation, which led to informed discussion and debate. "730 The Marxist Daily 
Mirror columnist Paul Foot agrees with the assessment that there was a measure of 
journalistic autonomy at this time. It was believed that not having a single proprietor 
would protect this. 73 1 
The circumstances surrounding the Labour Party's involvement in the takeover of MGN 
are generally well known. According to Tom Bower, Maxwell's most famous biographer, 
the former MP had seduced the Labour leadership in July 1984.732 To assess this further, 
however, we need to start nine months earlier. Reed International announced in October 
1983 that it wished to float independently the company that possessed the Daily Mirror, 
around the time Kinnock became leader. Reed originally accepted refusing to sell to a 
single owner and affirmed that the paper would stay Labour-supporting. As Bower 
suggests, it was crucial for Maxwell to get the Labour leader's support if Reed was to 
break the first part of this pledge. 733 
Within weeks of his election, Kinnock had secret discussions with the title's then editor 
Mike Molloy. The outcome was that the contents of a then confidential letter were 
approved. This, it was agreed, would only appear in the Daily Mirror at the time when 
the new chairman of MGN was known. It appears to have never been published 
anywhere. The letter was much more hard-hitting than what was eventually Kinnock's 
729 Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press submitted by Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., April 
1975, (1) 8, (1) 9. 
730 Author interviews with Geoffrey Goodman, August 12001 and January 2 2003. 
731 "Miles was a very good chairman. I liked him. He was journalist friendly.... The argument was that if 
there was a single buyer it would be damaging to the freedom of the press. " (Author interview with Paul 
Foot, January 6 2003). 
732 Bower, Tom. 1996. Maxwell : the final verdict. London: HarperCollins.: 371-2. 733 Bower, Tom. 1988. Maxwell : the outsider. London: Aurum.: 288. 
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public position. It underlined his original determination to preserve both journalistic 
autonomy within the Daily Mirror and his concerns about business diversification into 
newspaper ownership. 734 
In this remarkable letter, Kinnock wrote of his "... concern over the proposed sale". He 
feared the sale would lead to one single owner with other business interests taking over 
control - just the sort of figure Maxwell was. He noted that: "Without a free and fearless 
press, there can be no true democracy. But a free press is no abstract idea. It means 
freedom, every day, from an owner's interference. " In heated tones, he announced: "It 
would be an outrage if the proposed sale left the Mirror open - if not today, then in future 
years - to a takeover by those who would curb your independence and try to make you 
obedient to the discipline of some big business vested interest, "735 
This was not one-off gesture by Kinnock, who had strongly expressed his concerns to 
others that he was unhappy about a Maxwell buyout 736 In the interim, negotiations had 
taken place about securing the papers as a trust with union backing, organised by Clive 
Thornton, who Reed had originally appointed to oversee the sale. However, Reed 
scuppered these talks. 737 At another meeting arranged in July 1984, after Maxwell made 
approaches to buy, Kinnock's private papers indicate he again committed the party to 
blocking any single proprietor. This was what Maxwell was pushing for. 
Kinnock told the Mirror's editor Mike Molloy and chairman Miles that he was 
committed to opposing having a single owner as the best way of safeguarding the paper's 
independence. By now, however, he had not closed the door to accepting Maxwell as one 
among a number of shareholders. But this was a position Maxwell was unlikely to 
734 Patricia Hewitt, Letter to Neil Kinnock, October 17 1983, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill 
Archives. 
733 Neil Kinnock, letter to the editor of the Daily Mirror, October 17 1983, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, 
Churchill Archives. 
736 Personal information. Geoffrey Goodman also told the author: "Kinnock was very sceptical. He 
questioned having Maxwell. " (Author interview with Geoffrey Goodman, January 2 2003). 
737 Author interview with Geoffrey Goodman, January 2 2003, Bower, Final verdict: 364. "Those 
committed to a diverse media were very horrified; there was a concern that Thornton wasn't given a 
chance. There was all this string-pulling by Maxwell. " (Author interview with Mike Power, then of the 
CPBF, now TUC campaigns officer, January 6 2003). 
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accept. 738 As Goodman, who worked under Maxwell, suggested, the businessman wanted 
to take over as a single proprietor, not one of a number of shareholders: "It was all or 
nothing. "739 Miles told Kinnock: "We couldn't ask for more, that would be 
040 fine... Maxwell will be entirely unpredictable. 
Backbench Labour MPs also shared these fears about Mirror journalists losing their 
autonomy in the event of one person purchasing the paper. One thrusting, newly-elected, 
MP put it thus: "... [O]ne must be concerned when newspapers are to be owned by an 
individual who gives unenforceable guarantees of independence"741 That MP was the 
future Labour leader Tony Blair, who would later deal with proprietors while ignoring 
calls for journalist autonomy legislation. 
Nevertheless, this call for autonomy and independence appeared to dovetail with the 
narrower demand that the Daily Mirror remain a party-supporting paper. Kinnock's 
original letter had a subtext, which reflected the tension of ownership with Labour 
representation. Kinnock stated that one aspect of independence that should be protected 
was freedom "... from slavish devotion to a party line... ". 742 Yet, "... independence from 
big business... " could well also be taken as code for traditional Labour Party concerns 
about the pro-Tory bias of the national press. In other words, it should stick to its stance 
as a pro-Labour paper, as Reed had pledged. 743 This also reflected concerns of the 
editorial and senior pro-Labour Mirror people. 744 
78 According to notes made by Kinnock's press secretary, Patricia Hewitt, he told the Mirror men: "`We 
want to see a diverse ownership. That's the best way of safeguarding your independence. ' The Mirror duo 
were pleased with this seemingly unambiguous assurance. " (Patricia Hewitt , Notes of meeting between Neil Kinnock and Tony Miles and Mike Molloy, July 5 1984, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill 
Archives). Patricia Hewitt was Kinnock's press secretary and then policy coordinator for the leader's 
office. She became Trade and Industry Minister in the Blair government. (2002. Who's who 2002: an 
annual biographical dictionary. London: A. & C. Black, 2002., 988). 
79 Author interview with Geoffrey Goodman, January 2 2003. 
740 Patricia Hewitt, Notes of meeting between Neil Kinnock and Tony Miles and Mike Molloy, July 5 1984, 
Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
741 HOC July 13 1984, col. 1468. 
742 Neil Kinnock, Letter to the editor of the Daily Mirror, October 17 1983, Neil Kinnock's personal 
? apers, Churchill Archives. 
a' Bower, Outsider: 281. 
744 At the later secret meeting, the Mirror men outlined their fears that support for Labour would wane if 
Maxwell took charge. Maxwell had recently praised Thatcher and they feared that, with his arrival, the 
Labour-supporting policy-making team, would exit. Mike Molloy told Kinnock: "We won't turn 
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At the same time as this, Maxwell was mounting a counter-operation to persuade 
Kinnock. A trump card was his historical commitment, as a former Labour MP, to the 
party - this question of Labour representation. The former Labour leader Foot was one 
go-between. Foot later said that a motivation was that Maxwell "... promised that the 
papers would continue to support the party. " Fearing that in other hands the paper's 
support for Labour would wither, Foot backed Maxwell. 745 Maxwell also enlisted the 
support of Roy Hattersley, now Labour's deputy leader. 746 
Yet, it is now clear that Maxwell also engaged in secret negotiations with Kinnock. 
Maxwell played on fears that Labour support would wither without him; assuring him 
that the paper would carry on supporting Labour. They spoke on the phone and, on July 9 
1984, Maxwell wrote a private letter telling Kinnock that if he did not have the leader's 
backing, the papers' ownership could be "... either wholly dispersed among City 
institutions or invested in some predator whose political sympathies are elsewhere". 747 
Kinnock now had an unenviable choice. He could maintain Labour's support in Fleet 
Street, albeit on Maxwell's terms as a single owner. Or he could provide some partial 
protection for the limited autonomy of the Labour-supporting senior journalists by 
supporting the Mirror journalists' representatives' opposition to the buyout. The 
requirement for Labour representation meant that despite his deep unease, he chose the 
former option. 748 
somersaults. Maxwell could tell me to write an article saying Mrs Thatcher is the best Prime Minister. I 
won't do that. " (Patricia Hewitt , `Notes of meeting 
between Neil Kinnock and Tony Miles and Mike 
Molloy', July 5 1984, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives). As it happened, the fears of a 
Thatcherite agenda being imposed were largely unfounded. (Thomas, The `Max Factor': 213-4). 
745 Quoted in Bower, Final Verdict: 372. Foot also had discussions with Hattersley, Molloy and Geoffrey 
Goodman. (Geoffrey Goodman, private correspondence with the author, September 28 2002). 
746 Bower, Final Verdict: 371-2, Free Press 26, November/December 1984, Greenslade, Maxwell: 63. 
747 Robert Maxwell, letter to Kinnock, July 9,1984. Kinnock's personal papers also reveal handwritten 
notes by Kinnock, possibly of a meeting with Maxwell, where it is written: "If you turn against me it will 
be widely interp. (interpreted? ) in the country as an opp'y (opportunity? ) missed. " It was indicated that 
Maxwell was a party member, unlike the other "... proprietors - all Tories". (Handwritten note, no date, 
Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives). 
748 Paul Foot put it: "The instinct would be that Kinnock would have sold out... and be first to go along with 
Maxwell. But he didn't. Then he was in a difficult position. " (Author interview with Paul Foot, January 6 
2003). 
200 
Instead of intervening to stop the newspaper becoming a one-man band, he adopted a 
hands-off approach. He abandoned a press release implicitly critical of Maxwell. 749 When 
Maxwell took over, Kinnock's response was measured. On Friday the 13`h of July, with, 
some understatement, Kinnock noted: "The history of single-proprietor ownership of 
newspapers in Britain is not a happy one. Mr Maxwell could be the exception to the rule. 
Many people will join me in hoping that he will be. 050 Maxwell had offered a guarantee 
that he would not interfere in the editorial judgement of the newspaper. 751 Yet, he ignored 
this commitment subsequently. 752 
The shift in Kinnock's stance was clear. The existence of the millionaire businessman 
and the pressure of realpolitik had dictated the Labour leadership's policy, and had 
overridden Kinnock's principles on journalist autonomy. Labour representation was key. 
As Philip Graf, the retiring Chief Executive of Trinity Mirror, owners of the Daily 
Mirror, put it more recently: "... Maxwell would not have been a good enemy for the 
Labour leader to have made". 753 In 1989, facing a Labour conference motion supporting 
the `Pergamon 23', workers Maxwell had sacked who had engaged in a legal one-day 
strike, Labour's general secretary Larry Whitty pleaded unsuccessfully for remittal. He 
implored reluctant delegates to recognise that Maxwell "... controlled a newspaper whose 
support the Labour Party is often grateful for... ". 754 As Whitty suggested and Hattersley 
749 Neil Kinnock's Office, Press Release, July 9 1984, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
750 Neil Kinnock's Office, Press Release, July 13 1984, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill 
Archives. 
751 Bower, Tom. 1991. Maxwell: the outsider. London: Mandarin.: 382, Thomas, The `Max Factor': 201. 
752 How much effect this interference had is a subject of debate. As indicated, James Thomas suggests that 
Maxwell's political influence on the Daily Mirror was limited. (Thomas, The `Max Factor': 201-226). 
Nevertheless, insider accounts indicate his interference was real enough. Greenslade identifies that leaders 
were even written in the paper without his knowledge as editor. And Mirror journalists Geoffrey Goodman 
and Paul Foot have both written of Maxwell's editorial interference. Greenslade has described Maxwell as 
"... the world's most intrusive proprietor" who "... attempted to play engine driver, signalman and 
stationmaster". (Greenslade, Roy. 2002. `Sorry Arthur', The Guardian, May 27,2002, Greenslade, Press 
Gang: 512). See also Greenslade, Maxwell and Foot, Paul. 2000. Articles of resistance. London: 
Bookmarks, 2000., 222-3, Goodman, Geoffrey. 2000. `Pimps or Pimpernels'. British Journalism Review 
11: 3-6. 
753 Graf, Philip. 2001. The Government And The Press: An Uneasy Relationship, Annual Livery Lecture, 
The Society of Editors, 3 April 2001. 
na Labour Party, Conference (Ed. ). 1991. Report of the annual conference of the Labour Party. London: 
Labour Party.: 91-2. 
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wrote after Maxwell's death, to not have the Daily Mirror's support for Labour would be 
a "... an intolerable psychological handicap". 755 
The need to maintain a foothold in Fleet Street - ensuring that Labour was represented - 
meant that commitments were sacrificed. Moreover, the power of ownership in a market 
economy meant that even the Labour leader had limited choice over the manner of that 
representation. Returning to a point considered in Chapter 1, there was no democratic 
control over that representation. Paul Foot describes Kinnock's dilemma well: "There is 
no democratic process... The only newspaper that supports Labour is sold on the 
marketplace and he is stuck. "756 
The 1987 election, Wapping, Nationalism and Labour representation 
There were other indications that the Labour leadership was starting to shift its policy on 
the media and press ownership, some previously little discussed. 
The Labour leadership dismissed the party's Arts and Media spokesman, Norman 
Buchan, at the start of the 1987 election year, indicating its minimal commitment to 
implement party policy. Buchan was a Kinnock ally, who, like his leader, had abstained 
. 
in the Benn/Healey deputy leadership contest. He had been keen on media reform and had 
personally strongly opposed press ownership concentration. 757 The reasons he was 
dismissed mostly related to broadcasting, but press policy was implicated. Buchan had 
called for a centralised arts and media ministry that included broadcasting in its remit, 
citing previous party policy. However, Kinnock rejected this. He sacked Buchan, when 
he opposed Kinnock's course, to be replaced by Mark Fisher. 758 
755 Hattersley, Roy. 1991. ̀Reflections on the Mirror', Financial Times, November 16 1991. 
756 Author interview with Paul Foot, January 6 2003. 
'S' Heffernan and Marqusee: 123, Tricia Sumner interview, February 6 2002. Frank Allaun `A true fighter 
for press freedom', Free Press, November/December 1990. Former teacher Norman Buchan was a former 
Communist Party member who had left after opposing the Hungarian invasion in 1957. He had been 
Under-secretary in the Scottish Office and then Minister of State for Agriculture. After 1979, he became 
Shadow Minister for the Arts. (1990. Dod's parliamentary companion.: 406, Allaun, Frank. 1990. `A true 
fihter for press freedom', Free Press, November/December 1990). 
731 Benn, The end of an era: 488-90, Freedman, 2000: 204, Freedman, 2003: 140-1, Heffernan and 
Marqusee: 123-4. In Benn's words, the leader "... had consulted everyone from Bragg to Bragg (Melvyn 
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As, Freedman says, this was a seemingly secondary issue, yet it indicated divisions in the 
party over media policy. 759 Others have seen it as indicating `Kinnock's weakness' or his 
reluctance to challenge the media `powers that be'. 
760 The left's determination to 
coordinate all media policy in one ministry may be explained by an earlier debate. Press 
reform proponents, notably Michael Meacher, feared that without this unitary approach 
any attempts at change could `fall through the cracks' between ministries, if political will 
was lacking. Whether this was a key reason why reform had not happened is not at issue. 
It was seen as a way of turning party policy into reality. 761 
However, a more substantial shift had happened to press policy by the time of the 1987 
election, which is little discussed in the literature that touches on the subject. 762 If 
successful in its aims, it would have targeted the largest selling daily tabloid - the Sun. 
Labour needed to neutralise this title's hostile coverage to aid its press representation. In 
this sense, the adopted policy can be seen as another attempt to increase Labour 
representation, albeit a probably ineffective one based on an error in policy transfer. Yet, 
the process of adopting it also indicated that the pressures to increase Labour 
representation were positively hindering demands for press diversity and participative 
and Billy)", before opposing integrating broadcasting policy into the new joint ministry. (Benn, The end of 
an era: 488). Mark Fisher was a documentary film producer and writer before becoming the Principal of 
Tattenhall Centre of Education. He became an MP in 1983 and was Arts and Media spokesperson from 
1987 to 1992. He was Labour spokesman on National Heritage from 1993 to 1997. He was a minister for 
National Heritage and in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport until 1998. (2002. Who's who 2002 : 
an annual biographical dictionary. London: A. & C. Black.: 712-3,2000. Dods parliamentary companion 
2001: 168th year. London: Vacher Dod.: 153). 
759 Freedman, 2000: 204, Freedman, 2003: 140. 
760 Tricia Sumner interview with author, February 6 2002. Heffernan and Marqusee: 123-4. 
761 As Sumner notes, having a single ministry would give press and media policy prominence. It would not 
be placed under other Home Office areas of responsibility, such as police and prisons, for instance. She 
adds: "That unified aspect was very important. The unions were very interested in that as well. " Also, as 
Allaun indicated, Kinnock's policy meant that the media minister would be subordinate to the Home 
Secretary. (Tricia Sumner interview with author, February 6 2002, Allaun, Frank. 1990. ̀A true fighter for 
press freedom', Free Press, November/December 1990). Nevertheless, an indication that the matter was 
not resolved by Kinnock's intervention was that Labour went into the 1987 and 1992 elections still 
committed to creating a unified ministry of the media and arts. (Labour Party, Britain will win, Dale: 308). 
762 For instance, the shift is not noted in the key work dealing with Labour Party press reform, that of 
Allaun. He sees little work specifically done on newspaper ownership in the time between the 1983 and 
1987 elections. (Allaun, Spreading the news: 91). One exception that mentions it is in MacShane, Media 
Policy, in Seaton and Pimlott: 215-235. 
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democracy. The change also indicated that part of the effect of the Wapping printers' 
defeat was that radical policies on diversity had retreated into populist rhetoric. 
The circumstances surrounding the Wapping dispute are well known. News International 
sacked around 5,000 printers when it moved to Wapping, prompting a bitter dispute. 
What is less acknowledged is the effect the dispute had on Labour's plans for 
diversifying the press. Labour's 1987 election manifesto saw a significant shift in press 
policy. Britain Will Win, with the leadership's blessing, called for a bar on foreign 
citizens and companies from owning UK newspapers. 763 Its main target was seen to be 
Maxwell's tabloid rival, Murdoch, and the News International's papers, which were such 
bitter Labour critics. As such, the print union leadership, under pressure over Wapping, 
pressed for the move. 
Kinnock had showed his sympathy for the foreigner bar in a rare foray into public 
discussion on press ownership policy. This happened at a 1986 rally to support those who 
News International had sacked. He gave public support to challenging the press owners, 
along the lines of a radical reading of the 1983 manifesto. His was a bold policy 
restatement by a Labour leader responding to the pressure developed during the dispute. 
However, all this belied his nationalistic message. 764 He wanted foreigners excluded from 
owning the British press. This new nationalist demand not only substituted pressure for 
763 Labour Party, Britain will win: 14. That this has been missed by commentators and even by activists at 
the time seems surprising and indicates that little was made of this pledge. 
764 In his speech, he accused Murdoch of being an autocratic threat to democracy, who, with two other 
owners, presided over "... one of the greatest concentrations of power in newspaper ownership anywhere in 
the world". He noted that, despite this concentration, "... we have one of the weakest systems of controlling 
it. " To beef up the system, Kinnock indicated that it would be `naive' to believe that curbing monopolies 
was enough. As if he was reading a page from James Curran's critique of the proposals of Labour's 1983 
manifesto, he announced that curbs on their own "... would simply encourage the dominant groups to 
unload their weak and loss-making titles". This would merely `diminish' variety. Nevertheless, Kinnock's 
answer to this problem, unlike that provided by those such as Curran, was to go no further than the 
manifesto had done. Ile recognised that what was needed was to create a climate for diversity. To achieve 
this, the Labour Party was committed to "... assisting the publication and distribution of new publications". 
(Neil Kinnock, speech to the Wapping Rally at Wembley, no date, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, 
Churchill Archives). 
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diversity with calls to a mild xenophobia, the new stand was based on a policy transfer 
developed from a factual error made at the highest level in the party. 765 
The print unions championed this new approach. They had been involved in bitter 
disputes with an Australian and, before that, the Asian Eddy Shah at the Stockport 
Messenger. In this situation, it would not be too surprising to suggest that this had stoked 
up nationalist prejudice in some members, which the unions expressed. 766 This nationalist 
theme came to the fore when the unions succeeded in getting the 1986 TUC conference 
to demand that a Labour government ensure that press "... ownership and executive 
control is retained in this country". 767 
765 Kinnock thought that it was a United States law prohibiting press ownership by foreign nationals that 
had forced Murdoch to take up US citizenship. He wanted a policy transfer so that such a law as he 
imagined operated there could be implemented in Britain. In fact, Kinnock simply had got it wrong. The 
law in the US that forced Murdoch to become an American citizen controls broadcasting. Like the British 
law on terrestrial broadcasting, which New Labour looked set to modify in 2002, ownership was only 
available to EU citizens, so only US nationals can be applicants and officers of stations with a broadcast 
licence. Rupert Murdoch had been operating in the US newspaper market from the 1970s. He bought the 
New York Post in 1976. He only became a US citizen in 1985. (Neil Kinnock, speech to the Wapping Rally 
at Wembley, no date, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives, Compaine Benjamin, M. 1982. 
Who owns the media? : concentration of ownership in the mass communications industry. White Plains, 
N. Y.: Knowledge Industry Publications.: 56,312, Shawcross, William. 1997. Murdoch : the making of a 
media empire. New York: Simon & Schuster.: 92-4,212-5, Strossen, Nadine. 1993. `Press Law in the 
United States' in Press law and practice :a comparative study of press freedom in European and other 
democracies : an Article 19 Report, edited by Sandra Coliver and Article. London: Published by Article 19 
for the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization.: 197,639). 
766 A particular indication of this was that the NGA insisted on not using the Anglicised first name that 
Shah preferred, but emphasised his foreigner status by insisting on describing him by his original name 
Selim Jehan Shah. (See for instance, NGA (82). 1983. ̀ Second Briefing Conference for MPs background 
notes', November 1983). Also, both Andrew Neil and Brian MacArthur recall one member of a NGA 
delegation saying: "His real name is Selim Jehan Shah. Why didn't you call him that? " (MacArthur, Brian. 
1988. Eddy Shah : Today and the newspaper revolution. Newton Abbot ; North Pomfret, Vt.: David & 
Charles.: 31, Neil: 94). No such problems existed for the East European white entrepreneur Hoch, who, like 
Shah, had an anglicised name. But this name was one the unions were used to describing him by - Bob 
Maxwell. 
767 Trades Union Congress. Annual, Conference. 1986. Report of the 118th annual Trades Union Congress. 
London: T. U. C.: 636. SOGAT's Brenda Dean did not complain that national newspaper ownership was in 
few hands but that they were in foreign hands. She noted that 70% of the market was owned by people who 
were not British citizens or by firms that were not British. The only response to the idea that such a motion 
was racist and would even affect black newspapers was that this was not the motion's intention. The 
printing unions resented any claims of having a "racist intent". Dean also compounded the error made by 
Kinnock by claiming that a citizenship requirement operated in Scandinavia, as well as America. (TUC 
1983: 637-8). In effect, like Kinnock, she was calling for a policy transfer. In fact, Norway and Sweden 
have no such citizen restriction. (Steingrim Wolland, `Press Law in Norway' and Hans-Gunnar Azberger 
`Freedom of the Press in Sweden' in Coliver, Sandra, and Article. 1993. Press law and practice :a 
comparative study of press freedom in European and other democracies : an Article 19 Report. London: 
Published by Article 19 for the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization.: 119,153). 
Of those countries that do have restrictions on foreign ownership of the press - as opposed to broadcasting 
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It was argued that such a law would increase newspaper accountability. Instead, it 
reduced the question of concentration and press participative democracy to the 
demonisation of a single owner - Murdoch. The proprietor had stripped the printers of 
their jobs. This appeared an attractive way of excluding him in a relatively painless way. 
Yet, disguised nationalism substituted itself for democratic accountability. It was left to 
the NUJ at the TUC congress to oppose the attempt to "... blame ... the 
foreigner... " as 
"... solving nothing". The union's Jake Ecclestone advocated the alternative of 
compulsory divestment. But delegates ignored his call to reject "... superficially attractive 
solutions... ". 768 
When that year's Labour Party conference debated the new departure, it faced no vocal 
opposition. The NEC-backed motion called for a bar on ownership by non-UK 
companies or individuals. Speakers used delegates' anger at the Wapping printworkers' 
treatment to again voice a nationalist sentiment. 769 The problem with the national press 
was clear, as the seconder Danny Sergeant, of SOGAT, indicated: "It is not British. It is 
foreign. , 770 This time no NUJ speaker indicated that this cut across existing press policy, 
as the union was not Labour-affiliated. Yet, two indications of this divergence were that 
- Australia, Canada, France and Spain, in three the strictures have rarely stopped foreigners from acquiring 
shares. It is only in France that a 1986 law specified that foreigners were not allowed to own more than 
20% of a press firm. (Sandra Coliver `Comparative Analysis of Press Law in European and Other 
Democracies' and Roger Errera, `Press Law in France' in Coliver: 260,61). 
768 He considered that those such as Murdoch would "... change their nationalities as easily as they change 
their suits". (TUC, Conference 1986: 639. See also Anon. 1986. `What the TUC decided in Brighton', 
Tribune, September 12 1986). 
769 SOGAT's original motion, which became part of the composite, did not even discuss companies, but 
openly opposed foreign individuals owning the British press. The motion's proposer, the NGA's Arthur 
Bonneger, declared it was crucial to maintain the "... power of the British media in the hands of our 
people. " (Labour Party, Conference (Ed. ). 1986a. Agenda for the annual conference of the Labour Party. 
London: Labour Party.: 70). 
770 There was a confused interweaving with concerns about multinational corporations. Thus, for the NEC, 
the NGA's Gordon Colling told the conference that press ownership: "... has an international capitalist 
influence which we wish to ameliorate". However, the answer to this was to target nationality, not the 
`capitalist influence'. (Labour Party, Conference (Ed. ). 1986b. Report of the annual conference of the 
Labour Party. London: Labour Party.: 118). 
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the CPBF opposed the new stance and a constituency ̀workers' control' motion was not 
composited in with the agreed position. 77' 
Most importantly, this new position made it into the 1987 manifesto. It was made clear to 
the shadow ministerial team, Mark Fisher and Robin Corbett, who were being advised by 
Curran and the CPBF's Mike Jempson, that this was being supported - and that it would 
"... catch Murdoch now". 772 The shadow minister, now Lord Corbett, told the author that 
the unions strongly influenced this policy, which he disagreed with. 773 However, it had 
leadership approval at this stage and the manifesto announced press control, like that of 
broadcasting, was "... to be retained by citizens of Britain". 774 Note that Labour did not 
target the companies' multinational nature, but the owners' nationality. 
How does this shift relate to questions of ownership diversity and democratic ownership? 
There is clearly a question regarding multinational control of the press, leading to a 
diversity deficit internationally. Some posed Labour's response in this way. 775 
Newspapers' specific local flavour could be lost. Also, this work does not consider 
"' The motion wanted to limit ownership by firms to one national title and wished to lodge the 
subsequently divested titles in the hands of the workers in the industry. (Labour Party, Agenda 1986: 70, 
CPBF veteran and Free Press editor Granville Williams, interview with author, June 14 2002). 
72 "I have never forgotten Austin Mitchell... wandering into the room when we were discussing the whole 
ownership issue and he just sort of said: ̀ Oh let's just slap on that no foreigners can own media here. ' I 
was saying that: `This is going to catch minority publications, it's xenophobic. ' He said: ̀ It doesn't matter, 
it will be popular and we will catch Murdoch now. '... What worried me [was] it was so sort of simplistic 
and populist. We were all gobsmacked that.. . the complexities of the issue were just thrown out of the 
window to put in something like that... Because I mean that clearly to say: ̀ No foreigners' is crude... It is 
not a very clever way to proceed. " (Mike Jempson, interview with author, September 3 2002). Mitchell was 
to soon change his attitude to Murdoch. 
73 According to Lord Corbett: "Wapping, in a sense, hardened attitudes. " He said the view of the unions 
influenced some in the party with the view that: "'What this party ought to be about is `sticking one up 
Murdoch' -a perfectly understandable, but not a wholly credible, policy... ". (Lord Corbett, interview with 
author, October 10 2002). 
74 Labour Party, Britain will win: 14. The 1988 party conference reiterated the commitment. (Labour Party, 
Conference (Ed. ). 1988. Report of the annual conference of the Labour Party. London: Labour Party.: 176). 
"s For example, Gordon Colling, of the NGA, at the 1986 party conference . (Labour Party, Report 1986: 118). Tricia Sumner put this view to the author. (Tricia Sumner, interview with author, February 6 2002). 
See also Littleton Suellen, M. 1992. The Wapping dispute : an examination of the conflict and its impact on 
the national newspaper industry. Aldershot ; Brookfield, USA: Avebury.: 193. There may well also be an 
argument for barring transnational conglomerates from owning the regional and local press. 
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broadcasting, but it is often argued that to protect cultures against the threat of American 
hegemony there would be a need for restrictions to protect national identity. 776 
However, these arguments do not apply so readily to national press news. The nature of 
national newspapers mean that, while there may be a pressure to Hollywood hegemony 
when considering the increasing role of `celebrity news', what is regarded as 
`newsworthy' tends to accentuate the national over the international. Thus, we can see 
that some of the papers that the print unions were most angry about, the Sun and the News 
of the World have been those with the least foreign coverage. In fact, it could be argued 
that it is those titles' (albeit-inaccurately) perceived ̀ Britishness', which adds to their 
success. 
Nevertheless, to argue that this would be answered by the nationality bar proposed was to 
conflate the question of foreign owners with that of foreign ownership. One newspaper 
commentator close to the party also exhibited this tendency. 777 It is difficult to see, 
generally, how diversity and democratic participation and ownership would be advanced 
by the restriction of ownership by nationality. 
Neither, incidentally, would it necessarily have been effective in excluding its most 
obvious target. Keeping it in the family could well mean that different members of the 
Murdoch clan could have citizenship in different countries, with effective control 
remaining with the same man. So, the policy was nationalistic and potentially ineffective 
even in the narrow aims it set itself. Instead, it had as an inspiration the hatred of an 
individual - Murdoch. He became one of Labour's most hated figures over the next few 
years. 778 Yet, while concentrating on one individual, the issue of the structure of press 
ownership and measures to be taken was progressively less discussed. 
776 Sumner interview, Littleton Suellen, M. 1992. The Wapping dispute : an examination of the conflict and 
its impact on the national newspaper industry. Aldershot ; Brookfield, USA: Avebury.: 193. This was an 
argument activists made after New Labour signalled their intention to relax the laws on foreign ownership 
in 2002. See, for instance, Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom. 2002. `The Communications 
Bill: some key areas of concern and suggested amendments', CPBF, 2 December 2002. 
777 Tom Baistow, `The Predator's Press' in Buchan, Norman, and Tricia Sumner. 1989. Glasnost in 
Britain? : against censorship and in defence of the word. London: Macmillan.: 55. 
778 Freedman, 2000: 207. 
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The other measures in the 1987 election manifesto reflected the more general policy shift. 
AES-style interventionism had receded in press ownership policy. As Curran and Seaton 
indicate, the manifesto reworked some of the themes regarding concentration's effect on 
press plurality. It is true that, in a limited sense, the 1970s' radicalism still influenced 
Britain Will Win With Labour. 779 But, its commitment to diversity was more vague and to 
democratisation and access non-existent. Under the contending pressures that we looked 
at earlier, the commitments made at the 1983 Labour conference did not find their way 
into the manifesto. This is despite the fact that no party body had formally jettisoned 
them. Instead, apart from the important new nationalist policy, the manifesto pledged a 
Labour government to enacting unspecified laws to "... place limits on the concentration 
of ownership". 780 As Allaun notes, it possessed even briefer commitments than the 1983 
document and was "... composed of generalities". 781 
Cross-ownership 
Another indication of the potential tension between Labour representation and diversity 
came as Labour policy turned its attention to the important development of diagonal 
cross-media concentration. Concern partly reflected the interest in providing for Labour 
representation, while opposition within Labour's ranks to the path taken prefigured what 
would become Labour's policy. 
Cross-media conglomeration was a very significant development in the 1980s - on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 782 The Labour Party's interest in this had been spurred by new 
developments. Technological innovation had increased as the Conservative government 
had relaxed cross-ownership rules. This saw News Corporation develop a cross-sectoral 
powerhouse; dominating the satellite sector and leading the national newspaper market. 
79 Seaton and Pimlott: 300. 
780 Labour Party, Britain will win. 
791 Allaun, Spreading the news: 91. 
782 Writers such as Ben Badjikian, Robert McChesney, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky have 
chronicled how the most powerful media market in the world, the United States, saw huge cross-sectoral 
media concentration develop in the 1980s. (Bagdikian, McChesney, Rich media, Herman and Chomsky). 
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In tandem, in contrast to the earlier period we are considering, the Labour Party now 
concentrated more on broadcasting policy. 783 
Interest was also linked to the Wapping dispute's nationalist policy response, however, 
the individual targeting of Murdoch and Labour representation. One needs to be careful 
about this. For some in the Labour Party, Murdoch represented a totem of the problems 
of press and cross-media concentration. Yet, he was also regarded by some as an `old- 
style' right-wing interventionist proprietor, in league with the Conservative Party, 
mutually advancing each other's interests. To oppose him would be to advance Labour 
representation. In retrospect, we can see that Murdoch's personal vilification as a pivotal 
point in Labour's policy evolution. The Labour leadership was moving from 
concentrating on policy targets to intervene to deal with concentration, through the 
individual targeting of Murdoch, towards later diluting diversification policies, while 
other methods to increase Labour representation took precedence. 
Labour concerns were heightened by Sky Television's launch and its takeover of a rival 
to form BSkyB, with Conservative government approval. In February 1989, Sky 
Television was launched amid a welter of positive publicity from the Sun and other News 
International titles, heightening concerns about cross-promotion. 784 The Conservative 
government had stated its opposition to cross-ownership. And it had formalised an IBA 
policy of reducing press interests in broadcasting in the 1990 Broadcasting Act. The 
Government position was that no newspaper owner could possess more than 20% of a 
terrestrial television station. 785 Yet, this was ignored when it came to non-British satellite 
channels, freeing News International to carry on with its satellite and newspaper 
interests. 786 
783 Freedman, 2000, Freedman, 2003. 
784 Andrew Neil, as Sky's executive chairman at the time of the launch admits that all the titles, bar the 
Sunday Times, which he still edited and saw a conflict of interest, treated the launch with "... positive 
reporting". However, he states that this was a reaction to the "... mountain of scepticism and bad press... " 
from other parts of the media. (Neil: 374) Hardly a critic, Shawcross describes the News International titles 
as "... shameless cheerleaders... ". (Shawcross, Murdoch: 302) See also Curran and Seaton: 83. 
785 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 19 May 1989, col. 630-3, House of Commons Hansard 
Debates for 18 December 1989, col. 42, Curran and Seaton: 295. 
786 HOC 18 December 1989, col. 43, Curran and Seaton: 295. 
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Bryan Gould, speaking for the frontbench, had called for stricter controls on cross media 
ownership in 1988 and the party publicly committed itself to this the next year. The 
rhetoric denouncing Murdoch was strident. 787 At first, the Shadow Cabinet argued that 
newspaper owners could not also own broadcasting stations - satellite or terrestrial. 788 
The Government's decision to allow Sky's takeover of the only other satellite operator in 
1990, creating a monopoly, prompted further Labour frontbench fears of cross-ownership 
domination and the attendant democratic threat. 789 Mark Fisher described it as a 
"... craven decision taken by a government in hock with Mr Murdoch"; an accusation 
which would be laid against the Labour leadership only a few years later. 790 
Yet, importantly, a tension already existed between this frontbench rhetoric and concerns 
from the leadership and strategists to not alienate media business. In official Policy 
Review documents, Labour's commitment to stifling cross-ownership was vague. It 
amounted to a pledge to refer the issue to a strengthened Monopoly and Mergers 
Commission. 791 It did not even bother to give any evidence to the Government-appointed 
inquiry into the allied area of media cross-promotion. 792 
By the early 1990s, pressure was mounting to shift policy away from even this minimal 
commitment to diversity and towards an accommodation with News Corporation. The 
arguments again reflected the tension between representation and diversity. They 
provided a precursor to later arguments in the party. The then right-wing Labour 
backbencher Austin Mitchell had caused a furore by accepting an offer to become a Sky 
presenter in 1989. In 1990, in a quasi-policy transfer, he called on Labour to follow its 
7.. Some analysis was radical. Labour MPs expressed concern that cross-ownership was part of a wider 
business diversification, leading to censorship of discussion regarding other firms owned by the papers' 
parent company. (HOC 19 May 1989, col. 597). 
788 HOC 18 December 1989, col. 53. 
789 HOC 24 April 1991, col.. 1156. 
790 Quoted in Henry, Georgina. 1990. ̀Satellite merger escapes scrutiny', Guardian, December 19 1990. 
791 Labour Party, Conference (Ed. ). 1988. Report of the annual conference of the Labour Party. London: 
Labour Party., Anon., `Labour launches media proposal', Free Press 49, October 1988, Labour Party, Meet 
the challenge: 59. 
792 This was in contrast to Buchan, the TUC, SOGAT and the NUJ. (Sadler, John, Trade Great Britain 
Department of, and Industry. 1991. Enquiry into standards of cross media promotion : report to the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. London: H. M. S. O.: 24-7,76). 
211 
Australian and New Zealand sister parties' example and work with and not against 
793 Murdoch. 
For Mitchell, those parties regarded promoting their own grouping as more important 
than challenging a media conglomerate. They had "... seen the virtues of working with 
someone who owns powerful communication media so that they can put over their case". 
In other words, in the tension between diversity and representation, the parties' short- 
term advance was more crucial than the media diversity goal. The name of the game was 
no longer attempting to restructure press ownership for Labour to get a `fairer' hearing. If 
this was to happen, Labour needed to accommodate to those owners and at least 
ameliorate concerns over diversity and accountability. This was especially the case, as 
indeed Mitchell pointed out, when Labour's policy on cross-ownership was by now so 
framed by the consideration of "... one medium, one channel, one television system and 
one person... ". This stood in stark contradiction to the Policy Review's pro-business 
spirit. 794 At this stage, the Labour leadership refuted such arguments and vendetta claims. 
However, its argument had become increasingly hollow and jarringly fanciful, as the 
methods it envisaged for achieving its vast aims were becoming progressively 
minimal. 795 As Mitchell put it, merely referring ownership to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission "... is the classic formula for any party that cannot decide what to 
do". 796 
793 HOC 9 May 1990, col. 241-2. 
794 He saw that the events at Wapping were "... monstrous... " but, if the Labour Party did not have policies 
do undo the wrongs, then just "... hitting out is irrelevant, and in a way that is damaging to the Labour 
Party's case. We are talking about a powerful medium of communication and we need to put over our case 
on all the channels that are available to us... As the principle of the Labour Party's Policy Review is, 'For 
heaven's sake, don't frighten anybody', why are we rushing in with such draconian penalties for one 
medium, one channel, one television system and one person? It does not make sense to do that. " (HOC 9 
May 1990, col. 241-2). 
79S Thus as late as 1990 Hattersley told the Commons: "I do not like the idea of a newspaper and its policies 
being owned and controlled by one man, and even less do I like the idea of several newspapers and their 
policies being owned and controlled by one man. My concern is for concentration in general to be reduced 
and, wherever possible, to be avoided. " (HOC 9 May 1990, col. 237). 
796 HOC 24 April 1991, col.. 1172. Yet, this radical aim was now not allied with a relatively coherent 
policy framework to deal with press concentration. 
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The party leadership was more decisive and assertive over Labour representation. This 
was taking precedence, as methods for the structural change of press ownership were 
receding from view. 
Policy retreat 
Letting the Monopoly and Mergers Commission adjudicate became Labour's 1992 
manifesto position, not just regarding cross-ownership, but for all press policy. 
Following the election failure, in line with other policies on intervention, even the 1987 
manifesto's minimal commitment to press diversity law was starting to wane. By the late 
1980s, the Labour frontbench still expressed concern that the lack of press ownership 
diversity provided "... an increasing threat to genuine democracy... ", as the deputy leader 
Roy Hattersley put it. 797 But there was little put forward to challenge this. As 
Keynesianism made an exit, the commitment to intervention to provide press diversity 
also started to dissolve. 
The Policy Review process saw the end of rigorous state intervention. Along the way, 
Labour adopted a Scandinavian social market and cultural industries approach to 
intervention to aid diversity. However, although the cultural industries approach guided 
other media policies, by the review's end, the leadership expunged it from plans for 
newspaper diversity. 798 
The review section on the media was considered by the Democracy for the Individual and 
the Community committee, chaired by Hattersley, who jointly oversaw media policy as 
Shadow Home Secretary. He had authored Democratic Socialist Aims and Values, which 
797 HOC 18 December 1989, col. 49. 
798 The analysis did survive as a general principle guiding some media policies. The report to the NEC by 
the Physical and Social Environment group as part of the second phase of the review in 1989 cited local 
authority support for `cultural industries' as important. (Report of the PRG: Second Phase of Policy Review 
PD2166A April 1989: 40-41, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives). And the cultural 
industries analysis infused the Design in the 90s document which called for investment in artistic design as 
aid to market competitiveness. Design was a key component of the change to a post-industrial age, which 
those around Marxism Today had trumpeted, where wealth creation was claimed to be often based more on 
design than production investment. (Labour, Party. 199 1a. Design the nineties. London: Labour Party. ). 
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was an intellectually ambitious, though failed, attempt to be the Policy Review's 
`ideological foundation'. His document's relatively radical aims for democratising and 
diversifying the press were undone by his failure to challenge market control. 799 
But this did not mean that activist and union demands had been extinguished. The 1988 
conference provided the review with a policy that was more interventionist than that 
proposed by the leadership. The motion passed continued with the nationalistic measure 
of stopping ownership by foreign individuals. Yet, it also called on the review to consider 
the now traditional routes of an advertising levy and publicly owned printing and 
800 distribution facilities, to broaden the press. 
New Left elements on the review took up this more interventionist approach. Ken 
Livingstone spearheaded a shift in Labour conference policy on diversity. When the NEC 
met at the start of the 1989 conference, he successfully proposed a motion, which had 
come from the Democracy for the Individual and the Community committee. This called 
on a Labour government to establish and fund a Media Enterprise Board, providing funds 
and advice to aid start-ups. Its terminology also indicated the more market-oriented 
cultural industries approach, indicating the GLC and soft left influences. 801 The call for a 
Media Enterprise Board to `help fund new and innovative media projects' became party 
policy at the 1989 conference. 802 However, it only made a short-lived appearance and did 
not figure in later Labour thinking. 
'" He aimed for press and broadcasting to "... represent and reflect every strand of political opinion and 
cultural characteristic... ", with "... diversity of ownership and equality of access ... ". The deputy 
leader 
was concerned about private and government domination of the media. He wanted to provide 
"... safeguards against the dangers to democratic expression and public information which control - 
whether by dominant government or private ownership - inevitably brings". Yet, Hattersley's aspirations 
were undermined by the absence of plans for intervention that actively aided new ownership. With the 
threatened eclipse of Keynesian interventionism overall and the particular rejection of such weapons in the 
press arena, as a radical expression of that policy, his aims remained but a pipedream. (Labour, Party. 1988. 
Democratic socialist aims and values. London: Labour Party.: 6). 
$00 It also now embraced considering newspaper exploitation of women's bodies. (Labour Party, 
Conference 1983: 176). 
soy Labour Party NEC, `NEC Minutes at the 1989 Labour Party Conference', November 1,1989, Labour 
Party Conference 1989. 
802 Labour Party, Conference (Ed. ). 1989. Report of the annual conference of the Labour Party. London: 
Labour Party.: 173. 
214 
Instead, as Keynesianism fled from the leadership's agenda, Labour's policy on press 
ownership became more reconciled to the manifesto commitments and became based on 
classical liberal pluralist notions of anti-monopoly curbs. The leadership had already 
supported a Policy Review position that went to the 1988 conference, which was more 
minimal and market-oriented than previous party policy. But it was more specific in its 
legislation than the 1987 manifesto had been. An indication of the significance that the 
Labour frontbench still placed in the CPBF was that the Shadow Trade minister Bryan 
Gould unveiled the new policy to the organisation's meeting, pre-empting the 1988 
Labour Party conference by a few days. Both organisations' delegates were informed 
that, rather than creating bodies that would help diversity, Labour would create 
legislation for divestment, along with cross-ownership legislation. The number of 
newspapers any one company could own would be limited and there would be `fair 
competition' legislation. 
Thus, in an important challenge to the media giants, they were to be divested of their 
newspapers. But, as with previous manifesto commitments, there would be no help for 
new owners in running the discarded titles - leading to the possibility that these 
newspapers would go under. 803 
However, even this policy pledge was short-lived. Despite the fact that the 1988 and 1989 
party conferences had endorsed a more interventionist policy, the later review document 
Opportunity Britain and the final report Meet the Challenge, Make the Change did not 
reflect this. The earlier assurances concerning ownership diversity evaporated. So 
Opportunity Britain regarded broadening the press was "... essential to our democracy". 
Yet both documents only bound Labour to a review of concentration by the Monopoly 
and Mergers Commission. There was a vague reference to strengthening that body to deal 
803 Nonetheless, an indication of the pressure on the leadership from the press on ownership was that, 
despite the Labour frontbench's proposals being less radical than previous Labour pledges, it was noted 
that they were still attacked by parts of the press. (Anon. 1988. ̀ Labour launches media proposal', Free 
Press 49, October 1988). 
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with ownership changes. 804 Media union representatives rejected this shift. One pleaded 
to the 1989 conference: "We do not have the time to refer to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission... ". 805 
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
However, the Policy Review did not only affect diversity policy. Calls for democratic 
participation and control were also extinguished. 
A throwback to the more radical stance of the past came with an attempt to provide an 
intellectual backdrop to the Policy Review, associated with the soft left. The Labour 
Party's Values and Aims: An Unofficial Statement by David Blunkett and Bernard Crick 
saw democracy and socialism as synonymous. Within this framework, the authors called 
for more democratic employee and user participation in the press, although they did not 
provide a blueprint for this. 806 However, little was heard from this point onwards from the 
mainstream soft left on democratising the press. 
More typical was Hattersley's Democratic Socialist Aims and Values. Hattersley's 
inability to consider the need for state or private ownership to be democratised stymied 
his call for `equality of access'. 807 
Nonetheless, a failed attempt to challenge this inertia on press democratisation came from 
another quarter. Along with the pressure towards the cultural industries approach, the 
804 Labour, Party. 1991 b. Opportunity Britain : Labour's better way for the 1990s. London: Labour Party.: 
45, Labour Party, Meet the challenge: 59-60. 
sos Tony Hearn, representing the Broadcasting and Entertainment Trades Alliance, added: "We must know 
from day one exactly how we intend to control who controls the media. We have to have clearcut policy 
decisions on how we extend massively access to the media to democratic and underprivileged groups. For 
that, we frankly need much closer co-operation with Walworth Road than so far we have been privileged to 
have. " (Labour Party, Conference 1989: 127). The previous year, Danny Sergeant, representing SOGAT 
182, had welcomed Gould's commitment to the CPBF. (Labour Party, Conference (Ed. ). 1988. Report of 
the annual conference of the Labour Party. London: Labour Party.: 116). 
806 Hattersley, Roy. 1987. Choose freedom : the future for democratic socialism. London: Michael Joseph.: 
9. 
807 Indeed, the book which the document was heavily influenced by, Hattersley's previously-produced 
tome, Choose Freedom, tentatively championed co-operatives and cited the GLEB positively. Yet, there 
was no mention of this with regard to the media. (Hattersley, Choose freedom). 
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New Left GLC experience had kept a radical spark in favour of broader participation in 
the press alive within the Labour Party. In contrast, by now, the NEC's union 
representatives strongly backed the leadership in quelling this radical thought. In the 
previous chapter, we indicated that the media unions were reluctant to embrace industrial 
democracy when faced with it, but would support paper aspirations. By the late 1980s, 
they were so intent on supporting the leadership that they would even refute resolutions 
on democratising ownership behind closed doors. Yet, concurrently, other media unions 
still complained publicly that the party hierarchy ignored their input on broadcast 
diversity and democracy. 808 We shall further consider this aspect of union policy in 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
At an NEC in May 1989, Livingstone proposed that the Labour Party should again 
support co-operatives in the press. But the effect of the News on Sunday failure was to 
work against this bid. SOGAT official and former Media Study Group member Ted 
O'Brien spoke to oppose this on the NEC, citing this and other negative experiences. 809 
This was the last attempt to introduce press co-operative policy on the NEC. The only 
remnant of the previous commitments to democracy and accountability in the press that 
survived for much of the Kinnock years was the pledge to introduce a statutory right of 
reply, which we shall consider in Appendix 2 of this chapter. However, this was not 
included in the 1992 manifesto. 
Thus, the Labour leadership's interest in press ownership reform of any sort decreased in 
the 1980s, despite what could be seen as a bias against Labour being as pronounced as at 
previous points. Lord Corbett says that Roy Hattersley, who had overall responsibility for 
808 Labour Party, Conference 1989: 127. 
809 Indicating the effect of demoralisation that the previous failures of co-operative newspapers had had on 
the unions, according to Tony Benn, O'Brien explicitly announced that: "... democracy didn't work in the 
running of a newspaper. " Instead, the newspapers' failure had "... cost the trade union movement a lot of 
money". Livingstone's motion was defeated on the NEC by 15 votes to six. (Benn, The end of an era: 565). 
Ted O'Brien was a new member on to the Communications Committee in 1989 joining sitting member 
Gordon Coiling. (Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. ). 
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the policy as Shadow Home Secretary, "... never showed much real interest... " in 
detailed work on press and media ownership despite his previous concerns. 810 
Aside from the other pressures to push press intervention down the agenda, such as 
Keynesianism's demise, the rejection of democratic control, union demoralisation and 
media business pressure, another important factor in this shift was the new emphasis on 
political communications, as we shall detail in the first appendix to this chapter. 
THE POLICY REVIEW AND THE SHADOW COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY 
The leadership became more interested in other methods for gaining Labour 
representation associated with political marketing, at same time as it judged that methods 
for achieving representation associated with the New Left were outmoded. The 
development of the new marketing strategy had to do with a lot more than its relationship 
to the press. Nevertheless, there were some direct connections. 
The Labour leadership was initially prompted by one of the Minority Report's co-authors 
to concentrate on an alternative method to aid Labour representation, rather than 
developing policy to aid diversity. 81 ' There was now a clear division between these 
seemingly synonymous aspirations. Following this, Dominic Wring, in his perceptive and 
persuasive study of political marketing in the Labour Party, identifies the involvement of 
the LCC in calling for a professionalisation of communication, the use of media, polling 
and marketing. 812 However, he does not elaborate on this. Yet, the LCC group's 
organising secretary explicitly prioritised representation over diversity in justifying this 
move. He concluded that political communication was a more pressing concern than 
newspaper reform. There was "... little point in whinging about press bias from the 
Opposition". Instead, what was required was what would become the familiar demand 
that all Labour people should "... speak with a united voice... " and that sophisticated 
B1° "I mean he never got in the way. If you told him, he was interested, and if you didn't, I don't think he 
would ask. " (Corbett interview). 
8' This link with the Minority Report is discussed further in Appendix One of this chapter. 
B12 Wring Dominic, James. 1997. Political marketing and the Labour Party : the relationship between 
campaign strategy and intra-organisational power. PhD, Cambridge: Cambridge University .: 
168,171. 
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marketing and advertising techniques should be involved. 813 Not all that the LCC called 
for was implemented. But it was an important pointer. 814 The TUC's failure to affect 
reform while Labour was in opposition also influenced it in backing away from structural 
815 reform. 
As the first appendix to this chapter details, the leadership considered that trying to 
manipulate coverage in the press and the media that already existed would achieve the 
goal that changing the newspaper and media environment was thought to achieve. That 
was a fairer press for Labour. It considered that it needed to deal with the newspapers 
before it got into office. Indeed, its perception was that if it did not deal with the press, 
then it would never get back in. 
The period since the 1970s saw a reaction against earlier political communications 
methods, prompted by the 1970 defeat. Callaghan rejected being `packaged like 
cornflakes'. Under Foot, the use of research pollsters was questioned. 816 However, this 
changed after 1983. Kinnock's leadership rediscovered and developed other techniques to 
make the press fairer to the party. 
The leadership concentrated on developing a sophisticated news management machinery. 
Eric Shaw identifies that the Shadow Communications Agency (SCA), which the 
appendix shall consider further, came into its own in explaining Labour's defeat. 817 The 
SCA was decisive in mapping out the new path for Labour that its Policy Review 
traversed. Although there was some continuity, Wring shows that campaigning took on a 
renewed significance in the 1980s. What changed was that the leadership became far 
more concerned to appeal to what strategists considered to be the electorate's opinion. 
Before 1987, it reintroduced sophisticated opinion research and advertising and, after 
813 Paul Convery, ̀ Letter to NEC Members', no date, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
814 Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 168-9. 
8IS Mike Smith, TUC head of secretariat and former head of its press and information department, viewed 
that "... the experience throughout the 80s was that our pressure on governments was to precious little 
purpose. The various ministers responsible would see delegations from time to time, but the idea of us 
having an influence on policy I think was pretty limited. " (Interview with Mike Smith, October 12002). 
816 Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Parry: 144-5. 
87 Shaw, Wilderness: 125. 
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1987, it established a market-led approach to satisfying what were perceived to be the 
electorate wants and needs. According to Wring, while the Policy Review accepted the 
market in the economic sphere, it also "... marked another turning point in the embrace of 
another ̀market' - in the domain of politics". 
818 
Implementing this marketing strategy, as Wring indicates, was key in creating an 
increasingly centralised organisation with a more powerful leadership and passive 
membership. 819 The Policy Review saw the soft left and the right in the party come 
together to reorientate the party's policy, with union support, against the rest of the 
left. 820 The leadership-dominated NEC facilitated further centralisation to make the 
Policy Review the key fount of decision-making, over and above that of the conference, 
with union support. 821 Under Kinnock, the unions generally returned to their traditional 
role as a bedrock of `social democratic centralism' - solid leadership allies. 
822 But this 
process saw their increasing marginalisation, as well as that of the soft left. 823 
"' Wring, Political marketing and organisational development: 12-15. 
819 Ibid.: 17. 
820 As a soft left-influenced newspaper, Tribune backed the Policy Review since "... socialist ideas needed 
to able to stand up to open debate". (Tribune editorial. 1987. `Time for some serious thinking', Tribune, 2 
October 1987). The LCC and the Marxism Today wing of the Communist Party rejected a unity call by Ken 
Livingstone, Peter Hain, Joan Ruddock and others. (Livingstone, Ken, Joan Ruddock, Peter Hain et al. 
1987. `Labour, the Liberals and the unity of the Labour Left', Tribune 21/28 August 1987, Rees, Caroline. 
1987. `LCC executive rules out 'links with ultra-Left", Tribune, 11 September 1987, Caroline. 1987. 
Caroline Rees, ̀ Back Left alliances says McLennan', Tribune, 18 September 1987). 
821 It successfully persuaded the 1989 conference to accept that Policy Review documents were 
unamendable by Labour conferences - they could only be accepted or rejected. (CLPD, CLPD Newsletter, 
No. 46 (Conference Edition), September/October 1992). The 1990 conference approved, in principle, the 
creation of a National Policy Forum, which also provided for greater party centralisation. Instead of the 
party as a whole having the chance to vote on motions which came to conference, it would be the party 
forum that would decide which motions were taken, further instituting this process of centralised policy- 
making, independent of direct activist involvement. (Labour Party National Executive, Committee. 1990. 
Democracy and policy making for the 1990s : statement. London: Labour Party., Labour, Party. 1992. 
Agenda for change. London: The Labour Party.: 28). The role of the unions in facilitating this centralising 
process can be indicated by the fact that it was the NGA print union's representative on the NEC, Gordon 
Colling who proposed in 1989 that NEC decision-making be centralised with fewer, more powerful 
committees. (NEC `Minutes', October 4 1989, NEC `Minutes', October 25 1989). 
822 Mandelson later told the TUC congress that the unions "... helped Neil Kinnock save the Labour Party in 
the 1980s". (Peter Mandelson, Speech to the 1998 Annual Trades Union Congress, London: Trades Union 
Congress 1998, quoted in Ludlam, Steve. 2000. 'Norms and Blocks: Trade Unions and the Labour Party 
since 1964' in Brivati and Heffernan: 231). Aided by sympathetic union officials in the name of 
electability, Labour's new employment secretary Tony Blair ensured that most of the Conservative 
legislation-would remain on the statute book if Labour regained office. This included the bar on closed 




With those around the SCA, what is striking was how resigned they were to press bias 
and how scant were their alternatives to this. We have already noted that Kinnock blamed 
the tabloids for the 1992 defeat. Yet research produced by the SCA accepted "... the 
hostile press (with which we are stuck)... " and "... Conservative control of the 
media.. . 9,. 
824 Also, Philip Gould, while identifying this bias, advocated challenging the 
operation of individual journalists but not the structure in which they operated. 825 
Implementing the right of reply, for instance, was not even seen as significant. His 
meticulous chronicling of the implementation of Kinnock's new media strategy did not 
even hint that the SCA had any regard for challenging press ownership as a way of 
counteracting imbalance. 826 This indicates in what low regard the media strategists close 
to Kinnock held this policy. 
There was now a divide within Labour. A Chinese wall existed between the two 
positions. One shadow minister describes the process as "... operating in isolation... ", 
with different strands independently developing policy in the period after 1987.827 Those, 
more on the left, were still trying to persuade the party to implement thoroughgoing 
policies to promote diversity - and a few to democratise the press. However, the fatalism, 
which had previously characterised those concerned about press bias on the right, was 
also shared in a particular way by this new right and the media strategists that became a 
dominating force. 
As we shall further discover in the first appendix to this chapter, by 1992 the strategists 
had extensive power over policy development. An indication of this was that a then 
newspaper management. (Minkin, Lewis. 1991. The contentious alliance : trade unions and the Labour 
Party. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.: 472, Shaw, Wilderness: 128). 
823 Shaw, Wilderness: 129-133, Heffernan and Marqusee: 166-184. 
$24 Ed Straw, 'Opposition into Government -A Strategic Framework', June 26 1987, Leslie Butterfield, 
Roddy Glen and Paul Southgate, 'Towards a Communication Strategy for the Labour Party, An 
examination of attitudes amongst women aged 25-44' no date, Neil Kinnock Archives, Churchill Archives. 
825 Philip Gould pinpointed a key factor in Labour's defeat in this period as a "... fearsomely hostile... " and 
"... terrible... " press. In his memoirs, he outlines evidence that a large percentage of the election coverage 
in 1987 in the Sun, Daily Mail and Daily Star was "... Labour knocking... ". (Gould, The unfinished 
revolution: 77,130-1). 
826 Gould, The unfinished revolution. 
827 "There is left hands and right hands. " (Corbett interview). 
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shadow minister made clear to the author he was not involved directly in the policy 
discussions surrounding the manifesto. The then frontbench spokesman, now Lord 
Corbett, says he was treated like a "... mere backbencher... " in these discussions. Yet, he 
was aware of the discussions of the political communication strategists and the 
leadership, where the concern was not to directly challenge media businesses. The 
leadership placed most emphasis on political marketing and little on press ownership 
policy. That policy's most prominent aspect, cross-ownership legislation, by the time of 
the 1992 manifesto, was ̀ kicked into the long grass', according to Corbett, with the 
strategists' involvement. 828 
828 Lord Corbett told the author: "You stop looking for people to upset, and you stop saying 'no'. That was 
a cop-out in a sense.. . The party strategists were saying `No, that is far too hard edged', you know 
it 




Despite all the pledges that the Labour leadership, particularly Roy Hattersley, had made 
on press reform, and Tory claims that Labour would revert to its previous radical 
position, Labour's 1992 election commitments were minimal. 829 The manifesto limited 
itself to merely calling for an "... urgent enquiry... " by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission into media ownership concentration, particularly cross-ownership. 830 In 
other words, a social democratic interventionist policy had been rejected for a more 
limited classical liberal pluralist notion of anti-monopoly curbs. 
It was clear which company was the target of this policy - News Corporation. This made 
it easier to reject the cross-ownership policy as one born of spite. There were particular 
concerns that centred on Murdoch because of his particular dominance in the British 
national newspaper market, his globalising ambition, his political links and his anti-union 
record. Yet, it is hard to dispute that he was a media hate figure for Labour to unite 
around also because of his then hostility to Labour, his nationality and his acumen. 831 
With satellite television, as with other areas, "Rupert Murdoch got in first and scooped 
the market... Capitalism is all about taking a risk. Rupert Murdoch got in and did it - 
successfully". 832 
The Labour leadership had concentrated on this individual more, with the hope of 
tackling the problems of party representation, and less on robust policies to regulate the 
market of which Murdoch was a participant. In taking this stance, it made it easier for a. 
829 Jones, George. 1992. ̀ Free press at risk from Labour, says Wakeham', Daily Telegraph, February 29 
1992. 
830 Dale: 308. See also Shawcross, Rupert Murdoch: 542, David Owen, `Hattersley Promise on Incomes', 
Financial Times, March 16 1992, Steve Thompson et. Al., `Comment hits media stock', Financial Times, 
March 24 1992. 
87 A similar point is made by Freedman, 2000: 207. 
832 Austin Mitchell, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 24 April 1991, col.. 1171. 
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new even more market-oriented clique of Labour politicians to refute such policies, when 
other representation strategies were shown to be effective. Indeed, Tony Blair would later 
publicly embrace Mitchell's wider logic of not offending Murdoch. Concerns over 
representation had guided the earlier shift in the leadership's stance towards Maxwell. 
Later on, policy became more minimal and was about containment of the existing press 
conglomerates - rather than actively promoting further diversity or participation, while 
other methods for representation were pursued. Eventually this approach was 
downgraded into a call for an enquiry, with no guarantees of any legislation. 
To conclude, we will consider how well the `classic' positions on policy formation 
outlined earlier in this work can explain this evolution. 
At the start of Kinnock's leadership, the backwash of the radicalising wave of the 
previous years was felt in local government. Mirroring this, the 1983 conference went 
beyond the relatively radical manifesto of earlier that year. It passed policy that reflected 
and went beyond a Scandinavian-style social market interventionist approach. At the 
same time, it also echoed the more marketised social democratic response coming from 
the cultural industry conceptions. Yet, the democratising ideas developed provided a 
more minimal version of the analysis of Marxists such as Raymond Williams and some 
social market notions. At this stage, crucial to its success was support from the unions, 
although it did not directly accord with what they proposed. The conference ignored the 
leadership-dominated NEC in passing this radical policy. 
From then on, as the leadership came to dominate internal policy formation, press policy 
edged towards accommodating business and the market. However, this was not a linear 
process. The period up to 1987 had seen the leadership achieving dominance over the 
NEC in forming policy, while the left divided. The press ownership policy in the 1987 
manifesto, for the most part, reflected this. There was a return to a more minimal version 
of the 1983 manifesto than the party conference proposals. However, the fact that it even 
reflected that somewhat interventionist document was an indication that the radical 
upsurge from 1979 onwards had not been completely quelled. 
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After that, the Policy Review saw a resurgence of interventionism with policy that again 
reflected both the Scandinavian-style social market interventionist and marketised 
cultural industry approaches. This reflected both the previous radicalising impetus on 
parts of the party and the influence of the cultural industries approach on its leadership. 
However, a reflection of leadership dominance was that once those around Kinnock 
rejected interventionism, so was it progressively expunged from press policy in the 
review process. There was, at first, a commitment to divestment and to legislate on cross- 
ownership. This was a move towards a liberal pluralist model, but one that confronted the 
press business' ownership. However, as the review gave way to the manifesto, this was 
replaced by rather vague commitment to cross-ownership legislation, consistent with a 
classical liberal pluralist position. 
As for demands for press democratic control, a similar, but more muted, process to that 
with newspaper diversity developed. The 1983 conference motion reflected the previous 
radicalising phase's short-lived legacy, most notably felt by the municipal socialists. The 
unions supported it. The municipal socialists' most notable figurehead, Livingstone, 
attempted to revive demands for press democratic participation during the Policy Review. 
But by then, the media unions' representatives spearheaded the leadership's rejection of 
this approach, citing the News on Sunday's failure. Instead, the only residue of previous 
calls for press accountability was a statutory right of reply, which did not even make its 
way into the 1992 manifesto. 
This process - with the leadership's hand on the tiller of policy formation and control 
over the NEC - would seem to accord with a view that, after the earlier aberration, an 
elitist explanation of the party's power relations was most appropriate. The wishes of the 
unions and the activists expressed at the party conference, with regard to diversity at 
least, had been ignored. However, this does not explain the pressures on the leadership 
itself. Although, there were conduits for this internally, they were mostly external. There 
was the impact of Thatcherism and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the initial 
influence of press proprietor Robert Maxwell on the leadership's policy. The pressure on 
the Labour leadership to shift policy to accommodate to these external factors would 
seem to accord with a Marxist analysis. 
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The development of union power in this period would appear to concur more closely with 
the elitist and Marxist views of policy development, as well as that of Minkin's. The 
unions' early support for more radical positions on diversity and democracy at the 1983 
conference appears to challenge the elitist stance. Yet, some unions' later subordinate 
role was more at one with the elitists' view. This weakening influence and the 
leadership's increased power was highlighted by the unions' sway on the SCA, as we 
shall see in the first appendix to this chapter. This was negligible. The unions did not 
even have a place on the Campaign Management Team, which had formally overseen the 
SCR's work, but which by 1992 had its power wrested from it. 833 
The unions' shifting stance could be better explained by the view of the Marxists and 
Minkin, in the sense that they both considered that it has been the unions that have 
proscribed the leadership's room for manoeuvre. However, the unions' lessening role in 
the latter half of the 1980s would seem to challenge Miliband's characterisation of their 
`crushing power'. Nevertheless, the Marxists' analysis, that the unions' degree of support 
for the leadership is tempered by rank and file pressure, goes some way to explain this 
power shift. Left industrial retreat and the failure of initiatives led to demoralisation, 
which, consequently, led to the end of the unions' radical turn. The major input the 
unions made into press policy in this period seems to have been an indication of this. The 
nationalist clause, which the unions, along with Kinnock, pioneered, was a product of the 
print unions' defeat. However, the unions by the end of this period were still pursuing 
policies more radical on diversity than those of the leadership. 
Rather than policy to legislate against the existing newspaper firms, the leadership 
developed a new press strategy to woo them. However, one tension in this new course 
was with regard to News Corporation. By 1992, the Labour leadership placed special 
emphasis on cross-ownership. This prompted concerns that BSkyB cross-ownership was 
going to be targeted, forcing Murdoch to have to choose between the five national 
newspapers and the satellite broadcaster. 834 The effect of even talk of the Labour Party 
833 Minkin, Contentious alliance: 415,419. 834 Shawcross, Rupert Murdoch: 542, Owen, Hattersley, Thompson. 
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legislating should not be underestimated. The Financial Times reported that fears of this 
had sent shares plummeting in those press firms that were BSkyB shareholders - News 
International, Pearson and Reed International. 835 News International was, of course, 
particularly affected. This indicated how important influencing party policy was for the 
press businesses. News International could well consider that, as Murdoch's sympathetic 
biographer put it: "... no company stood to lose as much from a Labour victory... ", 
despite its minimal commitments. 836 How this tension between Labour and News 
Corporation would be resolved will be one subject of the next chapter. 
935 Owen, Hattersley, Thompson. 
836 Shawcross, Rupert Murdoch: 542. 
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7. Business News: Press Policy Under Blair and Smith 
In 1993, the Labour shadow minister responsible for press ownership policy, Ann Clwyd 
announced that the "... unregulated growth of Mr Murdoch's empire... " was "... an 
affront to a democratic society.... ". 837 And her counterpart in the trade and industry brief, 
Robin Cook, concurred that it needed to be curbed by law. 838 Nine years later, the two 
equivalent Labour ministers, now in Government, jointly announced a self-avowed 
deregulatory package, which gave the press magnate the opportunity to expand into a 
hitherto unexploited area - terrestrial television. 839 
This chapter will explore why and how this shift came about. We will consider how press 
cross-ownership policy dramatically shifted and Labour newspaper policy's last 
bogeyman was appeased. Curran, in his insightful press reform study links press policy 
in the 1990s to general party acceptance of a neo-liberal agenda. So will this work. 
However, he possibly underplays how successive electoral defeats affected policy. 840 
Equally, writers on New Labour and press news management have not fully charted the 
interrelation between press ownership policy on diversity and Labour representation 
through media news control. 841 
837 The statement was issued under the headline `Sky Trek: The Next Degeneration', (Snoddy, 
Raymond. 1993. ̀ Media mogul with the mostest: Rupert Murdoch's reach is global, prompting criticism 
that he has too much power', Financial Times, September 4 1993). See also Clwyd, Ann. 1993. ̀ Ann 
Clwyd, `He's used his power to evade controls that governments might place on him", Daily Mirror, 
September 3 1993. 
838 Robin Cook viewed that: "The domination of much of the media by one man is not healthy for 
democracy and is not fair for competition. " (Cook, Robin and Clwyd, Ann. 1993. 'Cook and Clwyd call for 
MMC inquiry into Murdoch ownership', Labour Party Press Release, September 3 1993). 
839 DTI/DCMS, Draft Communications Bill - Policy Narrative, HMSO, 2002, DTI/DCMS, Draft 
Communications Bill, HMSO, 2002, Great Britain Department of, Trade, Industry, Media Great Britain 
Department for Culture, and Sport. 2002. Draft Communications Bill regulatory impact assessment: The 
Stationery Office, 2002.. The Trade and Industry Minister overseeing this was Patricia Hewitt, who, as 
Kinnock's secretary had been instrumental in him rejoining the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting 
Freedom (Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archive). 
840 Curran, Press Reformism. 
841 Bob Franklin, nevertheless, calls for regulation of press ownership and legislation to provide journalistic 
autonomy. He also refers to the influence of Labour's press regulation on News International's coverage of 
the party in government. (Franklin, Bob, and Trust Catalyst. 1998. Tough on soundbites, tough on the 
causes of soundbites : New Labour and news management :a Catalyst paper. London: Catalyst Trust, 
1998. and Franklin, Bob. 2001. ̀ The Hand of History: New Labour, News Management and Governance' 
Pp. 130-144 in New Labour in government, edited by J. Smith Martin and Steve Ludlam. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2001.: 130-144). 
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In contrast, we shall consider how the trade union leadership and Labour membership 
acquiesced in this continuing shift from Labour representation through diversity to one 
based on the new media strategy. That strategy's by-product was to sacrifice diversity. 
Yet, it succeeded in providing representation for a long period. 
This chapter shall describe how the Labour representation goal was achieved - at the cost 
of going further than the previous government in minimising diversity and avoiding a 
challenge to newspaper ownership power. 
This chapter explores far more than the party's relationship to one man. Nevertheless, the 
connection with Murdoch will be a central part. The Blairite critic and journalist Nick 
Cohen wrote that: "... the most bewildered beggar on the street can understand New 
Labour's dealings with Murdoch in a moment". 842 This chapter shall argue that the 
relationship is a little more complex. Nonetheless, it will be suggested that, while New 
Labour entered into no formal pacts with any businesses, including News Corp, as 
Labour insiders reveal, there was an understanding. As one Blairite MP and media 
specialist told the author, in gaining newspaper support, it was understood that no 
policies would be adopted to challenge the press. 843 
Sometimes when looking for complex answers for motivations, one can ignore the more 
mundane. This chapter shall suggest that Murdoch came to support Labour because its 
leadership was more prepared to act upon his wishes than the traditional business party - 
the Conservatives. While the Tory government considered laws to exclude Murdoch, the 
Labour Party leadership rejected the minimal ownership controls in its 1992 manifesto.: 
While Labour has not unreservedly backed News Corporation, this chapter will explore 
how, in pursuing a minimalist classical liberal agenda, the Labour leadership made its 
peace with its previous backer turned tormentor. 
842 Cohen, Nick. 2000. Cruel Britannia : reports on the sinister and the preposterous. London: Verso, 
2000.: 144. 
943 Linton interview. 
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PARTY POLICY UNDER SMITH AND BLAIR 
The policy struggle under Smith 
John Smith was elected as leader in 1992 on the back of Labour's fourth election defeat 
in a row. His predecessor had lost with the press and media strategists at the helm. 
Smith's reign was marked by a struggle between those branded `Old Labour', or 
traditionalist, and the ascendant new right, termed `modernisers' by commentators taking 
New Labour terminology at face value. 844 The traditionalists, as we shall see, blamed the 
strategists for the defeat. The new right suggested that to win office Labour needed to 
change along with the electorate; targeting aspirational Thatcher supporters and further 
embracing the market. 845 
However, a decisive problem with this argument was that, despite all these claims of 
change, the most discernable shift was that the electorate was turning to Labour. 846 
Labour consistently maintained a significant opinion poll lead from autumn 1992. This 
made the traditional social democrat's call for just `one more heave' a convincing 
847 strategy. Smith could win. In the 1997 election's aftermath, the leadership repeated the 
mantra that Labour was `elected as New Labour, we should govern as New Labour'. 
844 Whether the New Labour project is a modernising one can be debated. It has been difficult to see how 
Blair's interest in an explicitly Christian morality, with its medieval roots, provides an example of 
modernisation, for instance. 
945 Labour was said to have not changed sufficiently to accommodate to shifting social attitudes. A series of 
Fabian pamphlets published at this time shared a similar prognosis to that advanced by the SCA under 
Kinnock. (Driver and Martell: 24-5. See also, for instance, McSmith, Andy. 1993. John Smith : playing the 
long game. London: Verso.: 237-8,240, McSmith, Andy, and Party Labour. 1994. John Smith :a life, 
1938-1994. London, Mandarin, 1994.: Mandarin.: 298-301, Sopel, Jon. 1995. Tony Blair : the moderniser. 
London: Michael Joseph.: 138. ). One `moderniser', Tony Blair, had earlier embraced a classical liberal 
argument to argue that among ̀ vested interests' Labour should challenge state control and the trade union 
movement, in favour of the individual. (Rentoul, John. 1995. Tony Blair. London: Little Brown and Co.: 
238-242). Pro-market shift was needed to demonstrate ̀economic competence'. (Driver and Martell: 25). 
846 The Community Charge had undermined Conservative support, despite Labour strategists' reluctance to 
emphasise this issue. A new factor was that the key question of economic competence, which had dogged 
Kinnock's chances, was now a concern directed at the Conservatives. The Tories' economic strategy had 
collapsed that autumn, with the failure of the ERM. 
847 Fielding, Labour Party: 24. For some discussion of the `one more heave' strategy, see McSmith, 
Playing: 23 7-8,240, McSmith, John Smith: 298-301, Thompson, Paul, Ben Lucas, and Committee Labour 
Party Co-ordinating. 1999. The forward march of modernisation :a history of the LCC, 1978-1998. 
London: Labour Co-ordinating Committee.: 12-3, Davies, Andrew. 1996. To build a new Jerusalem : the 
British Labour Party from Keir Hardie to Tony Blair. London: Abacus.: 436. 
230 
However, we can see that the assumption behind this slogan was misguided. The 
electorate's shift to the party preceded New Labour's advent by two years. Yet, critics of 
the ̀ traditionalists' were on firmer ground in questioning their rivals' rationale. 848 
In this situation, it is perhaps not surprising that Smith himself wavered between the two 
camps. 849 As a member of the old right, he also distanced himself from the third position 
- the democratising thrust of the Labour new left. The leadership flirted with 
Keynesianism for a short time before the autumn of 1993, then adopted a more 
unambiguously neo-liberal strategy. 850 Analogously, as we shall see, the party's position 
on newspaper ownership went through a more radical moment before moving closer to 
that which would be advocated by Blair. 
648 It was not clear which Labour Party tradition the traditionalists wished to return to. (Rentoul: 267-8). If 
it was the old Keynesian-style post-war consensus, this was over. In their defensive stance, the 
traditionalists did not possess a complete and positive strategy for governing. 
849 His time was an interregnum. (Panitch and Leys: 225, Fielding, Labour Party: 87). He was ̀ Playing the 
Long Game'. This meant avoiding siding with a faction when he could honourably do so. (McSmith, 
Playing). Many commentators and insiders associate him with the traditional social democrats. The new 
right `modernisers' were said to view him as ̀ sleepwalking to oblivion'. He had anaesthetised Labour into 
a `semi-comatose' state. (Wright, Tony, and Matt Carter. 1997. The people's party : an illustrated history 
of the Labour Party. London: Thames & Hudson Ltd.: 166-7,169, McSmith, John Smith: 331, Davies, ̀  
Jerusalem: 436, Fielding, Labour Party: 85-8). Philip Gould saw Smith as no moderniser. Gould quotes . Smith as announcing during his leadership contest: "If radical change involves the Labour Party subverting 
its principles and aborting its mission, then I'm conservative in that very narrow sense. " (Gould, The 
unfinished revolution: 161, quoting Sunday Times February 2 1992). This view was shared more widely. . According to Fielding: "One union official even jokingly spoke of Smith's `Horlicks leadership'. ' 
(Fielding, Labour Party: 91). 
850 Party documents tentatively advocated public sector growth and full employment in Britain and, more 
forcefully, as a Europe-wide initiative at this earlier stage. (Anderson and Mann: 95-6). Later, for instance, 
despite the Keynesian-sounding title, by the 1983, the document Rebuilding Britain was using pro-market 
language to advocate debt reduction and proposals to "... lever in private finance wherever possible... " in the 
public sector. (Labour, Party. 1993. Rebuilding Britain : Budget action for investment and jobs. London: 
Labour Party, 1993.: 1,13,14). However, it was only under Blair that these facets were developed into a 
coherent package. (Driver and Martell: 40-1). 
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Organisational changes under Smith and Blair 
The modernisers influenced Smith in his organisational control over policy-making, 
nonetheless. Although he valued the union's role, Smith weakened trade union influence, 
under pressure from the modernisers, most notably with the adoption of one member one 
vote (OMOV) for selecting MPs. 85' 
OMOV seemed to signal greater membership power. Jennifer Lees-Marshment, for 
instance, suggests that New Labour also increased member participation rights. 852 New 
Labour certainly cloaked its reforms in the language of membership empowerment. 
However, this was part of a process, following Kinnock's reign, to "... reduce the 
influence of party members and re-educate them", with the role of conference 
"... effectively undermined... ", as one academic Blair sympathiser described it. 853 
Instead, a new body, the National Policy Forum, now formally developed policy, with the 
NEC's role "... significantly reduced". 854 Constituencies and unions had little 
representation on the forum. 855 No motions from the constituencies or unions could now 
be taken directly to the party conference, except if they were very narrowly-defined 
851 The 1993 conference agreed to Smith's demands to adopt one member one vote (OMOV) for selecting 
MPs, cut the union's influence in selecting the leader and reduce the union's vote at party conference. 
(Ludlam, Norms and Blocks: 232,234, Shaw, 1945: 192-5. See also Fielding, Labour Party: 85-7. Wright, 
The people's party: 166-7, Panitch and Leys: 225, McSmith, Playing: 244-6). 
852 Lees-Marshment, Jennifer. 2001. `The Marriage of Politics and Marketing', Political Studies 49,692- 
713: 694. 
953 Smith, Martin J. 2000. `The Transition to New Labour' in Brivati and Heffernan: 146-7. New Labour 
transformed the party so that demands from the unions and constituencies could be blocked or eliminated. 
With the unions' role weakened, after Blair was elected it was the turn of the party conference, the NEC, 
and, with this, ultimately the unions again, to have their decision-making power curtailed. Power was to be 
centralised, with the new Labour government's leadership given far greater involvement in deciding the 
party's policies. See Callaghan, Retreat: 197-8. 
sa Smith, Transition: 147. Previously, under Smith, there had been a renamed and restructured NEC Policy 
Committee. (Benn, Free at last: 144). In overseeing this new forum and policy development, the NEC 
effectively had its position usurped. A Joint Policy Committee, chaired by the prime minister and 
composed equally of the Government and the NEC, would operate as the `steering group' for the policy 
forum. The union's majority control on the NEC would end. (Ludlam, Norms and Blocks: 232). Although 
the conference would remain the supreme arbiter ostensibly, it would be this policy committee that would 
take "... strategic oversight of policy development". (Labour Party National Executive, Committee. 1997. 
Partnership in power. London: National Executive Committee, Labour Party, 1997). 
855 Less than a third came from constituencies and union representatives were to occupy only just over one 
sixth of the seats. (Ludlam, Norms and Blocks: 232). 
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EU against demand-led macroeconomic policies. 862 The new market idealisation was 
articulated in the. watershed new Clause IV. 863 
Yet, there was a tension in this new market-led framework, which we will witness with 
regard to media cross-ownership policy, between Labour's aim to be the champion of 
small and medium-sized business and its emphasis on export-led growth. 
8M 
Economic globalisation, the press and cross-ownership865 
Labour's economic analysis was guided by the globalisation concept and it structured 
press ownership policy. It considered that the nation-state's sovereignty had considerably 
weakened. An important aspect of New Labour's take on globalisation was the shift to a 
world dominated by capital flight. This phenomenon is one where investors are able to 
quickly take their money out of the country, if their interests are threatened. This has 
been heightened by the communications revolution where, as Blair told Japanese 
businesspeople in 1996, this can happen at "... a flick of a switch or the push of a 
button... ". 866 
What we need to grasp from this is its impact on regulation. Those considering 
globalisation have emphasised that the point of capital flight is that it indicates that 
962 Webster, Paul. 1997. `Britain sank Jospin's EU jobs scheme', The Guardian, June 21 1997, Kettle, 
Martin. 1997. `Labour's bright new dawn ends at Dover', The Guardian, June 21 1997. See also Marquand, 
David. 1997. `After Euphoria: The Dilemmas of New Labour', The Political Quarterly, 4: 335-8: 336, 
Anderson and Mann: 114-5. 
863 While the gesture to ditch the old Clause IV may have been mainly symbolic, in the new clause we 
learnt that that the Labour Party was working for "... a dynamic economy, serving the public interest, in 
which the enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition are joined with the forces of 
partnership... ". Labour, Party. 1984. Rulebook of the Labour Party: London :4, quoted in Taylor Gerald, 
R. 1997. Labour's renewal? : the policy review and beyond. Basingstoke: Macmillan.: 171. See also 
Anderson and Mann: 32. 
864 Labour Party, Vision for growth: 47, Blair, Tony, and Party Labour. 1997. New Labour : because 
Britain deserves better. London: Labour Party, 1997.: 9-10,12-13. 
865 This work will not consider the question of cultural globalisation. 
866 Blair, Tony. 1996. New Britain : my vision of a young country. London: Fourth Estate, 1996.: 120. This 
flick of a switch metaphor became quite a favourite in New Labour writings on globalisation. As one party 
document put it the year before, the world economy had changed to create "... footloose companies... " 
operating in "... global and fast-moving markets... ". (Labour, Party. 1995a. A new economic future for 
Britain : economic and employment opportunities for all. London: Labour Party, 1995.: 6). 
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multinational corporations can hold nation-states to ransom. That is, by virtue of these 
huge capital shifts, the transnationals can dictate to governments on regulation, along 
with other areas of government control - backed by a relocation threat. A similar 
argument is regarded as true with regard to press and media cross-ownership regulations, 
as we shall see later. 
New Labour accepted the consequences of what Blair called "... the disciplines of the 
international economy... ". 867 As he told the News Corporation's Leadership Conference 
on the Hayman Islands in 1995, which we will discuss further later, globalisation was a 
technologically-determinist phenomenon that "... is reducing the power and capacity of 
government to control its domestic economy free from external influence... ". 868 
Thus, New Labour implied that this process was part of an objective and inevitable ̀ tidal 
wave' of change, not a product of choice by conscious actors or a tendency with counter- 
tendencies. It obscured the reality - that multinationals and international financiers had 
been agents of these changes and had employed technology to bring about convergence. 
Moreover, the Labour leadership wilfully obscured the idea that governments had choices 
in their actions and had aided these shifts. 869 Linguistics specialist Norman Fairclough 
identified how New Labour's language hid this. It described globalisation or technology 
as the actor, rather than the companies or governments. This, of course, disguised the 
leadership's role and absolved it from its actions. 870 
867 Blair, New Britain: 118. The same speech saw two of the consequences of those disciplines as being that 
"... tax rates need to be internationally as well as nationally competitive... " and that there should be no 
"... rigidity or to inflexibility in labour markets... ". (Ibid.: 121-3). 
868 Blair, T, `Speech to News Corp Leadership Conference, Hayman Islands, Australia, July 17 1995', in 
Ibid.: 204. 
869 They had helped create the disciplinary `iron cage'. It was the actions of governments in the 1970s 
onwards which had added to the present power of the multinationals and the financiers. (Callaghan, 
Retreat: 234). 
"° Fairclough, Norman. 2000. New labour, new language? London: Routledge, 2000.: 23-34. Just one 
example of this comes from Blair's Mais lecture where he argues that: "We must recognise that the 
UK is situated in the middle of an active global market for capital -a market which is less subject to 
regulation today that it has been for several decades. Since it is inconceivable that the UK would want 
to withdraw unilaterally from this global market-place, we must instead adjust our policies to its 
existence. " (Blair, New Britain: 89-90). 
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New Labour's political influences 
Behind this shift was a reaction to radical right neo-liberalism, which it shared with 
Clinton and the so-called New Democrats. 871 Philip Gould advised Blair, after becoming 
leader, that he faced "... `Conservative hegemony'... " and that New Labour needed to 
rebuild "... completely from the ground up... 91.872 As we have already suggested, the shift 
was not as abrupt as this. Yet Heffernan, particularly, convincingly argues that, simply 
put, Thatcher developed a new paradigm and the Labour leadership progressively came 
to accept it. Britain saw a tension at both elite and mass levels in the established 
consensus by the 1970s. The parties went in different directions, creating alternatives. 
The two alternatives were fought over, with the Thatcherite neo-liberal option coming out 
on top. Labour viewed that it `lost' the 1980s and thus followed the Conservatives, who 
were said to have `won' that decade. New Labour eventually indicated that any 
alternative would need to be developed from this starting point. 
873 There was "... an 
acceptance of the economic legacy of Thatcherism ... " as the neo-liberal 
Economist 
crowingly put it. 874 
All the aspects of the `inevitable' globalisation mantra were also Thatcherite dictats that 
Labour had accepted progressively as its election defeats mounted up. Globalisation acted 
as an impersonal justification for a course Labour had taken and a way of deflecting the 
blame from the Labour leadership for accepting that neo-liberal path. 875 New Labour 
871 Driver and Martell: 172-3. The Australian Labor Party, whose leader Paul Keating was said to be close 
to Blair, and had seen a sharp lurch to the right, could be seen as another role model apart from the US 
Democrats. (Manners, Bruce. 1995. `Blair learns from down-under world where Left is Right', Sunday 
Telegraph, December 31 1995, Pilger, John. 1994. `The very best of mates', Guardian Weekend, July 23 
1994, Gallagher, Tony. 1995. `Blair, Murdoch and some disturbing questions about the superhighway', 
Daily Mail, October 5 1995). 
872 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 212. 
$" Heffernan, New Labour and Thatcherism. In this sense, the 1997 election success was "... was not 
another 1945... but a 1951... " where, like Churchill's Conservatives, Labour had to "... adjust to and 
succeed in a political world which was not of their making... ". (Crouch, Colin. 1997. ̀ The Terms of the 
Neo-Liberal Consensus' The Political Quarterly : 352-360.: 352). 
874 Leader, ̀ The vision thing: Tony Blair says his mission is to modernise Britain. It is not quite clear what 
he means', The Economist, September 27 1997. 
87S It took the Thatcherite Economist to argue that: "New Labour's fondness for talking about globalisation 
may be partly because it provides a politically acceptable way to ditch old ideas - `it was not that we were 
wrong you see, it's just that times have changed. "' (Leader, 'All mod cons: Tony Blair's economic 
inheritance', The Economist, September 27 1997). Globalisation instructed that business regulation would 
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effectively constructed: "... neo-liberalism itself as a given and irreversible fact of life' . 876 
As Mandelson latterly put it: "... globalisation punishes hard any country that tries to run 
its economy by ignoring the realities of the market or prudent public finances. In this 
strictly narrow sense ... we are all `Thatcherite' now". 
8" 
This is not to say that there were not policy differences between New Labour and the 
Conservative Party. 878 (Nor did the shift happen as incrementally as this simple narrative 
suggests). What New Labour grandly termed the `Third Way' - between undiluted neo- 
liberalism and Keynesian corporatism - also involved an emphasis on supply side 
measures, most notably on `education, education, education' and `New Deal' 
employment measures. 879 A communitarian influence on crime and welfare policies 
provided the call that rights should be matched by responsibilities. 880 
have to be minimal. Labour had committed itself to slashing `outdated regulation', further than that 
operated by the Conservatives. So party documents argued: "Labour does not believe in unnecessary 
outdated regulation on business ... 
in general, Labour recognizes the virtue of cutting red tape to reduce the 
burden of petty regulation wherever possible, while maintaining effective safeguards where necessary. " 
(Labour Party, Vision for growth: 12). Globalisation also dictated that national Keynesianism had to be 
abandoned. Tax and spend socialism had to be ruled out. "The growing integration of the world economy - 
in which capital and, to a lesser extent, labour move freely - means that it is not possible for Britain to 
sustain budget deficits or tax regimes that are wildly out of line with other major industrial countries. One 
of the requirements of our tax structure is to attract enterprise into the UK from overseas. " (Blair, New 
Britain: 89-90). Yet, as we saw, this had started to happen in the 1980s. Also, in the name of 
`modernisation' and accepting the operation of the "... new global markets... ", came market liberalisation. 
Thus, it was suggested: "For industry and jobs, there's no switching the clock back, but measures to 
modernise and equip our business and people for the new global markets. " (ibid.: 23). 
876 Fairclough: 28. Mulgan is another who by the time Labour was about to get into power saw a globalised 
world with a constrained ability of governments to act within it. As Mulgan put it, governments: "... need to 
be able to smell the way the world is moving, and adapt to it". (Interview with Lloyd, John. 1997. `Blair 
seeks current heirs for intellectual electricity', Financial Times, April 26 1997). 
87 He was writing after organising a Third Way conference with Blair and Clinton in 2002. (Mandelson, 
Peter. 2002. ̀ There's plenty of life in the ̀ new' Third Way yet', The Times, June 10,2002). 
878 For one thing, a core within the party still did not share these New Labour values. 
879 For a definition of the Third Way as involving public spending control and supply-side measures see 
Blair, Tony. 1998. ̀ A Modern Britain in a Modern Europe: speech to the annual friends of Nieuwspoort 
dinner, Ridderzall', The Hague. An early indication of this emphasis came with the Labour Party statement: 
"It is no longer sufficient to rely on the old national levers of demand management... it is failures of supply 
- in investment, in education and in training ... that lie at the heart of Britain's chronic economic 
weakness... ". (Labour, Party. 1995b. Rebuilding the economy. London: Labour Party, 1995.: 6). As 
Callaghan wryly states, this analysis: "... would have been a surprise to the highly educated and highly 
skilled people of Russia and Eastern Europe, still starved of inward investment ten years after the collapse 
of the Communist regimes". (Callaghan, Retreat: 158. ) Attempts to more broadly define the Third Way 
have had an occasional tendency to be vapid. So Gould quoted approvingly from Clinton a definition of the 
Third Way thus: "People do not believe in the rhetoric of left and right ... they have real problems, and they 
are crying desperately for someone who believes the purpose of government is to solve their problems and 
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Aspects of New Labour's consideration of globalisation also marked it out from pure 
Thatcherite neo-liberalism. The new right leadership, at least at first, saw that minimal 
government intervention could manage globalisation to bring benefits 881 Also, some of 
the widely held hopes of non-Conservatives on domestic policy, dashed in Labour's first 
term, were realised to a small degree as the Government settled into its second. 882 
But, overall, there was an altered political "... ground broken and reset... ", primarily by 
Thatcher, as well as Major, around which Labour gravitated. 883 Going beyond the 
Downesian model, which sees that electors influence parties, and Dunleavy's conception 
that parties influence electors, Heffernan recognises that parties can influence one 
another. The new ground reflected political change and a reaction to the Conservative's 
ability to control the political climate and achieve repeated electoral success. 884 
However, implicitly, New Labour had left some small room for movement, even within 
the globalisation `straitjacket'. The `hyperglobalist' thesis sees self-sufficiency and 
sovereign power having withered away. 885 New Labour has tended to vary between this 
make progress. " Gould's own attempt to consider it was that: "Halfway solutions linking old models don't 
work. New Labour should be positioned in the centre. " (Gould, The unfinished revolution: 236,25 1). 
880 Driver and Martell: 118-20,130-2, Anderson and Mann: 243-8, Sopel: 145. For the link between the 
Clinton, the communitarians and New Labour, see Gould, The unfinished revolution: 233-4, Rentoul: 285-6 
and Sopel: 145. For the argument that this rejected Thatcherite neo-liberal individualism in favour of 
conservatism see Driver and Martell: 28-9,167,169. 
881 This is how New Labour regarded the Third Way emphasis on education. Mandelson and Liddle, for 
instance, explicitly took from Reich the insistence that, while capital was mobile, labour was not and 
companies would go to where the skilled labour was. (Mandelson and Liddle: 89-90). As early as 1994, 
Gordon Brown publicly announced that the onset of globalisation meant that the government needed to 
help supply a more skilled workforce to enjoy economic productivity. Brown stated that: "... the 
competitiveness of nations is now determined by the skills and talents of their citizens. In the modern 
economy where capital, raw materials and technology are internationally mobile and tradable worldwide it 
is people - their education and skills - that are increasingly the most important determinant of economic 
growth. " (Brown, G, `Introduction' in Blair, New Britain: 2). 
82 Domestically, it was prepared to raise national insurance payments and use some of the savings it had 
amassed in order to increase spending significantly. 
883 Driver and Martell: 2. 
884 Heffernan, New Labour and Thatcherism, citing Downs, Anthony. 1957. An economic theory of 
democracy. New York: Harper and Row. and Dunleavy, Patrick. 1991. Democracy, bureaucracy and 
cublic choice : economic explanations in political science. New York ; London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.. 
8s The comprehensive overview provided by Held and his colleagues divides those debating political and 
economic globalisation into ideal types. One group adheres to the hyper-globalist thesis. Another group 
subscribes to the transformationalist thesis. While the separation Held and his fellow writers make between 
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view and that of the transformationalists - those that make no claims regarding 
globalisation's future direction. Indeed, part of the slippage of New Labour's approach to 
globalisation was to, at one and the same time, explicitly state that globalisation had 
happened, was inevitable and was following a set direction, while implicitly recognising 
that the process was indeterminate and still happening. 886 Thus, New Labour accepted 
implicitly that the process's future direction could be shaped. 
How has this affected Labour's press policy? It shall be argued here that New Labour 
accepted a neo-liberal globalisation agenda, the logic of which would bring its views 
more in line with press business. Following on from what was indicated in the previous 
chapter, New Labour justified its policies as promoting international competitiveness. 
However, within that, there were choices as to how closely to align with the newspapers 
firms. The particularity of this alignment may be coincidence, but looks suspiciously like 
collaboration, where New Labour's understanding of representation was also a factor. 
the hyper-globalist and transformationalist thesis can be debated, there is a basic divide. This is between 
one that sees the end of the sovereign nation state and one which makes "... no claims about the future 
trajectory of globalization... ". (Held, David. 1999. Global transformations : politics, economics and 
culture. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press : 7,3-10). Anthony Giddens was also a significant 
interpreter. (Giddens, Anthony. 1998. The third way : the renewal of social democracy. Malden, Mass. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998. ) 
886 Fairclough, for instance, quotes Blair as claiming that "... the driving force behind the policies 
associated with the Third Way is globalisation because no country is immune from the massive change that 
globalisation brings. " (Fairclough: 27, quoting Blair, T., `Facing the modern challenge: the third way in 
Britain and South Africa', 1999. Fairclough sees this as indicating that globalisation has been achieved. 
Yet, by using the verb `brings', it both implies that it has happened and that it is still to happen. There are 
other examples of this, for instance Blair's Hayman Islands speech. (Blair, Tony, `Speech to News Corp 
Leadership Conference, Hayman Islands, Australia, July 17 1995', in Blair, New Britain: 204). Within a 
broader attack on New Labour's critics with regard to globalisation, Anthony McGrew argues that the 
operation of the `Third Way' was a challenge to the notion that New Labour operated within a hyper- 
globalist straitjacket. (McGrew, Anthony. 2004. `Globalisation', in Plant, Raymond et. al. eds., The 
Struggle for Labour's Soul. London: Routledge: 137-162: 150-7). 
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PRESS POLICY UNDER SMITH 
Press and media strategy under Smith 
This shift was not clear at the start of Smith's time in office. In the early part of Smith's 
reign, the policy on both press ownership and Labour representation in the press differed 
from the later Kinnock period. Under Kinnock, the pressure to increase Labour 
representation through a press and media strategy had led to a tension with the demands 
for press diversity. Instead, Smith shunned the more overt press manipulation techniques 
and, in the early period, his frontbench vigorously promoted the cause of press plurality 
and accountability. 
The sea change in Labour's media relations and the techniques employed saw Smith 
banish many of Kinnock's key players from any effective influence. He also closed down 
the Shadow Communications Agency. 887 Why was this? The election failure did not help. 
Smith also had a personal animosity to Mandelson's coterie. 888 But the main reason was 
that the new leader was hostile to the media strategists' methods and their weighty 
influence. 889 In the period before his sudden death, Labour quietly used some of the 
887 The prominent strategists included Mandelson, Philip Gould and Hewitt. (Worcester Robert, M., and 
Roger Mortimore. 1999. Explaining Labour's landslide. London: Politico's Publishing.: 88, Gould, The 
unfinished revolution: 161-179, Jefferys, Kevin. 1999. Leading Labour : from Keir Hardie to Tony Blair. 
London: I. B. Tauris.: 204, Macintyre, Donald. 1999. Mandelson : the biography. London: HarperCollins.: 
246-50, Routledge, Paul. 1999. Mandy : the unauthorised biography of Peter Mandelson. London: Simon 
& Schuster.: 137,153, Sopel: 140, McSmith, Andy, `John Smith 1992-1994' in Jefferys: 205. Sopel: 140. 
Davies, Jerusalem: 435). Mandelson was `left kicking his heels', offered minor roles such as giving media 
advice to Smith's wife and running one by-election in Newbury in May 1993, where Labour's vote fell 
considerably. (Routledge: 139,140,146. Macintyre: 236,248-9, Gould, The unfinished revolution: 161-2). 
Phillip Gould fared little better, in his own words, left: "... out in the cold... ", accurately perceived as "... the 
architect of a defeated and discredited campaign... ". (Gould, The unfinished revolution: 161-2. See also 
Macintyre: 246). 
888 He was said to have described Mandelson's then associate, Derek Draper, as "... that little bastard ... ". 
(Routledge: 137,147. See also McSmith, John Smith 1992-1994: 205). 
889 Observers, in the words of Smith's biographer, indicated that the leader's view of the 1992 defeat was 
that it was, in part, caused by an over-reliance "... on professional advice in preference to the political 
instincts of experienced politicians". (McSmith, John Smith 1992-1994: 205). See also Davies, who 
implicitly links Smith with the more traditional social democrats in the Labour Party. (Davies, Jerusalem: 
435). 
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Clinton campaign's electoral techniques. 89° Yet, Smith publicly rejected what he called 
"... the black art of public relations". 89 1 He had an "... innate detestation of trickiness with 
the press". 892 
Thus, on this issue, he mostly sided with the traditionalists. 893 Although there was not 
complete symmetry, the battle between the `modernisers' and the `traditionalists' was 
intimately linked with perceptions of the media strategists' role. If there was the need for 
a completely new political approach to win over the press to broaden the party's support, 
then Labour needed the media strategists. If it could win without the Conservative 
newspapers' backing, then "... such people were surplus to requirements". 894 
890 Clinton campaigners worked for Labour on an important 1994 by-election. (Mike Jempson, Labour 
press officer for the 1994 Eastleigh by-election, interview with author, September 3 2002). 
91 He was quoted in 1993 as saying: "I don't like the black art of public relations that's taken over politics. 
We're talking about the government of the country - not the entertainment industry. " (Gould, The 
unfinished revolution: 105, also cited in Macintyre: 241). Jon Sopel indicates of the media strategists that 
there "... was a recognition by Smith that, in the name of Party unity, their presence would have been an 
unhelpful reminder of the ancien regime, and Neil Kinnock's more aggressive leadership style". (Sopel: 
140). 
892 According to his director of communications David Hill. (Macintyre: 241). 
893 These more traditional social democrats had John Prescott as a leading figure. He launched a series of 
attacks on the image-makers. This was a key aspect of the battle being waged between the traditional social 
democrats and the new left, on the one side, and the 'modernisers' of the new right. (McSmith, Playing: 
241-2,246, McSmith, John Smith: 302-3). The more bizarre aspect of this was the personalised public spat 
with Mandelson, which reached its apogee when Prescott conducted a `conversation' with a crab he 
christened ̀Peter' at a photo call with reporters. 
894 "Clipping the wings of the image-makers was one way to slow down the advance of the 
modernizers. "(McSmith, John Smith: 302-3). It is not as simple as to purely associate the press and media 
strategists with the `modernisers'. For instance, the `moderniser' MP Kim Howells, who Sopel wrongly 
describes as a traditionalist, in the period after the 1992 election, attacked the `spin doctors' for the 
Sheffield rally and anodyne statements that were produced by the party in that election. (McSmith, Playing: 
242, Sopel: 139. ) However, a strong indication that there was a link came in the clash over Clintonisation. 
Hollick and Philip Gould were among those who went to the US to survey and write on the lessons of the 
Clinton campaign for Labour. (Gould, The unfinished revolution: 175,177, McSmith, Playing: 241). 
Brown and Blair went later. (Sopel: 140-6, Macintyre: 241, Anderson and Mann: 22). Gould's message 
from the US was that Labour should further centralise its organisation - especially its political 
communications, as it was to do under Blair. Hollick announced that there was a need for a `new Labour 
Party', in part characterised by revising the trade union links. (Gould, The unfinished revolution: 175-177). 
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Press and Cross-Media Ownership under Smith 
At first, the Labour frontbench team also rejected the message of MPs wanting a press 
business rapprochement. Smith appointed the soft left stalwart Clwyd as Shadow 
Heritage Secretary in November 1992. Her duties included press policy. He was aware of 
the former journalist's involvement as a press and media campaigner and that she 
championed the right of reply, which she continued to support. Under her, Labour press 
policy limited itself to the same targets as the later Kinnock years. Yet, she employed a 
radical public zeal, notably with regard to News International and News Corporation, 
which associated the policy more with the remnants of the Labour new left. Although, by 
this stage, others in the party had little input in policy development, an indication of the 
direction taken was that Clwyd brought in the CPBF's Mike Jempson, as an adviser. 895 
896 897 She clashed with Jempson on policy. Yet, she was close to the CPBF. 
The Shadow Heritage Minister followed conference policy in rejecting calls to weaken 
the cross-media ownership rules. If anything, she intended them to be strengthened to 
challenge oligopoly -a market failure that needed government action to correct. In 
February 1993, Clwyd publicly told the Government to take action against News 
Corporation's "... totally unacceptable concentration of media ownership... ". 898 She 
renewed calls to hold an inquiry by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission into press 
895 Mike Jempson, interview with author, September 3 2002, Granville Williams interview, Freedman, 
2000: 227-8, Freedman, 2003: 160. 
996 He believed that Clwyd "... was nervous about the brief... " and he felt other MPs around her were 
"... building an atmosphere of paranoia, at the time". (Mike Jempson, interview with author, September 3 
2002). A member of her ministerial team, now Lord Corbett put it more forcefully: "She was the worst 
person that I have ever worked with in frontbench jobs, absolutely the worst, did not trust you, kept 
interfering -a busybody. It was: ̀ Who were you seeing, what were you up to, who said what, why did you 
say it, what did they say? ' and all that bloody rubbish. " (Corbett interview). 
89 "Ann Clwyd actually did relate to the campaign. She was one of those Labour MPs that knew us and 
trusted us. And therefore ... in shadow office she also relied on us, as a ... think tank... ". (Granville Williams interview, June 14 2002). As Jempson put it: "We quite liked the idea of having her, because she 







ownership and cross ownership, targeting News Corporation's "insidious monopoly.. . of 
opinion" later that year. 899 
In this earlier period of Smith's leadership, in stark contrast to the situation under Blair, 
Labour regarded media economic globalisation as a development that could and should 
be challenged. 900 So, Clwyd slammed "the globetrotter", after Murdoch publicly boasted 
that technologically-determined globalisation would let him overwhelm national media 
regulations. 
901 
Thoroughly modern Mowlam 
However, those associated with the modernisers fought back. They were aware of 
Smith's hostility to their conception of how to gain Labour representation in the press. 
They targeted media ownership liberalisation. Clwyd's attacks on News Corporation had 
prompted a strong repost in one of its newspapers, the Sunday Times. Its political editor 
had arrogantly counselled Smith to not follow Kinnock's `mistake' "... in involving his 
party in a commercial tussle well outside its orbit". Tellingly, he contrasted Clwyd's view 
with the "... struggle for modernity... ". 902 
Little noticed by other writers, Peter Mandelson, languishing in obscurity on the 
backbenches, had put out earlier feelers towards this new policy direction. He demanded 
a broadcasting ownership review in a Commons debate he initiated in July 1983. 
899 HOC June 10 1993, col. 474, Ivor Owen, ̀ Labour pledge on press ownership', Financial Times, June 11 
1993. See also Raymond Snoddy, `Newspaper price war stepped up by Murdoch', Financial Times, 
September 2 1993. She wrote in the Daily Mirror that his ownership concentration undermined "... free 
expression of the different points of view in society". (Clwyd, Ann. 1993. ̀ He's used his power to evade 
controls that governments might place on him', Daily Mirror, September 3 1993). 
900 When this notion was suggested to Lord Corbett, despite his antagonism to Clwyd, he readily agreed 
this was the case. (Corbett interview). 
901 She vowed to use the law to divest his newspaper and satellite holdings after previously promising that 
the News Corporation mogul "... must and will be stopped... ". (Culf, Andrew. 1993. ̀ Murdoch claims his 
technology will conquer national media laws', October 13 1993, Culf, Andrew. 1993. ̀ Clwyd attacks Tory 
line on broadcasting', The Guardian, September 27 1993). See also Freedman, 2000: 227, Freedman, 2003: 
161. 
902 Blair, it was said, needed to unburden himself of "... the left-wing's obsession with yesterday's lost 
arguments". (Jones, Michael. 1993. ̀Labour in a silly spin over satellite success', Sunday Times, September 
5 1993). 
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Contrary to party policy, he entertained the notion that this could consider further 
deregulation. 903 
Following this, Clwyd lost her place as a shadow minister. She failed to gain sufficient 
MP support in the elections still taking place to decide Shadow Cabinet places. 04 A 
moderniser replaced her, in a move that replicated the other shifts towards a more pro- 
business neo-liberal agenda - although it is not clear that Smith knew the direction she 
would take party policy. The party leader installed Mowlam in the Shadow Heritage post 
in October 1993. Mowlam, like Clwyd, was from the soft left tradition, but now closely 
aligned herself with the new right. 905 
The provisional outline of a new pattern started emerging fully six months before Blair's 
assumption of the leadership. Two interrelated pressures on Labour would be 
accommodated. 906 The policies to achieve this would be developed after the new right 
gained power over all aspects of press strategy. The Labour frontbench would vie with 
the Conservatives to outdo each other in arguing for liberalisation, as part of an emerging 
accommodation to a globalisation notion and a Tory paradigm. Within this framework, 
Mowlam, as a former key player in Smith's business-friendly Prawn Cocktail offensive, 
particularly attempted to ingratiate the party with a series of media conglomerates, of 
which News Corporation was just the most prominent. As Lord Corbett put it to the 
author: "Along comes Mo and Mo wants to tear it all up and start again... We have to 
903 HOC July 8 1993, col. 568. 
Ironically, for what was to happen, Lord Corbett, suggests this was because she failed to get sufficient 
support of left MPs. He emphasised that her position on media policy had little to do with this. He said: "In 
the Shadow Cabinet election there are all these slates running and you get on the Campaign Group slate or, 
the Tribune slate ... In an 
ideal world you get on both, and those alliances kept shifting and they shifted in 
a way that kept her off for two or three years, and then she got back on. " Corbett thought John Smith had 
little involvement in drawing up the policy she was espousing: "I don't think that John was there long 
enough there to get a grip on it, and I am not sure how much he would have listened to her anyway. I am 
absolutely certain that he was not the happiest bunny when she turned up in the Shadow Cabinet. " (Corbett, 
interview). 
905 In the months to come, she would become a part of the Blair leadership election team. (Gould, The 
un inished revolution: 202). 
906 One then Labour adviser regards the sea change as coming in 1994. (Mowlam advisor Jean Seaton 
interviewed by Nicholas Jones (Nicholas Jones, personal notes)). Yet, the new policy was already being 
publicly considered the year before. 
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stop being old fashioned, and childish... Minimum regulation and that is all we are 
about... ". 
907 
The influential future Culture, Media and Sport select committee chair, Gerald Kaufman, 
who wanted market domination of the media, particularly pushed the Labour frontbench 
towards this. He invoked globalisation and/or international competitiveness as the 
justification. 908 Labour still mentioned the role of a diverse press in maintaining 
democratic debate and discourse as a concern. But Labour by then rarely acted upon this. 
Mowlam's determination to start anew made the shift more abrupt, according to her 
deputy shadow minister, now Lord Corbett 909 The poor communication between 
successive Labour spokespeople was another factor. They did not pass on information on 
policy initiatives, according to another insider. 910 This haphazard attitude was again 
indicative of the relatively low importance placed on press and media policy. 
In November 1993, Mowlam first called for deregulation after facing concerted demands 
from press companies that globalisation had left national regulations outmoded 91 Rather 
than opposing a Government review to consider deregulation, Mowlam took up the 
modernisers' cudgel to battle to shift Labour's policy, so as to accept this new `reality'. 
At this stage, under Smith, she was mindful that the change of party policy had not fully 
occurred. Yet with this shift, came a change from Clwyd's view of globalisation. Instead 
of seeing it as a process that should and could be challenged, Mowlam reflected the New 
907 Corbett interview. 
908 Ibid. See, for instance, Kaufman, Gerald. 1995. `A word in you receiver dish', Guardian, July 12 1995, 
Gerald Kaufman, `We can't wait any longer to map the digital mediascape', New Statesman, April 3 1998. 
909 "There is a bit of Mo that likes to shock and I don't say that critically at all, and she is very much a sort 
of `why' person. You know, `why is this is where we are ... and 
lets look at this and start again', ". (Corbett 
interview). 
910 As Mike Jempson put it: "The most interesting thing for me, which I must admit came as a real shock, 
because I kind of assumed that machine politics had some rigour and some system, was that each 
successive shadow ... whatever they 
did never got passed on to the next person ... 
I think what was 
confusing to people who had been advisors was that they kind of assumed that there was a continuity to the 
advice. " This was, for instance, his experience in the detailed work he had done regarding Labour policy's 
with regard to the BBC. (Mike Jempson, interview with author, September 3 2002). 
911 In this instance, the regulations related to broadcasting and ITV ownership and it was the Conservative 
government that had announced a review to consider liberalisation. The justification for this review would 
be one that would be regularly invoked by the Labour leadership. That is that the press and media firms had 
to expand in order to compete in the world market. 
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Labour language indicated by Fairclough, following Marx's critique. With this, the 
market became a reified subject, rather than a human creation that could be regulated by 
government. 912 
The Shadow Heritage Secretary's new line soon extended to calling for increased cross- 
media ownership. Once the Government review was in place in January 1994, the 
discussion switched to newspaper ownership in broadcasting. The Conservative 1990 
Broadcasting Act had responded to concerns about cross-ownership by introducing rules 
so that no newspaper proprietor could own more than 20% of a terrestrial TV station. 13 
Labour had then opposed this move, as representing a "... dangerous concentration... " of 
ownership. 914 
However, newspaper businesses, through The British Media Industry Group, had been 
campaigning for the law to be changed. Along with successfully lobbying the 
Conservative government, the BMIG also used the review to lobby Labour. 915 It used the 
language of an all-conquering globalisation and a multimedia revolution to argue that it 
needed greater access to TV ownership to expand in order to survive. The companies saw 
it as unfair that Murdoch could indulge in satellite TV cross-ownership, but they could 
not do likewise with terrestrial television. 916 
912 Thus, she told one newspaper: "My personal view is that politicians are not keeping up to speed with 
changes in the market place. My personal view is that we should have a change of policy. The reality is that 
we haven't. " (Wynn Davies, Patricia. 1993. `Labour attacked over TV `sell-out", Independent, November 
26 1993, Nisse, Jason. 1993. `Foreign firms plan ITV bids: French group stalks LWT as ownership rules 
are eased', Independent on Sunday, November 28 1993, Nisse, Jason. 1993. `Brooke to allow large 
television companies to merge' Independent on Sunday, November 28 1993). 
913 See, for instance, Great Britain Department of National Heritage. 1995. Media ownership : the 
Government's proposals. London: HMSO.: 10, Goodwin, Television: 143. 
9: 4 Department of National Heritage: 10, HOC April 24 1991. 
91 The BMIG was also very influential in the Conservative government's liberalisation shift. Its members 
were the main beneficiaries. (Doyle, Media ownership: 94-5). The BMIG included the Pearson Group 
(involved with the Financial Times), Associated Newspapers (The Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday), the 
Guardian Media Group and the Telegraph. 
916 As the managing director of the Pearson Group, Frank Barlow, put it: "Canal owners didn't end up 
owning railways, or railway owners running airlines: they went out of business. That's what this legislation 
will do to publishers unless it is changed. " (Barlow, Frank. 1994. `Expansion or bust', Independent, 
January 12 1994). Goodwin has effectively dismissed the BMIG's claims that its demands for increased ' 
cross-ownership were a response to a new multimedia environment (Goodwin, Television). Another 
problem was with the argument of financial survival. The difficulty was that the official industry statistics 
did not indicate this. They showed that television's share of advertising had stayed at the same level over 
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Yet, along with the danger to diversity, cross-ownership potentially threatened public 
service broadcasting and led to cross promotion. 17 Commercial television's takeover by 
proprietors who were used to influencing the political direction of reporting and by 
editorial staff schooled in this tradition would, at least, provide a potential challenge to 
ITV's practice of `balance'. 
Under the combined pressure of the Conservative's influence on the political climate, the 
new understanding of globalisation and the newspaper businesses demands that this 
dictated a fresh course, Mowlam caved in. 
At first, the shadow minister indicated that she feared that a deal would be struck between 
the Conservatives and press businesses to end the 20% rule 918 Within days, as if to pre- 
empt this, she made those fears a reality for Labour. Without reference to any agreed 
Labour conference policy, she decided that the 20% rule was "... irrational... " and had to 
be changed. At first, she indicated that she did not know what percentage it should be 
replaced by. An indication that her new understanding did not automatically dictate a new 
path was that she disputed the claims that media groups needed to be bigger to compete 
internationally. 919 However, her scepticism about expansion soon faded. 
The party leadership further advanced its business-friendly neo-liberal deregulatory 
approach at the 2 1s` Century Media Conference, presided over by Mowlam in July 1994 - 
the previous ten years. (Brown, Maggie and Michael Leapman, `Let the feeding frenzy commence', 
Independent, January 12 1994, Trades Union Congress. Annual, Conference. 1994. Report of the 126th 
annual Trades Union Congress. London: T. U. C.: 301). 
917 This was one reason that, even under the Conservatives, cross-ownership legislation, impinging as it did 
on the more interventionist broadcasting law, went beyond the competition law applying to other industries. 
As we have seen before, the traditionally editorially partial positions taken by the press contrasted with 
public service imposition of `impartiality' when it came to news reporting. It should also be remembered 
that the extent to which public service broadcasters have maintained a sense of balance, particularly with 
regard to labour movement reporting, has been questioned, particularly by the work of the Glasgow Media 
Group. (Beharrell, Peter, and Group University of Glasgow Media. 1976. Bad news. London ; Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul., Beharrell, Peter, and Group Glasgow University Media. 1980. More bad news. 
London ; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ). 
918 Brown, Maggie. `Giant media groups on the way', Independent, January 4 1993, Snoddy, Raymond. 
1993. ̀Media review aims to boost UK ownership overseas', Financial Times, January 4 1993. 
919 Mowlam, Marjorie. 1994. ̀Labour's Watching Brief, Independent, January 12 1994. 
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before Blair became leader. Media campaigners had originally suggested this event. Yet, 
rather than organising a party gathering to which outside speakers would be invited, 
which would reflect Labour's traditional alliances in media reform, Mowlam organised a 
conference for media business to tell the Labour leadership what it should do. A 
participant from one of Labour's traditional allies considered that it represented "... the 
very clear statement that New Labour was going onto a corporate media agenda' . 920 A 
more surprisingly blunt assessment of its role comes from Mowlam's deputy, Corbett. He 
said: "We had a great bloody conference... which some media moguls paid for... And 
that was it really. It just went out of the door after that... ". 921 
When the author questioned Mowlam, she denied that she had wanted to loosen the 
ownership rules. 922 However, the facts speak for themselves. Mowlam had taken on 
board the liberalising message from the newspaper owners, reiterated at the 
conference. 923 Before and at the event she argued that "... some loosening of cross-media 
restrictions... " was "... inevitable... " 924 
Mowlam also told the author: "I was doing nothing to add to Murdoch's strength. It was 
the furthest thing from my mind. "925 Yet, again the reality was different 926 As we have 
920 "In other words, it was an exclusive business thing... This is about a relationship to the media where 
`we start to minimise the flack and start talking business friendly'. " (Granville Williams interview). Among 
those involved were the BMLG and News International, cable companies and the privatised BT. (Goodwin, 
Television: 146, Freedman, 2000: 230, Freedman, 2003: 163). Although the press and media strategists 
were not seen to be involved in these developments, a key ally was. Lord Hollick, a central figure in the 
election campaign also an important Labour link to the media corporations, had recently attacked the 
existing cross-ownership rules. (Freedman, 2003: 161-2). 
921 Nevertheless, it should be noted that Lord Corbett approvingly spoke of the policy of listening to media 
business interests and stopping "... going out of our way to find specific interest groups to upset. Because 
this did not have a good effect when the vote came to be counted. " (Corbett interview). 
922 Mo Mowlam, questioned by the author at the launch meeting for her book, Momentum, in Brighton on 
May 6 2002. Also, she was offended at such suggestions from campaigners for diversity when she was 
shadow secretary, according to one witness. She said that she had not done ̀ anything wrong'. (Granville 
Williams interview). ' 
923 At the conference, Guardian Media Group's chair, Harry Roche reiterated the BMIG line that the 20% 
rule should go. The justification was to aid international competitiveness, so that newspaper publishers 
"... would be able to make the proper contribution to the investment required in Britain... ". (Maggie 
Brown, `Rule change urged on media ownership', Independent, July 14 1994). 
924 Henry, Georgina. 1994. ̀Balancing act on a see-saw', The Guardian, June 27 1994. See also TUC 1994: 
389, O'Malley and Soley: 94. 
925 Mowlam in Brighton. 
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seen, the loosened cross ownership rules would aid News Corporation and BMIG. This 
was because the regulations barred them from having a stake in terrestrial TV, which 
analysts increasingly saw them as craving. 27 It was certainly the case, by this stage, that 
Clywd's commitment to challenge News Corporation's existing ownership had 
evaporated 928 Labour's former bogeyman, along with other media businesses, was 
starting to be accommodated. A conference witness says a News Corporation 
representative even thanked the organisers for the opportunity to influence party 
policy. 929 By that time, seemingly high-spending media conglomerate lobbyists had 
Labour's ear. Jempson views it that: "She may well not have realised it, but ... the 
significant thing, I suppose, was that it [Labour] was saying `we're listening to you'. " 
930 
Again, as with other areas, at the time, Mowlam invoked globalisation as a justification 
for deregulation. She had earlier indicated that she regarded this as part of as an 
unstoppable ̀media revolution'. Again similar to the wider thinking, she also viewed that 
it could be managed in order to bring benefits 931 
Nonetheless, nothing was decided formally at this stage. The Labour movement strongly 
opposed this new line. However, the leadership ignored it and flouted its decisions. The 
TUC and socialists outside the Labour Party rejected the new trajectory, as has been 
926 One leading press activist dismissed the view Mowlam expressed to this work's author as "... just wish- 
fulfilment". (Granville Williams interview). What is striking is how little Langdon's sympathetic biography 
deals with this important period of Mowlam's time as a politician. Equally, little is mentioned in Mowlam's 
autobiography, save that she says that she met many media executives who would help her later on in her 
career. (Langdon, Julia. 2000. Mo Mowlam. London: Little, Brown & Company., Mowlam, Marjorie. 2002. 
Momentum : the struggle for peace, politics and the people. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2002. ) After 
questioning Mowlam, one gets the impression that this period is a closed book, which she is reluctant to 
reopen. 
9z. See, for instance, Barnett, Steven. 2002. `Bill throws broadcast up in air', The Observer, May 5 2002 
and Doward, Jamie. 2002. ` How far can Blair go before Murdoch hits back? ', The Observer, May 5 2002. 
928 See, for instance, Leader, `A place in the Sun for Blair? ', Independent, August 10 1994. 
929 Mike Jempson, interview with author, September 3 2002, Freedman, 2000: 230. 
930 "It was really a shift from `we have got something to say, you must listen'. And the amount of money 
that was being spent lobbying then, I think, was extraordinary. " (Mike Jempson, interview with author, 
September 3 2002). Lord Corbett confirmed the lobbyists' involvement, saying: "Mo ran a very open door 
policy and that was fine. " (Corbett interview). 
9" In arguing for this, she also used the `Third Way' rhetorical device of appearing to provide an 
alternative to two unsavoury positions. She indicated that her view was opposed to both Kaufman's and to 
the traditional Labour approach, which she characterised as the "`We know what's best for people' one, 
let's keep things as they are" position. (Henry, Georgina. 1994. `Balancing act on a see-saw', The 
Guardian, June 27 1994). 
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noted by Freedman. 932 A section of Labour MPs, including Mullin, Clwyd and Dennis 
MacShane, took the same view when they brought the Media (Diversity) Bill to the 
Commons in January 1995, as indicated by Humphreys. 33 
What other accounts have downplayed was that the 1994 Labour Party conference also 
opposed the new line. The first conference with Tony Blair as leader overwhelmingly 
backed a motion calling for the party to oppose any moves to further deregulate the 
media industry. 934 A succession of speakers called on Labour to go further and commit to 
diversifying the oligopolistic press; "... proper newspaper regulation... to break up the 
monopolies... ", as one delegate put it. Mowlam dutifully pledged to the conference to act 
932 Freedman, 2000: 232-4. The TUC congress criticised Mowlam, agreeing that the relaxation of rules 
"... would lead to further concentration of media ownership and power which already distorts the 
newspaper and publishing industry in the United Kingdom. " It was agreed that the TUC general council 
should work with the media unions and the CPBF to campaign against relaxing the rules. The TUC went 
further to vow to campaign for measures to limit newspaper ownership and cross-media ownership by 
individual firms and to "... reverse the unhealthy concentration... ", although it was not specific as to what 
this would entail. Tony Burke, of the printers union, the GPMU, was only one of a number of senior media 
union trade unionists to attack Mowlam's "... disastrous... " plans to further loosen the "... very few 
effective restrictions on media ownership in the UK... ". The union leaders were particularly scathing about 
Labour's new rapprochement with News International. Burke warned Blair, who was then soon to be 
installed as leader: "Beware of Aussies bearing gifts because there will he a very high price to pay for 
Murdoch's support. This Faustian pact will lead to eventual disaster for Labour ... ". The NUJ's general 
secretary John Foster condemned the liberalisation as leading to a situation where "... fewer and fewer 
owners will gain editorial control". (TUC 1994: 389-91, Freedman, 2000: 230). 
933 These again faced the problem that they would have restricted ownership rather than providing for new 
titles. Moreover, they placed limits on foreign ownership that would have faced the same problems 
identified in the previous chapter, although they were by no means either as nationalistic or draconian as 
those the party leadership advocated, even if their main target would be similar. Nonetheless, if such a Bill 
had been enacted, it would have made possible a significant step towards press diversity, at least. In 
contrast to Mowlam's position, and in line with the sentiments of the recently-passed party policy and the 
social democratic tradition, Labour MP Mullin introduced the Media (Diversity) Bill to the Commons, 
under the ten minute rule, in January 1995. Clwyd, Dennis MacShane and other Labour MPs supported it. 
It aimed to enforce press diversity by barring any national newspaper proprietor from owning more than 
one daily or Sunday title. In an example of policy transfer, which went beyond the US policy, which was its 
inspiration, the Bill barred any non-EC citizen from possessing more than 20% of a company that owned a 
national newspaper or TV station. It would also change the law so that satellite operations would be 
governed by the same rules as terrestrial television. On cross-ownership, this would mean that no firm with 
a controlling interest in satellite or terrestrial television could own more than 20% of a national newspaper, 
which would have led to News Corporation having to sell part of its empire. (HOC, January 11 1995, col. 
153-6. See also Humphreys, Peter. 2000. ̀ New Labour policies for the media and the arts' Pp. 221-239 in 
New labour in power, edited by Augustine Lawler Peter and David Coates. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000.: 228). There was an additional problem in that there was no provision for 
supporting the divested titles. As we shall see later, in a depressed market, newspapers like the Independent 
were to be baled out while facing a bitter price war by the Times. Thus, such a bid for press diversity would 
have to have been backed up with measures to sustain the divested newspapers. Otherwise, it would have 
led to titles going to the wall. 
934 Porter, Henry. ̀ Murdoch: The Wooing Game', The Guardian, September 26 1994. 
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against further deregulation - and then the Labour frontbench promptly ignored her 
commitment 935 
ENTER TONY BLAIR: GLOBALISATION SHAPED BY REPRESENTATION 
The tide was turning further away from the conference position. With Blair's arrival, 
press ownership policy could be fully developed along the modernisers' lines. As we 
shall see, there was a determination to go along with the globalisation grain. Labour also 
developed its strategies for gaining representation in the press and media. Neither was the 
globalisation strategy nor that concerning representation dictated by the other. However, 
the first enhanced the second. There is a suspicious coincidence of these two strategies. 
We shall also see that there are some indications that the representation strategy and the 
agency of the newspaper businesses shaped how New Labour treated the imperative to go 
with the grain of globalisation in press policy. 
The connections with the press businesses look suspiciously like collaboration in this 
context. Nevertheless, this work will argue that, in seeking to get press support, and 
particularly that of News Corporation, there was no need for a formal `pact'. Instead, 
insiders describe the understanding between Blair and News Corporation. The 
organisation was well aware of Labour's policy shifts and had been involved in 
discussions on them. 
Thus, the tension between diversity and Labour representation was by now reaching 
breaking point. Those formulating Labour policy were aware that wooing newspaper 
businesses and, in the process, advocating rules that even reduced media diversity would 
advance the goal of Labour representation. 936 Also, Labour's bid to increase its 
representation in the press could benefit from Labour's economic policy shift. Labour 
935 Rudd, Roland. 1994. ̀The Labour Party in Blackpool: Tougher line on media urged', Financial Times, 
October 8 1994. 
936 Like for the most part under Kinnock, the relationship between the two is not discussed much by Labour 
insiders. For instance, as we indicated in the last chapter, the role of the press businesses is little discussed 
by Philip Gould. In fact, business generally is little discussed in the book. It only is alluded to tangentially 
when the market economy is discussed or when he indicates that there is a need for a competitive Britain. 
(Gould, The unfinished revolution). 
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operated within a framework reset by neo-liberalism, as we indicated earlier. In such a 
climate, support for Blair did not have the dangers of the past for the hierarchies of 
traditionally Conservative newspapers. 
In this, as with other areas, as we have seen, Smith was the aberration. 37 The latter part 
of the Smith era was not out of sync with regard to press ownership. Yet, under Blair, the 
press strategy's two aspects were much more clearly accordant. New Labour emphasised 
representation rather than diversity, building on the momentum of the later Kinnock 
years. As we shall see in Appendix I to this chapter, this representation strategy had 
some similarities to that under Kinnock, although there were particular differences, with 
regard to the tabloid press and News Corporation. This representation strategy was 
extraordinarily successful, before the cracks started to appear. 
The unions underwent a similar process. By now, as we have noted, no other agency 
inside Labour aside from the leadership had much influence on party policy. Although 
New Labour greatly froze the TUC out of policy development, the little pressure which 
the unions could have placed on the leadership on press diversity was repeatedly not 
exercised -a point which has been underplayed 
938 The TUC had pulled back in 
campaigning to challenge press ownership policy. One key reason for this was that the 
TUC paralleled the party in concentrating on getting better representation for itself, rather 
than by following the media unions' pleas to concentrate on attempting to increase 
diversity, as shall be considered further in Appendix 1 of this chapter. 
93' As Charles Clarke put it: "Tony Blair was the linear descendant of Neil Kinnock as a modernising 
Labour leader. John Smith was not. " (Interview with Clarke, in Gould, The unfinished revolution: 178). 
938 An indication of the distance that Blair wanted to be seen to make between himself and the trade union 
leadership was given by the senior broadcaster Nicholas Jones to the author. He said: "If you want to find a 
picture of Blair with union leaders, you will not be able to find it. They don't exist. You know when he 
does not come out and stand with them on the steps of Downing Street - he knows that that would be a 
disaster. You can see him walking down the steps with John Monks into the TUC dinner, but they will 
never ever allow us access, so you cannot ever see Blair in a smoke-filled room with trade union leaders. " 
(Nicholas Jones, interview with author, August 30 2002). 
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Labour Representation: Meeting Mr Murdoch 
We shall assess the impact of globalisation on press policy in detail in the course of this 
chapter. Firstly, however, we need to consider the question: Why did the Conservative 
newspapers, particularly News Corporation's, soften their support for the Conservatives 
and edge closer to Labour? Martin Linton and the former Marxism Today editor Martin 
Jacques have argued that class dealignment caused this 939 This argument, similar to that 
New Labour used to explain the party's previous electoral defeats, would have had more 
validity if the press organisations had not been at the same time engaging in crude `class 
war' tactics in derecognising the main journalist union 940 
A more convincing explanation is that New Labour consciously wooed those newspapers, 
as part of a bid for representation, which was reciprocated. Why it was particularly 
considered that the News Corporation tabloids were important will be outlined in the first 
appendix to this chapter. Other methods for achieving representation through structural 
change of the press were part of a past to which New Labour did not wish to return. Such 
policies were out of kilter with its attempt to go with the grain of globalisation and also 
the tenor of EU media policies. The shift in Labour's stance on newspaper and media 
ownership had the advantage of making Labour more amenable to press business 
interests. 
McNair and Freedman are among those who recognise this latter point, with regard to 
Murdoch, and suggest that both sides would gain from deepening their relationship. But 
they do not extensively develop this point 941 So, how, specifically, was New Labour able 
to get Murdoch's support? Colin Seymour-Ure suggests that Murdoch's motives to 
support Blair can only be inferred, with regard to media policy. 942 It cannot be proved 
939 Linton interview. This is an argument McNair cites and accepts. (McNair, Brian. 1999. Journalism and 
democracy : an evaluation of the political public sphere. London: Routledge, 1999.: 149-50). 
940 For examples of this, see NUJ magazine Journalist. 
941 McNair, Journalism and democracy: 150, Freedman, 2000: 224-5, Freedman, 2003: 158-9. 
942 Seymour-Ure, Colin. 1997. ̀ Editorial Opinion in the National Press' in Britain votes 1997, edited by 
Pippa Norris and T. Gavin Neil. Oxford: Oxford University Press in association with the Hansard Society 
for Parliamentary Government.: 78-100: 84. Yet, he starkly notes, in relation to Murdoch that: "In one 
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unambiguously, certainly. However, by primarily using two insider sources, one a diary 
previously relatively little noted, we can attempt to piece together at least a preliminary 
answer to this question. 43 
A combination of circumstances brought them together, it appears, as both a political as 
well as a business decision. From insider accounts it appears that Murdoch is a deeply 
political right-winger who wishes to advance such an agenda, but will adjust his tactics in 
doing this, constrained by his business interests 944 Murdoch had shown himself to be 
tactically adroit. He had let some of his papers support a British Labour government-in 
the 1970s and the Australian Labour Party - before withdrawing support to both 
gas On 
this occasion, Murdoch became hostile to the Conservative leadership, while the Labour 
leadership's overall policy positions were closer to Murdoch's than at any time 
previously. The Labour hierarchy was willing to relax media legislation to Murdoch's 
advantage, among others. It progressively looked more likely to win and thus it was also 
to Murdoch's business advantage to support Labour. 
In order to understand this development, we should quickly consider the Major 
government's relationship with Murdoch. At first, insider accounts suggest, it was less 
that Murdoch was attracted to Blair but more that the Tories under Major disillusioned 
him - while he could work with Blair. He had told close confidants that he was now 
"... dead against... " Major, seeing him as "... useless and finished... "946 The newspaper 
that the then Sunday Times editor Andrew Neil described as `Murdoch's mouthpiece' 
political field today's media baron does have an interest which is direct and fundamental: media policy. - 
(Seymour-Ure, Prime ministers: 113). 
943 Wyatt, Neil, Andrew. 1997. Full disclosure. London: Pan Books. The Neil book was poured over, not 
least by other journalists. Lord Wyatt's diaries were either rather dismissed or ignored. See Chapter 2 for a 
discussion on the validity of this particular source. 
944 Neil, Wyatt. 
gas As he told one interviewer: "There is no point either in sucking up to politicians. What is important is to 
make sure that you have covered political bases. " (Brooks, Richard. 1998. ̀ Love, marriage and the real 
Rupert Murdoch', The Observer, November 8 1998). According to a senior NUJ official: "Murdoch deals 
with whoever is in power, and this even goes as far as his employment policies. All Murdoch's papers in 
Australia are union closed shops and Murdoch negotiated with the unions quite happily. Murdoch deals 
with existing power... ". (Gopsill interview). 
946 This emerges from Wyatt's journals. This assessment is all the more striking because Murdoch revealed 
it to Wyatt, who he knew was a close confidant of the then Prime Minister. (Wyatt: 442, see also 105,324- 
5,443. See also Neil: 569). 
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made clear its opposition. 947 As early as January 1994, a Sun editorial had bitterly 
attacked the Major leadership wailing: "What fools we were to believe this lot. "948 
As importantly, the feeling was mutual. Like another Conservative premier before him, 
Major had felt the newspapers' wrath. He felt the Conservatives' traditional press allies 
had turned against him from the time of the ERM debacle in 1992 949 He also hated press 
intrusion. 950 What is more, according to his confidant, he had specific reasons for this 
hostility, to do with his personal life. 951 Lord Wyatt says this prompted Major to privately 
vow to him: "If I had a majority of a hundred and fifty, I would crush Rupert 
Murdoch. -052 This hostility seems to have extended to members of his Cabinet 953 
This may have been an idle threat, but Major did consider ways of reducing Murdoch's 
power. He also made sure that those close to Murdoch knew he was considering this 954 
His Conservative predecessor Stanley Baldwin, with the help of his scriptwriter and 
cousin-in-law, Rudyard Kipling, had famously railed against those who had `power 
without responsibility' 955 Major responded by contemplating legislating in a way that the 
94' As for proprietorial interference in its editorial line, its former chief leader writer commented that: "In 
the case of the Sun, the decisive voice has always been that of Mr Murdoch. " (Spark, Ronald. 1997. ̀ It was 
Rupert Murdoch wot done it', Daily Telegraph, March 19 1997). 
941 Quoted in McKie, David. 1998. "Clingers, Waverers, Quavers: The Tabloid Press in the 1997 Election. " 
in Political communications : why Labour won the general election of 1997, edited by Ivor Crewe, Brian 
Gosschalk, and John Bartle. London: Frank Cass, 1998.: 117. 
949 The Sun had led most of the Conservative press in backing Redwood against Major in the 1995 
leadership contest. (Ibid.: 115-130, esp., 117. Norris, Pippa. 1998. "The Battle for the Campaign Agenda. " 
in New Labour triumphs : Britain at the polls, edited by Anthony Stephen King. Chatham, N. J.: Chatham 
House., Junor, Penny. 1993. The Major enigma. London: Michael Joseph, 1993.: 302). For instance, Sun 
editor Kelvin McKenzie had famously told Major in the immediate aftermath of the ERM debacle that he 
had "... a large bucket of shit on my desk and tomorrow I'm going to pour it all over your head". This story 
is retold in Neil: 10-11. 
950 According to his biographer, before becoming PM: "... he had enjoyed a favourable press for the most 
part and had built up no immunity". (Junor: 216). c
was said that he had discovered that the Sun had spent vast sums in the early 1990s renting an 
apartment near a house where it thought he had a girlfriend, in order to spy on his movements. He also was 
furious at the way a Murdoch paper had exposed an affair his son James had had with his superior at work. 
(Wyatt : 163). We now know that Major had conducted an affair with a Conservative colleague in 1980s. 
(Currie, Edwina. 2002. `I chose my lover too well', The Times, September 30 2002). 
952 He was quoted as adding: "It's the reason why no decent people want to go into public life these days. If 
they can't get something on him, they get it on his family. " (Wyatt: 481. See also p. 511 and p. 602). 
93' Major was said to have told Wyatt: "It would have been much worse if the others had had their way in 
the Cabinet. They want to close some of his newspapers immediately. " (Wyatt: 514). 
994 Ibid.: 162. 
955 Curran and Seaton. 
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Labour leadership had shied away from. Major considered bringing in the sort of law the 
Labour Party had supported in its radical but nationalistic phase -a nationality clause for 
the ownership of titles 956 His and Murdoch's mutual antagonism was exemplified and 
amplified by the proposals for newspaper owners and cross-ownership contained in the 
Conservative government's Broadcasting Bill. 
Globalisation shaped by representation: The Broadcasting Bill and Labour 
Following lobbying from the BMIG, the Conservative government announced in 1995 
that it would liberalise cross-ownership rules to bring it more in line with general 
competition policy. Yet, this would be achieved in a way which would exclude News 
Corporation and the Mirror Group. The Government had justified this move in terms of 
the inevitable rush of technologically-determined globalisation and convergence. "" In a 
significant departure from Labour's previous positions, but in the framework of Labour's 
globalisation analysis, the Labour frontbench turned its back on the party's conference 
policy and followed suit. 
The shift in Labour's policy, which Mowlam had considered under John Smith's 
leadership, now became a reality under Blair's New Labour opposition. Despite the 
rhetoric, New Labour seemed little concerned that the rights of the press firms to oversee 
the promulgation of ideas with few controls came with responsibilities. Instead, Chris 
Smith having taken over from Mowlam as Shadow Heritage Secretary, agreed with the 
Conservative government's 1995 White Paper, which opened the way for newspaper 
956 Wyatt: 481. See also p. 511 and p. 602. 
957 Great Britain Department of National, Heritage. 1995. Media ownership : the Government's proposals. 
London: HMSO, 1995.: esp.: 7,15. Rather than considering that ownership was key in gauging diversity, , the Conservatives placed more emphasis on audience share in its measurements. Moreover, calculations of 
audience shares in various systems advocated measured audience share in various media differently, 
leading to hugely divergent conclusions. The BMIG's calculations, for instance were denounced as a 
lobbying tactic, which was necessarily arbitrary and subjective in its weighting. The BMIG also 
downplayed the difference in ownership systems, by equating, for instance, a publicly-owned BBC - bound 
by impartiality laws, with Associated Newspapers - publishers of the passionately polemical Daily Mail. 
(Collins and Murroni: 70, Goodwin, Television: 147-8, Barn ett, Steven. 1995. ̀ More noise, fewer voices = 
Powerful vested interests must not dictate who owns the media', Independent, March 27 1995). 
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groups with under 20% of national newspaper circulation to wholly own as many 
television channels as they wanted - up to 15% of the entire television market. 
Yet, this legislation left News Corporation out in the cold. The Conservative plans left the 
majority of newspaper groups in the BMIG able to spread into television. However, 
News Corporation and the Mirror Group could not expand into terrestrial TV, because of 
their newspaper holdings' size. Murdoch made clear his "... furious rage... " at even this 
minimal constraint. 958 An insider account indicates that Murdoch was also influenced to 
support Blair because the Major government was investigating News Corporation digibox 
monopolisation. Despite lobbying from Murdoch personally and others, Major refused to 
budge. He was said to have revealed: "It would have been much worse if the others had 
had their way in the Cabinet. They want to close some of his newspapers 
immediately. "959 
Blair and his coterie had had"meetings with Murdoch on his trips to London, as insiders 
960 have revealed, Yet, this rapprochement's most visible illustration was Blair's 
attendance at the News Corporation's Leadership Conference on the Hayman Islands in 
July 1995 961 In this, the parallels between New Labour and the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP) were striking. 962 Blair was said to have become close to the Labor leader Paul 
958 Wyatt's diaries reveal that, according to his close ally, the White Paper's proposals left Murdoch "... in a 
furious rage... " with "that idiot Dorrell", the National Heritage minister outlining them. (Wyatt: 511,582). 
There was also a public response, where Murdoch railed: "... you come and nationalise me. I don't care if 
you say `get out of Britain'... ". (TV interview with John Pennygate reprinted as `The empire strikes back', 
The Guardian, May 22 1995, Culf, Andrew. 1993. 'Murdoch dismisses `paranoid' critics', The Guardian, 
May 22 1995). See also Oborne, Peter. 1999. Alastair Campbell : New Labour and the rise of the media 
class. London: Aurum.: 142 and Craig, Jon. 1995. `Murdoch attacks `vendetta' over media ownership', 
Daily Express, May 24 1995. 
959 Wyatt: 536,550,553,514,582,684,720,722. A telling aside by one leading journalist was that: 
"Cabinet ministers now talk in private, in terms similar to those used by the Bennites in the early 1980s, of 
the unchecked power of foreign newspaper owners. " (Macintyre, Donald. 1995. `The odd couple on 
honeymoon in the Sun', Independent, July 18 1995. See also Williams, Get me a murder a day: 240. For a 
discussion of the Conservative position on digital TV see Goodwin, Television: 152-3. 
° Neil: xxii-xxiii, 209-10, Wyatt. See also Oborne: 141-2 and Greenslade, Press Gang: 621. 
96' As a senior NUJ official put it to the author: "Power works not just behind the scenes. It also works by 
demonstrating your power ... 
It is very embarrassing for politicians, but for Murdoch the important thing 
was that Blair was seen to be there. " (Gopsill interview). 
'62 Like Labour in the 1970s, Murdoch had given the ALP support and then his papers had given its leader 
a battering. In the 1980s, the ALP had worked hard to provide a compliant media. Its period in office saw a 
concentration in newspaper ownership, so that by 1994, of the twelve major dailies, seven were controlled 
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Keating, meeting him beforehand and travelling to the Hayman Island conference with 
him 963 Particularly significantly, Blair chose this conference to make one of his most 
important speeches embracing globalisation, as we have seen. Furthermore, one of the 
consequences of going with the grain of globalisation, he told the corporation's top 
executives, was that press and media legislation would aim at an "... open and 
competitive media market... ". 64 
As the pressure for diversity was waning, if going with the grain of globalisation was 
important and wooing Murdoch was seen to be significant, then there was an 
overwhelming pressure on press ownership policy considerations such as diversity. These 
could be seen to be subordinate or even counterproductive. The journalist and media 
activist turned Blairite MP Martin Linton told the author that there was a shift in 
Labour's policy to gain the support of press business, particularly News Corporation and 
the tabloids. But, he indicated, a "... price has been paid". He considered that: "There are 
obviously things that this government wouldn't be prepared to do because it might 
by Murdoch and three by Conrad Black, owner of the Telegraph titles. (Manners, Bruce. 1995. ̀Blair learns 
from down-under world where Left is Right', Sunday Telegraph, December 31 1995, Pilger, John. 1994. 
`The very best of mates', Guardian Weekend, July 23 1994, Tony Gallagher, ̀ Blair, Murdoch and some 
disturbing questions about the superhighway' Daily Mail, October 5 1995, Pilger, John. 1994. 'Murdoch's 
Love for New Labour', Free Press, No. 88, September-October 1995). The changes, which Paul Keating 
introduced as Australian government treasurer, led to Murdoch's News Limited moving from being one of 
the smallest newspaper companies to publishing more than 60% of Australia's newspapers. At the time, it 
was widely believed that the Government was partly motivated by the wish to favour media owners it 
regarded as ̀ mates'. Those Keating negotiated with included Murdoch and Conrad Black. According to a 
company memo, Keating is said to have told a media rival latterly that he alerted Murdoch and another 
media mogul Packer, but not other media firms, months prior to the new legislation being announced. 
(Schultz, Julianne. 1998. Reviving the fourth estate : democracy, accountability and the media. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998.: 83-4. See also Pilger, John. 1994. ̀The very best of mates' Guardian 
Weekend, July 23 1994). Analogous with New Labour's concern to be represented in the press, Keating 
told the latter he would look favourably at a request to increase his shareholding, if he ensured his 
companies' newspapers provided ̀ fair and balanced' reporting of the Labor Party in the 1993 election. An 
Australian Senate inquiry judged that Keating had abused his position with this. (Schultz, Julianne. 1998. 
Reviving the fourth estate : democracy, accountability and the media. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998.: 1998,84-5). 
%3 Manners, Bruce. 1995. ̀ Blair learns from down-under world where Left is Right', Sunday Telegraph, 
December 31 1995, Pilger, John. 1994. 'The very best of mates', Guardian Weekend July 23 1994, Tony 
Gallagher, ̀ Blair, Murdoch and some disturbing questions about the superhighway' Daily Mail, October 5 
1995, Pilger, John. 1994. 'Murdoch's Love for New Labour', Free Press, No. 88, September-October 
1995. 
964 Blair, T, `Speech to News Corp Leadership Conference, Hayman Islands, Australia, July 17 1995', in 
Blair, New Britain: 204-5, John Pilger 'Murdoch's Love for New Labour', Free Press, No. 88, September- 
October 1995. 
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jeopardise the support of the press. The most obvious one is to take any action about the 
press itself. "965 Some party officials were said to have shared this view, according to 
Jempson, who was then a party press officer. It was more importa nt to retain power than 
regulate press ownership 966 However, it appears that decisions were made centrally and 
not all Labour policy spokespeople were involved, even by this stage. 967 
As for Murdoch and New Labour, from one side Linton considers that they had a shared 
understanding over such issues. Linton puts it thus: "I don't buy the notion that there has 
been a crude pact... But I think they do know one another well enough to know what 
they will do in given circumstances. So they are able to take account over what the 
other's reaction would be and there is no doubt in my mind that they do pay attention to 
that . "968 From the other, the 
Sunday Times' former editor Neil also views there was an 
965 "Certainly Blair wasn't someone who said the press didn't matter. Blair, and especially Alastair 
Campbell, regarded the press as very very important. But their strategy was not at all to legislate. I suppose 
he'd take the Harold Wilson view even more strongly, that to try to legislate would cause such 
hostility ... clearly from looking at his actions when he became party leader, his meetings with Murdoch... and Alastair Campbell's constant attempts to improve relations with tabloid newspapers, even 
the Mail, to reduce the hostility. I don't say he was trying to court them, but he has tried to keep 
communications open to reduce the hostility. And that has been a very successful strategy, well, by 
comparison with what went before. " (Linton interview). 
966 Mike Jempson, who was a Labour Party press officer in the early period of Blair's leadership, as well as 
being a media activist, said party officials dismissed calls for tougher press ownership laws, saying: "lt is 
all very good, but the important thing is we have to get into power and then we have to make sure that we 
retain power. " He added: "Why expect the press to give you reasonable publicity when you spend your 
entire time telling [them] that they are the devil incarnate? So to say to Mr Murdoch or whatever, `you are a 
human being too'... there is always the danger then that you are too friendly in order to make friends. Once 
you have said `I am open to your view of the world' where do you draw the line? " (Mike Jempson, 
interview with author on September 3 2002). 
967 As Mowlam's deputy, now Lord Corbett said: "This is with the benefit of hindsight. I mean, it may well 
be that there were those among and around the leadership at that time who saw the advantage on at least 
softening the anti-Labour stance of new papers like the Sun in particular. Because it was clearly bloody 
unhelpful to have a front page like they did in the `92 election. So I think all that, of which I had no 
knowledge -I have to say that - if that what was happening it does not surprise me at all. And, to that 
extent, it makes sense ... I don't think that I would have been privy to that, as it were. Whether Mo was I don't know, I really don't know. " (Corbett interview). 
966 Linton interview. The Sun's editor at the time, Stuart Higgins, referred to "... that agreement... " when 
discussing the issue on BBC's Newsnight programme. He then corrected himself to describe it as an "... er, 
meeting". (Keegan, William. 1997. ̀ May there be harmony with no Major key', The Observer, March 23 
1997). 
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'understanding'. 969 Nicholas Jones identifies that Campbell was one conduit for this; 
providing a link with News Corporation's top brass. 70 
Labour was now briefing that it would no longer challenge News Corporation's interests, 
by seeking to break up its holdings. Blair was quoted as saying: "It is not a question of 
Murdoch being too powerful . 
071 Deputy leader John Prescott slapped down Shadow 
Competitiveness and Regulation Minister Richard Caborn when he called for BSkyB's 
pay-TV monopoly to be investigated by the competition authorities. 72 
This was the prelude to what would be the most astonishing departure from Labour's 
previous commitment to diversity, perhaps. It would go beyond just following the 
deregulatory Conservatives. Both parties invoked globalisation to justify their position. 
The Conservatives had listened to the BMIG in applying the ideas of globalisation and 
convergence. Yet, Labour's consideration of going with the grain of globalisation was 
different to the Conservatives, indicating that this was open to interpretation. 
Its policy would leapfrog the Conservatives to apply the globalisation notion in a 
particular fashion that attracted rather than repelled News Corp, as well as Labour's age_ 
old allies, the Mirror Group. Of course, this process already had started under Mowlarn 
But this came to fruition with New Labour. The tension between and Smith 973 
representation and diversity was about to increase. 
969 He says that Blair once indicated to him that: "... how we treat Rupert Murdoch's media interests in 
Cower will depend on how his newspapers treat the Labour Party in the run up to the election". (Neil: xxv). 
70 Jones told the author: "I can tell you this, that the people who can get through to him are the executives 
of News International, in a way that other people could not. Now, that, therefore, to me reveals a closer 
relationship than is perhaps healthy. " Nicholas Jones describes it as there being a "... quid pro quo... ", 
where Labour provided a series of exclusives to News Corporation titles, in return for Labour 
representation, to the annoyance of other news outlets. (Nicholas Jones interview). We will explore this 
phenomenon in the appendix to this chapter. 
'1 Brown, Kevin. 1994. ̀ Labour backs off threat to Murdoch', Financial Times, March 24 1995. See also 
`Interview: Tony Blair', New Statesman, March 21,1997, McSmith, Andy and Patrick Wintour. 1997. 
`Major begged Thatcher to put pressure on Sun', The Observer, March 23 1997. 
972 Wynn Davies, Patricia. and Matthew Horsman. 1995. `Prescott slaps down complaint over BSkyB', 
Independent, November 21 1995. 
973 As one senior activist indicated: "Whatever Mo Mowlam says, the actual intention and the effect of 
Labour policy was to put Murdoch in a much stronger position. Because, once you actually start saying 
`Well, we would like you to use your papers editorially to support us', this is what you would call the 
Faustian pact. " (Granville Williams interview). 
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When the Government published the Broadcasting Bill itself, as other writers have 
indicated, the Labour frontbench went further towards neo-liberal cross-ownership 
deregulation. 74 The Labour leadership now did not just want to follow the Conservatives 
by loosening the cross-ownership laws. It wanted to get rid of them completely. In taking 
this stance, the Labour leadership was defining press and media policy in terms of 
general competition strategy, as had the Conservatives. 975 Yet, unlike Labour, the 
Conservatives explicitly justified having a separate 20% rule as a diversity protection 976 
New Labour justified its stance by citing globalisation and international competitiveness. 
In the globalised market, where other media firms were getting larger, the new Shadow 
Heritage Minister Dr Jack Cunningham argued that cross-ownership regulation impeded 
such firms as News International - now regarded as British - from being able to compete. 
The nationalist objection to News International under Kinnock had been turned on its 
head. Nor did size matter as much. As Labour's press and broadcasting spokesman Dr 
Lewis Moonie, who had attempted to amend the Conservative legislation in Committee, 
put it: "There is nothing intrinsically wrong with big companies. There are lots of nasty 
"977 small ones. 
But what is also significant was that Labour spokespeople went beyond globalisation in 
explaining the move and also invoked the question of Labour representation and the 
support of press businesses. It did not refer to News Corporation, which it was now 
974 Goodwin, Television: 152-3, Freedman, 2000: 233-4, Freedman, 2003: 165. The Bill closely followed 
the White Paper on cross-ownership. The Conservatives wished to preserve the proposal to stop newspaper 
firms holding a market share of 20 per cent or more from expanding into terrestrial broadcasting. However, 
we should not overemphasise how hostile the Bill was to News Corporation's interests. The 1996 
legislation did not place any limits on ownership in one medium, so the situation where News International 
owned 38% of the UK national newspaper market could remain. The fact that Labour did not oppose the 
Government's proposals and in fact would go beyond them, aided the pressure against pluralism. (Doyle, 
Media ownership: 106,109. For an analysis of the 1996 Broadcasting Act, see Doyle, Media ownership: 
Chapters 6 and 7 and Goodwin, Television). 
"' Freedman indicates this with regard to broadcasting policy. (Freedman: 236, Freedman, 2003: 165). 
976 The Conservatives argued that specific media ownership rules were needed to preserve democratic 
debate. They were "... the safeguards necessary to maintain diversity and plurality". They also identified 
ownership limits as one way of defending control of broadcasting "... by editorially partisan newspaper 
groups... ". (Department of National Heritage: 7,20-1). 
"HOC July 2 1996, col 843-4, Brown, Maggie. 1996. ̀Gloves off in the free for all', The Guardian, April 
15 1996. 
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allowing to buy up sections of terrestrial TV - to add to its ownership of one-third of the 
newspaper market and its satellite monopoly - while it was lobbying the conglomerate to 
gain support. Instead, Labour justified the shift by pointing to the Mirror Group. As 
shadow minister Cunningham complained: "... the Government's friends are being 
looked after in the legislation, and the single newspaper that supports Labour is being 
excluded" 978 
This statement indicates that how New Labour was going with the grain of globalisation 
was also shaped by concerns to appease press business. If concerns about the Mirror 
Group were an important reason, it would not invalidate the point that diversity across the 
media was being sacrificed for Labour representation. However, the Mirror Group was 
already ̀ on board' with Labour. What was novel and also significant was Labour's new 
`understanding' with News Corporation, which welcomed the Labour move. 79 
Another indication that the Labour frontbench was going further than simply following 
Conservative catch-up in accepting neo-liberal globalisation was that two right-wing 
Conservatives resigned from the Government to support the Labour position. Despite this 
pressure to remove the controls, the Government stood its ground and the amendment 
was lost 980 
978 HOC July 2 1996, col. 843-4. See also Foot, Paul. 1996. ̀Sour note, Moonie tune', The Guardian, April 
15 1996 and Leading article, `Mirror, Mirror on the screen . . ', The Guardian, April 17 
1996 and Doyle, 
Media ownership: 110. 
979 The media group had rejected the 20% rule as passe in the new media age where its recent submission to 
the Government had suggested that consumers were accessing news in ever-new ways. "And no group 
dominates, or can hope to dominate all the pathways to the public, " it claimed. (News International, 
Response to the White Paper, A New Future for Communications: 4 
www. communicationswhitepaper. gov. uk, quoted in Doyle, Media ownership: 135). 
' 
9s0 Goodwin, Television: 152-3, Wintour, Patrick. 1996. `Government facing defeat', The Guardian, May 
16 1996, Smithers, Rebecca and Patrick Wintour. 1996. `Tory MPs quit after media bill revolt', The 
Guardian, May 22 1996. 
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Opposition to Labour's new stance 
Socialists inside and outside the Labour Party challenged New Labour's neo-liberal 
volte-face. One outside, Paul Foot, saw that it gave increased power to the media owners, 
which could be used against Labour. 981 More importantly, ignored by Freedman, who 
implies more homogeneous support in the Labour ranks for the new stance, a number of 
Labour backbenchers broke ranks to support amendments opposing the new Labour 
right's deregulatory thrust. 82 An amendment proposed by Mullin and Austin Mitchell, in 
a shift from his previous standpoint, aimed to bar all newspapers with more than 10% of 
the market from being able to buy into television. This, the rebels noted, would exclude 
all firms owning tabloid titles from TV ownership. 83 Mitchell pointed to fears that 
importing newspaper values into broadcasting could threaten TV balance and lead to 
cross promotion. 84 While Mullin obliquely indicated that Murdoch's hand was behind 
Labour's latest move, other parties' members explicitly talked of "pay-back" after the 
Hayman Island trip 985 More than 70 members of the House supported the Labour 
backbenchers' motion. But both the Labour frontbench's amendments and Mullin's were 
986 defeated. 
981 He contrasted Labour's former position with the move, which he saw as handing "... power, strength and 
confidence to unelected, irresponsible media oligarchies which, if their commercial interests are threatened 
for a single second, even by a Labour government, will turn on their former benefactors and tear them to 
pieces". (Foot, Paul. 1996. ̀ Sour note, Moonie tune', The Guardian, April 15 1996. See also Freedman, 
2000: 234, Freedman, 2003: 166). 
982 Freedman, 2000: 233-4, Freedman, 2003: 166. 
983 The opposition included those not associated with the left, such as Giles Radice. (HOC July 2 1996, col. 
833-4,835-7). 
9" HOC July 2 1996, col. 835-7. 
985 HOC July 2 1996, cols. 835,838 and 840. 
986 HOC July 2 1996, cols. 843-850, Gopsill, Tim. 1996. ̀ Meanwhile back on the benches... ', Free Press, 
No. 93, July-August 1996, Humphreys, New Labour: 229. 
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The effect of the understanding 
However, the ̀ understanding' between Blair and Murdoch did appear to have a corollary 
for New Labour, in terms of Labour representation. Campbell provided privileged access 
to News Corporation's papers, as part of his strategy both before and after being 
elected. At the same time, Labour's coverage in the Sun perceptibly shifted, while the 987 
Times became less hostile. Blair's by-line appeared on numerous articles in the 
newspapers of News Corporation and other groups 
988 The day after Blair had written 
characterising himself as the defender of Britain's national identity, came the 
announcement that "The Sun backs Blair... ". The wording was telling. The Sun was only 
supporting Blair and not those ̀unreconstructed' sections of the party whose politics were 
not tightly moulded by the Thatcherite legacy. It was backing a Labour victory in its own 
neo-liberal terms 989 
A number of senior . Sun journalists were shocked and 
initially hostile, providing an 
indication that top management made this decision ?0 The surprise was not confined to 
987 Nicholas Jones interview, Jones, Nicholas. 2001. The control freaks : how new Labour gets its own wcry. 
London: Politico's, 2001.: esp. 198-206, Oborne: esp. 174-176. For instance, after News Corporation 
closed Today down, the Sun quoted Blair imploring readers to read Campbell's column in that title. 
(Horsman, Matthew. 1995. 'The man who killed Today holds key to tomorrow', Independent, November 
21 1995). See also the appendix to this chapter. 
988 Significantly, it was on Europe and nationalism that the key blow in the Sun was struck in March 1997. 
On March 17, the political editor Trevor Kavanagh, who was close to Murdoch and an initial Blair sceptic 
identified the significance of an article by Tony Blair on page 2 of the Sun with the headline "I'm a British 
Patriot". Kavanagh wrote that Blair's pledges would "... reassure voters that New Labour has strong 
reservations about a totally pro-European policy". (McKie, Clingers: 119). See also Neil: xxiv. This was 
significant because it indicated Blair was prepared to adapt his own pro-EU stance in seeking the titles 
approval. For Mandelson this was a particular political adaptation. He has been a vice-chair of the pro-Euro 
European Movement. (Williams, Get me a murder a day). The author was told that, according to Major's 
media officer Shelia Gunn, the Conservatives attempted to negotiate for News International's support prior 
to the 1997 election. Significantly, Europe was a sticking point in their failure. (Linton interview. See also 
McSmith and Wintour). 
989 As former editor Higgins said later: "The lines of communication were strictly with Blair and Campbell. 
That's why our headline was 'The Sun Backs Blair' because we had reservations about the rest of the 
party. " (Interview with Greenslade, Roy. 1997. ̀Nice one Sun, says Tony', Guardian, May 19 1997). Soy it 
did not endorse all Labour stood for. For instance, it condemned the mildly redistributive initiative of the 
windfall tax as looking "... dodgier by the moment". The Sun's leader announced "The Labour Party say 
they have changed ... Let's give them a chance to prove it. " (McKie, Clingers: 120). Seymour-Ure makes a 
similar point. (Seymour-Ure, Editorial Opinion: 85). 
It was said that four of the most senior journalists opposed it and the Scottish edition rebelled - delaying 
the announcement north of the border by a day. (McSmith, Andy and John Arlidge, 'Sun chiefs tried to defy Murdoch' and McSmith and Wintour). Former editor Higgins told a fellow journalist that "... a lot of 
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the Sun's newsrooms. 991 One prominent Labour supporter, musician Paul Weller, who 
had been part of the party's youth and cultural initiative of the 1980s, Red Wedge, spoke 
for many bewildered, but not necessarily hostile, party members and trade unionists. He 
described the relationship between the new Sun and New Labour thus: "... it slated them 
and tore them to pieces, and all of a sudden, the next day it's all changed. It was like in 
Orwell's 1984 - one minute everyone's told to hate some country and the next day 
s992 they're the allies again and it's the other lot you're supposed to hate. 
By the time of the 1997 election, as many tabloids as broadsheets backed Labour. 993 For 
the first time in living memory, more than 8 million voters were reading a Labour- 
supporting title. This well outshone the explicitly Conservative supporting titles' 4.5 
million voters 994 There was also a huge disparity on the Sundays. 995 And even the 
Conservative-supporting papers' management showed less hostility than in the past 996 
Whether Labour would have ever been required to shift its position on newspaper cross- 
ownership to achieve the Sun's backing is open to question, even with this 
`understanding'. According to Wyatt's diaries, the go-between connecting News 
Corporation and New Labour, Irwin Stelzer, identified two reasons for Murdoch's 
rapprochement with Labour - his anger with the Major government and his fear of being 
on the losing side. 997 It was in News Corporation's business interests to be on the winning 
side. Tellingly, the Sun's editor shared this view. 999 It can be credibly argued that News 998 
people at a senior level... ", including the hugely important Trevor Kavanagh, were at least sceptical. 
(Interview with Greenslade, Roy. 1997. `Nice one Sun, says Tony', Guardian, May 19 1997, Neil: xxiv). 
9" Even as seasoned an observer as Linton earlier that year had predicted that the Sun would side with the 
Conservatives. (Linton, Martin. `It's still up to you, my Sun', The Guardian, January 6 1997). 
992 Interview with Baker, Lindsay. 1997. ̀Made in England', The Guardian, June 28 1997. 
993 The Sun, Mirror and Daily Star were positioned on the same side as the Guardian, Independent and 
Financial Times. 
914 Franklin, Bob. 2004. Packaging Politics, London: Arnold: 143. 
"' Greenslade, Roy. 1997. ̀ The press. Taming paper tigers, but for how long? ', The Guardian, May 1 
1997. 
'6 We shall discuss the Express titles later in Appendix 3. Their rigid support for the Conservatives was 
waning - reflecting their management. And the Mail titles' proprietor Lord Rothermere had indicated the 
year before that he could conceive of some of his papers supporting Blair. (Bellos, Alex. `Daily Mail 
Croprietor gives new hint of election backing for Blair', The Guardian, April 15 1996). 
7 Wyatt: 720,722. 
998 Seymour-Ure, Editorial Opinion: 79. 
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Corporation needed Labour's support more than the party needed the corporation's, not 
withstanding all that we have considered regarding representation! 
000 
PRESS OWNERSHIP POLICY AND DEMOCRATISATION 
In tune with New Labour's shift away from economic democracy in political discourse 
and the move towards market populism that we shall explore in this chapter's Appendix 
1, even a debate on democratic control of the press was muted. Under Smith, Labour 
pressed for a legal right of reply, as Appendix 2 will consider. A think tank advising the 
Labour leadership made demands for journalistic autonomy, focusing on control rather 
than ownership. But New Labour ignored its demands with regard to the press. 
Before 1997, the IPPR tentatively followed the path of democratisation in its research, 
which New Labour considered. 100' The researchers' New Labour stance led them to 
criticise previous policy. They claimed the Labour left had concentrated on ownership 
rather than control. In order to justify this claim, the writers ignored the past left debates 
on democratic media ownership. Instead, they implied that the Labour left had not 
considered the journalistic autonomy question. Yet, part of the reason this argument 
could be used as a stick to beat the left with was that, by now, it waý underplaying 
"9 He said: "Imagine the nightmare scenario for us on election day, with Labour having the landslide they 
had and us being on the wrong side. ... It would have been a complete nightmare, going against everything 
we think the Sun stands for, i. e. popular opinion. " (Interview with Greenslade, Roy. 1997. ̀ Nice one Sun. 
says Tony', Guardian, May 19 1997). In other words, it was key to be on the winning side for the Sun. ' 
10°° Consider again the quote in the last reference by the Sun's then editor. Note that, implicitly, even he 
was not claiming credit for the victory. He was concerned more that Labour might well have won without 
him and his paper. "Through the Sun newspaper and through other newspapers, even the Mail ... people had just shifted, there was a sea change in public opinion. And, in my view, Murdoch understood that as 
well - that it was tactically wise to recognise that shift and by confirming it and then making that ludicrous 
claim, you know, that they were part of the victory, then it seems to me that you have got the situation that 
is myth rather than reality. It was not, at the edges it might have added one or two seats to Labour, but I 
think decisively there had been a shift... It was seen as the Government in waiting. " (Granville Williarns 
interview). As an NUJ official put it: "Murdoch does not control the world, you know Murdoch fits in with 
it, but he is always on the winning side, always... His judgements are very good. " (Gopsill interview). A 
similar point can be made in relation to how other newspapers had been wooing Labour. As Goodwin 
notes, the BMIG's lobbyists were among those that targeted the Labour Party three years previously, as it 
had been riding high in the polls and appeared to be on course for electoral victory. (Goodwin, Television.. 
146). 
1001 Collins and Murroni. 
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demands for industrial democracy. In fact, even campaigners in the CPBF had gone cold 
on the issue after the demands for an industrial right of reply had died down. '°°2 
The IPPR researchers reconsidered the discussion in the last Royal Commission on the 
Press. It had called for editorial self-determination over production. They called for 
journalists to be given this same level of `independence' as the Royal Commission had 
given editors, including the ability to refuse material and refute editorial policy. '003 In the 
context of the rest of their proposals, this demand was remarkably strident. Journalistic 
refusal recalled the most radical policy implemented by other European social democratic 
governments. The demand to be able to reject editorial policy even goes beyond these. In 
fact, it would be formally unworkable, unless accompanied by alternative editorial 
decision-making structures. It would only be possible with some form of journalist 
workers' control. 
Regarding public participation in the press, the researchers argued for wider 
accountability and representation in media regulation. They recognised the problems of 
the lack of direct participation in media decisions, identifying a paternalistic legacy in 
media legislation. To partly overcome this, they advocated a Consumer Council for 
Media and Communications to represent consumer interests. Nevertheless, the 
researchers did not make clear how this would operate in the self-regulatory world of the 
press. '°°4 This aspect of the IPPR's work made little immediate impact on New Labour 
thought with regard to the press. Labour ignored calls for journalistic autonomy. New 
Labour's 2002 draft Communications Bill, which we will consider later, advocated 
minimal marketised public participation with a Consumer Board, indicating a possible 
link with the IPPR proposals. But none of this impinged on national newspaper 
regulation. 1005 
1002 Granville Williams interview. A notable exception was James Curran. See Curran, Policyfor the press. 
10°' Collins and Murroni: 73-4. 
1004 Ibid.: 178-9,185. 
10°5 DTI/DCMS, Policy Narrative, DTI/DCMS, Draft Communications Bill, DTI/DCMS, Regulatory 
impact assessment. 
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Instead, considerations of `direct democracy', which have involved Labour and the 
broader media, came in the new market populist form we shall consider in this chapter's 
Appendix 1. As we shall see, there has been a subterranean discourse concerning the 
supplanting of representative democracy by `direct democracy' of a particularly 
marketised sort. Other aspects of this new direct democracy include the consideration of 
the use of citizens' juries, telephone polls, referendums and internet discussion and 
voting, to just name those referred to in an internal party discussion in 2002.1006 
LABOUR IN OFFICE: PRESS OWNERSHIP AND CROSS-OWNERSHIP POLICIES, 
REPRESENTATION AND DIVERSITY 
Labour in government, in tandem with going with the grain of globalisation, extended the 
new press and media strategy it developed in opposition under Kinnock and Blair. The 
motivation was to gain the maximum Labour representation. However, there was a 
continued tension with Labour's previous goal of press ownership diversity, which 
continued to be downgraded. Nevertheless, the representation strategy was little 
challenged by a Labour and trade union movement, which saw it as successful and, as we 
shall see in Appendix 1, was replicated in the union leadership. The Labour hierarchy 
continued to develop the `understanding', which had placated press and media owners. 
However, the Government's representation strategy started to run into difficulties and 
showed signs of unravelling. This could have implications for Labour's press ownership 
policy. 
Three interrelated pressures guided Labour Party policy on entering government. The 
Government had accepted a particular conception of globalisation. Secondly, Labour was 
concerned to merge press policy with competition policy, in line with EU policy. Thirdly, 
these notions were shaped by press and media organisations to justify their continued 
expansion. At moments, the Labour government explicitly acknowledged this guidance. 
It embraced the large press and media firms' conception, rather than that of Labour's 
1006 National Policy Forum Consultation Document, ̀ Democracy, Citizenship and Political Engagement 
Labour Party, 2002,11. ' 
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former allies - the Labour and trade union campaigners for media plurality. Diversity 
continued to have a low priority. All of these pressures were on display in the debate 
concerning predatory pricing. 
War! 
The Times' price war had been launched in 1993. It was significant in that it replayed 
some of the issues we have been discussing. The Labour government both appeared to be 
concerned to not challenge News Corporation and to bring newspaper ownership law in 
line with toughened general competition legislation. The debate was not about social 
democratic intervention but about how stringent should be classical liberal anti-monopoly 
law. 
By bringing press policy in line with competition policy, the aim was to influence firms' 
behaviour rather than alter the structure of the market. In doing so, this would bring it in 
line with EU policy. EU policy has tended to concentrate on competition policy because 
of its emphasis on the Single Market and controversy over whether it has the jurisdiction 
to interfere in national press and media diversity legislation. It may be considered that the 
Government simply wanted British convergence with EU policy, as has happened in 
other EU states. 1007 However, as Doyle's research indicates, many media companies 
demanded this convergence. It is also the case that other countries under the EU's 
jurisdiction have other laws to specifically restrict ownership. 1008 
As Doyle notes, the problem with competition law in a press context is that is concerned 
with increasing efficiency rather than diversity. It is less consistent than prescribed 
newspaper and cross-ownership limits, as it relies on a public interest test and a case-by- 
case approach. This makes it much more susceptible to Government interference. Also, 
while strengthened competition law encourages diversity in some instances, few 
competition enquiries have led to decisive action. Research indicates it has not been 
particularly effective at a national level in other European states. More importantly, 
1007 As Meier and Trappel argue, the competition policy notion of economists has come to dominate the 
public policy conception of diversity across Europe. (Meier and Trappel: 38-59,40). 
°08 Doyle, Media ownership: 33-4,112-3. 
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competition and plurality are not the same. Titles in the UK's oligopolistic market may 
be ruthlessly competitive for market share. 10°9 Enhancing competition, therefore, is not 
enough. Most media ownership restrictions are based on concerns to protect cultural and 
political pluralism - different from competition promotion. 
1010 Competition does not 
guarantee a range of voices required for pluralism. 1011 
The battle in the national daily newspaper market began in 1993 when News Corp cut the 
Times' price from 45p to 30p, initiating a price war. 1012 As Murdoch put it, the Times 
circulation was "... uneconomic. So we cut the price and it worked wonderfully. """ 
Under John Smith, Labour frontbenchers had consistently called for an investigation into 
this, as competitors accused News Corporation of predatory pricing, i. e. selling the paper 
below cost price. Robin Cook claimed that News Corp's policy was "... calculated to 
restrict consumer choice... ". 1014 It could cause competitors to close, particularly the 
Independent. Although hostile to News Corp's interests, the frontbench shared a 
consistent classical liberal position. They saw the specific use of competition law as key 
1009 Doyle, Understanding: 125. 
'°'° Doyle, Understanding: 169. 
10ll Doyle, Media ownership: 27,112-3,131,179. As Colin Sparks indicates, oligopolistic competition in 
the British newspaper market has normally operated through product differentiation. Yet, the Times' price 
war was an exception. It came about because there had been a sharp decrease in the national market from 
the late 1980s. In this situation, all the newspaper firms had excess capacity and so the excess profit, which 
they gained as oligopolists, was threatened. (Sparks, The Press: 49). In such a situation, there is always an interest in setting a lower price, as long as others do not follow suit. If they do, all the firms involved lose 
out. The competitive pricing that happened in the 1990s meant that companies had not even covered their 
costs in order to compete. The Times managed to gain most of its extra sales from its rivals. (Doyle 
Understanding: 128,132-3). ' 
1012 Bell, Emily. `Rivals sniff at cut-price tactics', The Observer, September 5 1993, Anon., `The multi_ 
media monopoly machine', Daily Mirror, September 3 1993. 
1013 Interview with Bill Hagerty, ̀ Blair, God and the net', The Guardian, November 29 1999. 
1014 The then shadow trade and industry spokesman Robin Cook and shadow heritage secretary Ann Clwyd 
made the call in 1993. Cook described Murdoch's `domination' of the media as "... not healthy for 
democracy" and needed to be curbed. (Cook, Robin and Clwyd, Ann. 1993. 'Cook and Clwyd call for 
MMC inquiry into Murdoch ownership', Labour Party Press Release, September 3 1993, Boogan, Steve 
`Labour demands Murdoch inquiry', Independent, September 4 1993). After the OFT rejected the calCook 
repeated his concern in the Commons in 1994, arguing that the pricing policy was "... calculated to-' 
restrict consumer choice in the newspaper industry". (HOC July 20 1994, col. 444). Mowlam also later 
called for an investigation, warning of "... the dangers of concentration of media ownership to the diversity 
of information sources". (Mowlam, Marjorie. 1994. `Letter. Labour fears on concentrated media 
ownership', The Guardian, August 11 1994, Henry, Georgina. 1994. ̀ Balancing act on a see-saw', The 
Guardian, June 27 1994). Those newspapers not owned by News Corporation such as the Guardian 
Independent and Telegraph had been calling for action on predatory pricing. (For a discussion on this, see Humphreys, New Labour: 229-232). 
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to newspaper regulation. Yet the OFT had examined the issue in 1993,1994 and 1996 
and found no basis on which to act against News Corporation. 1015 
After coming into office, Labour introduced a Competition Bill to tighten up policy. 1016 
Labour MPs were among those demanding the Bill be amended in the light of the OFT 
investigations. They felt the Government had not acted on its concerns in opposition to 
protect press diversity's special requirements. ' 017 Yet, the Labour frontbench dismissed a 
call to strengthen the law in a classical liberal manner, in a way that would have 
challenged News Corporation. 
In common with a number of non-media issues, the opposition united left MPs with 
Lords' members. Lord Borrie was a party member, a Labour advisor on competition 
policy and a former Director General of Fair Trading. Lord Tom McNally was a former 
Labour media advisor and now a Lib Dem peer. Together, they successfully introduced 
Competition Bill amendments aimed at strengthening predatory pricing provisions. 
McNally told the Lords that increasing press diversity with ventures similar to the 
threatened Independent would be "... unthinkable... " under the price-cutting 
environment. Instead, the Labour government was accused of acceding to Murdoch's 
wishes; a claim ministers rejected. '°'8 
Despite its experience in opposition, New Labour argued that the amendments were 
unworkable and unnecessary. It was "... wrong in principle... " to treat the press 
differently from any other good. )019 
1015 Office of Fair Trading, ̀ Press Release: Newspaper pricing: News International gives assurances', May 
21 1999. 
1016 Humphreys, New Labour: 125. 
101 Ibid.: 229-230. 
10" House of Lords Hansard for 13 Nov 1997, col. 309-313. There were also claims in the press that 
Labour had turned from its position in opposition in order to keep the Sun on its side, although ministers 
denied this. (Humphreys, New Labour: 230). 
1019 The ennobled industrialist Lord Haskill, who was now speaking for the Government in the Lords, saw 
that the Bill would cover predatory practices. (Lords Hansard text for 13 Nov 1997, col. 313). The latter 
claim was from Labour minister Lord Simon. (Lords Hansard text for February 9 1998, col. 913-23). 
Labour whipped its peers against the amendments. However, 23 Labour Lords including senior former 
ministers and the recently ennobled film producer Lord Puttnam backed the revolt. Only around 80 Labour 
peers voted for the Government. They included Lord Hattersley, Lord Barnett, Lord Ashley, Lord Shore 
and Baroness Castle. (Lords Hansard text for February 9 1998, col. 923, Humphreys, New Labour: 230-1). 
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The Bill's third reading in July 1988 saw Labour MPs still backing the amendments, 
which were defeated. 1020 The Europeanist loyalist Giles Radice was one of those who 
expressed concerns about News Corporation's influence on British politics. 
1021 Yet, one 
of the few Labour backbenchers to vocally back the Government, media activist Austin 
Mitchell again argued that Labour representation was more important than an 
64 ... explosion of 
impotent anger against Rupert Murdoch... )'. 1022 The Government 
defeated the amendments more narrowly in the Lords, with some notable Labour figures 
still defying it. 1023 
At first glance, subsequent events appeared to legitimate New Labour's claims. Peter 
Humphreys' sophisticated review of New Labour's media policies notes that a fourth 
enquiry by the Office of Fair Trading, following complaints by newspaper competitors, 
found the Times guilty of deliberately cutting prices to affect competition. 1024 This 
The Government argued that the new Competition Bill would strengthen the existing legislation, partly 
because it would bring the UK in line with European law. This was because, unlike the previous legislation, 
there was no need to prove that a company intended to force out a competitor to show that a firm has 
flouted the law. See, for instance, Trade and Industry secretary Margaret Beckett, HOC 11 May 1998, col. 
28 
1020 Chris Mullin and Labour leadership loyalist Giles Radice, Treasury Committee chair, led support for 
the Lords amendments. Reflecting that this was a debate between different classical liberal conceptions of 
regulation, Mullin had argued that his amendment merely attempted to create a free market against anti- 
competitive practices. (HOC 11 May 1998, col. 70). After an extensive debate, the timid Radice withdrew 
his amendment. Mullin's amendment was overwhelmingly defeated, with Radice and Solely among the 
Government's supporters. The Labour rebels included the former shadow minister Clwyd, ' media 
campaigners such as David Winnick, those on the left, and those formerly seen as on the party's right, like 
Gwyneth Dunwoody. (HOC July 8 1998, col. 1165). 
1021 HOC July 8 1998, col. 1136-52. The debate again focused on News Corporation. (Humphreys, New 
Labour: 231). A number of speakers made the point that Labour in opposition was more keen to tackle this 
than in government. See, for instance HOC 8 Jul 1998, col. 1141. One Labour rebel, Bob Marshall- 
Andrews viewed the need for specific legislation because: "No other major commercial undertaking is 
owned for the express and specific purpose of obtaining and using political power and influence. " He 
convincingly argued that predatory pricing that in any other industry would be economic suicide could be 
engaged in the newspaper market for political gain. The Labour Government it was said, contradictorily, 
saw the need for specific competition legislation for newspapers when it came to the Fair Trading Act, but 
not with predatory pricing. (HOC July 8 1998, col. 1149-51). 
1022 He argued that: "As we spent more than 20 years attacking the politics of The Sun and have now come 
to accept so many of them, that is a rather curious ground on which to attack Mr Murdoch. " (HOC July g 
1998, col. 1155). 
1023 In October 1988, Lord McNally again tabled an amendment in the Lords. This time it was defeated by 
116 to 87, with Labour peers including Kinnock's former economic advisor Lord Desai, as well as Lord 
Borrie, voting for it. (House of Lords Hansard Debates for October 20 1998, col. 1347-60). 
1024 Humphreys, New Labour: 232. Following independent research that showed that News Corp's price- 
cutting strategy had affected other newspapers, the OFT's director John Bridgeman judged in May 1999 
that the Times had deliberately made a loss. This was judged to have happened between June 1996 and 
January 1998 when the Monday edition was sold for l Op. (OFT, `Press Release: Newspaper pricing: News 
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ironically justified the Labour government's claim that the rules were tight enough to 
snare News Corporation abuse. 
However, the reprimand for this was a minimal `slap on the wrist' - in contrast to another 
ruling on a far smaller-scale local title. 1025 OFT director John Bridgeman decided merely 
to put News Corp `on notice'. He justified this by arguing that the predatory pricing had 
stopped. 1026 
In retrospect, we can see that the basis of the amendments from Mullin and the Lords was 
formally wrong. Despite his expertise in the area, Lord Borrie was inaccurate in his 
assessment, which Mullin followed, that the Government's Bill would be ineffectual 
against the Times. However, in doing so, they kept up the pressure on the OFT in 
confronting News Corporation and so uncovered an important dynamic. 
1027 The 
Government refused to directly target the News Corporation empire, which was later 
found to be engaged in predatory pricing. This indicated its concern to bring press law in 
line with general competition law as well as its timidity in challenging, in the name of 
diversity, its new ally in Labour representation. 1028 The weak and insignificant 
punishment handed out by the OFT - the minimal reprimand given for predatory pricing 
to News Corporation - may also have been an indication of this tentativeness. 
International gives assurances', May 21 1999). On the independent research, see Atkinson, Mark. 1999. 
`The heavy price of Murdoch', The Guardian, March 30 1999. 
1025 The OFT fined Aberdeen Journals Ltd more than £1.3 million in 2001 for predatory pricing in its 
advertising in a free newspaper, in order to expel a rival free title. (OFT, `Press Release: Scottish 
newspaper group fined for predatory pricing', July 16 2001). 
'°26 Bridgeman concluded that: "This behaviour ended 16 months ago, and so it seems to me that informal 
assurances are the most appropriate remedy in this case. " (OFT, Press Release: Newspaper pricing). 
1027 Granville Williams interview. 
1028 It may have been coincidental, but as the Labour MP David Winnick, put it, the view was that: "... in 
order to be re-elected, we should not do anything by way of legislation that will give offence to the person 
who owns so much of the media in this country". (HOC 8 Jul 1998, col. 1152). 
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Cross-ownership Policies and Diversity 
Alongside this, New Labour's perception of economic globalisation and its insistence on 
converging media policy with general competition law was dictating press ownership 
policy. In line with Labour's earlier position, the pre-election arts and media document 
Create the future and the 1997 election manifesto reflected this globalisation rhetoric and 
the latter, a deregulatory passion. In the former, the now heritage secretary . Jack 
Cunningham made a leap from the valuable assessment that the world's media were 
proliferating to the claim that there is a "... growing globalisation of the media". 1029, The 
manifesto contained little specifically on the press, and only one paragraph on the media 
as a whole. Yet it insisted that globalisation should dictate deregulation. 1030 
Create the future also formed a bridgehead between previous and future policy on 
another theme, the role of the press, media and design in the `knowledge-driven' so- 
called New Economy, so influential in US thinking. This was exemplified by Smith's 
book, Creative Britain, which defined Labour's cultural approach in its first term. 1031 As 
Freedman argues well, it emphasised the particular strengths of the now `creative 
industries' for Britain's international economic well-being. 1032 What is striking about this 
book is that it attempted to wed Smith's previous soft left cultural industries approach 
with the New Economy ideas. Yet, it eschewed any traditional Keynesian interventionist 
1029 Labour Party. 1997a. Create the future :a strategy for cultural policy, arts and the creative economy, 
London: Labour Party.: 11. 
1030 The "... regulatory framework for media and broadcasting should reflect the realities of a far more open 
and competitive economy, and enormous technological advance... Labour will balance sensible rules, fair 
regulation and national and international competition.... ". For the viewers - it did not discuss the 
newspaper readers - "... quality and diversity... " would, nevertheless, be upheld. (Labour, Party. 1997v 
New Labour : because Britain deserves better. London: Labour Party, 1997.: 31. See also Freedman, 2000: 
239). 
103 The importance of the press and media and design (which were regarded as an integrated whole) was 
not so much seen for its role in democratic discourse, as for its function as one of the most profitable and 
sizeable sectors of the economy and thus central to globalisation and economic competitiveness. This 
reflected the previous emphasis on cultural industries. But it also looked forward what Freedman termed 
the concentration on the "... economic value of the commodification of knowledge... " (Labour Pam,, 
Create the future: 10-11, Smith, Chris. 1998. Creative Britain. London: Faber, 1998., Freedman, 2000" 
241, Freedman, 2003: 171). 
1032 lt boasted that "... we have recognized the importance of this whole industrial sector that no one hithert o 
has even conceived of as `industry'. " (Ibid.: 26). See also Humphreys, New Labour. 221). It is certainly 
true is that it reflected certain key themes. Dubbed by the press as ̀ Cool Britannia', it sought to develop 
Britain as a cultural powerhouse (Freedman, 2000: 241, Freedman, 2003: 171). - 
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measures to bolster these media industries. Instead, Smith, again saw globalisation's 
unstoppable rise as playing that role. 1033 A problem with this was, as New Labour 
insiders later quietly admitted, the New Economy emphasis was mistaken. 1034 
Another innovation was the creation of the Department of Culture Media and Sport 
(DCMS) to oversee this. However, as if to indicate this profit-driven approach and to 
emphasise a structural, as well as ideological, link with general competition law, the 
DCMS started working closely together with the DTI. Thus, the DTI and DCMS together 
launched the Green Paper Regulating Communications in 1998. At this stage, Labour 
rejected complete convergence with general competition law and cross-media 
deregulation. 1035 Yet, it pressed the argument that globalisation required diversity to be 
sacrificed. It used the determinist objectivist language we have seen before, assigning as 
little role to the subjective as the crudest Marxist economism. 1036 New Labour indicated 
there was no choice about economic development. There was a globalisation wave and 
the Government's role was to make sure the British economy surfed it. 
This globalisation perspective was consistent with other non-media Government policies. 
But the press and media firms were also pushing for this. This pressure noticeably 
influenced the Government to go yet further in distancing itself from Labour party policy 
1033 Thus, the aim was to provide "... products and services which we can exploit... " in the "... expanding 
international markets... ". And again, it was "... British innovation and creativity... " which "... played a 
central role in the relentless process of globalization". (Ibid.: 29,30). 
1034 Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State at the DTI, admitted that: "We did give the impression in our first 
term that we were more interested in this so-called New Economy than in manufacturing. " (Today 
Programme, BBC Radio 4, August 6 2002). A lively description of the rise and demise of the New 
Economy in the United States is given in Frank. 
1035 It still genuflected in front of the traditional adage of diversity that there was a need to "... have controls 
on ownership over and above those applied by general competition law to ensure that no individual voice 
becomes too dominant". At this stage, the decision was not to challenge the cross-market provisions of the 
1996 Broadcasting Act. These had been "... debated fully... " in the passing of the act. The Labour 
government saw these as proving "... regulatory certainty, while allowing considerable flexibility to deal 
with market developments. " (Department for Culture, Media, Sport, Trade Great Britain Department of, 
Industry, and Media Great Britain Department for Culture. 1998. Regulating communications 
approaching convergence in the information age. London: Stationery Office, 1998.: 32). 
16 It was the case that "... [s]ome concentration of ownership has been regarded as inevitable... ". But the 
Labour government paper also went further in justifying oligopolisation by invoking globalisation and the 
mantra of international competitive advantage. Concentration was now, in fact "... possibly desirable, since 
it confers advantage in terms of global competitiveness". (Department for Culture, Media, Sport, Trade 
Great Britain Department of, Industry, and Media Great Britain Department for Culture. 1998. Regulating 
communications : approaching convergence in the information age. London: Stationery Office, 1998.: 16). 
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on diversity. The Way Ahead was the Government's response to the Green Paper 
consultation, published the same year. This made no mention of the need for cross- 
ownership rules at all. Instead, the DTUDCMS emphasised that general competition law 
would be enough to stop abuses. 1037 This paper explicitly made clear a factor that had 
been involved in the Labour government following this path. Respondents -a large 
majority of which were individual press and media firms, industry bodies or regulators - 
had `accepted' this shift. Yet again, the Government expressed this move as an objective 
process of market forces, where the author was neither it nor media businesses. Contrary 
to the experience of increased concentration in the media industry, there was a need to 
expunge "... unnecessary regulation... ". 1038 
This process further developed with the White Paper A New Future for Communications, 
published in December 2000, which proposed a new industry regulator, Morn., its 
promotion of markets, competition policy and regulatory reform, replicated the Labour 
government's general approach to industrial policy mentioned at this chapter's start. 1039 
New Labour had a tentative and vague position on cross-ownership at this time. 
However, the White Paper opened up the possibility of further liberalisation and `a lighter 
touch' for newspaper mergers. 1040 
Labour's 2001 manifesto mentioned nothing about media ownership itself. '04' However, 
its business manifesto vowed that it would bring in communication reforms that would 
remove "... the archaic regulations that are slowing the pace of innovation and 
1037 "As competition develops, the need for sector-specific regulation is likely to reduce as greater reliance 
is placed on the operation of general competition law. " (DCMS/DTI, Regulating communications) See also 
Freedman, 2000: 248, Freedman, 2003: 174. 
1038 Ibid.: Section 1.13, Section 2.11, Section 3.11. 
1039 See AHRB Centre for British Film and Television Studies, Sheffield Hallam University, `Broadcasting, 
Citizen Rights and Social Cohesion', Section 5, Sheffield Hallam University, Doyle, Media ownership: 
130-1. 
1040 It welcomed comments on these areas. (Department of Culture, Media, Sport, Trade Great Britain 
Department of, Industry, and Media Great Britain Department for Culture. 2000. A new future for 
communications. London: TSO, 2000.: Chapter 4). This prompted media commentators and newspaper 
executives to view that ministers wished to avoid offending newspaper proprietors in the run-up to a 
general election period. (Wells, Matt, David Teather, Dan Milmo and Maggie Brown. 2000. `Great white 
hope', The Guardian, November 20,2000). 
104 Labour Party, Labour's business manifesto 1997. 
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change". 1042 Possibly coincidentally, the election saw the press businesses, and 
particularly News Corp, provide Labour with new levels of support. The Express 
newspapers had come on board in the interim, as we shall see in this chapter's Appendix 
3, and 2001 saw the Times back the party. Following on from the argument that the Sun 
had used four years previously, it suggested that New Labour had entrenched some core 
Thatcherite tenets in government. 1043 By 2001, seven of the ten national newspapers and 
six of the Sundays supported Labour. In terms of circulation 72 per cent of the voters by 
then read a pro-Labour title, while an astonishing 7.8 per cent read a Conservative 
paper. '°44 Equally, although the Sun wobbled in its support, calling Blair `the most 
dangerous man in Britain' and the cabinet the most arrogant in history, it still backed the 
Labour leadership; marking a huge difference from 1992.1045 
The Communications Bill: `the most significant legislation on the media in 50 years' 
Following this, there was another possible coincidence. In October 2001, the Government 
used a newspaper industry function to launch a consultation paper on media ownership. 
This presented the options, among others, that cross-media limits be repealed., 046 
Respondents included News International and the CPBF. 1047 And the following month, 
Rupert Murdoch publicly threatened to withdraw his support for the Blair government 
after setbacks to BSkyB. '°48 
1042 Ibid.: 19. 
1043 Anon. 2001. 'Times gives backing to Blair', Independent, June 5 2001, Allison, Rebecca. 2001. `Times 
backs Labour for the first time', The Guardian, June 5 2001. 
1044 However, this indicated a collapse in Tory support rather than backing for Labour. (Franklin, Political 
Communications, 1994: 143-4. 
1045 Ibid.: 144-5. 
1046 Consultation on Media Ownership Rules, sections 6.4.15 and 6.5.12. 
1047 News International plc, Response to Consultation on Media Ownership Rules, DCMS website, 
http: //www. culture. gov. uk/creative/index. html, 2002. Campaign For Press and Broadcasting Freedom, 
Response to Consultation on Media Ownership Rules By DCMS and DTI, (November 2001), CPBF, 2001. 
Boas He was quoted as saying that it was "not his style" to influence the Government into regulatory 
changes. Yet, as if to indicate this was precisely the case, he was quoted as warning: "It would be 
interesting if a lot of our newspapers weren't so Labour supporting. Then Tony Blair would not have to 
worry about being seen to be looking after his friends. " (Cassy, John. 2001. `Murdoch on Blair, Britain and 
babies. And those whiners at ITV as well', The Guardian, November 3 2001). The quote was reported in 
the Daily Telegraph as: "If our newspapers were anti-Labour, perhaps he wouldn't worry so much about 
looking after his friends. " (Trefgarne, George. 2001. `BSkyB boss threatens to turn titles anti-Labour', 






After being reminded by Murdoch that his support was conditional, when the draft 
Communications Bill finally arrived in May 2002, it was clear that it went a stage further 
in distancing the Labour government from diversity. The NUJ described the bill as the 
"... most significant proposed legislation on the media since the establishment of 
commercial broadcasting nearly 50 years ago". 1049 Yet, there was strikingly little public 
discussion on it. One factor in this may have been that the press and media firms were in 
a unique position, as Doyle puts it, to "... sustain a climate of public indifference.... ", 
about policies which would deregulate the media to their advantage. '050 This was said to 
replicate the US situation. '°5' 
The draft Bill covered a much broader range of issues than national press ownership and 
cross-ownership. 1052 Nevertheless, in these areas it was strongly deregulatory. Again, it 
was not just playing Conservative catch-up and following the former Tory government's 
position on globalisation, but going beyond this. It shared the demands of press business, 
including those of News Corporation. It completely turned its back on Labour's formerly 
like-minded reformers, the CPBF. '053 
On cross-ownership, it moved towards the policy that the Labour leadership had 
pioneered in the mid 1990s, and News Corporation, among others, had championed - that 
the restrictions be completely removed in favour of general competition law. 1054 The 200, 
rule was to be scrapped for owning the five channel. '°55 This would open the possibility 
of a complete takeover by any of the large newspaper groups, most prominently, the 
United wholesale had been blocked and the OFT had launched an investigation into claims that BSkyB had 
abused its dominant position over its digital competitor, the since defunked ITV Digital. 
1049 NUJ, `Communications Bill 2002: The NUJ 's response: Briefing for Members of Parliament', May 14 
2002. 
soso Doyle, Media ownership: 177. See also Meier and Trappel: 38-59: 39. 
iosi According to one senior media communication historian, the 1996 Telecommunications Act was little 
debated. Robert McChesney wryly questioned why this would be the case: "... where would the citizens get 
informed? Only through the news media. " (McChesney, Corporate media: 43). 
1052 See DTI/DCMS, Policy Narrative, DTI/DCMS, Regulatory impact assessment. 
1053 In a tired repetition of the rhetoric of the German Bad Godesberg agreement, Jowell argued that there 
was a need to get "... rid of regulation where possible but to keep them where necessary". (Tessa Jowell, 
Voice of the Listeners and Viewers meeting at the House of Commons, May 14 2002). 
1054 News International plc, Response to Consultation on Media Ownership Rules, DCMS website, 
http: //www. culture. gov. uk/creative/index. html, 2002: 4. 
1055 DTI/DCMS, Regulatory impact assessment.. 65-7. 
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largest - News Corp, with the attendant cross-media promotion threat. The rules would 
still apply to ITV. 1056 When asked, Jowell's justification for this discrepancy was that 
five channel had less public service obligations, was not a universal service and 
ownership was not an issue. 1057 She rejected claims that News Corporation was being 
given preferential treatment - the Government was "... proprietor neutral". However, this 
was to miss the point. By treating all businesses equally, it was also potentially aiding 
News Corp, as well as the owners of The Mirror and the Daily Mail, as Jowell herself 
admitted. 1058 The tension was still further heightened between business support and 
diversity, with the latter suffering. 
The self-avowed deregulatory proposals also would open newspapers to cross-ownership 
in national and local radio. Importantly, the Labour government explicitly justified this as 
aiding press and media business and again it went beyond the former Conservative 
government's position. '°59 The test of public interest, related to plurality, would go. The 
previous government's 1995 legislation had allowed those newspaper groups with less 
than 20% of the press market able to acquire a percentage of the radio market. The 
proposals said that those groups with more than 20% of the national newspaper market 
could now own radio stations. The original stipulation was that there needed to be at least 
two or more other commercial broadcasters, as well as the BBC, reaching more than 50% 
of the adult population in the radio station's area. 1060 After further media business 
lobbying this was reduced to two commercial stations in total. 1061 
1156 Great Britain Department for Culture, Media, and Sport. 2002. A new future for communications : 
communications bill. London: The Stationery Office.. See for instance, Cassy, John. 2002. `Pundits 
expected the blueprint for TV and radio's future to be a fudge but it looks like a free for all', The Guardian, 
May 9 2002. 
1057 She viewed that: "A bigger and better Channel 5 would be good for British broadcasting and good for 
the British public. It doesn't matter who owns it if that were the achievement - that success. " (Jowell, 
Tessa. Guardian Online chat, May 10 2002, http: //talk. guardian. co. uk/). 
1058 Jowell, Tessa. Guardian Online chat, May 10 2002, http: //talk. puardian. co. uk/. 
1059 It was promoted as a pro-business measure: "The removal of rules that stipulate public interest tests 
will remove the significant risk for businesses of spending a great deal of time and resource putting 
together merger proposals that are subsequently rejected. " (DTI/DCMS, Regulatory impact assessment: 65- 
7). 
1060 Ibid.: 61-3. 
1061 DTI/DCMS, Communications Bill, HMSO, 2002: 411-16, Anon.. `Local radio ownership proposals in 
full', Guardian, November 14 2002. 
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Also, the Labour government Bill provided for the possibility that the new overseer of 
this legislation, Ofcom, would review the legislation no less than every three years. 1062 
This laid the process open to the spectre of constant lobbying. But more importantly, it 
represented a significant democratic shortfall, as the Government acknowledged. Despite 
this, it saw fit to ensure that Parliament would not have the final say over such important 
legislation. Ofcom's business bias was heightened by the appointment of City University 
Business School's dean, Lord Currie. 1063 
Nevertheless, initial opposition to the bill on the Labour ranks did not concentrate on the 
question of cross-ownership, even though this had been a theme of leading opponents 
outside the House, such as Professor Steve Barnett. 10M Former Sky presenter Austin 
Mitchell, who had sung the News Corp's praises in the past when even the Labour 
leadership was hostile, was among MPs and Lords who had problems with the Bill; some 
of whom initially saw `the Murdoch question' as a `red herring'. 1065 The NUJ, which 
again was among leading opponents of the legislation, shared this assessment initially- 1066 
More stress was placed on important provisions in the Bill for increased international 
broadcasting ownership and on broadcasting content regulation. This was to change. 
1062 Regulatory impact assessment: 65. 
1063 Although the former advisor to John Smith and Gordon Brown showed some reluctance in extending 
non-EU broadcaster involvement in ITV. (John Cassy, ̀I'm no meddler', Guardian, July 29 2002). 
1064 He stated, for instance, his concern, if the Labour government went ahead with its proposals, that: 
"Frankly, I wouldn't care if Murdoch were Mother Teresa and the son of God rolled into one. That is 
simply too much power in the hands of one man... ". Barnett, Steven. 2002. `One man, one media? ', 
Guardian, May 8 2002. 
1065 Private information. 
1066 In its briefing to MPs, it opposed the cross-ownership provisions, but chose not to strongly emphasise 
them. In the past, it had challenged the other media unions' nationalistic opposition to Murdoch. At this 
time, it justified its relatively muted stance on News Corporation's possible further encroachment, by 
arguing that business rivals greatly fuelled opposition to News Corp. (NUJ, `Communications Bill 2002. 
The NUJ 's response: Briefing for Members of Parliament', May 14 2002). A person key in formulating 
this NUJ policy, Tim Gopsill, justified the downplaying of Murdoch thus: "In the debate over the 
Communications Bill, Murdoch was overstated in the sense that he was not the only one, nor the worst, I 
think, because, at least, Murdoch is a good publisher. He knows how to sell newspapers. He is very good at 
it, very successful at it, and he has got an idea about what makes successful media, I am not saying good 
media, but certainly successful media... He is interested in journalism... But these [other] companies are 
only interested in money. So, I would personally rather have even a global proprietor, if you have to 
choose, one who knows something about decent newspapers. " (Gopsill interview). 
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New Labour's attempt to railroad the legislation on newspaper business ownership of the 
five channel hit a potential obstacle. A joint committee of MPs and peers, headed by Lord 
Puttnam, recommended that the Government defer plans to allow press groups, including 
News Corporation, further access to five. This was among its 148 recommendations. 1067 
Puttnam later argued that: "You cannot expect the government to tackle Murdoch when it 
needs the support of his newspapers. " 1068 The committee, half of which were Labour MPs 
and peers, and also included the SDP's Lord McNally, divided on this question. Only one 
Labour MP, Brian White, sided with a Conservative to back the Government's plans for 
the five channel. 1069 Those Labour MPs with professional experience in his area on both 
sides, so to speak, backed the committee majority. Paul Farrelly had been a senior 
national newspaper journalist and John Grogan had worked as a Labour Party press 
officer. 1070 The latter appears to have become radicalised by this experience and started 
organising amendments to the draft Bill. 1071 Following this, opposition to the Bill by the 
end of 2002, at least among the unions, significantly shifted, as we shall see in a moment. 
Despite this, the DCMS rejected the report's major recommendations, even before they 
were published. According to newspaper reports, they announced that the provisions 
were "... not tentative proposals, they were decisions" - rather making a mockery of the 
legislation's description as a "draft Bill". 1072 
1067 It was said that the case for deregulating Channel 5 ownership had "... yet to be made". Neil Armstrong, 
`When will the Americans land? ' Mediaweek, October 4 2002, Joint Committee on the Draft 
Communications Bill, Draft Communications Bill, HMSO, July 2002. 
1068 Lord Puttnam, Hard Talk BBC News 24, October 4 2002. 
1069 It was rumoured by reliable sources that the Labour MPs on the committee had been instructed by the 
then No. 10 media advisor Ed Richards to support the Government but the majority, in practice, had 
refused. (Private information). 
1070 Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Bill, Proceedings of the Committee Relating To The 
Report, July 25 2002, http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/jt200I02/jtselect/jtcom_ 
107 Personal information. 
1072 "I mean what is the point in going through quite properly setting up a joint committee in this area... but 
then not even have the courtesy to say ̀ Well, this is a very interesting report, we need to have time to study 
it, we are not wholly persuaded by the argument, but we will look at it'. Now it has almost bloody 
guaranteed a great row, because it is I think that it is just discourteous. They may well stand up x months 
later, and say 'No it won't work because because, because'. It needs some very good explanations as to 
why that may be... ". (Corbett interview). See also Cassy, John and Patrick Wintour. 2002. 'Blair faces 
fight on TV controls' and Leader, ̀ TV drama in the making', The Guardian, July 29 2002, Halpin, Anita. 
2002. Communications Bill, verbatim report of TUC Congress, Rose, David., 2002. ̀ Blair will force Lords 
to accept US buyers, Broadcast, October 4 2002. 
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The Communications Bill 
When the Communications Bill was published on November 20 2002, despite 
Government claims that it had accepted more than 120 of the Puttnam committee's 146 
suggested changes, on newspaper business ownership of the five channel and foreign 
ownership there was no substantial modification. As indicated, on newspaper business 
ownership of radio, there was further liberalisation. 1073 
But importantly, Labour shifted its position from that in its first term on national 
newspaper policy itself. If one narrowly considered this policy in 2000, ignoring 
representation and cross-ownership, there was a strong case for sharing Humphreys' 
assessment that it differed hardly from that of the Conservatives! 
074 However, despite 
reports that assumed there was little in the draft Bill exclusively related to the press, this 
was not true. ' 075 
Once again, Labour went beyond Conservative catch-up, explicitly justifying this move 
to appease press owners. In the Bill itself, the special merger regime - the minimal 
monopoly provisions that came in with the 1973 Fair Trading Act - were scrapped, as 
News Corp, for one, had prominently demanded. 1076 No longer would there need to be 
the minister's prior approval for any merger in which the newspapers involved had a total 
paid-for daily circulation of 500,000 or more. 1077 It is true that the act had been 
ineffective. 1078 Yet, rather than arguing that the rules should be more rigidly adhered to, 
1073 DTI/DCMS, Communications Bill, HMSO, 2002: esp. 285-6 and 287-8. As Maggie Brown put it: 
"... [OJn the biggest issues... the government, led by the DTI, remains steely". (Brown, Maggie. 2002. `Bill 
of rights - and wrongs', Guardian, November 25,2002). 1074 Humphreys, New Labour: 222. Despite all the policy development in opposition, what was striking 
was, as Lukes describes, the decision not to decide. (Lukes). 
1075 For this incorrect assessment see Armstrong, Neil. 2002. ̀ When will the Americans land? ' Mediaweek, 
October 4 2002. 
1076 News International plc, Response to Consultation on Media Ownership Rules, DCMS website, 
httn: //www. culture. gov. uk/creative/index. html, 2002: 11. 
107 It was this which had been invoked at the time of the Times Newspapers takeover in the 1980s. (DTI, 
`Guidance on DTI procedures for handling Newspaper Mergers', 
htw: //Nv%N, Nv. dti. aov. uk/cl)/ncwsmerp, erszuide. litiii. ). 
1078 It had proved to be ineffectual at halting press concentration, with claims that the rules were flouted. In 
fact, of the 175 cases, mostly concerning local titles considered by the regime since 1980, only four were 
refused. Also, the 1973 legislation did not include takeovers by companies and conglomerates that did not 
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or that international concentration should be considered, the fact that few mergers had 
been rejected under the law was used to justify taking it off the statute book. Indeed, the 
Government explicitly rationalised the move on the basis that the "... rules, and the 
uncertainty and costs they create, are disliked both by newspaper proprietors and by 
regulators". 1079 They imposed "... unnecessary burdens both on business and on the 
authorities". 1080 In this assessment, the considerations of both readers and the journalists' 
were ignored. 
In its place, there was an overriding example of New Labour's trend of harmonising press 
law with general competition law. ' 081 The takeover law would be subsumed under a new 
system for non-media mergers that was introduced in the Government's 2002 Enterprise 
Act. The Bill's `public interest' clause would be applied if the Secretary of State 
considered there was a risk to plurality. One former newspaper editor concluded that this 
would lead to tighter regulation. 1082 Yet, there would be no automatic compulsion on 
ministers, now committed to a `lighter touch', to call for an inquiry on a merger. '°83 
When the minister did, Ofcom would produce a report for the Secretary of State with 
recommendations. Its role would be advisory. It would then be up to the Competition 
Commission to use general competition rules, considered by a newspaper panel that 
would consult with a "... representative cross section of those who may be affected... ". 
However, again, the minister alone would decide as to a remedy, if it thought one was 
needed. 1084 This would again face all the problems of applying general competition law to 
the press that were outlined when we considered the Competition Bill earlier. 
already own UK newspapers. Thus, concerns regarding the integration of the press into the broader 
business community with the attendant problems that we alluded to in the introduction, not least pertaining 
to cross-promotion, were not addressed. Nor were the problems of transnational ownership by companies 
not already involved in the UK market. 
1079 Regulatory impact assessment: 62. 
logo DTI, A new future for communications: Section 9.4.7, Regulatory impact assessment: 62. 
108' Doyle, Media ownership: 130-1. 
1082 Preston, Peter. 2002. ̀ Dickie's takeover trick will never be easy again', The Observer, May 26,2002. 
1093 The minister would intervene only when he or she considered there was a threat to diversity. 
(Regulatory impact assessment: 62). 
, osa These could include past mandates including altering the corporation's constitution, such as in the 
appointment of directors or editorial board and agreement over the operation of newspapers. 
DTI/DCMS, `Communications Bill Newspaper Mergers: The New Regime', 
www. dti. gov. uk/ccp/topics2/merpers. htm#newspapers: esp: 25-30, DTI/DCMS, Communications Bill: 310- 
319. 
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Particularly, it would now be more subject to ministerial interference than previously. 
There would be no consistency, as with automatic referral. Instead, the Secretary of State 
would only have to intervene if a merger lead to a company having a share of more than 
25% of the newspaper market. '°85 
Questioning the globalisation notion 
The Government's summary of the proposals which would eventually make it into the 
Communications Bill again talked of globalisation as an unstoppable objective process. It 
implied that globalisation was not something that governments actively created, or, at the 
very least, shaped. This objective process, which, seemingly, had no conscious actors, 
determined the legislation. 1086 
This ignored the fact that the Bill's provisions would indeed make the British 
broadcasting sector more open to international takeover by media conglomerates. This 
included, for the five channel, potential takeover by groups with a huge national 
newspaper interest. 1087 Thus, the legislation would make the British media market far 
more globalised than before. The Government's determinist language also justified an 
evolving role for the regulator Ofcom, which as `competition in the media sector 
increased' would have a brief to deregulate further to bring media competition law more 
into line with general competition legislation. This had further implications for cross- 
ownership. 1088 
1083 DTI/DCMS, Newspaper Mergers, DTI/DCMS, Communications Bill: 310-319. 
1086 Thus, it was suggested that: "In the communications sector, competition is often local and national in 
character but it is also increasingly global ... Tpday's world combines a fast changing consumer 
environment with an increasingly international and competitive market place... Unnecessary regulations 
need to be removed wherever possible. " (Hewitt, Patricia and Tessa Jowell, ̀ A summary of our proposals', 
HMSO, 2002). 
1087 The legislation did not just open up the possibility of a News Corporation takeover, it laid open the, 
albeit unlikely, possibility of a takeover by the multinational Trinity Mirror, now owners of the Mirror 
titles. 
1088 The language of general competition law permeated the draft Bill in other ways. Thus, the preamble to 
the Bill - its more public face - repeatedly used the term citizens, indicating an understanding of the 
particular role of the media in democratic debate. Yet, in the Bill, the minimal provisions for democratic, 
representation, a merely advisory panel, was termed the Consumer Panel. Its responsibilities were 
concentrated on providing customer redress, rather than representing individuals in ensuring the media 
plays a role in providing alternative viewpoints for an informed citizenry. In fact, the terms citizen or 
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However, this adherence to globalisation and a determinist view of convergence can be 
questioned. As we saw, capital flight is seen as central to globalisation. It is incontestable 
that capital flight is an aspect of modern economic life. However, it was also the case that 
it afflicted centre-left left governments before the term globalisation was ever coined. As 
we saw, one former media union activist turned New Labour politician was among the 
host of commentators who justified the idea that the world had changed by pointing to the 
Mitterrand government's radical policy failure. For many, the reason was 
globalisation. 1089 However, Mitterrand analysts have noted that capital flight affected the 
French Blum government in the 1930s. 109° Considered in this way, capital has always 
been ̀ footloose'. Analysts, most famously Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, have 
questioned whether the integrated nature of the world economy was a new 
phenomenon. 1091 
In a similar sense, globalisation arrived on the scene to justify movements already 
happening in press and media policy. The commitment to diversity under Kinnock was 
crumbling well before globalisation provided justification for this development. The 
citizens appears 16 times in the preamble text. Yet, the Bill itself used the term only once, when referring to 
"citizens of the European Union". In contrast, the Bill itself used the terms customer/customers 82 times 
and consumer/consumers 20 times. (DTI/DCMS, Policy Narrative, DTI/DCMS, Draft Communications 
Bill). 
Citizen/citizens Customer/customers Consumer/consumers 
The Policy 16 4 42 
Bill Contents 0 7 1 
Part 1 1 when referring to "citizens of 
the European Union" 
21 0 
Part 2 0 52 11 
Part 3-6 0 1 7 
Schedule 0 1 1 
1089 MacShane, French lessons. 
1090 Ambler, J. S. `Is the French Left Doomed To Fail? ' and `French Socialism in Comparative Perspective' 
in Ambler John, S., and Issues Institute for the Study of Human. 1985. The French socialist experiment. 
Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.: 8,10,17,208-10, S. Halimi, `Less Exceptionalism 
than Meets the Eye', in Daley, Anthony. 1996. The Mitterrand era : policy alternatives and political 
mobilization in France. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996.: 86,91. 
1091 Hirst Paul, Q., and Centre University of Sheffield Political Economy Research. 1995. Globalisation in 
question. Sheffield: Political Economy Research Centre, University of Sheffield. 
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globalisation defence was tacked on as a justification for policy positions that had 
preceded it, such as those linked with neo-liberalism. 
Also, John Callaghan, when comparing different European social democratic parties, 
makes an pertinent point. If globalisation was a uniform external pressure, as the Labour 
leadership has suggested, then it would have been regulation in the small open economies 
such as those of the Scandinavian states, which would be most at threat. It is undeniable 
that social democracy in those states is in retreat. However, freedom of movement within 
the so-called `iron cage' is still greater there than in other European economic 
powerhouses. 1092 And this is counter-intuitive to the reasoning of the globalisers. 
When we consider state intervention to advance press plurality, the point is even more 
striking. As we noted in the appendix to Chapter 3, those same small open Scandinavian 
states have continued to lead the way in social democratic Keynesian-style 
interventionism to achieve a more diverse press. Such a situation suggests persistent 
evidence of the importance of national institutions, which goes against some of the wilder 
globalisation claims. 
As Doyle notes, the idea that globalisation and convergence had impacted on the British 
media had been questioned as early as 1994.1093 And her study of the 1996 Broadcasting 
Bill indicates that the economic advantages to cross-ownership, associated with 
globalisation, when newspaper businesses expanded into television, did not exist. 1094 In 
fact, Doyle's evidence suggests that political, rather than economic interests were 
foremost. No research was carried out to prove the convergence claims that synergy and 
1192 Held, Global transformations, Callaghan, Retreat. 
1093 This was the gist of a submission to the Cross Media Ownership Review, which was held by the 
Conservative government prior to the 1996 Broadcasting Act. The Centre for Communication and 
Information Studies at the University of Westminster questioned much of the claimed cross-media synergy 
and viewed that most media firms stayed in their home market. In this, News Corporation was an 
exception. (Nicholas Garnharn and Vincent Porter, Evidence to the Review of Cross Media Ownership, 
Centre for Communication and Information Studies, University of Westminster), cited in Doyle, Media 
ownership: 92. 
1094 Neither the arguments about international competitive advantage, associated with globalisation, nor the 
promised synergies were forthcoming. Despite the expected onset of globalisation, few companies were 
expecting to focus beyond the UK market despite the liberalisation. The Bill had little effect on overseas 
expansion. (Doyle, Media ownership: 118-9). 
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productivity would be enhanced. Instead, media groups were hostile to conducting these 
studies. 1095 Thus, the logical thrust of Doyle's research is that business pressure, rather 
than any belief that going with the grain of globalisation would bring economic benefits, 
motivated the Conservative government's actions. 
Similarly, among the Labour government's justification for further liberalisation there is 
scant concrete research of the economic benefits. However, we have already noted that 
the Government explicitly justified changes in that they would unburden press 
businesses. 
There is also evidence from the broader analysis of economic globalisation among media 
and non-media firms that a conscious globalisation strategy by governments does not 
necessarily lead to enhanced economic performance. Even among those writers that Held 
et al describe as the hyper-globalisers, it is questioned whether a governmental strategy to 
expand home-based multinational business and improve their economic performance 
adds to its home nation's economic wellbeing. In fact, they suggest the research evidence 
over time bears out the idea that there is a progressive divorce of national economic 
performance from that of the home-based multinationals. '096 Thus, New Labour's 
argument that loosening ownership rules guarantees the survival of such firms, or at least 
strengthens the possibility for enhanced economic performance, through economies of 
scale, is doubly fraught with difficulty. Most importantly, it is detrimental to diversity 
and thus democratic debate. But also, even within New Labour's own terms, such a 
policy would not necessarily add to the nation's economic wealth. 
In the case of the Communications Bill, the argument goes further. The opening up of the 
five channel to cross-ownership, including by international press conglomerates, without 
reciprocal agreements, did not aid British-based multinationals to expand abroad. 1097 It 
1°95 Doyle, Media ownership: 113-120,172-3. 
1096 Held, Global transformations: 280-1. 
1097 When directly asked whether the British government would lobby the United States to reciprocate the 
British gesture, Jowell answered that: "The World Trade Organisation is the only route and we will pursue 
this to establish reciprocity but this, as things do with the WTO, will take a long time. " (Jowell, Tessa. 
2002. Guardian Online chat, May 10 2002, http: //talk. guardian. co. uk/). 
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merely made it possible for foreign-based transnationals to squeeze them out in Britain. 
Thus, the language of aiding British international competitiveness was not that used in 
justifying the draft Bill. Instead, the Labour government argued that it would promote 
"... inward investment... " in Britain. 1098 What was needed was "... that the UK reinforces 
its position as one of the most attractive places for communications companies to do 
business". 1099 What the Government neglected to mention was that profits would, go 
elsewhere and that in the US case, the British gesture would not be necessarily 
reciprocated. 
Opposition in the Labour movement 
For a long period, Labour's strategy on press representation was regarded as successful. 
Its media ownership trajectory faced relatively little effective resistance. As we have 
indicated, MPs and peers voiced some opposition, which delayed, but did not derail, 
legislation. As Curran and Seaton note, part of the reason for the weakness of opposition 
was the effect of the decimation of the media unions, which we outlined previously. ' 1 00 
However, as we have noted, no other agency inside Labour aside from the leadership had 
much influence on party policy. This meant the media unions' weakness was even more 
pronounced. They were less able to operate the informal levers of influence on the 
Labour government that other unions could use. These, in turn, were less effective than 
previously. 
Thus, formally and informally, they would have to rely more on the TUC's relative 
collective strength. Yet, although the TUC was now greatly frozen out of policy 
development, the little pressure which it could have placed on the leadership on press 
diversity was repeatedly not exercised -a point which has been underplayed. The TUC 
1098 Jowell, Tessa. Voice of the Listeners and Viewers meeting at the House of Commons, May 14 2002, 
Hewitt, Patricia and Tessa Jowell, ̀ A summary of our proposals', HMSO, 2002. 
10°' Hewitt, Patricia and Tessa Jowell, `A summary of our proposals', HMSO, 2002. Department of, Trade, 
Industry, Media Great Britain Department for Culture, and Sport. 2002. Draft Communications Bi11, The 
Stationery Office, 2002. 
1100 Curran and Seaton: 360. 
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general council only made a limited attempt to honour its commitment to campaign for 
diversity. 110 ' 
The TUC once again agreed in 1996 to conduct a large-scale campaign to oppose 
Labour's move "... towards a `free for all'... " in cross-media ownership. 1102 This would 
inevitably have involved confronting the Labour Party. However, an indication of what 
was to happen was that the TUC general secretary John Monks expressed his 
`reservation' to the congress that it could not "... go into this in a half-hearted way". 1103 
This appears to be precisely what happened. A report on the proposed campaign, which 
had been agreed, was not forthcoming in 1997. The motion was spearheaded by the NUJ, 
which condemned Labour's position at its own conference and in front of the TUC. "°4 
However, not being affiliated to Labour meant that it could not lead any such response in 
that party. This quiescence replicated the low level of industrial action in the unions in 
Labour's first term in office. 
The pattern carried on after New Labour came into office. The 1998 congress also saw 
the TUC take on Labour over press and media ownership. It overwhelmingly supported a 
NUJ motion opposing cross-ownership. ' 105 Tony Lennon, President of BECTU and then 
of the CPBF, slammed Labour media policy as "... actually more Tory than the 
Tories". 1106 The congress also again agreed to organise a conference with the media 
unions "... as part of a strategic TUC campaign to bring about true democracy in the 
media". In response, TUC general secretary John Monks referred to News Corporation's 
dominant press ownership, committing himself to working "... to take on this juggernaut 
101 For instance, the broadcasting union BECTU, the printing union GPMU, and the non-Labour affiliated 
NUJ opposed the Conservative government's proposals to increase cross-ownership. Yet, the general 
council merely indicated that it was attempting to coordinate a response with these unions and mentioned 
nothing about attempting to influence Labour Party policy on this question. (Trades Union Congress. 
Annual, Conference. 1995. Report of the 127th annual Trades Union Congress. London: T. U. C. ). 
"02 Trades Union Congress. Annual, Conference. 1996. Report of the 128th annual Trades Union 
Congress. London: T. U. C.: 27-8. 
103 Ibid.: 109. 
1104 Ibid.: 27-8. 
"05 Trades Union Congress. Annual, Conference. 1998. Report of the 130th annual Trades Union 
Congress. London: T. U. C.: 90-2, Anon. `Murdoch should mark his words', Journalist October/November 
1998. 
1106 TUC 1998: 92. 
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which is running through so many parts of British life". 
' 107 However, again, this 
campaign did not materialise. The 1999 and 2000 congress reports did not even allude to 
this concern, which Monks the year before had viewed as one affecting "... the lives of 
just about everyone in the nation". 1108 
Granville Williams, the editor of the CPBF's Free Press, and a member of the TUC's 
North West regional council, said attempts to resurrect the resolution were "stonewalled": 
"All of that was just formally noted and stuck in the filing cabinet - and that was the end 
of it. 109 According to Mike Smith, head of the TUC Secretariat, the TUC saw itself as 
playing a limited role as it had other priorities and limited resources. It seems that it was 
up to the media unions themselves to carry out the campaigning. 1110 
However, small pockets of resistance to this view appeared in many media unions, 
notably in the NUJ and the broadcasting union BECTU. As we have seen, the NUJ was at 
the forefront of opposition. It attempted to mobilise dissent among other unions. "" l1 The 
tenor of its disagreement subtly changed during the Bill's passage. Although broadcasting 
content and defence of public service broadcasting was still a priority, its opposition to 
ownership changes strengthened. The printers' union, the GPMU, also registered its 
opposition and offered its parliamentary lobbyist's services. 1112 
With this pressure, the TUC again overwhelmingly passed a motion at its 2002 congress, 
proposed by Equity and seconded by the NUJ. This indicated its fear concerning further 
media concentration. It opposed relaxing ownership rules - at least until reciprocal 
legislation was adopted in other countries. There was again a call for the TUC general 
council to make representations and work with unions on a campaign opposing sections 
1 107 Ibid.: 91,92. 
1108 Ibid.: 92, Trades Union Congress. Annual, Conference. 1999. Report of the 131st annual Trades Union 
Congress. London: T. U. C., Trades Union Congress. Annual, Conference. 2000. Report of the 132nd annual 
Trades Union Congress. London: T. U. C.. 
1109 Granville Williams interview. 
1110 Mike Smith, interview with author, October 12002. 
1111 The NUJ was helping organising coordinating meetings with the communications union, the CWU, 
BECTU, Connect, Equity and the CPBF. Tony Lennon, of BECTU was the convenor. (Personal, 
Information) 
1112 Gopsill interview. 
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of the Bill. The NUJ, which was one of a number of unions that had seen a left turn in 
their leadership, reported to the first TUC general council following the conference on 
this. 1113 However, the TUC's effect in the Labour Party has been limited for reasons we 
will reconsider in the conclusion. 
Despite the Bill's importance, there was no motion taken on it at the 2002 Labour Party 
conference. The reasons for this were procedural as much as directly political. It was 
unlikely the conference could have taken an emergency motion on the Bill because of its 
timing, for reasons discussed in the first part of this chapter. Also, Labour's rolling 
programme had not set in motion such a discussion on the media to be taken at the 
conference. 1114 Such was the low priority given by party activists to media reform by this 
stage, it is not clear that it would have been prioritised as one of the few emergency 
motions in any case. Nevertheless, this also indicated traditional activists' demoralisation 
about Labour Party action in the face of the new procedures and a classic problem with 
the new procedure when discussing relevant, but not emergency, motions. 
I 113 TUC, General Purposes Committee Report to Congress, TUC, 2002: 23. Tony Dubbins, `Fighting 
against media monopoly', Morning Star, October 1 2002, personal information. Anita Halpin of the TUC, 
seconding the motion argued that: "New Labour has gone even further than the Tories dared in the 
relaxation of ownership rules. " (Anita Halpin, Communications Bill, verbatim report of TUC Congress, 
http: //www. tuc. org. uk/congress/tuc-5617-fD. cfm#tuc-5617-10). Others that had seen a shift included the 
CWU, Britain's second-biggest union, Amicus, transport union, the RMT and the civil service union the 
PCs. 
1114 A discussion on democracy, which would include the media within it, was scheduled to be discussed at 
the 2003 conference and agreed in 2004. (Labour Party, Democracy, and Commission Citizenship Policy. 
2002. Democracy & citizenship : second-year consultation document. London: The Labour Party, 2000. ) 
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CONCLUSION 
We shall discuss how this all relates to the ̀ classic texts' on Labour policymaking power 
as part of the concluding Chapter 8. However to conclude here, we shall extremely 
briefly consider Labour's trajectory. 
We considered earlier that New Labour's communitarian influence would demand that 
with the rights of press business come responsibilities. Philosopher Onora O'Neil has 
argued forcefully, put simply, that an acceptance of a theory of obligations impacts on 
communications! 115 She argues that accepting the notion of obligations leads to a state 
commitment to "... developing and sustaining institutions... ", fostering communication 
diversity and protecting voices faced with the danger of marginalisation. 1116 This is the 
concern which Labour formerly identified itself with, notwithstanding its difficulties and 
contradictions with representation. 
Yet it is a commitment the Labour government seems to have discarded. New Labour 
went even further than previous Conservative regimes dared in relaxing ownership rules. 
The Communications Bill represented the failure of the hopes of generations of media 
activists who had put their faith in a Labour government to deliver communication 
diversity. 
Third Way advocates have argued that one reason for the decline of traditional social 
democracy is that its interest in equality was in conflict with policies to create cultural 
pluralism. 1117 Yet, there is an irony here. As we have seen, left variants of social 
democracy, especially the Labour new left, were concerned about cultural diversity and 
the representation of it in the media. For all the problems concerning its solutions, this 
part of the left was actively involved in trying to create strategies to provide for plural 
representation through diverse ownership and increased participation. In contrast, New 
.... Onora O'Neil, ̀ Practices of toleration', in Lichtenberg, Judith. 1990. Democracy and the mass media ; 
a collection of essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.: 155-85. 1116 Ibid.: 173. 
1117 See, for instance, Giddens, Anthony. 2000. The third way and its critics. Malden, Mass.: Polity Press.: 
85-8. 
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Labour's `actual existing Third Way' stripped away some of the few remaining 
regulations concerning press ownership and cross-ownership. It made possible increased 
domination by fewer multinational corporate players, greater international concentration, 
and less cultural plurality and ownership diversity. "8 
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8. Conclusion 
Labelling someone an optimist or a pessimist can often be unhelpful. However, it is 
striking that Curran, who was a Labour Party member for many years treats the struggle 
for a diverse and democratic media within the party sympathetically but rather 
pessimistically. ' 119 Freedman declares himself to be a socialist outside the Labour Party 
and cites a series of authors openly dismissive of Labour left currents. Yet, the breadth of 
internal radical discussion on broadcasting policy pleasantly surprised him. 1120 The glass 
was more than half empty for Curran and approaching half full for Freedman. 
This study has taken the latter emphasis when it comes to press policy. We are now 
aware that for a myriad of reasons, the glass is at low level. More recent calls for a press 
advertising tax, for instance, seem to be a product of a different age. 1121 However, if we 
consider the history of the last 30 years from Curran's normative policymaking 
perspective, it is important to note the liquid that was in the glass, rather than just its 
disappearance. In downplaying, particularly, his own pioneering work, Curran is 
understandably, but unnecessarily, self-effacing and reflective of his own personal sense 
of failure. One factor in this, the crushing of optimism felt when Labour came into power 
in 1997, has contributed to the whole enterprise being unreasonably diminished. 
To downplay these important moments in Labour Party thought can give the wrong 
impression. It can mistakenly leave the reader fitting this historical sweep into the sane 
perspective as New Media, New Policies, which reduces Labour Party discussion on the 
media before New Labour to The people and the media and two pages in the 1991 Arts 
and the Media pamphlet. 1122 
1119 Curran, Press Reformism. 
1120 Freedman, 2000. 
1121 However, even here, it is important to note there has been discussion of recent implementation of this 
demand in other countries. Some US states have said to have implemented an advertising tax, including on 
parts of the media. (Tomkins, Richard `Let's ban advertising. Only joking, let's tax it', Financial Times, 
May 16,2003). 
1122 Collins and Murroni: 3-4. See also Freedman, 2003: 2. 
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Leo Panitch and Colin Leys' important work on the Labour Party attempts to recover its 
history from the revisionism that saw New Labour triumphing over an undifferentiated 
old Labour of Dennis Healey and Tony Benn or, in our narrower arena, Gerald Kaufman 
and James Curran. 1 123 In an extremely modest sense, this work is a contribution to this 
project, which notes the profound problems with the `New Left' solutions, but also the 
quiescence of the old Labour right and New Labour's neo-liberal reality. We shall return 
to this point later. But first, we shall consider the evolution of Labour policy for 
democratic participation in the press. 
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
As we saw in Chapter 1, a number of writers have held that diverse media ownership is 
needed for democracy. However, even some strident advocates downplayed the role of 
democratic control in aiding political democracy. 1124 Nevertheless, this work has 
considered the importance of participative control for political democracy. The thesis 
attempted to consider it in relation to the various media models put forward. 
It is true, as has been argued, that no society can guarantee that all communicators can 
express all possible content in all contexts. Yet, as Onora O'Neil indicates, one 
justification for state media regulation is that, in its absence, unaccountable businesses 
will regulate access instead. "25 
For a time, Labour agreed to legislation that would have aided participative democracy 
for those working in the press industry, at least. These conceptions for democratic 
ownership of the press are associated more closely with the New Left/Marxist and radical 
democratic/social market models. As was indicated, the broader question of employees' 
democratic involvement in industry had excited some Western European social 
1123 Panitch and Leys. A more critical reading of the New Left legacy, influenced by Panitch and Leys, has 
been provided more recently by Wickham-Jones. (Wickham-Jones, New Left). 
1124 Thus, McChesney's revelatory short consideration of this subject, which sees ̀ participatory self- 
government' as his goal, little considers this area, mentioning accountability twice only fleetingly as a 
target. (McChesney, Corporate media: 66,67). 
12 O'Neil: 178. 
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democratic parties in the 1970s, as part of the New Left upsurge. This was reflected in 
British Labour Party policy. However, in the early 1970s, this was not shared by the 
journalists' representatives, which, although not affiliated to the Labour Party, were 
involved in policy development. The NUJ leadership's position on the study group had 
fused elements of a classical liberal pluralist and the social market model. However, this 
traditional view was under pressure. The New Left Free Communications Group was by 
then influencing the Labour Party as well as the NUJ. One journalist and FCG supporter, 
Neal Ascherson, used the study group to call for direct forms of staff democracy, which 
echoed the views of Raymond Williams and of other Marxists, although not their 
revolutionary intent. Although most of the group supported workers' participation in the 
press, there was a dissenting social democratic voice. This division was reflected in The 
people and the media where general statements of intent did not lead to clear policy. 
While it called for participation, it did not specify how this would be operationalised. 
As for broader involvement than staff democracy, O'Malley indicates that the New Left 
connection to The people and the media extended to the demand for accountability. t 126 
However, we saw that this again divided the committee and, although there was a 
concern to fund newspapers that met a community need, industrial democracy was 
prioritised. While left critics bemoaned that there was not enough emphasis on 
journalistic participation, they were on stronger ground criticising the little consideration 
of broader involvement. 
By the time of the Royal Commission, the Labour Party both publicly and in its policy 
positions supported industrial democracy in the press, reflecting the New Left, Marxist 
and some social market models. Yet, the conference policy went beyond this, towards 
other Marxist and social market models, minus their revolutionary implications.. It 
cautiously considered reader involvement. The Labour government's involvement in the 
closed shop legislation highlighted potential tensions within New Left notions, when it 
was shown that greater industrial democracy could clash with public participation and 
access. 
1126 O'Malley: 89. 
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However, this did not stymie demands for journalistic participation. The Labour 
government did this. It shelved both the demands for journalist autonomy made by the 
1977 Royal Commission on the Press and the commission's Minority Report, which the 
Labour Party had promoted, which went further than the commission in this respect. 
The left's radical challenge to Keynesianism and the democratic upsurge in the party 
again put press worker control on the agenda at the 1979 party conference. Yet, calls did 
not extend to the broader community. Nevertheless, this left momentum was relatively 
short-lived. An attempt to put flesh on this proposal in the party's Media Study Group, 
which went beyond Williams' model towards again considering broader community 
control was scuppered. It faced reluctant media unions, with their maximalist approach 
leading to minimal conclusions. This was combined with some MPs' reluctance based on 
fears of business resistance. 
In the 1980s, Labour shifted from the municipal socialists approach, reflected in the 1983 
conference motion. This combined Marxist models of reader accountability with radical 
models in fusing marketised and collectivist forms. Livingstone's attempt to revive this 
approach was spurned, with a print union representative spearheading this. 
Instead, as the appendix to Chapter 5 showed, the unions backed the industrial right of 
reply, which minimally reflected Williams' Marxist model. Yet, with its implicit 
acceptance of private ownership of the press, it also looked to radical schemas. 
Eventually, party policy concentrated on a legal right of reply. Labour made a last 
attempt to provide a statutory right of reply with the support of the frontbench during the 
Smith interregnum. 
The legal right of reply did not require a restructuring of the press. One analyst of Labour 
media policy saw this as an advantage. It would aid public acceptance of the measure. 1127 
1127 Allaun, Spreading the news: 93. 
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However, Freedman sees it as a retreat. 1128 This work has argued that taking the legal 
path was a problem, but not quite in the way Freedman envisaged. It was a huge step 
forward from the self-regulation of the Press Council regime, with "... independence from 
any external accountability beyond the market". 1129 However, in some options 
considered, it substituted this for decision-making overseen by state appointees or judges 
connected to the state, rather than broader public or staff participation. This reflected a 
radical pluralist model and a social democratic tradition. It attempted to seek public 
accountability, rather than direct nationalised state control, as had John Keane. It 
attempted to be representative. Yet, also, in some variants, it followed the social 
democratic public service tradition in its attachment to the state and was a policy transfer 
from social democratic governments and those to their right. It failed to become policy 
and the Labour hierarchy abandoned it. Instead, the Labour government adopted notions 
of a marketised minimal participation, with the idea of a subordinate Consumer Council 
in the Communications Bill. But the council's remit was not intended to include 
newspapers. 
1128 Freedman, 2000: 183. 
1129 Seymour-Ure, Colin. 1996. The British press and broadcasting since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell.: 242. 
See also O'Malley and Soley. 
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DIVERSITY, LABOUR PARTY REPRESENTATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE PRESS OWNERSHIP POLICY 
The relationship between diversity and Labour Party representation has been a theme 
throughout the time that this work covers. Yet, Curran and Freedman, as insightful 
writers, have downplayed or consciously avoided the question of political 
communications. Downplaying the question of the importance of this in order to gain 
Labour Party representation can affect how the last 30 years of press policy is considered. 
In Curran's assessment, he particularly understates the role of four electoral defeats on 
the Labour movement. 1130 
However, this author shares the view of numerous commentators that the mass media has 
become increasingly central to politics. Jerry Palmer considers there to be a political 
marketing literature consensus that media relations are central to modern politics and 
communication functionaries are vital to parties and governments. ' 131 We saw this was 
the case with Labour. 
Other writers have referred to representation and diversity from the mid 1980s 
onwards. 1132 Academics who came to be associated with the left shared the alarm about 
the lack of Labour representation. 1133 
To repeat, this work has argued that the division over the aim of Labour representation in 
national newspapers and diversity is integral to explaining the tensions in Labour press 
1130 Curran, Press Reformism. 
1131 Palmer, Jerry. 2002. ̀ Smoke and mirrors: is that the way it is? Themes in political marketing', Media, 
Culture & Society 24: 345-363.: 348,359,360. 
1132 Brian McNair identifies that press observers by the 1980s saw the inequality in newspaper support for 
Labour as a problem, in addition to the historic concern with concentration. (McNair, Journalism and 
democracy: 146-8). One close observer, Nicholas Jones, deals with much similar material, when it comes 
to political communication and the relationship of No. 10 to News International. But, as a non-academic 
writer, he is not systematic in theorising his ideas and in teasing out causal connections for shifts in Labour 
press ownership policy - and nor should he be expected to be. (Jones, Sultans. and Jones, Control freaks. ) 133 See, for example, Peter Golding and Graham Murdock, `Confronting the Market: Public Intervention 
and Press Diversity', in Curran, The British Press: 75-93,82. 
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ownership policy. This tension was not just from the time of Kinnock onwards, but also 
in the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
Thus, the first major discussion in the party on the media in 1972 was a response to 
perceived press hostility, particularly directed towards the trade unions. And even while 
the first media study group was deliberating, the more public expression of this 
discussion justified it in terms of creating a particularly Labour press, rather than a more 
diverse one. 
Yet, there was also a broader anxiety on the Labour left that the press structure 
challenged the notion of pluralism in the democratic system, irrespective of the specifics 
of the Labour Party's press treatment. 1134 Nevertheless, this was confused. On the one 
hand, the New Left transcended the mainstream Labour concern with party bias in the 
press to emphasise the broader problem of exclusion of the public's opinions. O'Malley 
also mentions this. The Home Policy committee and its report reflected that shift. ' 135 Yet, 
this work detailed that the tension between these two interrelated positions was not 
eradicated. Instead, the New Left ascendancy merely masked this. The most prominent 
academic Labour left advocate, for instance, saw the need to tailor diversity concerns to 
appeal to those whose interest was in a Labour movement press. 1136 
So, to advance diversity, The people and the media reflected the strain between the public 
service conception and Scandinavian-style interventionism. The methods it envisaged for 
intervention reflected the social market interventionist model. Yet, Benn insisted that the 
document should describe itself as being in the public service tradition. This reflected the 
tension. Most trade unionists on the group were one side. They wanted better Labour 
movement representation. This idea fitted in better with a public service conception, 
which wanted to balance the press. Some from the New Left tradition were on the other 
side. The academic Curran most notably reflected this. Their major interest was, with 
directly diversifying the newspaper market. 
14 Holland, Countervailing Press Power, 94-123: 107-8. 
1 "3s O'Malley: 89. 
1136 See, for instance, Curran, Different approaches: 89-135,124-5. 
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This tension between the social democratic and New Left traditions and between Labour 
representation and diversity should not be overstated. Those involved were not 
necessarily even aware of it. And Benn notably was on one side in the diversity 
discussion and on the other on the question of democratic participation. 
Yet, the tension between representation and other press policies continued with the Royal 
Commission on the Press, initiated by the 1974 Labour government. The model the party 
put forward for diversity was that of an Advertising Revenue Board. Nevertheless, an 
indication of the division between the Labour Party and the Labour government on this 
policy transfer from a Scandinavian social market model was that this solution was only 
put forward tentatively by Labour officials. The Labour administration did not act on the 
plans when they came to address the report. 
Instead, the Labour officials were motivated, again, to provide for Labour movement 
representation, rather than diversity. Labour leader Wilson had set up the Royal 
Commission, in part, as a response to the end of his long newspaper honeymoon. Those 
on the NEC and its representatives on the Royal Commission on the Press emphasised the 
point that they wanted to change the structure of the market in order to provide `fairer' 
newspaper coverage. However, the problem for that aim was that the effect of the 
schemes would have been to have increased diversity. They may have enhanced Labour 
movement representation. But they wouldn't have had a predictable political outcome. ' 137 
The schemes would not have guaranteed anything like political parity. 
For that to happen, there needed to be some sort of control of the outlets. This could have 
either come through state control from above - through a public service conception; or it 
could have come from below through participation in the newspapers' control; or there 
could have been a combination of both. The first approach was attempted after Labour 
left office in 1979. The Meacher and Mullin proposals for an Independent Press 
1137 As Seymour-Ure says, a government press subsidy would have kept Conservative-supporting titles 
running, possibly at a cost to the Labour-backing Daily Mirror. (Seymour-Ure, British press and 
broadcasting: 215). 
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Authority were in the public service tradition and eventually became party policy, though 
they did not make it into the manifesto. Meacher and Mullin went beyond ̀ broad-brush' 
attempts to achieve diversity to attempt to obtain balance and thus representation of 
Labour and the left. In doing so, they indicated the huge problems of attempting to 
achieve balance in the press and reflected difficulties to do with the public service 
model's positive view of employing the state's coercive force. 
A less problematic solution came with the Open Press Authority concept, which reflected 
the Scandinavian social market model. Yet, by the time of the 1983 election this had been 
discarded. Nevertheless, the manifesto commitment was a sea-change from that of four 
years before. Its anti-monopoly law went beyond the liberal pluralist model, while its 
commitment to a launch fund was a policy transfer from Scandinavian-style social 
democracy. 
Ater the perceived part that the newspapers played in Labour's defeat in 1983, the 
emphasis in this last radical phase was again on answering this bias, as much as diversity. 
The Labour conference again put its faith in the flawed public service model IPA. It 
placed as much stress on achieving balance as plurality. Yet, the News on Sunday's 
collapse dealt a huge blow to attempts to bring greater Labour movement representation 
with some control by the movement itself. After this, some unions became less 
enthusiastic about promoting Labour through structural change. 
As intervention became politically unacceptable, those who wanted Labour 
representation looked to another attractive method. Aaron Davies has tentatively 
suggested that the unions concentrated on political communications to deal with press 
bias. 1138 This work has provided some limited confirmation of this but has more 
importantly suggested that the Labour leadership made a similar assessment. The new 
media strategy's by-product was a renewed pressure to seek press business approval - to 
1138 The emphasis on backing an alternative press was a product of another era. There was a strategy to 
professionalise and increase the resources of union PR operations, which was regarded as successful. 
(Davis, Aeron. 2002. Public relations democracy : public relations, politics, and the mass media in Britain. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.: 114-5,125-149). 
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not upset the apple cart by bringing forward proposals for structural change. 
Backbenchers had already advised Kinnock that Labour's case would be advanced if it 
accommodated to News Corporation over cross-media ownership. In the retreat from 
press ownership interventionist policies, we are entering the difficult territory of 
" anticipated reactions. In Lukes' terms, there was the question of non-decisions, to avoid 
aspects of press ownership being considered. ' 139 This was not apparent, even to some of 
the actors involved - Corbett being one. Yet, as the higher echelons of the party 
abandoned interventionism in other areas, at least after 1987, they placed less emphasis 
on structural change and much more on political communications. 
The shift from intervention had happened under Kinnock. The demand for intervention 
was not just some left fetish. This work indicated that proposals that just restricted 
existing ownership could well lead to papers being shuffled around existing firms, as 
Negrine argues. Worse still, jettisoned newspapers could go to the wall. 1140 Such 
proposals would need to be accompanied by some sort of launch body for new 
publications. They would also need to protect the body's independence from the state 
and its democratic legitimacy; going beyond appointing representatives. Nevertheless, it 
is a measure of how far Labour has departed from previous discussions on diversity that 
such a limited measure now seems utopian, outlandish, impossible and even dangerous in 
party circles. 
Labour thinkers had grappled with the problem for democratic expression of there being 
a dual market in newspaper production, which heavily disadvantages low-income readers. 
However, this work has confirmed what Curran suggests - that there is no way of 
redistributing advertising revenue which does not have potential problems to be dealt 
with over time. The answers that he advocated in the 1980s; to impose a levy on all 
advertising to finance new publications or, more recently; to fund such a press from the 
1139 Lukes. 
1140 Negrine: 55-66. It is a testament to the continuing ingenuity of James Curran's vision that in more 
recent years he has suggested the National Lottery as a possible new funding source. (Curran, Policy for the 
press). 
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lottery, seem appealing. 114 1However, this would not directly deal with the dual market. 
Such titles financed by such a levy would still face the problem of seeking advertising 
revenue. A levy placed on papers charging high advertising rates, to deal with this, faced 
the wrath of companies producing those currently over-subsidised newspapers aimed at 
high-income readers. There would instead need to be subsidies for low-income reader 
newspapers with a strong current affairs content, as Curran suggested. ' 142 Such a scheme 
is not acceptable in the political climate at the time of writing. Nevertheless, that this is 
the case is not a failing of past Labour policymakers. Instead, it represents a democratic 
flaw of a market system that makes press provision so skewed against lower-waged 
readers. 
141 Curran, Different approaches: 89-135, Curran, Policy for the press. 
1142 Curran, Different approaches: 89-135,119. 
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. 
POLICY CHANGES AND GLOBAL SHIFTS 
Why was there this shift from more radical models of diversity and democratic control 
under New Labour? There were also broader reasons for the evolution than just Labour's 
renewed emphasis on political communications. This work argued it was a reflection of 
its general drift to the right with the demise of Keynesianism and the rejection of 
employee democratic control. It was affected by the general loss of confidence in public 
intervention following the collapse of the Soviet Union, union demoralisation and the 
impact of Thatcherism. This thesis also indicated that New Labour's determination to 
converge press policy with general competition policy was in line with EU policy, as has 
been indicated elsewhere. 1143 
However, this work has suggested that an overriding reason for this shift was that the 
Labour leadership accepted that it needed to go with the grain of globalisation. Others, 
from different perspectives, have previously argued that New Labour accepted the dictats 
of globalisation. 1144 It has been implied that this influenced its media policy. 
1145 But this 
work has argued this linked with New Labour's particular concern with representation. 
One question is whether globalisation of the press and media is a qualitatively new 
phenomenon and the only tendency at work in the world economy. As Kevin Williams 
indicates, there is concentration, conglomeration and internationalisation of the British 
media. However, it does not automatically follow that there is simply economic 
globalisation, as he implies. "46 This is not just a question of semantics. Globalisation 
indicates a distinct new economic order. It is true that technology is eroding traditional 
"" It is also in line with deregulatory moves in other countries such as the United States. (Doyle, Media 
ownership: 31-2,150, chapter 10, Doyle, Understanding: 169). See also Humphreys, New Labour: 231. 
1144 Anderson and Mann: esp. 338, Daniel Wincott, `European Social Democracy and New Labour' in 
Leonard, Dick, and Society Fabian. 1999. Crosland and new Labour. Basingstoke: Macmillan in 
association with Fabian Society.: 189, Shaw, 1979: Chapter 4 esp. 194-5, Callaghan, Retreat: 156-165. 
1145 Freedman argues this. He discusses globalisation and, to an extent, relates it to New Labour's adoption 
of the `Third Way'. (Freedman, 2000: 221-2,246-7,259-64). In this sense, this work only partly agrees 
with Seymour-Ure when he argues that the Communications Bill that it : "... looked more like a pragmatic 
response to corporate pressure than the result of core Labour beliefs (new or old). " (Seymour-Ure, Prime 
ministers: 15). 
1146 Williams, Get me a murder a day: 241-2. 
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market boundaries. Internationalisation and convergence have accelerated. However, that 
is not the same as claiming that there is "borderless economy", as Doyle puts it. ' 147 This 
is particularly true for newspapers. Clearly, the on-line versions may change this, yet the 
Financial Times is one of a few print newspapers in the whole of Europe that has sizeable 
international sales. 
This work has accepted that the world economy has changed, one aspect being the 
liberalisation of capital movements. Yet, before globalisation was talked of, there was a 
significant post-war internationalisation of British press ownership, as Seymour-Ure 
points out. 1148 Indeed, as Panitch and Leys and Callaghan indicate, from different 
perspectives, the Labour left considered the implications of economic internationalisation 
more generally before Labour right considered globalisation. 1149 This was also true for 
the press as this work indicated. It was precisely concern about the international 
economy's effect on the press that prompted left media activists to call for government 
intervention. 
This work's insistence on the role of the subject and that there are counter-tendencies to 
globalisation situates it alongside writers such as Colin Hay and David Marsh, and Peter 
Taylor. 1150 It sets it apart from hyper-globalisers such as Reich and `radicals' such as 
Giddens. "5' It queries the notion, along with others, that there is no alternative to neo- 
liberal restructuring, as the dominant understanding of globalisation dictates. ' 1s2 
"47 Doyle, Media ownership: 2. 
1148 Seymour-Ure, National Press: 265-6. 
1149 Panitch and Leys accept the existence of the phenomenon and wish to challenge it, but Callaghan is 
more sceptical. (Panitch and Leys: 263-264,269, Callaghan, Retreat: esp. Chapter 7). 
1150 Colin Hay and David Marsh, ̀ Introduction: Demystifying Globalization', in Hay, Colin, David Marsh, 
and Group University of Birmingham Political Sociology Research. 2000. Demystifying globalization 
Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with POLSIS, University of Birmingham, 2000.: 1-20, Peter J 
Taylor, `Ization of the World: Americanization, Modernization and Globalization', in Hay and Marsh: 49- 
70. 
1151 Reich Robert, B. 1992. The work of nations : preparing ourselves for 21st century capitalism. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1992., Giddens, Anthony. 1998. The third way : the renewal of social democracy. 
Maiden, Mass. ; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998. and Giddens, Anthony. 2000. The third way and its critics. 
Maiden, Mass.: Polity Press.. 
"" Hay, Colin, and Matthew Watson. 1999. "Globalisation: `Sceptical' Notes on the 1999 Reith Lectures. - 
Political Quarterly 70: 418 - 425., Callaghan, Retreat, Glyn, Andrew. 1995. 'Social Democracy and Full 
Employment', New Left Review 211: 33-55., Glyn, `Internal and External Constraints on Egalitarian 
Policies', in Baker, Dean, A. Epstein Gerald, Robert Pollin, Institute Political Economy Research, and 
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Specifically, it agrees with Kevin Williams that "... media futures are not 
predetermined.. . ". 
1153 Nevertheless, despite the fact that there was no rigid `iron cage', 
the work has argued that New Labour accepted a specific globalisation agenda. "54 
However, this thesis has gone beyond arguing that New Labour's acceptance of 
globalisation simply determined its press policy. It indicated that an important 
consideration has been that conscious actors shaped its tendency to neo-liberal 
globalisation. As was indicated, following Fairclough, neo-liberal globalisation has not 
been the product of impersonal forces. "55 It has required decisions by governments, such 
as the Labour administration, to liberalise press and cross-ownership laws - and 
transnationals have been conscious actors in the process. This work argued that the same 
was true of Labour's press and media policy. Labour's policy went with the grain of 
globalisation but was shaped to appeal to other actors; most notably, business. Thus, even 
a writer who accepts the `borderless economy' notion, Gillian Doyle, argues that 
appealing to the key media corporations was central to New Labour's policy. 1156 We have 
seen that the New Labour government itself specifically indicated that it geared some 
provisions of the 2002 Communications Bill to deal with the concerns of "... the 
newspaper proprietors... ", as well as regulators. "57 
Amherst University of Massachusetts at. 1998. Globalization and progressive economic policy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.: 391-409, Hirst Paul, Q., and Grahame Thompson. 1999. Globalization in 
question : the international economy and the possibilities of governance. Cambridge, UK ; Oxford, OX, 
UK ; Cambridge, MA, USA: Polity Press : Blackwell Publishers.: Chapter 7. 
1... Williams gives the example of the French government's determination to defend its indigenous film 
industry in the GATT treaty talks as an example. (Williams, Get me a murder a day: 10). 
1154 As Daniel Wincott argues, it may be the case that globalisation's effect is less in its irresistible effect 
but more `as a cluster of ideas' which impacted on New Labour. (Daniel Wincott, `European Social 
Democracy and New Labour', in Leonard, Dick, and Society Fabian. 1999. Crosland and new Labour. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with Fabian Society.: 189). It may be true that the adoption of the 
Third Way 
1155 Fairclough: 23-34. 
1156 As Doyle indicates of the draft Communication Bill: "For New Labour just as for the previous 
Conservative administration, concerns about pluralism appear to count for little (beyond the level of 
rhetoric) while the main impetus guiding actual changes of policy is a desire to accommodate the strategic 
interests and concerns of major UK commercial media players. " (Doyle, Gillian. 2002c, `What's `new' 
about the future of communications? An evaluation of recent shifts in UK media ownership policy', Media, 
Culture & Society : 715-724.: 715). See also Doyle, Media ownership: 2. 
"'' If we remember, the justification for scrapping the special merger regime of the 1973 Fair Trading Act 
was that: "... rules, and the uncertainty and costs they create, are disliked both by newspaper proprietors 
and by regulators". They imposed "... unnecessary burdens both on business and on the authorities". 
(Regulatory impact assessment: 62). 
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Thus, globalisation and neo-liberal policy transfer were over-riding factors in the shift in 
ownership legislation. However, along with the influence of the EU to harmonise with 
general competition law, the Labour government's understanding of globalisation led it to 
closely align with the newspaper firms. The alignment could have been mere coincidence 
but has looked suspiciously like collaboration, related to the concern with Labour 
representation. 
It can be seen that the party, and the TUC in practice, prioritised representation over the 
more abstract questions of diversity and democracy. And, in terms of representation, this 
was, for a time, a very successful strategy. If we understand that for many in the Labour 
movement the `press problem' was simply one of representation, then it had been 
`solved'. Thus, we have an additional explanation as to why party demands for press 
ownership policy has weakened. There has been a resigned perception that it is worth 
achieving Labour representation by other means. For the unions, this links to their long- 
term concern to create a Labour movement title, which took precedence over diversity, 
before being abandoned. 
Interestingly, some commentators have reflected Labour policymakers past conflation of 
diversity and representation in assessing this new climate. McNair considers that because 
more newspapers now support the Labour Party in government then there is a "... more 
diverse, even pluralistic press". 1158 Even as distinguished a commentator as Curran 
appeared to share this concept of representation and has conflated it with 
concentration. 1159 
Yet, increased representation does not necessarily equal further political plurality, or as 
we have seen, increased ownership diversity. As many observers from different 
viewpoints acknowledge, there is now far less political diversity between the parties than 
115" McNair, Journalism and democracy: 149-50,164-5. 
1159 So, he argues that the British press was not representative of public opinion because it backed the 
Conservatives more strongly than the popular vote in the 1980s. And he suggests the reason for this was 
ownership concentration and market entry barriers. (Curran, Policy for the press: 11-2). 
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in the 1980s. And McNair points to the 1980s as a time when there were concerns over 
representation. It is only partly the case that if the Labour Party's political position shifts, 
and the newspapers react to these changed circumstances, that a more diverse set of 
views is then represented. This work considered that the Labour leadership's rightward 
drift in press policy reflected a more general pro-market shift that the pro-Tory press had 
previously championed against Labour. In this sense, it questions the notion that, as 
McNair suggests, the `mainstream left' is in government. Although this work has not 
systematically addressed the question, the evidence presented tends to challenge the idea 
that New Labour is in the mainstream Western European social democratic tradition. 1160 
Equally, this thesis has challenged the notion that the Labour Party members, 
`mainstream' or otherwise, have as much influence on Labour Party policy as in the past. 
Furthermore, if we shift the argument to consider Labour movement representation, 
which is what animated many in the Labour Party discussions, it is not clear that most 
newspaper groups have lessened their hostility towards the unions. The bitter struggles 
for union recognition in the newspaper industry, post-Wapping, suggest this. This is not 
to suggest that diversity could credibly be measured in terms of Labour movement 
representation. Rather, this work has indicated that in terms of ownership diversity, there 
is little plurality. The problems of ownership concentration remain, as McNair himself 
acknowledges. 1161 
The notion of representation has its problems. If representation is meant to mean that 
which fairly represents the voting patterns of the electorate, then the press now is 
representative of Labour and less so of Liberal Democrats, for instance. If it is meant to 
be representative of the opinions of the people in society, then this may not always be the 
case, at least when it comes to political coverage. This is despite classical liberal claims 
that newspapers need to reflect the views of their readers in order to survive. It is true, for 
instance, as McNair suggests, that the left on the political stage is more marginalised than 
160 While Stefan Berger is one who sees New Labour as a return to the Western European social 
democratic tradition, this work's evidence sides with Callaghan, who rejects this view convincingly. 
Callaghan cites an EU battle over state intervention to combat unemployment as one example of this 
divide, for instance. (Callaghan, Retreat: 165). 
1161 McNair, Journalism and democracy: 217. 
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in the past. However, if a market where there is no explicitly socialist title has satisfied 
the tastes of all consumers, then this assumes that there are very few socialists in the UK, 
Yet, there are indications that this is incorrect. 1162 
The extent to which the left's anti-capitalist message has found a chord among that 
sizeable wave of activists challenging globalisation in its different forms can be debated. 
More broadly, Davis concludes from polling evidence that British citizens are more 
socially-oriented than the pro-business newspapers and political parties. 1163 In addition, 
opinion polls conducted during the 2001 election indicated that the state of the public 
services was the chief concern of those polled, they were suspicious of privatisation of 
these services and were prepared to increase tax to pay for improvements. 1164 Contrast 
this with what the biggest selling daily newspaper's own manifesto had to say on these 
matters. 1165 Coming back to the narrower point, however, diversity cannot be equated 
with Labour Party representation in the press. 
Changes to policymaking under Kinnock and Blair have indicated that the two are not 
synonymous. The Labour Party developed new techniques to make the press ̀ fairer' to 
Labour. In the process, the demands for diversity fell by the wayside. Along with other 
factors, some saw that the demands had become less important for getting a `fair deal' 
and were actually counterproductive for getting that deal. 
1162 An indication that such a view is incorrect is the small but significant support given to the tiny far-left 
Socialist Alliance, which polled 100,000 votes in the UK in the 2002 General Election. This demonstrable 
support should be allied with that of many others who decided neither to vote or to vote Green or to 
reluctantly vote Labour. The support for the Scottish Socialist Party is another indication. 
1163 Regarding tax, privatisation, welfare spending and employee rights, Davis' view is that "... the mass of 
consumer citizens are fairly antagonistic towards the excesses of neo-liberal policy-making ... They might 
vote for pro-business parties, buy pro-business papers and support the capitalist system per se, but the 
majority of the UK population are rather more `liberal' and society-orientated than those papers and 
parties. " (Davis, Public relations democracy: 179). 
1164 Rod Brookes, Justin Lewis and Karin Wahl-Jorgensen, ̀The media representation of public opinion- 
British television news coverage of the 2001 General Election', Paper presented to the PSA Media Group 
conference September 10-11200 1. 
1165 "The lesson of privatisation applies as much to health care and education as it does to airlines and 
telephones. Commercial competition is good for everyone. So Labour's medium term goal should be to 
take no more than 37p in the Pound in taxes, leaving workers more control over what they earn. " (Trevor 
Kavanagh, George Pascoe-Watson and David Wooding, `The Sun's Election Manifesto', Sun, May 9 
2001). 
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An important indicator of this was that the most visible sign of the representation strategy 
was to woo the largest press business. Again, New Labour's understanding of 
globalisation was the determining factor when calling for the end of all cross-ownership 
rules. But it was explicitly shaped by its interest in Labour representation - to further 
ingratiate Labour with its one supporter in the press at this time, the Mirror Group. It also 
looked suspiciously like cooperation that this call happened as the `understanding' 
between New Labour and the News Corporation was developing. 
This work considered reasons why press businesses were likely to be more inclined to 
support Labour. The work questioned the notion that class dealignment of the press 
businesses or, as some writers have put it, the loosening of the ideological moorings of 
the newspapers, was the reason. 1166 It accepted the idea that there was a 
presidentialisation of politics. However, it rejected the allied argument that newspapers 
sought to position themselves with `seemingly non-ideological party leaders' as part of 
this presidentialisation. 1167 
Labour has taken on aspects of Otto Kirchheimer's `catch-all' party, which is often 
associated with a political communications assessment of modem politics. 1168 The 
leadership has been strengthened and the party member's role downgraded, in contrast to 
Jennifer Lees-Marshment's assessment, discussed in Chapter 7.1169 However, the 
emphasis of this work - that press policy has undergone a neo-liberal shift - is at odds 
with the notion that Labour has become programmatically indeterminate. There has been 
a determination to deregulate. In this sense, New Labour has gone along with another 
postulate of Kirchheimer. It has sided with the previously `hostile interests' of the 
business community - in this case that of the media. Contrary to some assessments, this 
"" Margaret Scammell, ̀New Media, New Politics', in Dunleavy, Patrick. 2002. Developments in British 
politics 6. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.: 169-184,179, Colin Seymour-Ure, `Are the 
Broadsheets Becoming Unhinged? ' in Seaton, Jean. 1998. Politics & the media : harlots and prerogatives 
at the turn of the millennium. Oxford: The political quarterly.: 43-54. 
1167 Seymour-Ure, Editorial Opinion: 99. 
1168 Kirchheimer, Otto, ̀ The catch all party model', in Mair, Peter. 1990. The West European party system. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.: 50-60, Scammell, Margaret. 1999. "Political Marketing: Lessons 
for Political Science. " Political Studies 47: 718-739.: 721. 
1169 Lees-Marshment: 698. 
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work has suggested that this is an ideological stance. 117° It was argued that Thatcher's 
Conservatives operated as a preference-shaping party and Labour moved into the new 
political environment created; one not always reflected by the less rightist-inclined 
electorate. If anything, it has been as much a case of `catch-up' as ̀ catch-all', when it 
comes to press ownership policy. Perhaps surprising sources have made a similar 
assessment. Political marketing theorists have noted that marketing was pioneered by 
some of the most ideologically-determined parties - Thatcher's Conservative Party in 
Britain and the Republicans under Reagan in the US. Some have borrowed from 
marketing to argue that parties like Labour have attempted to challenge these strong 
`market leaders' by attempting to reduce ̀product differences'. 1171 Nevertheless, although 
the attraction to media business of Labour's press ownership policy is clear, its attraction 
to the electorate as a whole is not so obvious. One isolated attempt to gauge public 
opinion on the Communications Bill, albeit by a vested interest, showed a majority 
opposed to American ownership of ITV. "72 
In contrast to Seymour-Ure's interpretation, for instance, this work has argued that it was 
precisely because Blair's inclinations were only `seemingly' non-ideological that his 
appeal was clear to some media corporations. They were attracted to his ideological 
support for the market, as we saw. To see Blair's pro-market drift as deideologising is to 
accept the Thatcherite revolution as the natural order, in the same way as it could have 
been argued in the post-war period that `Butskellism' was non-ideological. Equally, to 
argue that the newspapers had become progressively less ideologically driven was to fly 
in the face of the experience of the virulent attack on Benn and the `loony left' in the 
1980s and then Kinnock in 1992. 
1170 Scammell, Margaret. 1999. `Political Marketing: Lessons for Political Science'. Political Studies 
47: 718-739.: 721. 
1171 Ibid.: 730, citing Collins, N. 1996. "Positioning political parties: a market analysis. " Harvard 
International Journal of Press/Politics 1. She also later argued regarding parties like Labour that by 
neglecting members and activists, were rejecting one aspect of marketing theory. That is that an 
organisation needed, through its members, to maintain a relationship with its customers. (Scammell, 
Margaret. 2003. `Citizen Consumers: towards a new marketing of politics? ' in Corner, John and Dick Pels, 
Media and restyling of politics, London: Sage: 117-136: 122,130-1). 
1172 The poll, carried out on behalf of the National Union of Journalists, showed that 52 per cent were 
against the Communications Bill leading to US ownership. The `yes' vote was 23%, with 24% 'don't 
knows'. NUJ Press Release, ̀Poll shows majority against American ownership of ITV', NUJ, February 11 
2003. 
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The shift in the News Corporation's newspapers' support for Labour, in particular, has 
been considered by many other academics and commentators. 1173 This thesis has 
accepted, along with other writers, that there has been hostility mixed with the support of 
the Sun, as issues, especially the euro, have been placed into the mix. 1174 Yet, what the 
work has attempted to do is look at this relationship in a little detail. Appendix I of 
Chapter 7 suggested New Labour and News Corporation shared an attraction to market 
populism and that media ownership played a part. In government, Labour has adopted the 
liberal pluralist model for press ownership. It has continued to develop the understanding 
with press and media owners in order to gain maximum Labour representation. 
All this means that the discussion about what is a representative press is key. There are 
no glib answers to gauging representation. This is a huge task for continued research. For 
instance, market democracy highlights the problems and the opportunities of going 
beyond representative democracy. This is a problem and a conundrum. 
1 173 See for instance, McNair, Journalism and democracy: 149-50, Thomson, Stuart. 2000. The social 
democratic dilemma : ideology, governance and globalization. Basingstoke: Macmillan.: 147. 
114 Margaret Scammell, ̀ New Media, New Politics', in Dunleavy, Patrick. 2002. Developments in British 
politics 6. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.: 169-184: 179. 
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LABOUR'S POLICY TRAJECTORY COMPARED 
This work has taken a different view from a range of writers who analyse New Labour. 
From different perspectives, Steve Fielding, David Coates, and Paul Anderson and Nyta 
Mann identify the continuity between ̀ Old' and `New' Labour. 1 75 Fielding considers 
that New Labour is placing ̀ old values in a modem setting'. 1176 This is compatible with 
this work when it agrees with Panitch and Leys that Labour's New Left upsurge 
challenged Old Labour. "77 In this sense, it considers that Kinnock's press policy was a 
move back to the more restricted intervention of Wilson and Callaghan. "78 
However, this work indicated that New Labour has gone beyond this trajectory. 
Comparing Labour policy with a series of media models, the thesis suggested that the 
1974-9 Labour administration's attraction to minimal anti-monopoly controls associated 
it with a particular liberal pluralist notion. Yet, this was replaced by the Blair 
government's insistence that those controls needed to be brought into line with general 
competition policy. This linked it with a significantly more unfettered liberal pluralist 
model. Although to date it has not gone as far as the complete withdrawal of all specific 
media regulations, it has signalled its intention to continue to chip away at the minimal 
press and cross-ownership regulations concerning newspapers. The policies converged 
with Conservative policies, away from traditional social democracy, as some authors 
have identified. ' 179 In fact, in this particular policy area, Labour went even beyond 
Conservative catch-up, as Hay put it. 1180 
1 175 Coates, David. 1996. "Labour Governments: Old Constraints and New Parameters. " New Left Review: 
62-77., Anderson and Mann, Fielding, Steven. 2000. `New Labour and the past' in Labour's first century, 
edited by Duncan Tanner, Pat Thane, and Nick Tiratsoo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 367- 
392. 
1176 In his analysis, he emphasises ocial democracy's roots in new liberalism. (Fielding, New Labour). 
117' Panitch and Leys. 
117$ Curran, for instance, identifies past senior Labour politicians as adopting a variant of a neo-liberal 
market approach when they refused intervention beyond the tightening of anti-monopoly legislation. 
(Curran, Different approaches: 94). 
1179 Hay, Colin. 1994. ̀ Thatcherite Revisionism: Playing the Politics of Catch-Up', Political Studies 42.: 
700-7, Hay, Colin. 1999. The political economy of new Labour : labouring under false pretences? 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.. See also Heffernan, New Labour and Thatcherism, Panitch and 
Leys, Callaghan, Retreat, David Coates, ̀New Labour's Industrial and Employment Policy' in Lawler and 
Coates: 122-135, Rorden Wilkinson, `New Labour and the Global Economy' in Coates and Lawler: 136- 
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Thus, this work sees in this particular policy area a contrast with other more general 
assessments which emphasise the challenge New Labour made to the Thatcherite 
framework and which distinguish New Labour from the Conservatives in its commitment 
to state intervention! 18' These authors' assessments may well be true for other aspects of 
government policy. 1182 Yet, that for press and cross-ownership has been defined by a 
particularly stark liberal pluralist agenda. The ̀ Thatcher effect' was to scupper notions of 
social responsibility and help strengthen the idea that newspapers were a business like 
any other. As Hugh Stephenson considers, this view contrasted with that of the Labour 
Party and even the Royal commissions on the press; that newspapers were key forums for 
democratic debate. "83 
The thesis also indicated that the Kinnock years saw a significant change in press policy, 
which would go some way in backing those writers who argue that the general shift in 
Labour policy was greater under Kinnock. l 1 84 Equally, this work considered that there 
was some continuity between the latter part of the Smith reign and that of Blair in press 
and cross-ownership policy. 1185 We saw that Mowlam pushed Labour in a deregulatory 
direction months before Blair was installed as leader. 
However, the work's evidence contradicts the notion that the shifts were greater under 
Kinnock than Blair. Employing the media models, the work saw that, as the Kinnock 
leadership started to dominate policy creation, there was a shift away from 
148, Denham, Andrew, and Mark Garnett. 2001. "From `Guru' to `Godfather': Keith Joseph, ̀ New' 
Labour and the British Conservative Tradition. " The Political Quarterly 72: 97-106. 
"80 Hay, Catch-Up: 700-7. 
1181 Smith, Transition: 143-162, Andrew Gamble and David Kelly, `Labour's New Economics' and 
Michael Kenny and Martin J. Smith, `Interpreting New Labour: Constraints, Dilemmas and Political 
Agency' in Smith Martin, J., and Steve Ludlam. 2001. New Labour in government. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2001.: 167-183,234-255. 
182 It appears that New Labour reacted against Thatcherism, for instance, in its commitment to 
communitarian politics and in its attitude to the constitution. (Driver and Martell. See also Denham, and 
Garnett: 97-106, Richards, David , and Martin J Smith. 2001. New Labour, the Constitution and Reforming 
the State. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001. ). McGrew argues that the Third Way represented a defence of 
social democracy in a globalising economy. (McGrew, `Globalisation': 151-4). However, as was indicated, 
the ̀ actually existing Third Way' has provided no such bulwark in press and cross-ownership policy. 
"B' Stephenson, Hugh, "Tickle the public: consumerism rules", in Bromley and Stephenson: 22. 
1194 Anderson and Mann, Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: esp. 15,219. 1185 Anderson and Mann. 
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interventionism. The liberal pluralist model was more clearly entrenched in the 1992 
manifesto. Yet, it contained anti-monopoly pledges that went beyond the particular 
classical liberal status quo that Wilson and Callaghan did not challenge and the Blair 
government has gone beyond. 
Also, we saw that what was merely in the mind of a shadow minister under Smith 
became a reality under Blair. Although this work questions the interpretation Scammell 
puts on the Blairite shift, it agrees that with regard to press ownership policy: "New 
Labour was not the `safety first' option of Anderson and Mann's characterization". '"86 
There was a shift from a liberal pluralist approach that emphasised the need for specific 
media anti-monopoly rules on cross-ownership, to one that wanted to reject these 
safeguards. There was a shift from the Kinnock period. The party only became associated 
with media oligopolisation, with all that implied for democratic debate, after Blair's 
election. 
1 186 Scammell, Margaret. 1999. `Political Marketing: Lessons for Political Science', Political Studies 
47: 718-739.. 
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POLICYMAKING POWER AND SOME PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED IN THE THESIS 
Dennis MacShane, writing long before becoming a New Labour minister, makes a 
number of perceptive points about the Labour governments' reluctance to grasp media 
reform. As MacShane indicates and as the work noted, the Labour government and 
leadership were unwilling to settle on a `limited unifying programme' and treat media 
reform as a priority. 
However, this work has shown that it is not true, as MacShane claims, that the party had 
"... no agreed policy on the media". It is not at all clear that to take one important figure: 
"If Labour had a media policy then Kaufman would promote it. " Indeed, MacShane 
admits that the party provided policies on the press, but he downplays the party 
conference's prime sovereignty, the study groups' role and, especially, the 1983 
manifesto commitment. A particular example of this is his claim that the party was 
reluctant to learn from abroad. ' 187 As we have seen, many of Labour's plans were policy 
transfers. To pose legitimate questions about strategies, as MacShane does, is not the 
same as suggesting there was no policy. 
Instead, the leadership and frontbench were reluctant to promote and implement the 
agreed policy. Some had an ideological objection - Kaufman, for instance, far from being 
a potential conduit of the radical policy, became a powerful pro-market advocate. 
Nevertheless, one surprise for the author came when he expected to find evidence that 
would confirm Freedman's findings on the unions' influence, rejecting MacShane's view 
of their conservative role. The reality was more complicated. The union hierarchy, at 
least, acted as a conservative force on a number of occasions. 
For instance, up until 1974, the NUJ rejected wholesale intervention. However, this 
stance collapsed. Like the TUC leaders' attachment to social democratic centralism, it 
was being assailed both internally and externally. Internally, it was starting to be 
1 
187 MacShane, Media Policy in Seaton and Pimlott: 218,219,220,224,231. 
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0 
challenged by calls for workers' participation. Externally, in the study group, it was not 
supported. The group instead looked to the more radical positions of Ascherson and the 
New Left Free Communications Group. This influenced The people and the media 
document and subsequent Labour Party policy. Thus, support for workforce participation 
in new newspaper initiatives was supported by the party conference as early as 1975. 
After 1974, MacShane's characterisation of union conservatism was shown to have some 
validity. However, the unions and the TUC were pressing for interventionist policies far 
beyond that which the Labour government would countenance. They rejected the policy 
the party had belatedly developed; challenging MacShane's other assessment. Applying 
the `classic' positions on policy formation to this tale of rejection challenges the pluralist 
view and accords with those of Minkin, the elitists and the Marxists. However, it appears 
that the Marxists' analysis explain the facts more fully. For reasons that were identified, 
an embattled Labour government was reluctant to openly challenge press businesses 
whose relative quiescence was needed by an administration fighting on other fronts. To 
emphasise the point concerning tensions; diversity and democratic control was sacrificed 
in order to enhance Labour representation. 
Equally, MacShane is only partly correct if we consider the period after 1979. Although 
the circumstances surrounding the Times takeover shows his assessment has some 
validity, the reality of whole period was more complicated than his schema allows for. 
The combination of the upsurge of an activist-backed and union-supported radical policy 
taken after 1979, followed by the resurgence of right-wing influence, lends itself to the 
analysis of Minkin and the Marxist position, if the alternative reading outlined is 
accepted. Yet, it was the outside pressure of business that forced the right wing to shift 
the policy - particularly reflecting the Marxist analysis. Also, the centrality of the union 
movement in changing policy on press democratic control would appear to accord with 
the analysis of Minkin, McKenzie and the Marxists. 
The continued centralising of power after 1983 also manifested itself with the operation 
of press policy. Although the process was not entirely linear, as we indicated, the 
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leadership strengthened its power and influence over press policy compared to that of the 
membership, the NEC and MPs. This and the unions' role in policy development accord 
better with the Marxists' analysis. 
The work suggested that the new media strategy reinforced the pressure towards Labour 
leadership centralisation. Also, the perceived power of the press and media meant that 
those who were the party media strategists became more influential in general policy 
formation. As we saw, particularly in Appendix 1 to Chapter 6, the question of 
presentation became an integral influence on policies adopted. By the time of the 1992 
election, the media strategists were playing a leading role in deciding general policy. 
This points to a key problem this work encountered. It was difficult to ascertain entirely 
the direct influence that the media strategists have had on press ownership policy. This is 
partly because the actors involved have been reluctant to discuss such questions. After 
1983, there seems to have been the appearance, at least, of a division of labour between 
those involved in press ownership policy and press presentation. Nevertheless, Corbett's 
insider account indicates that some of those seeming to formulate press policy had little 
sway by the time of the 1992 election. This area could certainly form the basis of further 
research. 
Panitch and Leys argue that the Labour leadership had the support of outside forces 
including the press in defeating the Labour new left and the democratising activist surge 
in the 1980s and 1990s. 1188 This work's analysis shares this assessment regarding press 
policy. But it has indicated that the power rested more with newspaper business than the 
writers explicitly suggest, especially after 1994. The thesis considered that one factor 
which structured the particular way Labour decided to go with the grain of globalisation 
was in accommodating with some newspaper firms. Whether the power of the press 
businesses was as the Labour leadership perceived is less important than the actions the 
party hierarchy pursued. 
1188 Panitch and Leys: 264 
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After 1994, the leadership's seeming internal mastery of policy formation would seem to 
accord with the idea that an elitist notion of policy creation was most apposite. The 
positions taken at past party conferences on diversity and democracy had been ignored. 
The members were primarily election fodder, merely consulted by their leaders. The 
formal position of the unions, as expressed at their congress, had been flouted. The 
leadership was dominant in its control of the NEC and among MPs. Equally, as we saw 
under Kinnock, the media strategy under Blair also strengthened leadership 
centralisation. 
In addition, the House of Lords' role has to be taken into account, which, on balance, 
may accord most with an elitist analysis. On other issues, it was less compliant to the 
Labour government's wishes than the Commons. This was also the case with predatory 
pricing claims. The Labour Lords were more noticeable irritants, than their Commoner 
equivalents, in challenging the Labour administration's stance. With the draft 
Communications Bill, a Labour Lord was the vocal leader of a joint parliamentary 
committee that questioned significant parts of the Bill and later called for amendments. 
We can tentatively suggest some reasons for this. One is the role of patronage. Miliband 
wrote in the early 1970s that this hidebound MPs. 1189 However, once they became peers 
of the realm, they were more capable of independence; they were not reliant on 
leadership preferment and so determined to be ̀ on-message'. Equally, more Labour peers 
may well associate, on occasion, with `Old Labour', through their adherence to ideas 
predating New Labour. 
As for the MPs and the PLP under New Labour, they have tended to be subordinate, with 
some notable exceptions. They have overwhelmingly supported the leadership due to a 
mixture of ideological affinity, with candidates carefully selected through centralised 
election procedures, loyalty and the centralising pressure to be `on-message'. This is not 
to ignore the important moments where MPs have challenged the new orthodoxy, as with 
1189 Miliband, Ralph. 1972. Parliamentary socialism :a study in the politics of labour. London: Merlin 
Press. 
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support for the Media (Diversity) Bill in 1995. This assessment would seem to accord 
with a Marxist and also an elitist analysis. 
However, while the elitist analysis provides a powerful explanation for a dominant 
leadership, it underplays the external pressures on party policy formation. A problem that 
has been pointed out in Marxist accounts of the sway of business on Labour policy is that 
capital in Britain has rarely "... achieved the necessary common consciousness, coherence 
and conspiratorial capacity to enforce its will upon the Labour Party... ". ' 190 Nevertheless, 
the leadership's anxiety to gain Labour representation and thus accommodate with the 
press companies, particularly News Corporation, was an external force structuring 
Labour in its overwhelming determination to go with the external pressure of 
globalisation. This seems to accord with a Marxist analysis. Again, whether the power of 
press business has been real or merely imputed was less important. 
The unions' weakened role would seem to be explained best by a combination of the 
elitist and Marxist analyses. Although the unions' role in formal policy formation 
progressively lessened, they still had some power, particularly in the years before the 
introduction of the National Policy Forum. Yet, on the question of press cross-ownership, 
they chose not to use this. TUC motions were ignored. Pressure was not exerted through 
Labour Party structures. The union best placed to consider press ownership and which 
seemed most keen to push forward this issue within carefully prescribed limits, the NUJ, 
was not affiliated to the Labour Party. This hampered its effect. ' 191 The Marxist analysis, 
where the unions' degree of support for the leadership is to an extent regulated by 
membership pressure can also to some degree explain this. In addition to the elitist notion 
of their being a `bond of confidence' between the union leaders and the Labour 
leadership, it was further industrial retreat that had strengthened the hold of social 
democratic centralism once again within the union leadership. `New Realism' and 
`partnership' were now the buzz-words. In particular, the TUC had gone down the same 
190 See Randall, Nick. 2001. ̀ Explaining Labour's Ideological Trajectory', Interpretations of Labour 
History Conference, PSA Labour Movements Group, Manchester, July 6 2001: 14. 
119' Interestingly, Jeremy Dear, the NUJ General Secretary, called for the NUJ to affiliate to the Labour 
Party. However, he faced very stiff opposition. (Gopsill interview). 
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path as Labour, emphasising its own media strategy rather than pressing for structural 
change in the newspaper industry. Conversely, the Marxist analysis could point to a small 
upsurge in industrial activity mirroring some resurgence of the trade union left. ' 192 
Generally, the unions' role has neither been entirely that which Freedman suggested was 
the case in television policy or that argued by MacShane. One aspect of this is union 
members' reluctance to increase reader participation. This is indicative of a journalistic 
culture, of which the determination to maintain high journalistic standards is the positive 
expression. The downside is the relative disdain expressed towards readers' input. One 
researcher identified this when considering US journalists' attitude to their newspapers' 
letters' page and wider reader participation. As Karin Wahl-Jorgensen indicates, the 
reluctance to consider such participation may well be indicative of a wider 
phenomenon. 1 193 Some previous Labour discussion did attempt to consider bringing 
participation into the mainstream. However, only some union activists were enthusiastic 
proponents of this. 
Nevertheless, contra MacShane, this work showed that, while the unions certainly did not 
betray the same radicalism as the New Left strata, the unions, together with the 
constituencies, were generally more radical than the Labour leadership on press 
ownership policy. 1194 
1192 This has led to a minimal challenge to social democratic centralism on issues perceived as more 
directly central to the union movement. The year Blair was elected in 1997 and 1999 saw some of the 
lowest figures for numbers of days lost in disputes. The figure for 2000 and 2001 was double that, although 
not at a high level. By July 2002, figures were already considerably higher than either of the previous years, 
with the figures for July itself more than double those for the whole of either 1997 and 1999. (Office for 
National Statistics, ̀ Labour Disputes 1994-2002', last updated September 9 2002, www. statistics, ggv. uk 
The Labour leadership was defeated on the Public Finance Initiative at the 2002 conference. A number of 
prominent unions have also showed marked reluctance to carry on funding the Labour Party as before. 
193 Wahl-Jorgensen, Karin. `The construction of the public in letters to the editor', Journalism, Vol. 3(2): 
183-204. 
1194 As we have seen, the main journalists' union, the NUJ has played a particular role in this. After 
experiencing a radicalising wave, it developed a workerist emphasis on democratising the existing press 
and extending the number of owners, rather than diversifying it beyond the existing ownership structures. It 
is instructive that the NUJ union official Tim Gopsill, who has been a prominent leftwing media activist for 
many years, views that: "The demand for alternative media was never really a demand of media workers, it 
was people from outside who wanted different media... ". (Gopsill interview). 
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In summing up, it is the case that no single simple classic theory of Labour policy 
formation can completely explain the power relations bearing on press ownership policy. 
However, of the theories on offer, the Marxist theory best approximates, if not 
particularly well. It may well be the case that not all aspects of general Labour Party 
policy can be explained by the Miliband analysis of leadership betrayal of the dormant 
radicalism of the party's rank and file. The New Left's radicalising impetus on press 
ownership policies questions simple theories of party embourgeoisment leading to a 
deradicalisation of Labour's politics. 1195 Miliband and Coates do chronicle a death 
foretold and their pessimistic conclusions betray, especially with Miliband, a less than 
healthy dose of instrumentalism. As Panitch and Leys indicate, Miliband's Parliamentary 
Socialism is scathing in its denunciation of the `illusions' of the left in attempting to 
transform the party. 1196 (We thus have this curious situation that while Miliband's work 
counsels that there is little opportunity for left advance in the party, contemporaneously 
he is advising Benn on precisely how to make that progress). 1197 For these reasons the 
alternative reading of the Marxists we considered in the first appendix to Chapter 1 is the 
interpretation we have considered. Students of Popper considering the seeming flexibility 
of a Marxist analysis might argue that this indicates Marxism's invalidity. 1198 Yet, to 
emphasise, this work has indicated that this alternative reading provides an approximate 
explanation of the power relations involved. 
This assessment challenges the popular view that, in effect, the voters decide Labour 
policy. Lees-Marshment argues that political parties are now designing politics to suit 
voters or, even more positively, "... parties are being more responsive to people, which is 
good for democracy". As we saw, she suggests that the difference between Labour pre- 
1987 and post-1987 was between a sales-oriented and market-oriented approach. Those 
parties that are sales-oriented sell their politics to the electorate after deciding what to 
11" See Randall, Nick. 2001. `Explaining Labour's Ideological Trajectory', Interpretations of Labour 
History Conference, PSA Labour Movements Group, Manchester, July 6 2001: 10,18,19. 
Panitch and Leys: 3. 
/97 See, for example, Benn, Tony, and Ruth Winstone. 1995. The Benn diaries. London: Hutchinson.: 577- 
8. 
198 See, for instance, Popper Karl, R. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations : Growth of Scientific Knowledge: 
Routledge. 
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sell. Those that are market-oriented design their "... product to suit the electorate at 
large" 1199 
However, this work has argued that the relationship with voters is more complicated. It 
was suggested that Downesian-style notions can only be applied to New Labour if they 
are radically rethought along the lines Heffernan considered, where Thatcherism had 
radically remoulded the electoral ground. Moreover, the work argued that Labour after 
1987 did not always simply follow what voters wanted. Lees-Marshment - rather 
uncritically accepts Labour strategists' research on this at face value. We saw that the 
marketeers did not respond to people's choices in a form of modified participative 
democracy, but tried to chart their undeveloped feelings - what Blumler, Kavanagh and 
Nossiter describe as "... perceptions, moods, needs and desires.. .,, 
1200 This is an 
important distinction. As one practising professional put it: "Politicians do not ask the 
voters what they want; they only seek reactions to what they have already decided to 
do. " 1201 Along with some political marketing literature, this work questions the idea that 
marketing interaction with voters shaped the issues and politicians simply reacted to this. 
Instead, there was `prior strategic direction'. 1202 We saw that Labour strategists' prior 
direction was so extensive that this questions whether the research was infected. 1203 
1199 Lees-Marshment: 698. 
1200 Jay G Blumler, Dennis Kavanagh and T. J. Nossiter, `Modern Communications versus Traditional 
Politics in Britain: Unstable Marriage of Convenience', in Swanson David, L., and Paolo Mancini. 1996. 
Politics, media and modern democracy : an international study of innovations in electoral campaigning 
and their consequences. Westport, Conn. ; London: Praeger.: 49-72,53. 
1201 Bruce, Brendan. 1992. Images of power : how the image makers shape our leaders. London: Kogan 
Pae.: 81. 
120f Jerry Palmer, ̀ Smoke and mirrors: is that the way it is? Themes in political marketing', Media, Culture 
& Society, Vol. 24: 345-363.357. 
1203 Philip Gould's book indicated he was involved in a clear political project. Yet, rather than being open 
to independent scrutiny, that the focus group research required, it was striking that the interpretation 
accorded with Gould's views. Moreover, we saw that political choices influenced the findings presented. 
We saw that strategists rejected the uncomfortable evidence regarding Kinnock's unpopularity and hostility 
to the poll tax, for instance. 
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REPRESENTATION, DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY: ONE LAST TIME 
The work also questioned the idea that the market could operate as a democratic tool 
when considering the relationship of readers to newspapers. The market may be the 
potentially simplest way that readers can ̀ vote' with their pennies in order to buy a paper 
that, along with a bundle of other interests, including entertaining and informing them, 
best represents either their political positions or their desire to have those positions 
challenged. Reasons why the market is flawed include the barriers to market entry and 
the way the advertising market has historically operated, which we have explored. In this 
sense, it is an imperfect market, which requires intervention to create diversity. 
There are other senses in which the market approach is flawed, however. Money may be 
a simple instrument to indicate intentions, but it is a blunt one. Readers cannot indicate 
which parts of the bundle or what aspects of the political line of a newspaper they 
approve of by handing over their coins to a newsagent. 
Even more importantly, the readers are not the only `voters' who can use their money to 
influence the already-flawed market. Advertisers, newspaper group shareholders and 
stockholding companies have overwhelmingly more money and power with which they 
can buy more ̀ votes'. As Frank argues in a similar context, ̀ one dollar, one vote' is not 
democracy but plutocracy. 1204 In Chapter 1, we suggested that the questions of 
democracy and diversity were interwoven. But to repeat, diversity of media outlets is not 
enough for equality over decision-making. Control by citizens is required. To press 
merely for Labour representation was to ignore what organisation was providing the 
representation. It was to call for representative democracy without any way of 
democratically controlling that representation. We have seen that the market cannot fairly 
provide that representation. 
Stanley Harrison was being rather simplistic when he wrote in 1974 that a "... handful of 
ultra-wealthy men... " commanded the press. Nevertheless, it is true of the businesses, 
1204 Frank: 86-7,97. 
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shareholders and advertisers that: "They submit themselves to no election, acknowledge 
no control or responsibility, and stand completely outside British democracy. ""205 
Notwithstanding what was indicated in Chapter 1, this threat to democracy still existed in 
the 1990s, as Kevin Williams indicated, while the number of businesses involved was 
decreasing. 1206 This work indicates that New Labour's policies, if anything, have 
reinforced this threat. 
The question then becomes: what can provide that control, in order to advance 
democracy? Clearly, the Labour Party's earlier discussions only provided flawed answers 
to this. A problem is one of how to create a situation where readers and citizens can 
participate and control. A difficulty is how to representatively gauge views and how this 
would translate into press representation. As we saw, the Labour left's concentration on 
representing ̀producer interests', mirrored the problems with wider media models. 
This work considered Labour's changing attitude to broader participation in the press and 
its effect on editorial freedom. Frank Allaun, for instance, seems to feel that Labour 
policies, if properly framed, would "... seek to give editors more, not less, freedom of 
operation". 1207 Well, up to a point, Lord Copper. Michael Gurevitch and Jay Blumler 
correctly identify that there is a tension between editorial autonomy and the ideal of 
offering individuals and groups access to the media. However, contrary to this thesis' 
emphasis, they also suggest that one of the requirements for democracy of the mass 
media is that it maintains a ̀ principled resistance' to efforts from those outside the media 
to subvert its independence. 1208 
This work has rejected government control, but indicated that democracy also involves 
the participation and involvement of the wider citizenry in the mass media. While 
interference of the proprietor could be banished and day-to-day decisions would be up to 
the editor, there would be some interference in the editor's freedom under the Labour 
1205 Harrison, Stanley. 1974. Poor men's guardians :a record of the struggles for a democratic newspaper 
press, 1763-1973. London: Lawrence and Wishart.: 221. 
1206 Williams, Get me a murder a day: 225. 
1207 Allaun, Spreading the news: 97. 
1208 Gurevitch and Blumler, Democratic Values: 270,271. 
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left's most participative notions. This cannot be hidden. That is the meaning of the editor 
being accountable. It would be impractical and idealistic to insist that an editor's hands 
should be tied on minute-by-minute decisions on a national daily newspaper. Yet, 
substituting the power of a chief executive with that of an editor is still autocracy. Input 
by democratically-elected employee and reader representatives would, perhaps, have to 
come on a weekly or monthly basis. This work does not seek to prescribe on this. 
However, to widen participative democracy, it would seem that decision-making over 
what is in each newspaper cannot be the preserve of one person be they an owner or even 
editor, or indeed one private company. 
Nor, however, does top-down state control, however seemingly benign, offer an 
alternative. Yet, this is not to dismiss the importance of carefully-circumscribed 
government intervention, especially when used to increase diversity. It would be easy to 
conclude from the discussion on spin and attempts at government interference in 
reporting that the last thing that would be required is increased government intervention 
in the press. It could be easily concluded that if there was intervention, it would be bound 
to lead to a more quiescent press. However, as we saw, strengthening the argument made 
by Els De Bens and Helge Ostbye, the case of Norway shows that that government 
intervention need not lead to negative interference in the press. One of the Norwegian 
government's most insistent critics, the Marxist daily Klassekampen has only existed 
because of the subsidy system. 1209 This sort of limited government intervention works 
there. Why not in Britain? 
1209 Els De Bens and Helge Ostbye, ̀ The European Newspaper Market' in McQuail, Denis, Karen Siune, 
and Group Euromedia Research. 1998. Media policy : convergence, concentration and commerce. 
Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London: Sage Publications.: 7-22,14. 
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THE FUTURE? 
What of the future? Appendix 1 to the last chapter indicated that Labour's representation 
strategy has become distinctly frayed at the edges. Pippa Norris casts doubt on the claims 
of Nicholas Jones and Franklin that spin has undermined politician's credibility. She 
particularly notes that Franklin's work is not based on evidence of public opinion. 121o 
However, this work has noted polling research that challenged this assessment. Pollsters 
indicated that the public were concerned about spin in the period up to 2002. The 
newspapers increased coverage of this phenomenon. This was an indication that the 
majority of newspaper businesses may not always be so supportive of a Labour 
government. By the end of 2002, the question of the entry into the euro and News 
Corporation's hostility also loomed on the horizon. 
One Blairite MP, with a history of media campaigning, has expressed his fear to the 
author that press support for Labour may be temporary. '21' For the News Corp press, the 
turn that the Sun made against Labour in the 1970s was one indication of this shift. 
Another was the experience of the Australian Labor Party. As we saw, the Telegraph and 
Mail titles' coverage had become more hostile by the end of 2002. The problem had not 
necessarily been solved. Labour could be again faced with an overwhelmingly hostile 
press. Martin Linton's prediction in this situation might be reductionist regarding 
ownership and control, but has a ring of truth. He told the author: "... when it does 
happen you will still be left with this irreducible problem that you have a press which is 
owned by four or five people.. . and they want to push their right-wing agendas 
in their 
publications, so far as their readers will put up with them". 1212 Crystal ball gazing isa 
1210 Pippa Norris, `Political Communications in Post-Industrial Democracies', in Dowding Keith, M., James 
Hughes, Helen Margetts, and Association Political Studies. 2001. Challenges to democracy : ideas, 
involvement, and institutions, the PSA yearbook 2000. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: 
Palgrave : in association with Political Studies Association.: 100-117,103, Jones, Nicholas. 1995. 
Soundbites and spin doctors : how politicians manipulate the media - and vice versa. London: Cassell, 
1995. Jones, Sultans, Jones, Control freaks and Franklin, Packaging politics. 
1211 As we saw, Paul Foot put a similar view. (Foot, Paul. 1996. ̀ Sour note, Moonie tune', The Guardian, 
April 15 1996). 
12 2 Linton interview. NUJ official Tim Gopsill views that: "In the modem Labour Party ... there is still a huge residual loathing and hatred of Murdoch... People's memories are not that short, people running the 
Labour Party now remember the 80s ... You can't abandon your whole history and all your experience, and 
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risky business for anyone, let alone someone attempting historical interpretation. Yet, in 
the circumstance Linton describes, there may be a pressure in the party to revisit the 
discarded policies on press ownership. The question would then be whether the 
liberalisation of media policy had made it much more difficult to put the genie back into 
the bottle. 
Unquestionably, the hold of the Labour leadership over policy formation is stronger than 
it was 30 years ago. Changes in the structure of the party have strengthened the 
leadership's hold. However, the Labour hierarchy's weakness then was a product of the 
breakdown of social democratic centralism, where the trade union leadership had 
provided its buttress. The Kinnock era saw a reinvigoration of social democratic 
centralism, as Wring identifies, following Shaw's notion. 1213 If the decline in the union's 
role in the Labour Party continues, it may make this centralism a more uncertain 
business. 1214 The distancing of the trade union hierarchy may also lead to it taking a less 
politically subordinated role, as it started to do, which may also have destabilising effects 
for the Labour elite. Whether this will have any impact on Labour's press and cross- 
ownership policy is more debatable, however. As indicated, while the non-affiliated NUJ 
developed in a radical direction, this was in reaction to an effective employer onslaught, 
rather than due to its strength. The press unions' ability to wield Labour policy-making 
power is low. Also, press ownership policy does not have the priority it once had for the 
trade union movement and party membership, for reasons we considered. Although, in 
Linton's scenario, this could change. 
The diversity of alternative publications is now on the Internet, where there are 
opportunities for broader participation. The advent of digitalisation has unleashed the 
potential for huge swathes of media content to be disseminated. 1215 Newsprint scarcity is 
not a barrier. As such, there has been much investment by publishers in Net-based 
you know that you have to do deals here and there, but ... the majority of the Labour Party are not going to be able to throw over their historical antipathy to right wing media owners. " (Gopsill interview). 
123 Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 166. 
1214 As Callaghan puts it "... coalition-building within the party may become a more uncertain business for 
the parliamentary leaderships". (Callaghan, Retreat. 199-200). 




projects. The potential income from the Net comes from such classified advertising, as 
well as display advertising, e-commerce links to items mentioned in articles and fees for 
subscription on-line versions of newspapers. 1216 
One question for further research is to consider whether it is likely to encounter the same 
problems with the costs of advertising and promotion that the newspapers have faced. 
Another concerns the opportunities for reader involvement in newspapers, which have 
increased with Internet access. 1217 
However, the initial enthusiasm for the Internet in providing a qualitatively different 
democratic media tool has withered for some. 1218 There has been a development of 
monopolisation, as Mansell and Doyle make clear. 1219 Involvement has not taken the role 
of active participation in the decisions regarding newspapers in the sense discussed 
throughout this study. Nonetheless, there have been excellent examples of increased 
diversity provided by the web, however on a comparatively small scale. 1220 However, this 
is not necessarily entirely positive. Blumler and Gurevitch have conjured a spectre of a 
1216 Doyle, Media ownership: 141-54. 
1217 There have been discussion groups, prompted by newspapers, which have extended debate among 
readers on key issues identified by the titles themselves. In addition, newspapers have hosted on-line 
discussions with prominent individuals. Nevertheless, it appears that, for the most part, these initiatives 
have mostly operated effectively as an extended letters page. Bromley argues that the opportunity of 
cyberspace is that its openness means that it has the possibility of bringing press accountability. It is 
certainly the case that the difference between email and the letters page is that the newspaper exercises 
more direct editorial control with material on the letters page. (Michael Bromley, 'Watching the 
watchdogs'? The role of the readers' letters in calling the press to account', in Bromley and Stephenson: 
147-162). 
1218 So one Internet enthusiast complained that it was changing "... from being a participatory medium that 
serves the interests of the public to being a broadcast medium where corporations deliver consumer- 
oriented information". (McChesney, Corporate media: 34). 
1219 This has particularly been the case with web-based portals and where for instance, existing media 
giants' access to content makes them able to benefit enormously. (Mansell, Robin. 1999. "New media 
competition and access : the scarcity-abundance dialectic. " New Media and Society 1: 155-182.: esp. 163)_ 
The Internet been the catalyst for a number of huge mergers, successful or otherwise. (Doyle, Media 
ownership: 178). One cyberbase and community action theorist has expressed fears that, without a battle 
for democratic communication: "... the few (mostly governments and large corporations) will act as 
gatekeepers for the many, where the elites can speak and the rest can only listen. " (Schuler, Douglas. 2003. 
'Reports of the close relationship between democracy and the Internet may have been exagerated', in 
Jenkins, Henry and David Thorburn (eds. ), Democracy and new media, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press: 69-84: 69. 
1220 An excellent example of the pluralistic potential of the Internet for providing diverse news, is, perhaps 
ironically, associated with one of the most prominent critics of the liberal pluralist view of the media, 
James Curran. The site is opendemocracy. net. This indicates a divergence across the Net. 
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division between a section of coherent communication and one dominated by a 
cacophony of voices with nothing to "... put all this together ̀ at the centre'. "22' In other 
words, the Internet's libertarian possibilities could leave us with sections of the Net 
colonised by the large media enterprises and another without any means to 
democratically determine which voices are prioritised. The discussion in this work may, 
in a modest sense, shed some light on the problems and opportunities of any steps along 
this road. 
Finally, in summing up media policy, Seymour-Ure argues that no-one put the case 
successfully "... that the need to hold an increasingly integrated media industry 
accountable to the public through the government was greater than the need to hold the 
government accountable through the media". 1222 However, what this work indicates is 
that, in the period we are considering, no-one successfully argued for a Labour 
government to enact forms of press accountability that went beyond this statist social 
democratic conception to one where other forms of democratic accountability were 
considered. In failing to do so, legislation did not go beyond considering the state and the 
market as an either/or, as does Seymour-Ure. Before this question was excluded from 
debate, at least with regard to the press, and citizens were reduced to consumers as we 
saw, Labour at least considered this crucial problem for the democratic functioning of 
society. 
The case for democratic control over the mainstream media subsequently lessened. This 
work indicates some reasons why pressure for greater participation has been derailed. In 
this sense, it can be situated within a literature that is concerned with this phenomenon 
both in this Britain and abroad. There were problems, or at least areas of contention, with 
all the models for democratic ownership put forward by those involved in debates in the 
Labour Party. There is the possibility that journalists and/or interest groups may be given 
too much power under such systems. Further research will be needed to assess all the 
1221 Blumler Jay, G., and Michael Gurevitch. 1995. The crisis of public communication. London: 
Routledge.: 168-9. However, perhaps the extensive role that the BBC has carved for itself on the Internet 
could provide one small challenge to this. 
1222 Seymour-Ure, British press and broadcasting: 273. 
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problems of these flawed models in this partly hidden history when deliberating over this 
important area for the advance of democracy. 
Nevertheless, the problems with the alternatives do not mean that they should be 
dismissed out of hand. They would have been more broadly democratic than a system 
where a few conglomerates dominate. There are examples where, in the slow process of 
policy implementation, problems have been ironed out. Curran gives the example of the 
Scandinavian press schemes where this is the case, when it comes to press diversity 
legislation. 1223 Hall, Land, Parker and Webb identify examples in other areas in British 
policymaking, also. '224 
With policies for democratic control, it is only through implementation that the power of 
groups such as journalists and/or pressure groups could have been assessed and adjusted 
if this was commonly wished. Thus, such difficulties provide a reason why there were 
disagreements in the Labour Party over implementing a democratic model that went 
beyond liberal pluralism. However, the problems were not a justification on their own for 
why no such system was implemented. In considering the shifting policies and power of 
policymakers within the Labour Party, involving both diversity and democracy, this work 
has attempted to outline some of the reasons why this was the case. 
u23 Curran interview. 
1224 Hall, Phoebe. 1975. Change, choice and conflict in social policy. London: Heinemann Educational. 
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 1: Approaches to Labour Party Policy 
Formation 
Chapter 1 introduced the notion of there being ̀ classic theories' of Labour Party policy 
formation. This appendix will survey these theories so that the rest of the thesis can relate 
them to the changing distribution of power involving press ownership policy creation. 
The Views of Beer and Minkin on Policy Creation 
Samuel Beer typifies one view of Labour Party policy formation. He sees Labour as 
having operated as a pluralist democracy, at least in its early days. Its early structure gave 
influential weight to extra-parliamentary organisation, with the conference, representing 
union interests, providing a powerful influence on the parliamentary party. Nevertheless, 
the MPs had some leeway in voting on policy positions and loyalty to the leader was not 
overwhelming. The interwar years saw the party adopt a socialist ideology that was 
shared by the leadership and rank and file. Although, in common with the British 
parliamentary system, an elite developed, the limits imposed on it were clearly delineated 
by party consensus. This elite had to make substantial concessions to the party followers 
in the 1950s. Latterly, although, he considers that influence had become more 
concentrated in this elite's hands. His emphasis is towards there being a plural diversity 
of power within the party. Power is shared between different elements in an intra-party 
democracy. 1225 In viewing the party in this way, Beer implicitly rejects the views of 
Robert McKenzie and Robert Michels, Ralph Miliband and David Coates, who we shall 
consider in turn. 1226 In his pluralist account, Beer particularly sees the role of the activists 
and the MPs as having considerable weight. 1227 
1225 Beer Samuel, if. 1982. Modern British politics -parties and pressure groups in the collectivist age. 
London: Faber and Faber.: 108-152,228-242,406. 
1226 McKenzie, R. T. 1958. British political parties: the distribution of power within the Conservative and 
Labour parties. London: I leinemann., Michels, R. 1959. Political parties :a sociological study of the 
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In his survey of intra-party democracy from 1956 to 1979, Lewis Minkin also suggests 
there was a certain plurality in policy formation. A number of sources were involved. 
There was the influence of the unions, the National Executive Committee (NEC) and the 
Labour Party conference, as the party's sovereign body. There was also differentiation 
within Labour governments themselves. This contributed to some diversity in policy 
formation. However, Minkin does not entirely share the pluralist analysis. Instead, he 
considers that there is no simple categorisation of power distribution. He, alternatively, 
detects some elements of elitism between the leadership and the party members, in which 
the leadership was predominant in creating policy. However, he also sees the influence of 
the unions prescribing the boundaries in the leadership's room for manoeuvre. 
1u8 
The Conception of Policy Development of McKenzie and Michels 
The elitist approach to Labour Party policy formation is exemplified by Robert 
McKenzie, writing in the 1950s, and is backed up by the earlier analysis of Robert 
Michels. McKenzie views the Labour Party's members as primarily election fodder, 
merely consulted by their leaders. Fie suggests that, for the most part, decision-making 
has been in the hands of the parliamentary leadership. By taking this view, McKenzie 
implicitly refutes Beer's assessment. lie also goes further than Minkin in stressing 
leadership power. By defending this state of affairs, McKenzie also implicitly rejects the 
analysis of Miliband and Coates who do not accept his normative implications. 1229 
oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. New York ; London: Dover Publications : Constable 
[distributor]., Miliband, R. 1969. The state in capitalist society. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson., 
Miliband, R. 1972. Parliamentary socialism :a study in the politics of labour. London: Merlin Press., 
Miliband, R. 1984. Capitalist democracy in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. Coates, D. 1980. 
Labour in power? :a study of the Labour Government, 1974-1979. London ; New York: Longman. 
1227 It is true, nevertheless, that in the later period he begins to agree with McKenzie and Michels on the 
leadership's power. lie particularly concurs with Michels in considering the source of its managerialism to 
be the specialist skills it needed to develop. (Beer: 406). 
1228 Minkin, L. 1980. The Labour Party conference: a study in ! he politics on lntra-party democracy. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.: 317. 
1229 For an explicit rejection of McKenzie's view that parliamentarianism should take precedence over 
intra-party democracy see Miliband, R. 1958. 'Party Democracy and Parliamentary Government'. Political 
Studies 6. 
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McKenzie suggests that this leadership power has been a product of the parliamentary 
system, where MPs' prime responsibility has been to their electorate, not their party 
membership. For parliamentarians to have taken a lead from elsewhere would be 
unconstitutional. Parliamentary government would be unworkable. The extra- 
parliamentary party had become just an organised pressure group with some privileged 
access. Leaders had to listen and take into account the views of the rank and file - and in 
opposition the leadership was more eager to take heed. But they did not become the 
servants of the party outside Parliament. He rejects the view that MPs were entirely 
subject to annual conference direction. 1230 
McKenzie indicates that the leadership had its hands on the tiller of policy creation. In the 
time he was surveying, he sees there to have been a social democratic centralism, with 
the link between the unions and the party as central in the extra-parliamentary party. He 
views that the leadership relied on the block vote moderation of the unions to derail any 
radical impetus from the membership at Labour's conference. A narrow band of union 
leaders, who wielded major influence over union delegation decisions, shared a ̀ bond of 
confidence' with the party leadership. 1231 
Conferences were also marked with a deference where delegates accorded Labour in 
government an "... awe and pride... " and ministers dominated conference discussion. The 
effect of this was that, while the conference had, on occasion, played an important role in 
party affairs and party programme, for the most part this had been with the leadership's 
approval. It had normally acted as a barometer of party opinion, influencing the NEC and 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). 1232 Indeed, McKenzie sees that constituency 
parties "... had little influence in the formulation of the goals and programme of the 
Labour Party, even less on the policies of the PLP, and only a faint influence on the 
1230 McKenzie: 485-6,488,558,583,585,587-8. See also 452-3. 123$ Ibid.: 423-56,486,490,492-3,506,586. 
1232 Ibid.: 496-9,506-7,508.11. McKenzie emphasises that the members of Labour Party, the vast majority 
of whom had been affiliated through the unions, gave their consent to this arrangement. To change this, 
would require the unions adopting procedures that were more democratic and gave constituency delegates 
more influence. This, for McKenzie would invalidate the conference as an authoritative body. (Ibid.: 506- 
7). 
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activities of a Labour Government". 1233 In a conflation of the normative and the 
explanatory, McKenzie regards the exclusion of membership control over policy 
formation as proper in a parliamentary regime. 
The PLP is seen to be dominated by the leadership. In Government, the operation of the 
Cabinet system made it a task of the PLP to minimise opposition to Government policy 
among MPs. There were rare indications that the leadership in Government sought 
approval for proposals before bringing them before parliament. When such an issue was 
discussed, however, the Government could normally rely on patronage and loyalty to 
secure support. Out of office, the leader had a "... degree of authority that is nowhere 
acknowledged in the constitution of the party". The Parliamentary Committee or Shadow 
Cabinet tended to dominate policy creation. 1234 
As for the role of the NEC in policy formation, although formally responsible to 
conference and with an in-built union majority, McKenzie's analysis is that it has been 
almost always led by the parliamentary leadership. This was by virtue of the fact that the 
majority of the NEC's members had often been leaders of the PLP. This state of affairs 
was again maintained by the consent of the unions, for the reasons already discussed. 1235 
Michels' View 
McKenzie's approach is linked to other elitists, such as Robert Michels. Though he was 
writing of social democracy, and especially the German party before the First World 
War, this work will consider the work of Michels, in order to provide a theoretical 
backdrop. Michels also emphasises that there was a lack of intra-party democracy. He 
provides an explanation as to why parties have been controlled by their leaders. His view 
is that an `iron law of oligarchy' governs parties. The development of an organisation 
leads to technical specialisation and a concentration of expertise among the leadership. 
1233 Ibid.: 557. 
1234 Ibid.: 299-309,416-7,445,447,527. 
1235An additional factor in PLP supremacy was that, because TUC General Council members had been 
debarred from the NEC, the union representatives on the executive were mostly second-rank. (Ibid.: 424, 
519-32). 
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Those involved gain knowledge in areas that others cannot access. They justify their 
dominance by their exclusive expertise. As the organisation expands, so does leadership 
power. 1236 Leaders can often disregard the positions of the party with impunity, since 
they are seen as indispensable. Dismissing such figures would discredit the party. 
Members are either happy to leave party affairs to the leadership, because they variously 
need guidance or look up to their `hero' leaders or are too tired to attend party 
meetings. 1237 
McKenzie rejected Michels' `iron law' as too rigid. He emphasised that the law did not 
recognise there was a space for revolts to undermine leaders and that the leadership had 
to listen to the rank-and-file. 1238 Nevertheless, Michels' view backs up McKenzie's 
position by providing reasoning for why leaders control parties, such as the Labour Party. 
There are seen to be organisational, practical and psychological reasons behind the 
leadership's dominance in policy development. 
The Analysis of Miliband and Coates 
Finally, we will look at the work of Miliband and Coates. They view policy development 
in the Labour Party as conditioned by the operation of capitalism. The Marxists share 
some assumptions with the elitists. Miliband and Coates view that the parliamentary 
leadership has had more power to create policy than other parts of the Labour Party. 1239 
Like McKenzie, Miliband also emphasises that a determining factor in this has been that 
the leadership and, for the most part, the unions and its Labour left opposition, have 
accepted the parliamentary system's dominance. But he sees this as negatively stifling 
radical policies and working class advancement. 1240 Nevertheless, unlike the elitists, the 
Marxists consider that the leadership's power over policy creation has not always been 
absolute. 
1236 Michels, R. 1959. Political parties :a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern 
democracy. New York ; London: Dover Publications : Constable [distributor].: 31-2,33,82-5,151-2,401. 
1237 Ibid.: 52,53,56,57,63-8,85-6. 
1238 McKenzie: 587. 
1239 See, for instance, Miliband, Capitalist democracy: 69-71. 
1240 Miliband, Parliamentary socialism: 13, Miliband, R. 1969. The state in capitalist society. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson.: 148-9. 
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One factor in this has been the unions. Like McKenzie and Minkin, both Miliband and 
Coates see a key role for the unions in policy formation. 1241 Contrary to McKenzie, 
Miliband emphasises that this points to a key explanatory factor: The Labour Party is a 
class-based party founded on the unions, but the leadership "... have always sought to 
escape from the implications... " of this. 1242 Despite this influence, both Marxists see the 
unions' role has been self-limited by their leaders' Labourist viewpoint, restricting 
involvement to the industrial and associating the political with the parliamentary. 1243 In a 
version of `social democratic centrism', for the most part, Coates indicates, the majority 
of union leaders have buttressed the PLP's policy-forming autonomy and have preferred 
to negotiate directly with the Labour leadership. 1244 
However, the Marxists emphasise, unlike McKenzie, that this state of affairs has not been 
axiomatic. At various times, after 1959, between 1970 and 1974 and in the late 1970s, the 
unions either withdrew their support or took a more active role in policy formation. 
Reasons for this included rank and file pressure and the election of more radical union 
leaders, due to resentment at Labour government policies. 1245 Although these shifts did 
not always presage a left-wing turn in Labour policies, it was more regularly associated 
with this and the role of the unions was a key determinant. 1246 
Miliband also sees that the leadership, for most of the time, maintained control by its hold 
over the NEC and the PLP. However, again this is not seen as axiomatic. Coates 
considers this as having shifted by the early 1970s, where the determinants of Labour 
policy included the political commitments and coalitions formed by the individuals in the 
1241 For instance, Miliband cites Labour minister Richard Crossman, in his introduction to Walter Bagehot's 
The English Constitution, that party sovereignty was partly undermined by the operation of the block vote. 
(Miliband, Capitalist democracy: 69, Crossman, R. H. S. ̀ Introduction' in Crossman, R. H. S. and Bagehot, 
W. 1963. The English constitution. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins.: 41). 
1242 Miliband, Parliamentary socialism: 348. 
1243 Ibid.: 374, Coates, Labour in power?: 202-226. 
1244 Coates, Labour in power?: 54. 
1245 Miliband, Parliamentary socialism: 346-7,350, Coates, Labour in power?: 2-7,56,57-85. 
1246 An exception to this trend, for Miliband, was after 1959. (Miliband, Parliamentary socialism: 346-7, 
350, Miliband, Capitalist democracy: 69,71-3 and Coates, Labour in power?: 2-7,56,57-85). 
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Cabinet. 1247 Miliband also considers that the NEC lessened its support for the leadership 
in the late 1970s. The defeat of the Labour government weakened the power of those at 
the top still further. Miliband cites the success of the Campaign for Labour Party 
Democracy over reselection as evidence of this. 1248 
Leadership domination of the activists and the Labour Left - seen as linked - is another 
feature of the two Marxists' accounts. The Left is seen as torn between loyalty and 
opposition. The Marxists' emphasis is on its acquiescence. 1249 For the most part, they 
implicitly accept the view against Beer that the membership's role in policy formation 
has been markedly limited. Nevertheless, Miliband also indicates that the Labour left has 
played a role in providing countervailing policies to the leadership. 1250 
Miliband sees this same tension operating among MPs. However, the pressures from the 
leadership, moderating policy creation by the PLP, are considered greater. Claims to 
party loyalty, the extensive tentacles of patronage, the co-option of rebels, severe 
disciplinary measures and the support for parliamentarianism have all succeeded in 
reducing the number of consistent left-wing parliamentarians achieving high office. 
1251 
Miliband and Coates, however, also look beyond the Labour Party to consider the 
pressures on policy construction, especially when in government. A key difference 
between the Marxists and Beer, McKenzie and Michels is how they see the influence of 
factors outside the Labour Party operating to restrict policy formation, including by the 
leadership. 
Miliband, for instance, sees democracy under capitalism as strongly limited by the 
operation of business within the economy, which is in turn restrained by universal 
1247 Coates, Labour in power?: 149-50. 
1242 Miliband, Capitalist democracy: 71-3. 
1249 Miliband, Parliamentary socialism: 14-5,374-5, Coates, Labour in power?: 276. 
1250 Miliband, Capitalist democracy: 68-9,158. 
1251 Ibid.: 41-6. 
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suffrage, meaning that those who sell their labour power also need to be placated . 
12 -52 
From this, in one of his earlier works, he sees his own `iron law of oligarchy' operating 
with "... no exception... ", leaving him open to charges of determinism. He argues that 
social democratic parties, such as Labour, have often been elected based on a 
significantly radical upsurge in popular consciousness, with openness to policy change. 
However, their leaders have wanted to assure business, dampen down expectations and 
have always been more moderate in the policies put forward than their supporters. 1253 
Civil servants provide another outside constraint for Miliband on Labour policy 
formation in government, as well as implementation. 1254 
Further than this, Coates makes a more general point, considering the period of the 1974 
Labour Government. He goes beyond Miliband's view, which tends to focus on the class- 
based power of elites, especially business, as a major limit on policy formation. Pointing 
to an area that we will consider regarding Labour policies on press regulation, Coates 
argues that Labour was incapable of understanding and dealing with the operation and the 
pressure of international capitalism. He refutes the allegation that this analysis is 
economically determinist. Other factors are significant, but there are definite limits to 
their influence - proscribed by the laws of capitalist accumulation. 1255 Thus, for 
Miliband, a law of oligarchy and, for Coates, the laws of accumulation affect the path of 
policy development, at least when Labour is in government, in what some see as a 
`chronicle of a death foretold'. 1256 
1252 Miliband, R. 1969. The state in capitalist society. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.: 139-49, Miliband 
Capitalist democracy: 97-9. 
125 Miliband, R. 1969. The state in capitalist society. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.: 89-91. While, on 
occasion, Miliband considered that the leaders might put forward policies opposing the ruling classes, they 
were mainly marked by timidity and, at their most bold, did not threaten the existing social order. Thus, he 
suggests: "Politics, in this context, is indeed the art of the possible. But what is possible is above all 
determined by what the business community' finds acceptable. " (Miliband, R. 1969. The state in capitalist 
society. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.: 92-3,97-9,99-100,106). 
1254 As non-governmental elements of the state, they "... are generally less vulnerable to popular pressures, 
or not vulnerable to them at all [and] are therefore able to act as bulwarks of continuity, stability, 'sound' 
and 'reasonable' policies... ", providing a limit on government and preserving conservative continuity. 
(Miliband, R. 1969. The state in capitalist society. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.: 137). 
1255 Coates, Labour in power? 
1256 Bale, T. 1999. Sacred cows and common sense : the symbolic statecraft and political culture of the 
British Labour Party. Aldershot ; Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate.: 1. 
381 
An alternative? 
However, the glimmer of an alternative reading of the Marxists is also possible, which 
this work will explore. Whether immutable laws govern policy creation, as opposed to 
implementation, is not so clearly identified in the Marxists' work. Minkin and McKenzie 
identify with the Marxists that the trade unions are a source of power. The unions were 
seen to be able to shift the balance of forces in developing policy, and open up an 
increased role for the activists and left MPs, through forums such as the conference and 
the NEC. Indicating the tensions between human agency and determinist laws within 
Marxism itself, Miliband at points glimpses at a role for pressures from below. The main 
one of these is seen as being the working class, firstly in the form of the unions, which 
have challenged what the Marxists saw as the conservative orthodoxy in policy 
formation. 1257 
Another factor can be indicated here. Minkin notes that, in the early period this thesis is 
considering, there was a developing institutional independence and differentiation of 
policy between the Labour Party and the Labour government. So, although the party had 
a limited effect on Government policy formation, the Labour government had decreasing 
influence on party policy output. This stalemate was sustained by the formal patterns of 
intra-party democracy and conference authority over the NEC, the change in political 
alignment evidenced at conference and the role performed by the NEC. 1258 Thus, there is 
the possibility for the party to engage in independent policy formation, less directly 
constricted by the factors Miliband and Coates invoke. 
1257 See for instance Miliband, Parliamentary socialism: 347, Miliband, Capitalist democracy: 149-150. 
1258 Minkin, L. 1980. The Labour Party conference: a study in the politics on intro party democracy. 
- --Manchester: Manchester University Press.: 317. 
382 
Appendix 2 to Chapter 1: Prelude - Labour representation 
after the war 
We shall start by considering policy following the Second World War. Starting here, it is 
important to appreciate three considerations. Firstly, the period before the war was also 
one where governments of all political hues generally did not have a policy or any special 
laws regarding the press. Any such policy was equated with political control. Yet, 
wartime measures had changed that. There was government economic control of the 
press. 1259 
Secondly, many committed to Labour representation in the 1970s and early 1980s wanted 
to create a mass market paper directly funded and controlled by the Labour movement. 
Yet, the era when this had last been the case had long since past by the end of the Second 
World War. British parties by then, unlike in other parts of Europe, neither controlled nor 
sustained British newspapers. 126° One could view the Daily Herald as the last example 'of 
this sort of direct Labour movement representation until its demise in the 1960s. But as 
Huw Richards makes plain, even it had stopped being an official Labour movement organ 
in 1929 when financial reasons forced the TUC to seek external commercial funding. 1261 
Thirdly, the period after 1945 also saw the Labour leadership turn to mass' media 
campaigning, which would lead to a particular interest in Labour representation in the 
press. 1262 We will consider this further in later chapters. However, what is important to 
note at this stage is that the concern for Labour representation figured in the calculations 
of the Labour leadership. This provided an early indication that Labour representation 
might not be a steady ally of diversity. 
After 1945, diversity considerations were reflected in demands that arose in the Labour 
Party for an inquiry into the press, following demands from the National Union of 
1259 Seaton, J., 'Government policy and the mass media' in Curran, The British Press: 300-I, Tunstall, J. 
1995. Newspaper power : the new national press in Britain. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford 
University Press.: 380. 
1260 Koss, S. 1984. The rise and fall of the political press in Britain. London: Hamilton.: esp. 678. 
1261 Richards, The bloody circus: Chapter 6. 
1262 See Wring, Political marketing and organisational development-. 1-12. 
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Journalists. 1263 There were concerns about press concentration, which led to a Commons 
motion calling for what became the first Royal Commission on the Press. 1264But, even at 
this early stage, one of the two Labour MPs calling for the enquiry, future leader Michael 
Foot, highlighted concerns about political bias against Labour in the provincial 
newspaper monopoly chains as a reason for action. l265 As it was, there was a tension 
between the interventionist demands made in the party and the Attlee government's 
acceptance of the commission's minimalist view of regulation, with press owner 
support. 1266 O'Malley indicates that Labour ministers designed the commission to take a 
middle course between press owner interests and demands for reform. 1267 It dismissed 
fears about monopolisation and rejected legislation as dangerous. 1268 Labour ministers 
took this advice. l269 The only substantial outcome was the delayed establishment of the 
self-regulatory Press Council to deal with complaints about newspapers. 1270 
Again, the combined concerns for Labour representation and press diversity surfaced in 
the Labour Party in 1961. Fears were raised that the buy-out of the Daily Herald by the 
owners of the Daily Mirror would mean the end of this consistently Labour-supporting 
title. However, the aspirant owners effectively courted Labour and union leaders, 
diffusing these concerns. Party support for a group that already owned a Labour- 
supporting daily . and 
Sunday newspaper was perhaps unsurprising. 1271 However, 
Labour's original worries were realised only three years later when the new owners 
1263 Berry, W. E. 1947. British newspapers and their controllers. London: Cassell.: 1, Koss, S. 1984. The 
rise and fall of the political press in Britain. London: Hamilton.: 638, Cole, H., 1952, Socialism and the 
press. London: Fabian Publications.: 18. 
1264 Berry: 2, Levy, H. P. 1967. The Press Council : history, procedure and cases. London: Macmillan.: 3-4, 
O'Malley T., 'Demanding Accountability: The Press, the Royal Commissions and the pressure for reform, 
1945-77' in Bromley, M. and Stephenson, H. 1998. Sex, lies and democracy : the press and the public. New 
York: Longman.: 87. See also Snoddy: 76. 
1265 Williams, Britain's media: 66, Levy, Press Council: 4. 
1266 Snoddy: 83-4. Berry: 4-10. 
'267 O'Malley T., 'Demanding Accountability: The Press, the Royal Commissions and the pressure for 
reform, 1945-77' in Bromley, M. and Stephenson, H. 1998. Sex, lies and democracy : the press and the 
public. New York: Longman.: 87. 
1268 Levy, Press Council: 5-8, Cole, H., 1952, Socialism and the press. London: Fabian Publications.: 26, 
Curran and Seaton: 289, Snoddy: 83-4. 
1269 Curran, J. 1995. Policy for the press. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.: 3 
1270 Allaun, Spreading the news: 71, Koss, S. 1984. The rise and fall of the political press in Britain. 
London: Hamilton.: 638, Levy, Press Council: 5-8, Snoddy: 84. 
1271 Jenkins, S. 1986. The market., or glory: Fleet Street ownership in the twentieth century. London: 
_Faber.: 46-7, Jenkins, Newspapers: 37., Richards, The bloody circus: 176. 
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closed the Herald in its original form. This was despite it having a circulation of over 
1.25 million readers, which was twice as large as that of the Financial Times, the Times, 
11 
and the Guardian put together. 1272 Writers have variously blamed rising newsprint costs, 
underfunding, the threat of commercial television, lack of interest from its ownerl'Is 
unimaginative reporting and the failure to merge with the News Chronicle as reasons f, 6i 




! Chapter 1, its low-income readership was not attractive to advertisers. The advertising, 
market had narrowed diversity and had reduced Labour representation. 
Labour government concerns for its own press representation also combined with a 
reluctance to go beyond a classical liberal view of the need for minimal anti-monopoly 
legislation in the 1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act. 1275 The Labour government created 
it as a response to the second Royal Commission on the Press. It was eventually 
incorporated into the 1973 Fair Trading Act by the Conservative administration. ' 276 The 
legislation modified the British tradition that refused to provide specific laws for the 
press. 1277 However, its commitment to diversity was more limited than the Royal 
commission's. The Labour government rejected the commission's proposal to challenge 
concentration with an Amalgamations Court. 1278 This would have only been able to 
consent to takeovers of large circulation dailies or Sunday newspapers by existing paper 
groups if it could be positively shown that this was in the public interest. 1279 Instead, the 
1272 Williams, Get me a murder a day: 216-8, Chairman's speech to the 1960 AGM, Trade Union Congress 
Files 790 in Richards, The bloody circus, Benn, T. 1979. The need for a free press. Nottingham: Institute 
for Workers' Control.: 5. 
1273 Jenkins, Newspapers: 37, Smith, The British press: 63, King, C. H. and Granada Television. 1967. The 
future of the press. London: Macgibbon and Kee., Richards, The bloody circus. - 1274 Curran and Seaton: 91-3, Williams, Get me a murder a day: 216-8, Richards, The bloody circus: 27_gß 
169-70,181-2. Gardner, C. 1979. Media, politics and culture :a socialist view. London: Macmillan.: 121, 
Benn, T. 1979. The need for a free press. Nottingham: Institute for Workers' Control.: 5. 
12" Snoddy: 85-6, Tunstall, Newspaper power: 380-1, Stephenson H., 'Tickle the public: Consumerism 
rules' in Bromley and Stephenson: 22, Robertson, G. 1983. People against the press : an enquiry into the 
Press Council. London: Quartet.: 121. 
1276 Curran, j., `The different approaches to media reform' in Curran, J., Campaign for, P. and 
Broadcasting, F. 1986. Bending reality: the state of the media. London: Pluto in association with the 
Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom.: 288,289. 
1277 Tunstall, Newspaper power: 380-1. 
1278 Robertson, G. 1983. People against the press : an enquiry into the Press Council. London: Quartet.: 
121, Stephenson: 22. 
1279 Levy, Press Council: 15-16,405. 
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Government called for such takeovers to be investigated by the Monopoly and Mergers 
Commission. In the same minimalist vein, it upped the Royal commission's 
recommendation for the size of a press group's newspaper circulation needed for an 
investigation to half a million. 1280 As such, the law had a negligible impact on arresting 
concentration. 1281 
Instead, the Government's concern for Labour representation tainted the proposals for 
diversity. The Labour administration gave the Secretary of State discretion to not refer 
takeover bids if she regarded the titles as being not otherwise economically viable. 1282 As 
Jeremy Tunstall asserts, the Labour government worded the discretion loophole clause 
deliberately vaguely so that Prime Minister Harold Wilson could interfere to preserve 
Labour support and discourage its enemies. In the event, he says, the party could not rely 
on its supporters to buy newspapers, so Wilson seems to have encouraged the leading 
contender with the hope of some reciprocal gratitude come the next election. 1283 Tunstall 
lists the cases of the Times in 1966-7 and the Sun in 1969 where Labour governments 
agreed to buy-ups and where there were political motives for approval. There were more 
subsequently. 1284 Stephen Koss also sees a political motivation in the case of the then 
Labour-supporting Sun. He reports that the Cabinet was divided over whether to oppose a 
planned merger of IPC and Reed, which was supposed to mean the end of the title. 
However, tellingly, Wilson regarded action against the then Daily Mirror's owners as 
political suicide. 1285 Labour representation was seen as more important than diversity. 
1280 Tunstall, Newspaper power: 380-1 Stephenson: 22, See also Curran, Policy for the press: 4, 
Humphreys, P. 1996. Mass media and media policy in Western Europe. Manchester ; New York: 
Manchester University Press : 94-5. 
128' An indication of the law's modest impact is that 150 ownership transfers were accepted up to 1993, 
including those of the Times, Sunday Times, Today and the Observer. Only three requests involving more 
minor newspapers were refused. (Curran, Policy for the press: 4. See also Humphreys, Western Europe: 94- 
5). 
1282 Levy, Press Council: 410, Robertson, G. 1983. People against the press : an enquiry into the Press 
Council. London: Quartet.: 121, Tunstall, Newspaper power: 380-1, Negrine, R. M. 1998. Television and 
the press since 1945. Manchester New York; New York: Manchester University Press : 174. See also 
Dunnett, P. J. S. 1988. The world newspaper industry. London: Croom Helm.: 122. 
1293 Tunstal 1, Newspaper power: 380-1. 
1284 Tunstall, J. 1983. The media in Britain. London: Constable.: 265. 
1285 Koss, S. 1984. The rise and fall of the political press in Britain. London: Hamilton.: 667. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3: Policy Transfers and Practicality it 
INTRODUCTION 
Were any of the schemes the Labour Party considered practical? As indicated, many ,öf 
the schemes debated in the party for restructuring the newspaper ownership were policy 
transfers from other parts of Europe. The 1990s saw most major Western Europea'in 
nations, bar West Germany and the UK, providing state subsidies to the press to 
I 
'd 
diversity. 1286 Among the more successful schemes for sustaining plurality have b 
lees 
those instituted in Sweden and Norway, which have included advertising tax and subsidy 
schemes, state advertising diversification and targeted subsidies. Also, comparable to the 
11, 
schemes discussed by Labour for democratic control within press organisations have , ,, 
been government laws established to provide a degree of influence by journalists. We 
shall consider attempts at broader community accountability with rights of repl 
) 
Y 
legislation later in this work. 
However, no simple policy transfer and no complete analogy can be made between any 
of the solutions that were followed in Norway and Sweden and those that were called for 
in the British Labour Party, for at least three reasons. In the Scandinavian countries, as 
we have indicated, there was a broadly continuous tradition of Labour movement 
representation by means of a party press. Also, especially in Norway, the newspaper 
market has been much more dominated by the local press for geographic, topographic, 
cultural, economic, social and political reasons. 1297 Importantly, the vast proportion of the 
money involved in the Scandinavian schemes has been used to safeguard existing 
diversity, which had been preserved with the survival of a party press and competition 
1286 See, for instance, Humphreys, Western Europe: 102-5. 
1287 Another contrast is that the introduction of commercial television as a source of competition for 
advertising came much later, to protect the press financially. (Murschetz, Paul, and Media The European 
Institute for the. 1997. State support for the press : theory and practice :a survey ofAustria, France, 
Norway and Sweden. Dusseldorf. European Institute for the Media.: 116,135-6,195-6, Murschetz, Paul. 
1998, 'State support for the daily press in Europe: A critical appraisal', European Journal of 
Communication 13,291-313.: 301) 
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within the local press. Only a small fraction has been used to encourage new publications, 
in contrast to what was envisaged by some of the more ambitious schemes for Britain. 
Nevertheless, there are indications of how some of the social market proposals based on 
radical Keynesian-style conceptions of economic management could successfully work in 
practice. 1288 They can be contrasted with the hyper-concentration of the British 
newspaper industry in the same period. In the Scandinavian countries, the justification for 
the subsidies, as with some of those more clustered around the New Left involved in 
British Labour Party proposals, was that the closure of newspapers had hampered the 
press's role in a democratic system. 1289 
SWEDEN 
Advertising Tax and Subsidies 
Along with direct general aid that goes to political parties, Sweden's main direct subsidy 
has been a selective one, first introduced in 1972.1290 Like the proposals made by 
Moonman and Richardson and others in the Labour Party, here subsidies are financed by 
a cross-media advertising tax. It is paid to those in a weaker market position, compared to 
their more powerful rivals. Also, in a similar way to proposals made within the British 
Labour Party, the subsidies have paid for a proportion of the aided papers' newsprint. 1291 
A Press Support Board distributes the money. 1292 A comparable scheme has operated in 
the Netherlands, where the subsidy is paid for by a levy on television advertising. 1293 
1288 Curran, Press Reformism: 46. 
1289 Fact Sheets on Sweden: Mass Media, Stockholm: Swedish Institute, 1999: 1 
'290 Murschetz, Europe: 294. 
1291 Murschetz, State support for the press: 124. 
1292 Swedish Ministry of Culture website, accessed May 3 2001, http: //kultur. re eringen. se/inen lg ish , 
Curran, Press Reformism: 46 
1293 Humphreys, Western Europe: 105-7, Sanchez-Tabernero, Alfonso, and Alison Denton. 1993. Media 
concentration in Europe : commercial enterprise and the public interest. [Manchester]: European Institute 
for the Media.: 231, Brandt, Kees and McQuail, Dennis. 1997. The Netherlands', Pp. 168-184 in The media 
in Western Europe : the Euromedia handbook, edited by Stubbe Ostergaard Bernt and Group Euromedia 
Research. London: Sage.: 158-9. 
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The tax and subsidy system has operated as the main provision of the scheme which, in 
the words of the author of one cross-national survey, "... has been widely seen as the 
model ...... 
1294 As was argued by those pressing for such a scheme in the Labour Party, 
the justification for selective subsidies in Sweden has been the operation of advertising. 
Two-thirds of the Swedish morning newspapers' revenue has been estimated to come 
from advertising. This advertising power has operated in what has seen to be as the 
`circulation spiral', which affects the less successful newspapers disproportionately, the 
so-called No. 2 titles. '295 Bifurcation has been less of a problem. 
Because of this role of advertising, Swedish research has shown that there is a very strong 
link between the percentage of households a newspaper covers in the area in which it 
sells - that is, its coverage as opposed to, say, actual circulation - and the paper's 
profitability. 1296 It has been on this basis that selective subsidies have been directed - to 
those newspapers with coverage of 40% or less. 1297 Research by Swedish subsidies expert 
Karl-Erik Gustafsson convincingly indicates that if a general subsidy had been paid, 
instead of the selective one, all the low-coverage newspapers would have gone under. As 
he puts it: "Market forces operate selectively. Countermeasures must also be 
selective. " 1298 
Swedish financing has met some opposition. The parties to the right of the, Social 
Democrats have tended to support general subsidies, which have benefited their 
newspapers, normally in a stronger market position, and opposed an advertising tax. 1299 
They have been concerned that the demands of the dailies of the Social Democrats and its 
minor coalition partners has shaped provision. 1300 Indeed, in Norway, it was in order to 
avoid an advertising tax-financed subsidy system that right-wing newspapers supported 
1294 Humphreys, Western Europe: 106. 
1295 Gustafsson, Karl-Erik. 1980. 'The press subsidies: a. decade of experiment' in Newspapers and 
democracy : international essays on a changing medium, edited by Anthony Smith. Cambridge, Mass.;: 
MIT Press.: 117-120, Murschetz, State support for the press: 124. 
1296 Gustafsson: 117-120, Murschetz, State support for the press: 124. 
1297 Murschetz, Europe: 303. 
1298 Gustafsson: 120-1. 
1299 Ibid.: 116-7. 
1300 Murschetz, Europe: 302. 
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subsidies, despite initial reluctance. 130 1For most of its time in operation, the Swedish 
advertising levy more than paid for the subsidy. For instance, in 1995 the tax revenue was 
twice the subsidy paid out. 1302 The tax was reduced when the `bourgeois' government 
came into office in the late 1970s, leading, for a time, to a net loss. Other critics have 
argued it should be replaced by a more integrated system "... proportionally levying the 
yearly advertising volume of a title to be paid by the advertiser... ". 1303 This would, of 
course, share significant elements with the Advertising Revenue Board proposals made 
by those such as Curran and included in People and the media and later Labour- 
supported schemes. 
The system has had problems, which Curran, for instance, is less clear in 
acknowledging. 1304 The Swedish system has not entirely halted moves to concentration. 
By 1997, the 15 biggest newspaper owners accounted for about 85% of circulation of all 
newspapers with more than two issues a week. 1305 It has not been entirely successful in 
sustaining a Labour movement press and aiding democratic citizenship. The newspapers 
have not represented the political preferences of the population, especially those of the 
left. About half of Swedish voters supported Social Democrats and, to a far lesser extent, 
the Communists, for many years. Yet, their press was only about one fifth of 
circulation. 1306 More recently, with readers now less ready to read the party press, 
newspapers are becoming more independent of the parties and the political legitimation 
for subsidies is weakening. 1307 The situation has not improved. The Labour Party 
newspaper group, The A-Pressen, was restructured in 1993-4, after it went bankrupt. 1308 
The Swedish Trade Union confederation, the LO, relinquished control of the major 
tabloid Aftonbladet. However, the new owners vowed to retain the paper's social 
democratic orientation. 1309 
1301 Murschetz, State support for the press: 124. 
1302 Ibid.: 153,190,193, Murschetz, Europe: 301. 
1303 Murschetz, State support for the press: 131,193. 
1304 Curran, Press Reformism: 46. 
1305 Gustafsson: 215-7. 
1306 Swedish Institute. 1999. Fact Sheets on Sweden: Mass Media, Stockholm: Swedish Institute, 1999: 1 
1307 Murschetz, Europe: 303, Swedish Institute: 1. 
1309 Gustafsson: 215-7, Murschetz, State support for the press: 164-5. 
1309 Ibid.: 215-7. 
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Nevertheless, compared to the British press system, what is more notable is the Swedish 
subsidy system's success in using similar methods to achieve similar aims as those in the 
British Labour Party. 
Concentration has by no means approached the British level. According to one expert, the 
selective subsidies have stopped some newspapers gaining the monopoly position they 
wanted to achieve. '310 Until the early 1990s, according to one cross-national study, as 
was the case in other Scandinavian countries, the press subsidy system helped provide for 
a relatively low level of media concentration and thus did not make necessary for it to be 
complemented by other strict regulation. 1311 Since then, as the pressure to oligopoly has 
increased, so the Swedish government and its Norwegian counterpart have started 
considering setting limits on the market share that each media firm can possess. In 
Sweden, the government now has committed to providing laws on ownership 
plurality. 1312 One writer sees the move to anti-monopoly legislation and new rigid 
ownership rules in Sweden and Norway, as displaying a "... fit of neo-liberalism". 1313 
However, there is an argument that press subsidies are not enough to avoid concentration 
and that effective controls on oligopoly can be used in tandem to defend plurality. 1314 
Moreover, importantly, despite fears to the contrary, diversity has been achieved without 
the state politically interfering in the press or impairing the newspapers' watchdog role. 
Paul Murschetz describes Sweden as "... a shining example of a country which has a 
politically neutral allocation of subsidies to its press". 1315 Gustafsson has emphatically 
rejected claims that newspaper independence has been forfeited. 1316 
1310 Gustafsson suggests: "The subsidy system complements the market system. " (Ibid.: 124-5). 
1311 Sanchez-Tabernero and Denton: 238. 
1312 Swedish Ministry of Culture website, accessed May 3 2001, http: //kultur. regeringen. se/inenglish . 1313 Murschetz, Europe: 304,305. 
1314 James Curran is among those who sees British anti-monopoly controls as ineffective. See for instance, 
Curran, Press Reformism: 45. 
1315 Murschetz, Europe: 303. 
1316 "There is no evidence that subsidies have had any effect on their criticism of the exercise of power by 
the government. " (Gustafsson: 121). 
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Also, while the spread of the press has not accurately represented political preferences, 
the party press subsidies "... are regarded as essential if the loss of a voice articulating a 
particular point of view is seen as impoverishing society as a whole". 
1317 The press's 
attachment to parties might be weakening, but this should be put in perspective. It was 
still the case in the late 1990s that: "... almost all newspapers declare[d] a political loyalty 
through their editorial pages". 1318 It is true, nevertheless, that the Labour movement press 
has suffered in the recent past. Nonetheless, Sweden was one of the Scandinavian nations 
in which for good number of years, there "... survived a Social Democratic press which 
was the envy of Labour parties the world over". 1319 While it might be argued that other 
factors had been central to this, such as the strength of the Social Democrats and the 
division among its opponents, the existence of subsidies cannot be ignored. Furthermore, 
it is undeniably significant that the LO no longer owns the tabloid Aftonbladet. 
Nevertheless, official surveys have since classed the paper, which is the largest 
newspaper in both Sweden and Scandinavia as a whole, and Arbetet (number eight in 
Swedish circulation) as Social Democratic newspapers. 1320 Also significantly, it was 
neither circulation problems nor reader desertion from the social democratic dailies that 
caused A-Pressen's bankruptcy. Instead, it was victim of the recession, which had seen 
advertising revenues massively fall. 1321 
Overall, both commentators and regulators agree that the Swedish press structure would 
be different without the tax and subsidies. 1322 Its "... strange Robin Hood device... " has 
"... helped preserve plurality of politically aligned newspapers in many cities that would 
otherwise have become subject to newspaper monopolies". 
1323 Without them, Arbetet and 
the conservative Svenska Dagbladet wouldn't have survived, as one cross-national survey 
13" Murschetz, Europe: 303. 
1319 Murschetz, State support for the press: 139,151. 
1319 Humphreys, Western Europe: 107. 
1320 Both according to 1998 circulation figures, (Swedish Institute: 1, Schibsted corporate website, www. 
schib, sted. no) 
1321 Murschetz, State support for the press: 164-5. 
1322 Ibid.: 117. The Swedish Institute's view is that: "It is inconceivable that the subsidy system could be 
abolished without immediately jeopardizing a very large number of newspapers. " (Swedish Institute: 1). 
1323 Sanchez-Tabernero and Denton: 228. It has been successful in its goal of maintaining a minority 
political press and, by 1998, a choice of local press in 19 Swedish regions - one less than previous years. 
(Gustafsson: 216). 
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notes. 1324 As even the sceptical Murschetz admits, subsidies have played a "key role" in 
saving newspapers. The subsidies have preserved "... freedom of information which the 
market has arguably failed to provide". 1325 
NORWAY 
State Advertising 
A system similar to the policy transfer proposed in the Labour Party's The people and the 
media and later party policy has also been enacted successfully with state advertising. In 
Norway, state advertising is distributed between all newspapers. This practice is defended 
on the basis that helps make state information available to as many citizens as possible. 
But apart from this, its justification is that it keeps newspapers alive. 1326 
The system has had the effect of counteracting the influence of advertisers, who back 
circulation winners. In contrast, government advertising has treated all publications more 
equally. Rather than leading to state bias, its proponents argue that it has ended the 
possibility that there might be partiality in the allocation of government advertising. One 
commentator argues that it has been a "... great help... " in sustaining papers. In fact, in 
order to strengthen this aspect, it was agreed in 1991 that the state would be able to target 
its advertising to the newspapers second in their market, which most suffered from losing 
advertising revenue. 1327 This was going a step further than what was proposed by British 
Labour activists. A fear could be that such targeting, which may well be used to sustain 
papers with a similar political allegiance as the leading government party, could smack of 
political patronage. Yet, the previous system, similar to that proposed for Britain, had 
operated effectively. 
1324 Humphreys, Western Europe: 106. 
1325 Murschetz, State support for the press: 189. 
1326 Civil service job vacancies are published in all daily newspapers. The state has to advertise in all 
relevant newspapers when it is conducting more specialist promotion. (Skogerbe, Eli. 1997. ̀The press 
subsidy system in Norway', European Journal of Communication. Vol 12(1): 105, Murschetz, State 
support for the press: 1334,193). 
137 Murschetz, Europe: 134,145 
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Targeted Subsidies 
Aside from government advertising redistribution, Norwegian governments have also 
implemented a relatively successful system of direct press subsidies. One reason why it 
cannot be directly compared to the solutions provided in the Labour Party has been that 
the state has directly provided the subsidies. Labour party activists ruled out this policy 
transfer because it would not be politically acceptable. As already indicated, Norwegian 
right-of-centre newspapers' hostility to an advertising tax led them to reluctantly back 
subsidies financed by the public purse. Nevertheless, Norwegian subsidies have some 
similarities to Labour Party proposals. And their operation again indicates that a subsidy 
system is both practically possible and can be relatively effective. 
In Norway, direct subsidies have been dispensed since 1969. They were instituted in 
response to the closure of a series of newspapers. 1328 Like Sweden, a major justification 
for the system has been to enhance political democracy. 1329 The bulk of the subsidy 
provided is for production. This provides a certain amount for every copy sold of a 
newspaper. ' 330 In a relatively similar way to the proposals made in The people and the 
media and later Labour Party proposals, some subsidies are targeted. In the Norwegian 
system, they have been channelled to those papers that are the second largest in their 
particular market, the so-called `No. 2s' and the smallest newspapers. Those that are seen 
to be `national opinion newspapers' also get extra support. Again, in a familiar fashion to 
the proposals agreed in the Labour Party, direct subsidies are also made to publications 
that represent a social or political interest group or a special target group. Examples are 
political party newspapers and those representing immigrant or disabled groups. 
Importantly, while all this targeting has meant a large role for bodies in allocating funds, 
at the same time, rules have also been introduced to prohibit state interference in editorial 
policy. 1331 
1328 Skogerbo: 102. 
1329 Murschetz, Europe: 291,303. 
1330 Ostbye, Helge. 1997. "Norway. " Pp. 169-184 in The media in Western Europe : the Euromedia 
handbook, edited by Stubbe Ostergaard Bernt and Group Euromedia Research. London: Sage.: 173. 
131 The Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Media in Norway, The Norwegian Ministry of Cultural 
Affairs website, accessed May 3 2001, Skogerbr : 106-7, Ostbye, Norway: 173. 
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While noting problems with the subsidy system in Norway, two senior Norwegian media 
analysts have considered its operation as a "success" or at least "partly successful". '332 ' 
Subsidies have preserved diversity. While they have accounted for only 2% of total press 
income, they have ensured the survival of many No. 2 publications. 1333 One survey by 
Sigurd Host noted that the system greatly reduced the further development of monopolies 
in the 1970s and 1980s. In the period from 1972 to 1989, second dailies' numbers 
reduced by a third of that in the period between 1952 and 1966. '334 
For those from Britain concerned about promoting a Labour movement press, the subsidy 
system has had some achievements, but they have faded to a degree. Yet, it is in 
promoting a more diverse press beyond party boundaries that it has more recently been 
most successful, in line with those more associated with the Labour new left pushing for 
subsidies. 
It was the `No. 2' subsidy that supported the Social Democratic papers. 1335 It maintained 
the world's strongest Labour movement press for 30 years. Yet, it is true, as with 
Sweden, that part of the justification for this has gone as the strong ties between political 
parties and the press have loosened. 1336 The situation appears bleaker for proponents of a 
Labour movement party press, than in the `golden age'. In the years up to 2002, the 
Labour Party and the press have nurtured more informal links with each other and the 
newspapers have been acting more independently. An important shift has been that Norsk 
Arbeiderpresse, the former press co-operative of the Labour movement, transformed 
1332 Host, Sigurd. 1991. "The Norwegian newspaper system: structure and development. " in Media and 
communication : readings in methodology, history and culture, edited by Helge Ronning and Knut Lundby, 
Oslo: Norwegian University Press.: 295, Skogerbo: 108. 
1333 Ostbye, Norway: 174. 
1334 Host, Sigurd. 1991. "The Norwegian newspaper system: structure and development. " in Media and 
communication : readings in methodology, history and culture, edited by Helge Ronning and Knut Lundby. 
Oslo: Norwegian University Press.: 295. 
1335 Skogerbo: 110. 
1336 See for instance The Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Media in Norway, 
http: //odin. dep. no/kkd/en eg lsk/, accessed May 3 2001. Skogerbe situates this press and party separation 
within the wider framework of the dealignment of voters and parties. (Skogerbe: 117). 
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itself into the business A -pressen in 1992. In 1995, the Labour Party sold its shares in this 
company. 1337 However, despite these developments, it should be noted that the ties of the 
company with the Labour movement were by no means been broken in the period we are 
considering. The chairman of the company's board was a senior figure in the Norwegian 
Trade Unions federation, the LO, and the chair and a sizeable number of the firm's 
corporate assembly were representatives of trade unions. 1338 Of the newspapers that the 
chain owns, a number still have ties to the Labour movement. '339 And senior 
commentators still regard these newspapers as ̀ Labour press'. 1340 Indeed, the strength of 
this press can be indicated by the fact that one out of six newspapers sold came from this 
chain, making it still stronger than any other Labour press in the Western world. 1341 
Nevertheless, a broader cultural and political diversity has become the justification for 
Norway's policy. It has been decried that this has happened by default. '342 However, to 
claim that this means that the subsidy no longer aids political diversity is to entertain a 
narrow conception of political diversity, shared by those in the British Labour and trade 
union movement who, as this thesis outlines, merely strove for a Labour movement press. 
The evidence for those in Britain on whether there were dangers in having press closely 
tied to the parties, including the Social Democrats, is mixed. One expert considers that 
the link with parties hampered the newspapers' watchdog role and delayed the 
introduction of professionalisation into Norwegian journalism. 1343 This consideration 
should not be overstated, however. There is no evidence that journalists on subsidised 
papers have been less critical or original than their profitable newspaper counterparts, 
according to another commentator. Nor, on a different note, is the assumption that 
subsidies prevented innovation and rationalisation been born out by the available data. 1344 
1337 Skogerbo: 113, A -pressen website, www. al2ressen. no ., accessed May 4 2001. '338 A -pressen website, www. apressen. no ., accessed May 4 2001. 139 Skogerbo: 114. 
1340 Ibid., Ostbye, Norway: 173. 
1341 Ostbye, Norway: 173. 
1342 Skogerbo: 110,112,113. 
1343 Svennik Hoyer, The Norwegian Press, The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, accessed 
May 4 2001. 
1344 Skogerbo: 110,111. 
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The most powerful example of the system's effectiveness, and an example of a wider 
conception of political diversity fostered by the subsidies, has been the creation of the 
national daily Klassekampen. Curran views the Norwegian subsidy system as being the 
most effective because it has provided for diversity by aiding the establishment of new 
newspapers, like this left-wing title, often critical of the Norwegian government. 1345 It is 
one of a number of smaller specialist newspapers, others of which address Labour, 
Christian Democrat and agricultural interests. This newspaper, with a national profile, 
was founded as a low-frequency publication the same year that subsidies were introduced 
in 1969. The paper became a weekly in 1973 and a six-day paper in 1977.1346 
If the Norwegian subsidy system was said to have partially failed, this deficiency was, to 
some degree, that it did not combine press subsidies with media concentration legislation. 
In 1999, this was tightened up. The government's Media Ownership Act created an 
independent body with power to intervene when there are media acquisitions. It had 
already taken action in its first year of operation. 1347 
Generally, though, the subsidy system has been fairly effective in providing for diversity, 
The Norwegian system has maintained a large number of newspapers and a high level of 
readership. 1348 It is widely regarded by commentators that this can, at least partly, be 
attributed to the press subsidies. While about a 100 new newspapers and 83 old papers 
had gone to the wall in the years from 1952 to 1989,69 new newspapers have beet, 
1345 Curran, Press Reformism: 46. 
1346 The Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Media in Norway, The Norwegian Ministry of Cultural 
Affairs website, accessed May 3 2001, Hest, Sigurd. 1991. "The Norwegian newspaper system: structure 
and development. " in Media and communication : readings in methodology, history and culture, edited by 
Helge Ronning and Knut Lundby. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.: 287,297. 
147 Roger Ingebrigtsen, State Secretary, The Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs, 6th European 
Ministerial conference on mass media policy, Cracow, Poland, 15-16 June 2000, The Norwegian Ministry 
of Cultural Affairs website, accessed May 3 2001. 
1348 Subsidies have been important in sustaining the highest circulation press per capita in the world - 
almost twice that of Britain. This is for papers that come out more frequently than weeklies (The 
Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Media in Norway, The Norwegian Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
website, accessed May 3 2001). While newspaper readership has gone down in most countries, in Norway 
it has maintained its high level, or even slightly increased. This is despite regional radio and television and 
the advent of an Internet press, which could have been expected to make a larger impact in a society with 
many more isolated communities. Each household is estimated to read 1.65 newspapers a day. (Svennik 
Hr, yer, The Norwegian Press, The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, accessed May 4 2001.: 
1). 
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created and stood the test of time. 1349 The total number of newspapers also increased 
from 199 in 1972 to 218 in 1995.1350 Some medium-sized newspapers have folded! 351 
However, it has been estimated that if subsidies were abandoned, local competition and 
second newspapers would largely disappear. While there has been a process of 
concentration, analysis has shown that subsidies have slowed down this process. 1352 
JOURNALISTIC INFLUENCE IN EUROPE 
Similarly, across Europe, there are legal sanctions to provide for a measure of influence 
and protection of journalists, as have been considered by some in the British Labour 
Party. In Austria, in laws similar to those suggested by Ascherson and the social market 
proponents in Britain, journalists have ̀ freedom of opinion' so they can refuse to involve 
themselves in work that conflicts with their own personal views. Also, in Sweden, 
journalists can refuse to write stories that offend a code of conduct, although this right is 
based on collective negotiation, not law. 1353 
In Germany, in a more minimal version of calls by some in the Labour Party, journalists 
have been given some voice on editorial policy after company statutes were introduced. 
In the Netherlands, similar statutes are in collective labour agreements. In addition, in 
France, journalists and editors have rights to full severance benefits if they resign or are 
sacked when a publication's ownership changes. In Austria, journalists are paid 
severance pay if they leave a newspaper because its political direction shifts. However, a 
trans-national enquiry notes that stronger protection of journalistic independence is 
limited across Europe to specific newspapers. These are those owned at least partly by 
1349 Host, Sigurd. 1991. "The Norwegian newspaper system: structure and development. " in Media and 
communication : readings in methodology, history and culture, edited by Helge Ronning and Knut Lundby. 
Oslo: Norwegian University Press.: 296. - 
1350 Skogerbe: 110. It may not be clear that many of the new newspapers succeeded because of the subsidy 
system. This is implication of what is said about all the Scandinavian countries by Professor Gustafsson in 
his interview with Paul Murschetz. (Murschetz, Europe: 306). But the subsidies have provided important 
incentives for newspapers in this sector. (Skogerbe: 109-10). 
1351 Svennik Hoyer, The Norwegian Press, The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, accessed 
May42001.. 1. 
1352 Skogerbo: 109. 
1353 Humphreys, Western Europe: 108-9. 
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their workforce and/or by independent trusts, with their own editorial statutes, where 
shareholdings are widely spread by statute. The French newspapers Le Monde and 
Liberation are examples of newspapers part-owned and controlled by their employees. '354 
CONCLUSION 
So, to answer the question posed at the start, some of the solutions posed by those in the 
Labour Party have been shown to be practical when applied in other parts of Europe. It is 
true that no simple comparison can be made between proposals made in the British 
Labour Party and the practice of press subsidy in Sweden and Norway. For instance, it is 
a relevant question to consider if schemes for maintaining diversity can be directly 
compared with schemes to promoting it. It may well be that this Scandinavian approach 
would have come too late in Britain, for instance, where left newspapers like the Daily 
Herald had already gone to the wall and there was already a high. level of ownership 
concentration, for instance in the local press. This is an argument put forward by those, 
some connected with the Labour new left, calling for a more directly statist approach. 1355 
Nevertheless, for about 30 years, the operation of subsidies in the Scandinavian countries 
has shown that this kind of aid can work to maintain some diversity. Without it many 
newspapers, some providing an alternative point of view to the more profitable papers, 
would have gone under. Failures to sustain plurality may well have due to the absence of 
ownership legislation, which is now being rectified. This provides an important lesson for. 
Britain where any subsidies would have to be implemented in tandem with tighter 
ownership rules. There also may well have been problems, not least the diminution of a 
party press, which have brought the subsidies system into question. However, in Norway, 
at least, the subsidy system has provided for cultural diversity. And part of its strength is 
that it has aided the creation of a newspaper like Klassekampen, an example of a new 
political press not associated with the old party political and Labour movement 
newspapers. Meanwhile, proposals made in the Labour Party for some measure of 
1354 Humphreys, Western Europe: 108-9. 
1355 See Curran and Seaton.: 343. 
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democratic accountability for the press, by those who work in them, particularly of a 
social market variety, have echoed the schemes put into practice in Europe. However, 
greater participation has been limited to a few individual newspapers. 
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Appendix to Chapter 5: The CPBF And The Right of Reply 
The CPBF was influential in pushing an agenda for control of the press in the Labour 
Party in this period. Thus, there was now a movement demanding press democratic 
accountability, as well as diversity. 1356 Set up by the print unions, and officially launched 
at the 1980 TUC conference, its key activists were print workers. Curran remembers that 
those involved were from a layer below the leadership, different from those who 
represented the unions in Labour Party meetings. 1357 
The CPF/CBPF and the Labour Party were linked from the start of the campaign. The tie 
with the party went from the highest level to the grassroots. Party leader Michael Foot 
became a sponsor of the campaign in 1982 and donated money, although little seemed to 
be made of this. 1358 More than 100 constituency Labour parties affiliated to the campaign 
in its first year, according to its internal minutes. 1359 
A sizeable number of the 64 original sponsors were Labour MPs, including Roy - 
Hattersley, a former minister who had witnessed the scuppering of the Minority Report 
proposals at first hand. 1360 The original 13-person steering committee also included 
another similarly placed former minister, Michael Meacher. Others were long-time party 
media activist Curran and the two previously-mentioned Labour Weekly journalists, 
Frayman and Ross. 1361 Along with Curran, Meacher and Frayman were also convenors of 
the organisation's working groups and were seen as key representatives of the 
1356 People involved with it organised as a first conference one on ̀ Democratic Accountability in the 
Media'. Key support and involvement in the early stages of the campaign came from the printing union 
SOGAT. (CPF. 1981. National Committee Report to the 1981 Annual General Meeting, May 9 1981). it 
should be said that some print union leadership's support for trusts and co-operatives evaporated when it 
was perceived that such forms of organisation could threaten their own union's representation. (Jenkinson, 
Sal. 1981. ̀Co-operatives don't threaten trade unionism', Free Press, No. 9, September/October 1981, 
Owen O'Brien, `Correspondence to the CPBF from NATSOPA General Secretary Owen O'Brien' (internal 
correspondence)). We shall consider later a more notable example of this phenomenon. 
1357 Curran interview, Curran, Press Reformism: 49. 
1358 Anon. 1982.150,000 appeal boost', Free Press, No. 13, May/June 1982. 
1339 John Jennings, ̀CPF Secretary's Report to AGM 1982', April 1982: 5 (internal correspondence). 
1360 Richardson and Power: 209-10. 
1361 Richardson and Power: 209. 
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campaign. 1362 Curran and Harriet Harman were among those who spoke at campaign 
events, urging it to make the party a key focus of its work. 1363 Tom Baistow was also 
involved in the CPF. Indeed, by 1982, its secretary could report that, because many 
campaign members were involved in the study group: "... we've been able to work 
closely, if informally, with the Labour Party in the formulation of policy". '364 
A key campaign that the CPBF became associated with Labour was on the right of reply. 
It operated as an important link between the unions and Labour Party activists on this 
issue and other press ownership concerns at this time. The right of reply was a significant 
development in its own right and an illustration of this changing attitude to democratic 
involvement of those working in the press. More importantly, the struggle to get it on to 
the statute book was probably the most prominent campaign on press control in which the 
Labour Party was involved in this period. 
The Industrial Right of Reply 
The right of reply has not always been so clearly associated with democratic control of 
newspaper production. However, the industrial right of reply has that imprint. The 
industrial right of reply was the attempt by the unions to use their collective strength to 
affect the content of the press, and the media generally, which they produced. They did 
this in order to seek redress for those they saw as wronged by the papers involved. 
Overwhelming, those seen as ill-treated were fellow trade unionists. Mostly, the 
industrial right of reply took the form of using industrial muscle to seek a reply to an 
article regarded as inaccurate or biased. On occasion, it involved refusing to publish such 
an article, if threats of action failed. It had a history stretching back to 1926 when one of 
the catalysts for the General Strike was the refusal of Daily Mail machine assistants to 
print an attack on trade unionists. After the strike, the print workers agreed with owners 
that they would not sanction industrial action that interfered with editorial control. This 
held until 1970, when a cartoon satirising a 'typical trade unionist' was printed only after 
1362 Anon. 1980. ̀Press On', Free Press, No. 1, February 1980 and Free Press, No. 2, May 1980. 
1363 CPBF, ̀ Response to the Freedom Association' no date (internal correspondence). 
1364 John Jennings, 'CPF Secretary's Report to AGM 1982', April 1982: 5 (internal correspondence). 
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the Evening Standard management agreed to print a statement opposing it from all the 
Standard chapels. As one media activist put it: "For the first time in half a century, access 
to newspaper columns - and the unaccountability of multinational publishers - [had] ... 
become a real political issue for workers in Fleet Street "365 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a spate of instances when the printers 
used their power to secure a reply to newspaper coverage seen as slanted. Titles involved 
included the Daily Mail during the 1974 miners' strike; the Times in 1977; the Observer 
over a Freedom Association advertisement on the Grunwick dispute the same year; and 
the Daily Express in its coverage of the People's March for Jobs in 198 1.1366 The 
coverage of the health service workers' dispute was a high point for the industrial right of 
reply. In a bid to pre-empt poor coverage, the trade unions organised links between 
themselves and media unionists. The printing union, the NGA, pressurised Fleet Street 
managements with calls for industrial action. Fleet Street electricians went on a 24-hour 
strike in support of the health workers. The NGA secured unpaid advertisements in a 
number of titles supporting the health workers and backing the right of reply. At the 
Daily Mail, after the management refused to print a reply to an editorial criticising 
sympathy action by national newspaper workers, the title decided to print the editorial as 
a blank space. 1367 
When the study group discussed the right of reply, it reprinted it in full and considered 
the CPBF's pamphlet on this question in 1981. The campaign situated the right in this 
publication within the key themes we have been concerned with. The CPF saw it as a 
question of democratic control and community access. It was needed because the public 
had "... no control over what the papers say. Nor do we have any right of access to their 
columns. " 1368 
1365 Power, Mike. 1982. ̀Bandying words with the barons', New Socialist, November/December 1982. See 
also Allaun, Spreading the news: 48-9, Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, 'Right of Reply 
History' (internal document). 
'366 CPBF, Right of Reply. See also O'Malley and Soley: 129. 
1367 Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, ̀Right of Reply - History' (internal document), 
Richardson and Power: 199-200, Paul Routledge, 'Sparks fly over health dispute', Free Press, 
September/October 1982. See O'Malley and Soley: 80. 
136 RD754 Media Study Group Feb 1981 Campaign for Press Freedom, 'Right of Reply': 2. 
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At this stage in the right of reply's history, the campaign shared the view that the unions 
would impose this reply, rather than the state. The procedure the campaign envisaged was 
that if a group or individual published a ̀ story which distorts the facts', then they could 
write a succinct letter to the editor for publication. If this was unsuccessful, then the 
individual or group would make contact with the trade unionists employed on the title. It 
would then be up to the union to decide whether the case was "... sufficiently serious to 
merit a reply". If so, then the union would negotiate with the relevant employers. The 
nature of this would be up to the union, but it could include the union negotiating a 
comprehensive agreement for dealing with right of reply issues. If this was unsuccessful, 
then the campaign supported the union taking industrial action to achieve its goal. The 
point would not be for the union to censor offending copy but to publish a reply. 
But what would be the basis for a union right of reply? The CPBF suggested that this 
should be when the issue was of public importance and when the "bias or distortion" was 
seriously damaging. It saw the industrial right of reply's advantage explicitly in terms of 
democratic control and access. It encouraged "... trade unionists working [in] the 
newspaper industry to consider the content of the press and their own role in producing it; 
and to work out, by democratic means of discussion and decision-making, ways to 
compensate for [the] misuse of the press, and to extend access to it". '369 Thus, the 
campaign originally regarded the union as the democratic arbiter of a right of reply. 
In the period after 1979, the TUC shared a similar view. Its 1980 conference backed a 
right of reply motion, proposed by the NUJ and backed by the printing unions. It 
instructed the TUC's General Council to examine ways in which unions, particularly 
those in the media, could "... apply pressure on newspaper and broadcasting employers 
... ". This pressure would, among other things, ensure different opinions got a 
hearing; 
individuals were not subjected to victimisation because of bias; and a right of reply was 
1369 RD754: 6, See also Campaign for Press Freedom, ̀Right of Reply: a statement', Free Press No. 3. 
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secured for such victims. 1370 It is important to note that there was no mention of the 
Government or the courts being involved. Following this in 1981, the TUC General 
Council backed moves by unions to achieve a voluntary agreement with editors over a 
right of reply. 1371 Thus, in the years we are considering in this chapter and this appendix, 
the TUC and the CPF both supported the industrial right of reply. 
The Legal Right of Reply 
What is not so extensively chronicled in other accounts of the right of reply is the shift 
that took place from this to demands for a legal right of reply. 1372 In a shift to a less 
radical position, the Labour's NEC study group rejected the industrial right of reply in 
favour of a legal form of redress. 
The position it and other others espoused came to dominate Labour's thinking on the 
right of reply. As already indicated, the Labour Party had backed policy on this in 1975 
and again in 1979. However, rather than seeing the unions as the arbiter of this, it 
regarded the Press Council, an example of self-regulation by the newspaper industry, as 
the body which would be appropriate to uphold this. 1373 In this period, however, figures 
in the Labour Party lost faith in self-regulation. '374 
A majority of the party's Media Study Group were also uneasy about the power the 
industrial right of reply gave to the unions, however. Labour Party representation was one 
concern here. Study group members feared that hostile forces would not take kindly to 
Labour-supporting unions using industrial muscle to have input on what was printed. 1375 
1370 Trades Union Congress. Annual, Conference. 1981. Report of the 113rd annual Trades Union 
Congress. London: T. U. C., Anon. 1980. ̀Labour movement's "yes" to Campaign', Free Press 3,1980. It 
indicated its support for the Campaign for Press Freedom's right of reply campaign in the interim. 
1371 Trades Union, Congress. 1983. The Other side of the story: a TUC report on redress against abuses by 
the media. London: Trades Union Congress.: 8-9. 
1372 O'Malley and Soley and Allaun, Spreading the news. 
137 Labour Party, Conference 1975: 362,1979, Labour Party, Conference 1975: 383-4. 
1374 O'Malley and Soley: 72-83. 
375 NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 10'" meeting', 22 June 1981. In a book brought out under the 
name of the chair of the study group, Frank Allaun, who became a leading advocate of the legal right of 
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However, the press also opposed the legal recourse. Baistow notes that attempts to get a 
legal right of reply onto the statute book were "... universally savaged by the qualities as 
well as those populars that could spare the space to mention if 9.1376 Allaun attracted the 
wrath of the Sun, for instance. 1377 
Yet, in 1981, as the minutes put it, group members were more concerned that a union- 
based recourse "... would be more difficult to justify than a legal right and would attract 
more adverse comment". 1378 Indeed, Allaun and fellow study group member Michael 
Meacher later told the House of Commons that instituting a legal recourse was a way of 
avoiding an industrial right of reply being exercised. 1379 Study group members considered 
that the response of print workers in demanding redress "... would not necessarily be 
socialist'. 1380 
At its ninth meeting in May 1981, the media sub-committee viewed the position of the 
campaign, with its support for union action, as an `interim proposal' and started to look 
more sympathetically at a right of reply not based on the unions. 1381 By June, under 
pressure from Curran, who was disposed towards an industrial recourse, it agreed to 
include support for union action only as a "... step towards the implementation... " of the 
legal variant. 1382 This move was followed by the TUC. A 1983 pamphlet it produced on 
the question did not even mention the history of the industrial reply. It backed a legal 
solution. 1383 The CPBF, at first rather uneasily, also followed suit to seek a legal path. 1384 
reply, the unions' attempts to secure such a right were described as "... unsatisfactory and arbitrary... ", 
while recognising that they were effective. (Allaun, Spreading the news: 49). 
1376 Baistow, Tom, Geoffrey Sheridan, Mike Power, Press Campaign for, and Freedom Broadcasting. 1984. 
Labour daily? : ins and outs of a new labour daily and other media alternatives. London: Campaign for 
Press and Broadcasting Freedom.: 106. 
1377 It saw him spearheading a campaign "... orchestrated by Labour's backwoodsmen to shackle this 
country's free press". The paper viewed that "... his lunatic plans to force newspapers to allow what he 
grandly calls a ̀ right of reply' to aggrieved people... " gave Allaun the chance to "... let all the pent-up 
venom of his years as a political nonentity flood out". Quoted in O'Malley and Soley: 80. 
1378 NEC Media Study Group, `Minutes of the 10`'' meeting', 22 June 1981. 
1379 HOC 18 February 1983,573,617-8. 
1360 NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 4`h meeting', 20 November 1980. 
18' NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 9's meeting', 18 May 1981. 
1382 NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 10`h meeting', 22 June 1981. 
1383 TUC, Other side: 21. 
1384 By 1982, its national committee had endorsed the legal method "... in principle... ", but still wished to 
"... look more closely at the details of how this would apply and operate in practice. " A conference 
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Tom Baistow, who, as we have seen, was hostile to printing workers having a major input 
into press editorial decisions, championed a state solution within the study group. 1385 The 
idea of a legal right of reply was to protect ordinary people who were subject to untrue or 
distorted reports. It would cover those cases where people could not invoke libel laws 
either because the distortions did not involve libel or the plaintiffs could not afford to 
take this legal recourse. 1386 It gave individuals, firms or organisations the right to require 
a newspaper to print a reply to a factually inaccurate report of equal length and position 
as the original report. It would apply across both the press and broadcasting sectors. 
While, by this stage, it was clear that the group favoured a legal recourse, it was not so 
apparent what forum would oversee this. Instead, there were wrangles between the study 
group, the Home Policy committee, the Press and Publicity and the NEC, indicating the 
complications with a legal right of reply. 
In another example of policy transfer, the study group agreed that it should consider the 
experience of other countries. It would contact sister parties to assess how effective the 
laws applying in their countries had been. 1387 Most other countries that have considered a 
right of reply have gone down a legal statutory route. This is the case with France, West 
Germany, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxemburg and Spain. 1388 In order to assess 
what sort of media model is associated with a state right of reply, it is worth noting the 
diverse political colouration of the regimes that brought in these laws. It has included 
organised by the campaign felt the right of reply was not enough on its own. And one insider indicated later 
that year that "... sharp differences... " still existed within the campaign on the worth of this statist 
approach. (Jennings, Anon. 1982. `Does the `right of reply' campaign go far enough? ', Free Press, No. 13, 
May/June 1982, Power, Mike. 1982. `Bandying words with the barons', New Socialist, November/ 
December 1982). 
185 NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 6ý' meeting', 19 January 1981, RD 661 Tom Baistow, `The 
Right of Reply', RD 816 April 1981 Tom Baistow, ̀ The Rights of Reply/Media Study Group Right of 
Reply Draft', CPBF, Labour daily?: 106. 
139 CPBF, Labour daily?: 106. 
1387 NEC Media Study Group, `Minutes of the 7`h meeting', 16 February 1981, NEC Media Study Group, 
`Minutes of the 9`h meeting', 18 May 1981,. 
188 Dewall Gustaf, von. 1997. Press ethics : regulation and editorial practice. Dusseldorf: European 
Institute for the Media.: 21,37-8,55,63-4,104, Paraschos, Manny. 1998. Media law and regulation in the 
European Union : national, transnational, and U. S. perspectives. Ames, Iowa: State University Press.: 79- 
81, Allaun, Spreading the news: 75. 
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Christian Democrat and clerical, as well as Social Democratic, governments. 1389 This was 
a policy transfer that was regarded as politically acceptable, yet the question of proximity 
of values of the countries concerned was less of a factor. This was because the political 
identity of the governments that enacted the right of reply were much more variable. 
By its ninth meeting in May 1981, the study group agreed with Baistow's proposals for a 
legal right of reply, based on his assessment of other states. This provided the basis for 
the party's public position, published as a NEC statement on the right of reply. This 
document was another example of policy transfer, as experiences of states' reply 
legislation in France, West Germany and Denmark were outlined in some detail in the 
relatively short document. 1390 
However, the NEC did not directly follow the example from any of these countries to 
provide a forum for adjudicating on this reply. The study group agreed that legal 
tribunals, the composition of which would be finalised later, would enforce the new 
law. 1391 Yet, the Home Policy Committee, in October 1981, expressed its concern about 
courts being used to enforce these sanctions and had pressed for a specially-created 
independent ribunal to decide. 1392 The NEC finally agreed that the public position of the 
party would be, in effect, a fudge. Adjudication would either be by a court or an 
independent ribunal, with appeal to a High Court. However, whichever way the legal 
adjudicating entity was constituted, it would provide a legally enforceable decision. A 
minor injection of industrial democracy was also included. Either body could make 
decisions in consultation with working journalists, with a tribunal having a journalist on 
its committee. 1393 But an important point was that in either case this would be a state- 
sanctioned body, closely linked to the judicial system. 
1389 Dewall: 37-8,55,634,104, Paraschos: 79-81, Allaun, Spreading the news: 75, World Statesmen 
website (Europe), http: //www. geocities. com/bcahoon. geo/EUROPE. html 
1390 Statement by the National Executive Committee: The Right of Reply, Labour Party March 1982. The 
TUC replicated this policy transfer. (TUC, Other side: 18-9) 
1391 NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 9th meeting', 18 May 1981, Freedman, 2000: 182. 
1392 NEC Media Study Group, ̀ Minutes of the 12th meeting', 19 October 1981. 
. 1393 RD1084: National Executive Committee ̀ Right of Reply: Amendments to Draft Statement (RD: 1027)', 
Statement by the NEC. 
408 
The other details of the legal right of reply that were agreed in 1982 do not need to 
concern us in such detail. As a policy transfer, they explicitly borrowed most from the 
French model and would provide individuals and organisations with the right to reply 
when any media were inaccurate or had grossly distorted information. 1394 There would be 
the threat of a tribunal or court administering a £40,000 fine if this was not carried out 
within three days. 1395 These were outlined to the 1982 Labour Party conference. Allaun 
saw such measures not as a panacea, but as "... a first step towards democracy... " in the 
media. 1396 This position was reiterated in Labour's Programme 1982 and the demand for 
a legal right of reply, without all the details spelt out, made it into Labour's 1983 
manifesto. 
'397 
While in the process of being agreed as party policy, Allaun, with backing from the 
Labour front bench, introduced a Bill into the House of Commons in 1981 and 1982 to 
give a legal right of reply. With some support across the parties, it had similar provisions 
as that called for by Labour, with decisions to be made by a court. Allaun again presented 
it in December 1982 and it was given its second reading in February 1983 when it was, 
debated. Allaun cited the experience of legislation in other countries, which indicated 
it was as an example of policy transfer. 1399 The party's front bench rejected the voluntary 
approach provided by the Press Council. Shadow home secretary Roy Hattersley viewed 
the right of reply as essential as the British press was particularly polarised. 140° Another 
Labour member, Barry Sherman, saw such a reply as a chance for independent citizens to 
have a voice in the media. The absence of this was a "... big gap in our democracy ...... 
1401 
But there were still concerns from the Labour ranks regarding the role of the courts in the 
reply. On the one hand, Sherman could identify with the Bill as he was not for the power 
of the "... big trade unions... " -a legal right to reply had taken them out of the picture. 
1394 RD 1092 October 1981 Amendment from the Media Study Group to RD 1027. 
1395 Allaun, Spreading the news: 104. 
1396 Labour Party, Conference 1982: 240-3. 
1397 Ibid.: 214-5, Dale: 181. 
1398 HOC, Vol. 37,18 February 1983, col 527-636, O'Malley and Soley: 80-1. 
1399 Ibid. col. 574. 
14°° Ibid 586-7, O'Malley and Soley: 80-1. 
1401 IbicL col. 611. 
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But the media activist and MP Philip Whitehead preferred that a Swedish-style statute- 
backed ombudsman would adjudicate, rather than a court. He also wanted its introduction 
linked with a reduction in other state controls on the press as a "... quid pro quo". He saw 
it could be linked with a relaxation of the libel laws to give more protection to journalists 
in what they could report without prosecution. 1402 Both the CPF and the NUJ only 
supported the Bill with reservations at this stage. '403 
As it was, the Conservative government opposed it. It only attracted 90 votes, ten short of 
what it needed to go onto the next stage, as many Labour MPs did not bother to turn up 
for the vote. This indicated that, despite the intense interest of some, there was also 
apathy among Labour members concerning challenging the press and media in 
general. 
1404 
1402 Ibid. col. 602-3,605-6. 
1403 Jennings, O'Malley and Soley: 81, citing NUJ, 'Press Statement from Jonathan Hammond, president 
NUJ': London, NUJ, 17 February 1983. 
1404 HOC, Vol. 37,18 February 1983, col. 637, CPBF, Labour daily?: 106. 
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Questioning the right of reply 
Freedman, while discussing broadcasting policy, argues that the view that bias could be 
dealt with by the state was a retreat from the more radical stance in The people and the 
media that causes of bias could be tackled through restructuring the media itself. 
1405 As 
we have seen, this argument can be substantiated when it comes to press policy. 
However, the process is not entirely straightforward. It is certainly true, as we have 
indicated, that parliamentary attempts to introduce such legislation focused attention on 
the right of reply rather than other measures. Yet, the study group, the Home Policy 
committee and the NEC saw the right of reply as providing a short-term answer to what 
they saw as editorial bias. They were at pains to point out that it came as part of a 
package. At least during this period, it was not meant as a substitute for longer-term 
solutions, such as anti-monopoly measures and initiatives for more diverse ownership. 1406 
Nevertheless, these proposals on ownership were not as radical as those presented in The 
people and the media with regard to one area - democratic ownership. The industrial 
right of reply was a foray into that territory. In contrast, the adoption of a state tribunal as 
the method for achieving a reply could represent some sort of retreat, or at least a shift to 
the right, from one of its antecedents. It could represent a change to a more social 
democratic idea of a positive role for a beneficent impartial state than the industrial right 
of reply. The industrial variant implied a version of workers' control. 
A statement like this poses many questions. One is: can we consider a right of reply as a 
democratising measure? The answer, in part, depends on the forum deciding on it. From a 
democratic point of view, both industrial and legal approaches are an advance on the 
notion that the word of the proprietor and/or editor is law and there is no other forum to 
consider inaccuracies. However, both also represent only a limited advance. The first 
1405 Freedman, 2000: 183. This was also the view of the editor of the NUJ journal, Ron Knowles. (Anon. - 
1982. ̀Does the ̀ right of reply' campaign go far enough? ', Free Press, No. 13, May/June 1982). 
1406 RD 816 April 1981 Tom Baistow ̀ Media Study Group Right of Reply Draft', RD 1027 August 81 
Home Policy Committee Press and Publicity Committee, ̀The Right of Reply Draft NEC statement', RD 
1112 October 1981 Home Policy Committee, ̀Draft NEC statement', Statement by the NEC. Michael 
Meacher also expressed a similar view in the debate on the Right of Reply Bill in 1983. (HOC, Vol. 37,18 
February 1983, col. 616). 
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leaves the union as judge and jury. The latter just provides for an unelected judge or 
another court procedure. The democratic nature of that would be largely determined by 
how a tribunal was appointed or elected. Labour advocates' justifications for a legal 
solution were instructive in this regard. Allaun, as we have seen, regarded a union-based 
solution as arbitrary. This may have been so, but that indicated a more general ̀problem' 
of democracy - that of relying on people's will. In this case, it meant relying on the 
democratic will of the narrow, albeit significant, section of the population that actually 
produced the newspapers in question. To advocate using the courts was to rely on the 
state in one of its less democratically accountable forms. 
Nevertheless, an industrial right of reply also begs a number of questions. With it, it 
would be implicitly left up to the unions to assess if distortion had taken place and how 
serious it was. As was suggested, it could be argued that a union was a more democratic 
forum for discussing distortion than the minds of an unelected individual editor or of 
those in a newspaper's management. Yet, by arguing this, there is the danger of again 
substituting the worker for the community. 1407 More promising might have been an elected 
community press council. An obvious series of models for this could have been the now 
defunct community health councils. These were introduced partly to compensate for the lack of 
direct democracy within local NHS management. A similarity with what we are envisaging is 
that they played an advocacy role for complainants. However, a major difference is that 
members of these councils were not directly elected, but were appointed and mostly 
represented `professional' rather than ̀lay' opinion. 1408 
Another major problem for an industrial right of reply came with the unions. In order to seek a 
reply, they refused to print newspapers or particular articles. Even the CPF in its early days, 
based as it was on the unions, asserted in its 'official' history that the right of reply was not 
censorship and it did "... not favour 'blacking' copy... ". However, it was perhaps less clear when 
1407 One answer to this, which still betrayed these workerist tendencies was put forward by the editor of the 
CPBF's journal, Geoffrey Sheridan, called for a ̀ workers press council' based at a local level around trades 
councils and the wider community to monitor the press and demand the right of reply. This suggestion 
would have prioritised one section of the citizenry, around trades councils, over others. (Sheridan, Geoffrey 
`Workers' press councils the answer', Free Press 3). 
1408 Boaden, Noel. 1982. Public Participation in Local Services. Harlow: Longman: 120-6. 
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asserting that the principle did not "... intend to interfere with the normal autonomy of 
editors". 1409 What needed to be explained here was the definition of'normal'. The autonomy of 
editors was being challenged. The challenge was to the ability of editors, and those companies 
to which they were responsible, to print what they wished without redress. As for Labour's 
legal redress, Allaun views the experience in other countries was one where laws did not put 
excessive pressure on editors but promoted "... self-regulation... ". '41° 
A further difficulty has also been with the definition of what should constitute grounds for a 
right of reply. Both Labour's official position on a right of reply and the industrial variant went 
beyond simply targeting inaccurate reporting. The official NEC and party stance was that there 
would be the opportunity for legal redress when the media, including the press, had grossly - 
distorted information - in other words, when it was biased. 
' 411 It might be considered that this 
would be difficult to implement, as distortion would be difficult to measure. Unless distortion 
was very clearly defined, it could be argued that a danger was that partisan journalism would be 
a target of a right of reply. Indeed, a similar point was made by one media-owning 
Conservative MP - who much later would have cause to regret his dealings with the press - in 
the course of the Commons debate on such a reply. Jonathan Aitken argued that a difference 
with the West German right of reply, and a reason why there were few attempts to secure 
redress in that country, was that that nation's laws did not confuse misrepresentation with 
factual inaccuracy. Replies were only available based on factual inaccuracy. 1412 
On this point, if one compares the grounds for a right of reply with other national laws, 
this is indeed instructive. It is the case that the state laws in countries such as Belgium, 
West Germany and Denmark have only permitted a right of reply for inaccuracies, not 
biases. 1413 However, the laws in countries such as France and Italy have entertained a 
wider definition of when a reply can be sought than factual error or even proven 
1409 Richardson and Power: 199. 
1410 Allaun, Spreading the news: 104. 
14ý 1RD 816 April 1981 Tom Baistow ̀ Media Study Group Right of Reply Draft', RD 1027, RD 1112, 
Statement by the NEC. 
1412 HOC, Vol. 37,18 February 1983, col. 609. 
1413 Paraschos: 79-80, Dewall: 21,63-4. 
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damage. 1414 Indeed, in Luxembourg, the law has provided no definition of the type of 
offence open to reply in the act. Thus, even those who are praised in articles are 
theoretically open to a right of reply. '415 As we have seen, it was the French law of 1881 
that the Labour Party's position was most clearly based on. There, it does not matter 
whether the article is not correct or defamatory for a right of reply to be legally 
sought. 1416 Nevertheless, it is claimed that this has not impaired the ability of reporters to 
do their job. One commentator, writing for an organisation that promotes journalistic 
freedom, considers that the law is widely accepted by journalists and it has not had a 
"chilling effect' 'on reporting. 1417 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the fuller expression of Labour's Position in 
Labour's Programme 1992 considered that the right of reply would explicitly tackle 
biased press reports by using the law and fining editors. It was thought the legislation 
would "... mitigate the worst effects of editorial bias... ". 1418 Now, this might mean that 
politically influenced information would be excluded, as it would be seen as biased. This 
would cut across any aim of promoting political diversity in the press and would seem to 
be a major state intrusion into newspapers' operation. Alternatively, it could be that a 
sizeable amount of what some would see as biased would not be regarded as such by the 
courts. In such a situation, the assertion in, Labour's Programme would be inaccurate. In 
other words, either the right of reply would be ineffective in countering bias or it would 
be heavily intrusive. Also, it is hard to see the logic of targeting the individual editor 
rather than the group s/he was working for. 
A final question mark hanging over the legal right of reply is that it could be used to stifle 
investigative reporting. The left journalist Paul Foot rejected it, as it would hamper his 
work. Foot viewed that it would provide an impediment to investigating the powerful, 
1414 Dewall: 21,37-8,104, Paraschos: 79-81, Roger Errera, `Press Law in France', in Article 19.1993. 
Press law and practice :a comparative study of press freedom in European and other democracies. New 
York: Article 19.: 68. 
1415 Paraschos: 81 
1416 Dewall: 37-8. Errera: 68. 
1417 Errera: 68. 
1418 Labour, Party. 1992. Labour's programme for Britain: annual conference, 1992. London: Labour 
Party.: 214-5. 
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who would use such laws to erase the few criticisms he has been able to make of them in 
his work. One indeed would imagine that it would leave a publication like Foot's Private 
Eye magazine open to being filled with as many replies as original articles. In responding 
to this criticism, Allaun, for example, has little answer, beyond asserting that the right of 
reply is not a panacea. 1419 A more sophisticated defence came from a then prominent . 
CPBF member and printer Mike Power. He seemed to view that Foot's central thrust was 
a criticism of reformism: "Paul Foot's main point is that the campaign for a legal right of 
reply attempts to create balance in a class-driven society where none can possibly exist. 
That hopeless position can be applied to any effort to change or introduce new laws. "1420 
If considered in the sense of reformism, the point is well made. However, a question over 
the right of reply which the debate on investigative journalism points to, is not that a legal 
right of reply fails in an attempt to provide balance in society, but that it does not attempt 
to do so. Instead, it narrowly focuses on the question of balance in one sector - the media 
- without necessarily considering the effect of this on society as a whole. 
So, an argument that has been made for a legal right of reply is that it is a way for 
ordinary people to achieve a reply in the media in a society where the rich and powerful 
"... have PR minders to ensure their right of reply". 1421 However, there is little to say that 
these same PR people would not exploit this legal right. One can envisage a new cottage 
industry among public relations officers whose job it would be to provide replies 
whenever an article challenging to business or other organisations was made in a 
newspaper. The threat of a percentage of the title being given over to these replies could 
well enhance the reluctance of press owners and editors to sanction any investigative 
reporting. An indication of how it could be employed was that one Conservative sponsor 
of Allaun's Bill backed it because it would give the right of reply to businesses that felt 
they were unfairly treated in the media. He gave the example of one firm that had gone 
downhill after it felt that it had been dealt with badly in a broadcast report. Although it 
1419 Allaun, Spreading the news: 93-4,104. 
1420 P Foot, ̀ Paul Foot on right of reply' Free Press No. 26, M. Power, What are we going to do about Paul 
Foot? ', Free Press, No. 27, January/February 1985, quoted in O'Malley and Soley: 84. 
1421 CPBF, Labour daily? 
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was not clear that the report was inaccurate, it was seen to be sensational. In the mind of 
the MP, this was enough for the firm to be able to secure a full right of reply. 1422 
Thus, it can be seen that if the idea of a right of reply is to challenge or redress power, 
then its effect needs to be considered in relation to society as a whole. The- press owners 
and their interconnected interests are not the only power. The question is not whether a 
right of reply provides a balance in society, but whether it further imbalances it. This 
discussion is related to that of journalistic autonomy and the relationship of the 
institutional power of the press and propreitors to the power of capital as a whole and the 
power resources at capital's disposal. The debate is whether, while enhancing community 
control of the press, a right of reply also strengthens corporate control of it. 
1422 HOC, Vol. 37,18 February 1983, col. 609: 618-9. 
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 6: The New Press and Media Strategy 
At the start of the Kinnock years, there was some agreement between the leadership and 
the rest of the Labour Party about how to deal with press bias. There was support for 
measures to bring diversity at all levels. There was also hostility to working with the 
Conservative newspapers, even before the fallout from the Wapping dispute. In 1984, for 
example, deputy leader Roy Hattersley announced that it was not worth the party working 
with the Sun, Mail, Express and Telegraph. Hattersley told the Guild of British 
Newspaper Editors' annual conference in April 1984: "The day has gone when you can 
excoriate an MP one day and hope for his cooperation with a human interest story on the 
next. " 1423 
Yet, as we saw, during Kinnock's time as leader, the demand for diversity had started to 
change. It became considered less important for getting a fair deal and was seen by some 
as counterproductive. How could you get the press on your side if you were challenging 
its ownership? The MP Austin Mitchell, as we saw in this chapter, publicly voiced this 
conundrum. The Labour hierarchy started to place little stress on structurally changing 
newspaper ownership and demands on this score became less radical. 
The News on Sunday's collapse provided another watershed. A title that was seen to be in 
the Labour movement press tradition had failed. The Labour leadership and its officials 
had been involved in its formation. Only those on the left saw this as a failure of 
Government policy. 1424 Instead, it was merely another confirmation that the goal of a 
Labour movement press, which had had its highpoint with the McCarthy Report, was 
fading. For some, this reinforced the view that there needed to be more emphasis placed 
on other methods to get a fairer view of the Labour Party in the press. Both the Labour 
Party and the trade union movement felt this. As a senior TUC official told the author, the 
failure to set up a Labour movement newspaper provided a major reason why the 
1423 Anon. 1984. ̀Hattersley flays the bias of Fleet Street', Free Press 23, May 1984. 
1424 Allaun, Spreading the news: 62. 
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momentum which had led to the setting up of the TUC's Media Working Group had 
"... more or less run its course". 
1425 
Also, journalism's changing structure was important. A significant and ironic shift came 
with the Wapping move and the assertion of employer power over journalists, as 
indicated by disputes such as Pergamon, mentioned in the chapter. Bottom line pressure 
has cut the number of journalists. Tunstall notes that national newspaper journalists' 
workload increased significantly from the 1960s to the 1990s. 1426 The irony of this was 
that as Labour policies to challenge this example of employer power faded into the 
background, so the new techniques to challenge bias through the new media techniques 
became potentially more effective. As employers cut journalist numbers, there was a 
premium on getting stories with minimum effort and time. At the same time, the PR 
industry's influence strengthened dramatically. Britain has not been unique in 
experiencing this. One expert has estimated that there are 20,000 more PR agents than 
journalists in the US. 1427 So, Labour strategies to provide journalists with more accessible 
and effective copy, in order to counteract bias, pushed at an open door. 
As has been implied, this idea of trying to influence the press was not new in the party. 
Wring notes that Labour formed its Press and Publicity department in 1917.1428 Yet, the 
perceived media bias in the 1920s and 1930s, especially in print, had led Labour to 
develop . other political communication methods. 
1429 There was a professionalisation of 
campaigning following World War Two. In fact, Clement Attlee appointed the first full- 
time Downing Street press secretary in 1945.1430 The 1950s saw Labour's media 
campaigning develop, with the advent of widespread television broadcasting. Labour 
1425 Mike Smith, interview with author, October 1 2002. 
1426 It is difficult to accurately calculate by how much, however. (Tunstall, Newspaper power: 136,137). 
'427 McChesney, Corporate media: 25-6, citing Stauber John, C., and Sheldon Rampton. 1995. Toxic sludge 
is good for you : lies, damn lies, and the public relations industry. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press. 
142 Wring, Political marketing and organisational development: 4. 
1429 Although the 1918 election saw some impartiality, this was short-lived. The Daily Mail's notorious 
Zinoviev letter which claimed Bolshevik support for Labour prior to the 1924 election dealt a bitter blow 
MacDonald's minority government, which went down to defeat. This contributed to a hostility to the press, 
the existence of which provided a barrier to the promotion of Labour policy other means for promotion. 
(Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 64-5). 




introduced what has been identified as the `persuasional' schema, where the media was 
targeted. Nascent spin doctors pursued sympathetic journalists. 1431 Wilson was an acute 
practitioner of that approach, with loyal lieutenants such as Gerald Kaufman and Joe 
Haines. As we saw, this approach had fallen into disrepute after the 1970 election failure. 
By 1983, there was a pressure to deal with the press by reverting to a reinforced 
persuasional stance. An indication that some of those who previously sought other 
methods of Labour representation now backed this strategy was that one of the Minority 
Report's co-authors led this new approach. David Basnett successfully proposed to the 
1983 conference that a Campaign Strategy Committee to professionalise party 
campaigning be set up following the election defeat. He saw that there was a need for 
"... greater professionalism in handling the media... ", as part of an organisational 
revamp. '432 The 1983 conference also saw the MP Joe Ashton inform delegates that what 
was needed was to use the press and media, as the SDP and the Liberals had done in that 
year's election. '433 He implied this was a better strategy than changing it. Ashton 
indicated that Labour was concentrating on developing policy rather than getting it 
across. 1434 
The new leader could justify going in this direction by pointing to Labour's performance 
in the 1983 election campaign, where, as indicated, the preparation was chaotic. 1435 As 
indicated, importantly, this was seen to be a product of left scepticism about political 
1431 Wring, Dominic. 1995. "Soundbites versus socialism: The changing campaign philosophy of the British 
Labour Party. " Javnost 4: 59-68. 
1432 Labour Party, Conference 1983: 36, Shaw, 1979: 54 and Wring, Political marketing and the Labour 
Party: 159. 
1433 Former engineer Joe Ashton has been an MP since 1968. Ile was a newspaper columnist for, variously, 
the Daily Star, the Sunday People, the Sheffield Star and Labour Weekly for most of the period from 1970 
until 1988. He was Labour spokesman on energy from 1979-1981. (2001. {Vho's who : an annual 
biographical dictionary. London: A&C Black.: 65). 
1434 Labour Party, Conference. 1983. Report of the annual conference of the Labour Party. London: Labour 
Party.: 208-9. 
1433 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 46, Hattersley, no goes home?: 241-2, Heffernan and Marqusee: 
29-30, Harris, Robert. 1984. The making of Neil Kinnock. London: Faber.: 203, Franklin, Packaging 
politics: 132, Butler, David, and Dennis Kavanagh. 1984. The British general election of 1983. London: 
Macmillan.: 275-7. For instance, the head of Press, Publicity and Advertising was only first appointed at 
the start of 1983 and just one of three press officer posts had been filled by the start of the campaign. 
(Franklin, Packaging politics: 132, Heffernan and Marqusee: 30). 
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communication techniques. '436 There were, however, other reasons for the disarray. It 
has also been noted that the trade union right and Shadow Cabinet, who dominated the 
1983 campaign, refused to promote the policies agreed by the party, leading to chaos. '437 
One party official sees that right-wing-dominated campaign did not play to Foot's 
strengths. 1438 Nevertheless, in an already media-saturated age, it is true that Foot was a 
poor television performer. '439 
Accounts of those involved have emphasised the view that Kinnock and his advisers 
shared the concern that the campaign had been poor and saw a problem of 
professionalism. According to insiders, a BBC Panorama programme, The Marketing of 
Margaret, profoundly influenced them to do the same for Labour. Broadcast soon after 
the election, this contrasted the professionalism of the Labour and Conservative 
campaigns. 1440 
The new strategy, centralisation and the SCA 
More importantly, though, in a sense, Kinnock shared the view that there had been a 
problem of a weak leadership, in hostage to more powerful forces. However, he did not 
regard the trade union right and the Shadow Cabinet as the malign forces. Rather, he 
blamed the activist membership, especially its left, as we have seen. 
As such, the renewed development of a media focus was both important in itself and a 
significant part of the organisational changes to distance policymaking from influence by 
the party membership. It was part of the start of a new centralisation process, which we 
referred to at the start of Chapter 5. Power was concentrated in the hands of the 
1436 Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 144-5, Shaw, 1979: 26. 
143 Heffernan and Marqusee, Wainwright, Hilary. 1987. Labour :a tale of two parties. London: Hogarth. 
1439 "There was a general feeling of complacency. There was a feeling of not caring just as long as you got 
the right wing back in control. " (Tricia Sumner interview, February 6 2002). 
1439 Shaw, 1979: 26, Butler, David, and Dennis Kavanagh. 1984. The British general election of 1983. 
London: Macmillan.: 271-2. 
1440 Interview with John Underwood, former Labour Party Director of Communications, in Philo, Greg. 
1993. 'Political Advertising, Popular Belief and the 1992 British General Election' in Media, Culture and 
Society 15: 3, July: 407-418: 410, Gould, The unfinished revolution: 292, Wring, Political marketing and 
the Labour Party: 153-5. 
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leadership, at the expense of the activists and the NEC. This press and media strategy 
provided an integral part of this process, which went beyond answering any problems of 
political communication in the previous election. In this, Kinnock mirrored the advice 
given to him by the LCC executive. This called on the leadership to restructure Labour's 
`management structures' as part of this newly reinvigorated media focus and identified 
concerns with the NEC's role. 1441 The party leadership and officials sought to utilise the 
press and the media to present information to potential supporters. It also employed 
sophisticated research techniques to gauge public opinion. '442 
As Wring indicates, many of the political communication changes that came after 1983 
did not concern Labour's relationship with the press. He emphasises that a continuity 
existed with the media and marketing strategy which operated since 1945, where Labour 
employed professional marketing consultants, with relative degrees of sophistication. But 
this strategy had been stifled by the 1970s. As he indicates, many of changes were not 
about press promotion, they were about transforming the party to appeal to what the 
leadership and the strategists considered were the electorate's views. 1443 We shall 
consider this aspect in a moment. 
Under the guise of injecting professionalism, but also strengthening leadership power, the 
Campaign Strategy Committee was instituted in 1983 and then press and media 
presentation and campaigning were brought together into a new Campaigns and 
Communications Directorate (CCD) in 1985, responsible to the leader's office)444 Peter 
Mandelson, who had been a television producer on the programme Weekend World, was 
appointed the CCD's first director in 1985.1445 
1441 Paul Convery, 'Letter to NEC Members', no date, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archive. 
1442 Taylor Gerald, R. 1997. Labour's renewal? : the policy review and beyond Basingstoke: Macmillan.: 
12, Shaw, 1979: Shaw, 1945, Seyd, Patrick, and Paul Whiteley. 1992. Labour's grass roots : the politics o, r 
party membership. Oxford: Clarendon Press.. 
443 Wring, Political marketing and organisational development. 13. 
1444 As Wring argues, the CSC was another example of the "... myriad of bodies that collectively diluted the 
authority of the once hegemonic National Executive". (Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 
161). 
144' Hughes and Wintour: 53, Paul Webb, ̀ Britain: The 1987 Campaign' in Farrell David, M., and Shaun 
Bowler. 1992. Electoral strategies and political marketing. lloundmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire [England] 
; New York: Macmillan Press : St. Martin's Press.: 50, McSmith, Andy. 1996. Faces of Labour: the inside 
story. London: Verso.: 255. 
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Mandelson's appointment saw a more sophisticated media centred strategic orientation 
compared to what had gone before. 1446 Mandelson indicated how powerful he saw his 
post by how he defined his role. It included "... deciding what we say, how we say it and 
which spokesmen and women we choose to say it". 14aß 
Under Mandelson, the Shadow Communications Agency (SCA) was instituted. Self- 
styled 'marketing and PR expert Philip Gould coordinated it. Mandelson oversaw 
presentation to the media while Gould busied himself with interpreting voter 
preferences. 1448 Gould reported to Mandelson who amplified Gould's diagnosis and 
evaluations. 1449 The SCA liaised predominantly with the Leader's Office, largely with 
Kinnock's press secretary Patricia Hewitt and his chief of staff, Charles Clarke, as well as 
MORI pollsters. '450 By 1986, the Campaign Management Team oversaw campaigning. It 
included Hewitt, Clarke and party general secretary Larry Whitty. 1451 This structure 
weakened the NEC's influence. 
Gould is among those who credit themselves with suggesting the SCA's formation. 1452 
But it is worthwhile noting that the LCC's original suggestion, included in Kinnock's 
private papers, advised employing the team behind the GLC campaign, who, indeed, 
became of the core of its personnel. 1453 
1446 Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 209. 
1447 Franklin, Packaging politics. 
1448 Panitch and Leys: 221, Gould, The unfinished revolution, Shaw, 1979. 
1449 Hughes and Wintour: 54. 
1450 Charles Clarke was a former president of the National Union of Students who headed the leader's 
office through all Kinnock's years as leader. He then became the chief executive of consultancy firm 
Quality Public Affairs before being elected an MP in 1997. He was appointed Minister of State in the 
Home Office in 1999. (2002. Who's who 2002: an annual biographical dictionary. London: A. & C. 
Black.: 407 and 2000. Dod's parliamentary companion 2001: 168th year. London: Vacher Dod.: 120). 
1451 Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives, Shaw, 1979: 62, Minkin, Contentious alliance: 415, 
419. 
1452 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 55. 
1453 Paul Convery, 'Letter to NEC Members', no date, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
SCA ̀ Management Group meeting minutes', April 29 1986, Hughes and Wintour: 55, Shaw, 1979: 57, 
McSmith, Faces: 246. For a description of the GLC's advertising campaign see Korner, J. 1985, Selling 
The GLC: The Anti-Abolition Campaign, BA dissertation, Polytechnic of Central London. 
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The SCA also included a sub-group of volunteer newspaper and magazine journalists 
sympathetic to Labour. '454 It regarded targeting the press as a key part of its work. Soon 
after being employed, Gould conducted a ̀ Communications Review'. He concluded that 
the "... main medium of communication for key target groups appears to be tabloid 
newspapers. " Targeting the media, including the press, provided the most low cost/high 
coverage form of political promotion. '455 
The period from the mid-1980s saw Labour targeting the agenda-setting mass media. 
This was a central feature of the market-led strategy. '456 The press was particularly 
important because of agenda-setting. Mirroring an influential concept in media research, 
the SCA publicly opined that: "Political advertising is too weak a tool to change people's 
minds. What it can do is influence what is on people's minds - and it is the Political 
agenda which largely determines the election outcome. " The SCA strategists believed 
that voters' opinions were not easily modified. Reflecting a marketised consumer theory 
of voting, they saw that electors identified with Labour on some issues and the 
Conservatives on others. Thus, SCA believed the party should emphasise in 
communications those issues on which it had policies that accorded with the popular 
sentiment, such as health. 1457 
The strategists considered that issues that the media, particularly television, covered most 
extensively most powerfully reinforced the voters' agenda. Therefore, setting the agenda 
meant influencing television programmes' agendas to cover the issues most positively 
associated with the party. Thus the emphasis, as Gould put it in his first report, should be 
1454 SCA, `Summary of Work in Progress: 25 March 1986', Kinnock private papers, Hughes and Wintour: 
58, Anderson and Mann: 364. Eric Shaw indicates that the print journalists, together with the broadcasters 
were little involved in the SCA in the latter period of Kinnock's reign, indicating the bias of the SCA 
towards advertising experts. (Shaw, 1979: 215-6). 
pass Philip Gould, 'Communications Review' December 22 1985,15,48, Neil Kinnock personal papers, 
Churchill Archives. 
1456 Wring, Political marketing and organisational development: 13,16. 
457 Gould, P. et at, `The Labour Party's campaign communications' in Crewe, Ivor, and Martin Harrop. 
1989. Political communications : the general election campaign of 1987. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.: 73, Shaw, 1979: 60-1, Franklin, Packaging politics: 135. See also Gould, The unfinished 
revolution: 314, Harrop, M. `Voters' in Seaton, Jean, and Ben Pimlott. 1987. The media in British politics. 
Aldershot ; Aldershot: Avebury: Dartmouth.: 61, Miller William, L. 1990. How voters change : the 1987 
British election campaign in perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.: 204-7. 
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to shift the "... campaigning emphasis from grass roots opinion forming to influencing 
opinion through the mass media". 1458 
How does the press come into this? Strategists believed that the newspapers' agenda 
would, in turn, affect the political agenda of the broadcasters. Thus Mandelson, 
particularly, developed a series of contacts in the broadsheet press, among lobby and 
political correspondents. 1459 It is said he employed a particular combination of threats and 
flattery towards them. 1460 
News International/News Corporation and the revamped strategy 
An important point to note was that there was a particular tension in the press and media 
strategy with regard to some newspapers. This provides a contrast with the period after 
1992. This was a by-product of the Wapping dispute. Rather than using the dispute as an 
opportunity to develop policy that would actually challenge the press firms' power, 
including that of News International, Labour concentrated its action on a boycott of the 
Murdoch-owned titles. This may well have been an effective consciousness-raising 
exercise and probably dented News International's profits. Yet, it did not follow that the 
Labour leaders significantly raised the profile of its policy on diversity or democratic 
ownership of newspapers, or reopened debate on it. Instead, the pressure was for the 
Labour and trade union movement to boycott speaking to News International journalists. 
This was an understandable reaction and showed a willingness to show solidarity with the 
sacked printers. However, in retrospect, it was counterproductive in dealing with the 
problem of press bias. It would have had an even more negative effect if it had been 
applied rigorously. The fact that it wasn't indicated the problems with the policy in 
regard to this new press and media strategy. 
1458 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 56, Hughes and Wintour: 52, quoted in Shaw, 1979: 61 and Seyd and 
Whiteley: 207, Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 172. 
1459 Shaw, 1979: 62, Heffernan and Marqusee: 212. 
140 Anderson and Mann: 365-6, Gould, B. 1995. Goodbye to all that. London: Macmillan.: 217, Hughes 
and Wintour: 183. 
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Kinnock at first questioned the ban on News International journalists. 1461 But the NEC, 
after calls from the print unions and the NUJ, agreed unanimously to a boycott motion. It 
could have been argued that the motion was ambiguously worded, merely calling for a 
boycott of the News International newspapers. 1462 However, it was taken to mean that 
Labour barred journalists interviewing or receiving information from party members. 
This move was counterproductive. The Labour Party excluded papers from which 
publicity was needed, whatever the level of bias. It laid Kinnock open to accusations that, 
by withholding information, the party was inhibiting press freedom and undermining the 
democratic process. 1463 One counterproductive effect of the bar was that the Westminster 
journalist lobby, decided to not allow Kinnock to lobby meetings. This was because 
Kinnock refused to answer questions from News International lobby correspondents. The 
correspondents would not agree on the restrictions on their members, rather than back the 
sacked print workers. 1464 Instead, Kinnock decided to hold a weekly conference in his 
Commons' offices to which News International journalists were not invited. ' 465 Eileen 
Jones argues that a by-product of this arrangement was that Kinnock controlled contacts 
with individual political journalists more directly. 1466 Thus, the policy's side effect was to 
encourage the idea that particular journalists could be cultivated. 
These tensions and difficulties with the boycott came to a head during the Fulham by- 
election. The candidate Nick Raynsford made clear that he was going to answer questions 
from all journalists. 1467 The leaders' office also privately urged Kinnock to tell the unions 
1461 Jones, Eileen. 1994. Neil Kinnock. London: Robert Hale.: 80-1, Benn, The end of an era: 438. 
1462 National Executive Committee, ̀Dispute with News International: Resolution adopted by NEC', 
January 29 1986, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
1463 Littleton Suellen, M. 1992. The Wapping dispute : an examination of the conflict and its impact on the 
national newspaper industry. Aldershot ; Brookfield, USA: Avebury.: 83 
1464 Neil Kinnock, letter to Chris Moncrieff, January 29 1986, Chris Moncrieff, letter to Neil Kinnock, 
January 29 1986, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives, Benn, The end of an era: 438, Jones, 
Kinnock: 80-1, Littleton: 82-3. 
1465 Neil Kinnock, letter to Chris Moncrieff, January 29 1986, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill 
Archives, Benn, The end of an era: 438, Jones, Kinnock: 80-1, Littleton: 82-3. 
1466 Jones, Kinnock: 80-81. 
1467 Nick Raynsford was elected MP for Fulham in 1986. He had been director of the London Housing Aid 
Centre before becoming an MP. He has been Minister for Housing and Minster for Local Government since 1987. (2000. Dod's parliamentary companion 2001: 168th year. London: Vacher Dod.: 270, Roth, 
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that he would not to impose the boycott during the election. As was noted, if there was a 
boycott it would have "... utterly dominated... " the election coverage. The leader would 
have had to call on the candidate to publicly repudiate his position. Not only would News 
International journalists have needed to be physically barred from entering press 
conferences, the leader's office raised the spectre that other journalists would refuse 
attend `in solidarity'. 1468 Instead, Kinnock's office proposed that all journalists should be 
admitted to press conferences "... however much we dislike it. ". However, the News 
International journalists would not be given `exclusive' interviews. 1469 This compromised 
boycott was publicly observed for the remainder of the dispute. 
Kinnock was personally reluctant to curry favour particularly with the News International 
tabloids, along with the other titles hostile to Labour, for the rest of the time he was 
leader. Alastair Campbell later described that Kinnock had a different fatalistic view of 
the press to his. Campbell also did not want to challenge press structures, but to build 
even more positive relations with them than Kinnock felt able to do. "It was one of the 
things I used to argue with Neil about - and I completely understand why he found it 
difficult because they were complete bastards to him - but I held the view that, however 
bad the press is, it can be worse, and it can be better, and you have to work at it all the 
time. "1470 
However, as it was, some key Labour figures maintained contact with News 
International, viewing the ban as counterproductive. The then Sunday Times editor says 
that Mandelson was one. Another who was said to have kept the lines of communication 
open during the dispute was a little-known Labour politician by the name of Tony 
Blair. 1471 Blair, in fact, a little later, cemented this early relationship by making The 
Andrew, and Byron Criddle. 2000.1997-2002 parliamentary profiles. London: Parliamentary Profiles.: 
1793-6). 
1468 Private correspondence from the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, ̀ 15.45: Meeting with unions re 
Fulham', no date, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
'469 In selling this to the unions, Kinnock was advised: "... you could save this to placate them: no special 
facilities - eg exclusive interviews/photo sessions - to be given to Murdoch journalists. " (Private 
correspondence from the Office of the Leader of the Opposition, ̀ 15.45: Meeting with unions re Fulham', 
no date, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives). 
1470 Interview with Philip Gould in Gould, The unfinished revolution: 214. 
1471 Neil: 161. 
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Times his sounding board. His articles formed a regular column more or less every 
fortnight for a period in the late 1980s. 1472 A leading member of Kinnock's office even 
went behind the leader's back to contact Fortress Wapping. As Kinnock's chief of staff 
Charles Clarke recalls: "I remember I went to see Kelvin MacKenzie at Wapping in 
January 1992. It's the only thing I ever did without telling Neil beforehand. 991473 
Nevertheless, it is important to note, for all the new aspects of the press and media 
strategy, Labour still regarded News Corporation as a breed apart. 
Leaders: seeking press approval and bolstering the leadership 
Nevertheless, with this revamped press and media focus, those close to the revamped 
strategy measured the success of campaigns by the manner with which the press and 
media treated them. An early notable example of this was the 1986 Freedom and Fairness 
campaign. Launched with advertising-style ̀ razzmatazz' and using innovative audio- 
visual techniques, it yielded a press incomparable for years. '474 In the days after its 
launch, praise came from perhaps more expected quarters such as the Guardian and The 
Observer. But it also came from less likely newspapers - the Financial Times, the 
Evening Standard and the Economist. 1475 This was indeed significant. But Philip Gould 
and supportive commentators accorded these plaudits with a particular importance. They 
regarded them as the judge of Labour's electability. 1476 Editors and journalists "... were 
treated as the arbiters of what it was sensible for the party to advocate, in a way that ever, 
National Executive members were not". 1477 Yet, this appeared to be a two-way process. 
The applause for campaigns such as this could well have come, in part, because it showed 
that Labour had acknowledged the press's importance and influence. 's1S 
1472 Rentoul, John. 1995. Tony Blair. London: Little Brown and Co.: 183,185,191. 
1473 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 112. 
1474 Shaw, 1979: 71. 
1475 Leader. 1986. 'The package has come a long way', Guardian, April 23 1986, Leader. 1986. ̀Labour 
starts to get its act together', Observer, April 27 1986, Leader. 1986. ̀Mr Kinnock's new party', Financial 
Times, April23 1986, Leader. 1986. 'Smile please', Evening Standard, April23 1986, Leader. 1986. 
Economist, April 26 1986. 
1476 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 60-1, Hughes and Wintour. 56-7. 
1477 Panitch and Leys: 221. 
1479 Heffernan and Marqusee: 207. 
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Also, along with what Wring emphasises, the renewed press and media focus was among 
the factors that put a premium on the leadership. This conveniently dovetailed with 
Kinnock's determination to assert leadership autonomy. Labour's communications 
officers made their allegiance to the leader, rather than the party as a whole, which they 
were supposed to represent. This was a part of the process where the leader became more 
powerful in the party in the 1980s, at the expense of Labour's elected forums - the NEC 
and the PLP. 
The SCA argued after the 1987 election that, as the press and media concentrated on the 
leaders, so leadership promotion would advance the party as a whole. 1479 It is the case 
that the conventions of the press and media mean that they tend to concentrate on the 
individual over the more abstract idea - to humanise the story. This certainly meant that, 
if Labour was to pursue the press, then it should be promoted in a `personalised' way. 
This, however, could have been achieved by other methods. 
The particular way it happened was to promote Kinnock as a decisive, tough and 
uncompromising leader, to be contrasted with what strategists perceived as Foot's 
weakness. 1480 For Mandelson, as two national party workers at the time remember, it 
meant consciously promoting the leader and his office rather than' just the party. 
1481 
Mandelson's later understudy Colin Byrne carried on this tradition into the 1990s. 1482 
Kinnock's attacks on the left, notably Militant, illustrated these two tactics of seeking 
press and media approval and asserting strong leadership. '483 His famous speech at the 
1985 party conference was applauded by much of the media, some praising it for 
1479 Hewitt P. and Mandelson P. ̀ The Labour campaign' in Crewe and Harrop: 53, also quoted in Webb: 
56. 
1480 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 51-3, Heffernan and Marqusee: 211, Benn, The end of an era: 441-2.. 
1481 Mandelson's former deputy, Andy McSmith (McSmith, Faces: 257, quoting Wintour, P, Guardian, 
May 301991) and the secretary to the Labour Party's arts committee Tricia Sumner (Tricia Sumner 
interview, February 6 2002). 
1482 Colin Byrne, ̀ Letter to Larry Whitty', May 24 1991, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
1483 Shaw, Discipline: 259, Heffer, Eric. 1986. Labour's future : socialist or SDP mark 2? London. Verso.: 
61,74, Panitch and Leys: 217. 
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showing the smack of strong leadership. 1484 The SCA, and others, justified the attacks as 
a way of gaining voter support. '485 - 
The strategists also aimed at presenting a strong leadership in the 1987 election, aspects 
of which were seen as presidential and personally centred on Kinnock. 
1486 The question 
was not whether but "... how `Presidential' should the campaign be... ". 
1487 A key feature 
of this presidentialism was the party political broadcast dubbed `Kinnock - The Movie, 
with, very unusually, `KINNOCK' rather than the Labour Party credited at the end. 1488 
Again, it is questionable whether this advanced the party as much as its leader. Kinnock's 
personal poll rating shot up after the broadcast. 
1489 Philip Gould acknowledged this as a 
"... key campaign goal ... 
". 1490 Yet, the party's own ratings did not show any similar- 
rise. '491 
The SCA publicly justified this course by citing research that indicated that Kinnock was 
... a major asset 
for the party. " 1492 However, as Gould later noted, Kinnock suffered 66 
poor personal poll ratings during his time as leader. And he privately indicated that the 
leader acted as a drag on his party. 1493 Yet an aspect of this presidential course, and an 
1484 Leapman, Michael. 1987. Kinnock. London: Unwin Ilyman.: 106, Shaw, 1945: 174-5, Elliott, Gregory. 
1993. Labourism and the English genius : the strange death of Labour England? London ; New York: 
Verso.: 137, Shaw, 1979: 36, Hughes and Wintour. 10. The Daily Mail put it thus: "Only when there is 
blood on the stage - the blood of his own party- can we be sure that a Labour leader means business. - 
However, the Sun however was not so positive. It said the speech indicated how divided the party was. 
(Both quoted in Leapman, Kinnock: 106). 
1495 Hewitt P. and Mandelson P. 'The Labour campaign' in Crewe and Ilarrop: 49, Shaw, Discipline: 259- 
90, Hughes and Wintour: 9-10, Leapman, Kinnock: 110. See also Miller, flow voters change: 66-7. 
1496 Shaw, 1979: 76-7, Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 153-5, Franklin, Packaging 
politics: 138-9, Miller, How voters change: 130-I, Webb: 55-6, Elliott: 138, Hughes and Wintour: 25, 
Heffernan and Marqusee: 82, Philo, Political Advertising: 411. 
1487 SCA Meeting, October 16 1986, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
1488 Franklin, Packaging politics: 138-9, Miller, flow voters change: 130-1, Webb: 52-3,56, Heffernan and 
Marqusee: 82-3, Hughes and Wintour: 26-7. 
1489 Franklin, Packaging politics: 138-9, Heffernan and Marqusee: 82-3, Hughes and Wintour: 26, Gould, 
The unfinished revolution: 79, Leapman, Kinnock: 110. 
1490 Gould, P. et. al., 'The Labour Party's campaign communications' in Crewe and Ilarrop: 86. 
1491 Shaw, 1979: 77, Heffernan and Marqusee: 83. 
1492 Hewitt P. and Mandelson P. 'The Labour campaign' in Crewe and Harrop: 52, Shaw, 1979: 76-7. 
1493 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 76,77,93,144-5. See also Heffernan and Marqusee: 80,104, 
McSmith, Faces: 12-3, Taylor Gerald, R. 1997. Labour's renewal? : the policy review and beyond. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan.: 111, Wilson, D. in `Questions and Discussions' in Crewe, Ivor, and Brian 
Gosschalk. 1995. Political communications : the general election campaign of 1992. Cambridge [England] 
; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.: 266-7. 
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indication that the SCA sided with the leader rather than the party, was that Gould later 
accepted that strategists consciously withheld information concerning Kinnock's 
unpopularity. 1494 Gould defended this by suggesting he acted out of loyalty; it was not 
part of his job to undermine the leader. 1495 Yet, his loyalty was supposed to be to the 
party. 
Importantly, the same centralising process saw the SCA become a new power base within 
the Labour Party, linked to the leader's office, but financed by the party. Although the 
NEC and, finally the Labour Party, was supposed to direct the SCA and the 
communications director, they had always operated as a more autonomous force linked to 
the leader. As Philip Gould makes clear, Labour's communication focus was developed 
without the knowledge or prior approval of the democratic structures of the party. The 
nascent SCA even operated in secret in the year before the NEC approved of it. 1496 
Mandelson told Gould in 1985: "All the time in the Labour Party you are boxing with 
those people on the NEC - to whom ... we are all ultimately accountable... who 
do not 
know what we are doing, who, if they did would oppose it... ". 1497 Meanwhile Mandelson 
himself promoted the leader, de facto as an adjunct of the leaders' office. As a party 
official in the early period, Sumner puts it: "Despite the fact that he was employed by the 
Labour Party, he saw his role as one of being Kinnock's spin doctor. He did not see 
himself as working for the party at all. Kinnock had people working for him. He had a 
reasonable amount of money. He should have been using that. I could never understand 
"149s why this wasn't challenged more. 
1494 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 144-5. See also Hughes and Wintour: 9-10, Heffernan and Marqusee: 
80,104. An indication of this came when the SCA internally justified the presidential course. Evidence was 
presented pointing to Thatcher's unpopularity, yet polling on Kinnock's popularity was not produced. 
(Gould, P. ̀ Election Strategy Meeting', n. d., Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives). 
1495 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 144. 
1496 Ibid.: 56-7. As an anonymous letter put it, in March 1986: "Now that the Shadow Communications 
Agency has been approved by the National Executive Committee, we had better do something about 
getting it properly set up. " (Anon., Letter, March 13 1986, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill 
Archives). 
1497 Interview with Mandelson, November 9 1985 in Gould, The unfinished revolution: 48. 
1498 Tricia Sumner interview, February 6 2002. 
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After the NEC ratified the SCA in March 1986, the SCA redefined Labour's priorities as 
the NEC's influence diminished. An early indication of this was that Mandelson and 
Gould led the SCA into redesigning the Labour Party's image for the 1986 conference, 
with approval for this achieved by deliberately underplaying its importance to the NEC. 
The two got it agreed by a NEC subcommittee with minimal discussion. Aiding the 
SCA's rise was Labour's new general secretary Larry Whitty who, according to Gould, 
backed Mandelson in "... quietly facilitating many of the changes Peter made". 1499 
This autonomy could even on occasion be from the leadership. Mandelson, on occasion, 
even before 1987, took decisions on presentation of campaigns and image that either 
challenged or contradicted those of the leader. 150° More latterly, the communication 
officials' briefing process took a new form that was more ambiguous. They promoted 
particular favourites, such as Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. It is not clear whether the 
officials advanced the future stars because of their proximity to the leader or because they 
were close to Mandelson, operating independently of Kinnock. 1501 
Centralisation and the party: On-message, spin doctoring and counter-briefing 
One aspect of this focus on the press and media and reinforcing the leadership was the 
idea of being `on-message', which was combined with spin doctoring and counter- 
briefing. 
The pressure from the predominantly Conservative press, and indeed newspaper 
executives and journalists, was to identify Labour debates in terms of splits. Thus, there 
was a pressure to conform to a particular form of discipline. 1502 This pressure fitted 
together neatly with the push for leadership centralisation. Getting the party to be 'on_ 
149' Gould, The unfinished revolution: 66,48. 
150° Ibid.: 60-1,64-5. 
1501 Gould, Goodbye: 226, Heffernan and Marqusee: 110,223, Anderson and Mann: 365. In a secret memo 
to Kinnock, his chief of staff Charles Clarke confided that various members of the Shadow Cabinet, 
including Hattersley, John Smith and Cook, believed that Mandelson, Blair and Brown were even 
conspiring to use the press to prepare a new leadership after Kinnock. (Charles Clarke 'Communications 
and Press Matters', no date, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives). 
1502 Shaw, 1979: 114. 
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message' achieved both aims. Being `on-message' has entailed quelling activist voices, 
and even discordant speech of more senior members of the party, in order that the clear 
message from the leadership, as articulated by the SCA, should be the only one the press 
hears. So, for example, Mandelson indicated in 1985 that what was needed was for 
Labour to be able to repetitively `ram home' one or two key points in each area, 
"... which is very hard when it comes to law and order and Bernie Grant [a deceased left 
MP] in one sentence eclipses everything that we have to say which is worthwhile ...... 
1503 
Again, this has the added corollary that it enhanced Kinnock's ability to bring policy 
development under his control. '504 
Associated with this, strategists concentrated on `soundbites'. They considered that to get 
ideas across in the press and media, which relied on the short quoted summary of political 
positions, spokespeople needed to repeat simple slick phrases. A young shadow minister 
in Mandelson's coterie, the future leader Tony Blair, was a public advocate. In a 
newspaper article, he summarised the art: "Our news today is instant, hostile to subtlety 
or qualification. If you can't sum it up in a sentence, or even a phrase, forget it. Combine 
two ideas or sentiments together and mass communication will not repeat them. To avoid 
misinterpretation, strip down a policy or opinion to one key clear line before the media 
does it for you. Think in headlines. " 1505 Again, using soundbites adapted Conservative 
thinking. The SCA had noted that the Tories had phrased ideas in ways that it was 
difficult to disagree and that some of Thatcher's `pet phrases' had entered common 
parlance. ' 506 
It may be sometimes true with political nostrums that if an argument cannot be 
summarised in a soundbite, it is the case that the argument is not entirely clear. However, 
"' Quoted in Gould, The unfinished revolution: 47. 
1504 Shaw, 1979: 113. 
"" Tony Blair. 1987. ̀A breakdown in communications', Times, November 24 1987. Also quoted in 
Rentoul: 191-2. 
1506 Leslie Butterfield, Roddy Glen and Paul Southgate, ̀Towards a Communication Strategy for the 
Labour Party. An examination of attitudes amongst women aged 25-44,1985, Neil Kinnock personal 
papers, Churchill Archives. For local campaigns, this strategy of constantly repeated soundbites was also 
emphasised. Local election campaigns would be organised from the top down with officials meeting the 
CLPs to organise the elections early on. Regular press releases for local campaigns were also encouraged. 
(Anon. ̀ Notes for Political Strategy Team', no date, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives). 
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the other side of this is a point Blair, perhaps ironically, starts to allude to in the same 
article already quoted. He notes that here is an effect on the "... quality of our democracy. 
The truth becomes almost impossible to communicate ... ". The complexity of a political 
position becomes lost as it is shortened to a soundbite. This Blair, evasively, blamed on 
the media. 1507 But, of course, accepting the soundbite culture Evas a deliberate choice that 
Labour's new press and media strategy embraced. Another key effect of the soundbite 
culture on the Labour Party came about because of the way the SCA applied it. The SCA 
indicated that Labour's communications needed to use soundbites in order that ideas 
sounded positive rather than negative. So, "... against unemployment... " became "... for 
employment... ". However, the SCA turned some of these negative phrases into positive 
ones in a way that was not value-free. This indicated how the use of soundbites affected 
policymaking. It was more than just `spin'. Thus, strategists translated "... curb police 
powers... " as "... fight against crime... " and, in education, "... equal opportunities for 
all... " became "... improve educational standards... ". ' 508 
This soundbite culture was more associated with the SCA than the leadership in 
Kinnock's time. '509 Unlike Blair, Kinnock never mastered the soundbite. This is clear 
when looking at the written drafts of his speeches. The verbal `tricks' - the dense sub- 
clauses piled up on top of each other, the extensive repetition, the complex puns, the 
over-elaboration and the unnecessary sophistry - are all there on the page. 
'510 
The concentration on the press and media also led to what has been regularly described as 
`spin doctoring'. This is such a famous activity that it has been included in dictionaries 
and portrayed in Hollywood films and hardly needs describing. 1511 Philip Gould defines 
spin doctoring as the unexceptional activity of putting the view of the party to best 
1507 Tony Blair, `A breakdown in communications', Times, November 24 1987. Also cited in Rentoul: 192. 
1508 Butterfield et al., 
1509 Even many of the SCA internal party discussion papers were written in headlines and soundbites. (Neil 
Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives). 
1510 Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
1511 The Chambers 21st Century Dictionary's definition of a spin doctor is "... someone, especially in 
politics, who tries to influence public opinion by putting a favourable bias on information presented to the 
public or to the media. " Chambers 21st Century Dictionary online, chambersharrap. com. Also cited in 
Richards, Paul. 1998. Be your own spin doctor :a practlcalguide to using the media. Harrogate: Take 
That.. 
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effect. 1512 Yet, it is more than this. However `objective', much journalism entails the 
reporter providing an interpretation. As Gould and Mandelson's former deputy McSmith 
indicate, spinning also entails providing a perspective on what has happened. 1513 In the 
short time between when a political event happens and when it is reported, it is the job of 
the spin doctor to provide an understanding and framework for the events that he or she 
hopes will be adopted by the journalist. 
In Labour's case, it has also indicated the importance of the press in agenda-setting, as 
one former party communications officer specifies. It has entailed both briefing after the 
event and providing an `after-briefing service' to broadcasters who were told which 
newspaper stories were worth following up. '514 This was particularly true in Kinnock's 
time, when communications officials targeted journalists on broadsheet newspapers that 
gave Labour more favourable coverage, in order to set the agenda for the broadcast news, 
as referred to earlier. 1515 
Labour's spin doctors also planted sympathetic stories with obliging press people, 
sometimes directly countering the reports in other press outlets. So, for instance, they 
instituted a damage limitation exercise with a story given to Andrew Grice at the Sunday 
Times about Kinnock's visit to America, following a previous disastrous trip. Replete 
with insider information about how Kinnock's spin doctors had carefully planned the 
outcome, the piece indicated that the tabloids had "... privately admitted defeat". '516 
This same coterie of journalists around the communications director were used to 
discredit those who were seen as querying the leadership line, isolating those who were 
seen as discordant voices. ' 517 Before 1987, Sumner identifies Norman Buchan as an 
example of someone briefed against. She told this work's author that she secretly 
1512 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 334. 
1513 Ibid.: 333, McSmith, Faces: 250, Miller, How voters change: 71-2. 
1514 McSmith, Faces: 250,253. 
1515 Shaw, 1979: 62, Heffernan and Marqusee: 212. 
1516 Grice, Andrew. 1990. ̀Kinnock wins tabloid game of hunt-the-gaffe' Sunday Times, July 22 1990. 
Heffernan and Marqusee identify Grice as one of those journalists with Mandelson's ear. (Heffernan and 
Marqusee: 219). 
1517 Shaw, 1979: 113, Heffernan and Marqusee: 212 -219. 
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intervened to stop hostile material from Mandelson going to journalists when Buchan was 
sacked. ' 518 
After the election defeat, a broader selection of the soft left was widely seen to having 
fallen victim to hostile briefings. These were said to include at various times John 
Prescott, 1S19 Bryan Gould, ' 520 Robin Cook' S21 and Michael Meacher. 1522 A secret internal 
party memo indicates how this operated with regard to Meacher. Press officer Colin 
Byrne indicated he had contradicted what Meacher had said on secondary picketing to the 
press "... under the guidance of the Leader's 1523 
The people and the media: party members and the revised strategy 
The leadership's renewed emphasis on the press and media and the political marketing 
approach after 1987 strengthened its perception that grassroots members and activists 
were less important. As it again regarded the press and media as the forum to influence 
the wider public, so the significance of party members' capacity to communicate with the 
public and to transmit the public's views back to the leadership, through the party, 
became downgraded. This contributed to weakening their power within the party. 
Members would have little role and be relegated to being bystanders. ' 324 
The SCA identified itself as public opinion's key interpreter through quantitative research 
- i. e. the use of opinion polls and qualitative research - such as the use of focus groups. 
This technique borrowed from marketing. '525 
Asia Tricia Sumner interview, February 6 2002. 
1519 McSmith, Faces: 75, Shaw, 1979: 113, Anderson and Mann: 365, Heffernan and Marqusee: 110,132, 
Gould, Goodbye: 217. 
1520 Gould, Goodbye: 224-31, Shaw, 1979: 113, Anderson and Mann: 365,1 leffernan and Marqusee: 110. 
1521 Anderson and Mann: 365, Gould, Goodbye: 217. 
1522 Shaw, 1979: 113, Anderson and Mann: 365, Ileffernan and Marqusee: 110, Gould, Goodbye: 217. 
1523 Colin Byrne, ̀ Letter to Larry Whitty', May 24 1991, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
1524 Seyd and Whiteley: 174,218. See also Shaw, 1979: 191. In 1981, one Labour commentator had 
identified this trend in politics, writing: "What is, in effect ... political marketing has 
become a principal 
instrument of political power, displacing the apparent importance of ... party membership... 
" (Bustin, 
Michael. 1981. ̀Different Conceptions of Party: Labour's Constitutional Debates' New Left Review 126 
March-April 1981: 20). 
1523 Practitioners note that the employment of focus groups was a technique developed in United States. It 
was mainly associated with marketing from 1950s to 1980s. It was in part developed by two academics 
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As was indicated in the chapter, unlike Shaw, who sees the review as intensifying the 
pre-1987 project, Wring argues that there was a post-election shift from a media-led 
strategic approach to one based on political marketing. Prior to 1987, Labour's political 
communications had reverted to what he describes as a ̀ persuasional' schema, rather than 
the `educational' school of thought that Foot had shared. The latter saw the role of 
campaigning to educate and evangelise for the Labour cause. '526 Jennifer Lees- 
Marshment describes there being a sales-oriented approach. '527 
By 1987, the Labour strategists already considered that electors had exogenously-fixed 
attitudes. Like consumers, they would pick and choose between party programmes on 
offer, rather than have their opinions shifted by a party project. 1528 As was indicated, after 
1987, they developed a market-oriented approach, where it was seen that the product was 
designed to suit voters. 1529 The party hierarchy viewed the market research findings 
produced by the SCA as representative of the electorate and accorded them an important 
role in decision-making. Polls and focus groups shaped policy. '530 Thus, a few months 
after the election, the SCA presented a survey Labour and Britain in the 1990s. In Philip 
Gould's words, this was "... a defining moment... " in the party's history. 1531 SCA 
members told a NEC and Shadow Cabinet joint meeting that electors had not voted for 
Labour because they saw it as old-fashioned and out-of-touch; a party of minorities and 
the poor. Policies on nationalisation, tax and industrial relations were still unpopular. The 
survey said that the party's greatest handicaps were extremism, disunity and the trade 
contributing to the US military effort by using focus groups to test propaganda for civilian consumption. 
The focus group technique has been used in a political context to identify the exact motives and reactions 
of a voter group. (Morgan David, L. 1998. The focus group guide book. Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London: 
SAGE Publications.: 38, Halimi S. `Spin Doctors Made in the USA' in Le Monde Diplomatique, August 
1999). 
1526 Wring, Soundbites versus socialism: 59-68. 
1527 Lees-Marshment, Jennifer. 2001. ̀ The Marriage of Politics and Marketing', Political Studies 49,692- 
713: 699. 
1528 Shaw, 1979: 60, Dunleavy, Patrick. 1991. Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice : economic 
explanations in political science. New York ; London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.: 113, Panitch and Leys: 221, 
Callaghan, J. 2000. The Retreat of Social Democracy. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
1529 Lees-Marshment: 699. 
is30 Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 183,189,190. 
1531 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 86. See also Shaw, Wilderness: 125. 
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unions. Yet, it suggested, if the party appealed to the upwardly mobile floating voters - 
and thus became more pro-market - this would be an election-winner. 
1532 
This shift from sales to marketing is one employed in business marketing literature. It is 
associated with notion that market power has shifted from the seller to the buyer. 1533 It is 
one akin to the customer sovereignty argument in neo-liberal media theory. 1534 For 
Margaret Scammell, Labour after 1987 "... provides the clearest evidence so far... " of 
this shift. She uncritically accepts the strategists' characterisation of their own work: 
"Labour was responding rationally to changing voter concerns, and attempting to do so in 
a way that allowed it a distinctive competitive advantage in the electoral 
marketplace. "'535 For Scammell and Jennifer Marshment-Lees, reflecting the notion of 
New Labour insiders, one upshot of this is that politics has been democratised, as politics 
has responded to the wishes of the electorate. '536 
Nevertheless, importantly, as Scammell later notes, the SCA's interpretation of these 
results was key. 1537 However, it is not clear that there was not a political agenda behind 
the research results provided to the party. It was striking that the Labour and Britain fn 
the 1990s' pro-market interpretation accorded with the views of the SCA's two most 
prominent individuals, Gould and Mandelson, and the direction of the Labour leadership 
- at times contradicting quantitative polling. 
1538 Gould himself made clear that he had a 
political agenda and that he suppressed results on Kinnock's popularity when they 
challenged his preset agenda, as we indicated. In addition, Labour latterly s%vitched 
1532 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 86-8, Mandelson, Peter, and Roger Liddle. 1996. The Blair 
revolution : can new Labour deliver? London: Faber and Faber.: 40,1 lughes and Wintour: 61-3, Anderson 
and Mann: 19, Shaw, 1979: 81-4, lleffernan and Marqusee: 97-8. 
1333 Scammell, Margaret. 1999. 'Political Marketing: Lessons for Political Science', Political Studies 
47: 718-739.: 724-5.. 
1534 Lees-Marshment: 695,696. 
1535 Scammell: 733. 
1536 Ibid.: 738, Lees-Marshment: esp. 709. 
1537 Scammell: 735. 
1539 On tax, for instance, it contradicted quantitative polling that indicated that electors were prepared to pay 
more for better services. (Heath, A. and McMahon, D. 'Changes in values' in Jowell, Roger, Social, and Research Community Planning. 1992. British social attitudes : the 9th report. Aldershot, Hants: 
Dartmouth.: 118-9. See also Taylor-Gooby P., 'Comfortable, marginal and excluded' in Jowell, Roger, 
Social, and Research Community Planning. 1995. British social attitudes : the 12th report. Aldershot: 
Dartmouth [for] Social and Community Planning Research.: 3-4 and Social, and Research Community 
Planning. 1991. British social attitudes cumulative sourcebook : the first sLt surveys.: A-1 S). 
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opinion polling to a firm recently acquired by the `modernising' ally of Gould, Clive 
Hollick. ' 539 
None of these points necessarily invalidate the research, they merely make it open to 
question. They make the need for independent scrutiny more pressing. This was 
especially the case with its quantitative focus group research. There was no way to 
independently assess its interpretation, as the SCA, and the tightly-controlled milieu 
overseeing it, made sure its work was not open to public scrutiny. 1540 Yet, even focus 
group advocates have argued that it was only with such access that such research could 
be legitimated. They have also questioned whether information from the relatively small 
numbers involved in focus groups, such as those employed by the SCA, could be used to 
generalise to a wider grouping, such as an electorate. 1541 Thus, controversial research 
gleaned from a market method of policy creation had come up with a pro-market solution 
to Labour's electoral woes. 
Moreover, the Labour leadership partly predicated its political marketing strategy on the 
assumption that activists were unrepresentative of the public, or even Labour voters. 
Thus, the idea developed that grassroots campaigning should be foregone in favour of 
press and media work. While after 1987, as we have seen, it was assumed that marketing 
techniques would effectively monitor the electorate's opinions. This view of the 
unrepresentative activist is shared by a number of commentators, including some from 
the left. '542 
However, social attitudes research on this is more ambiguous than is sometimes thought. 
For instance, importantly for this whole work, both voters and Labour members 
u'9 Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 193, DCMS Press Release. 2002. Lord Hollick to be 
new Chairman of the South Bank Board, 18 February 2002. 
140 Shaw, 1979: 64,148, Anderson and Mann: 367. 
1541 Krueger, Richard A. 1998. Analyzing & reporting focus group results. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE 
Publications.: 11,34-38, Krueger, Richard A. 1994. Focus groups :a practical guide for applied research. 
Newbury Park: Sage Publications., Morgan David, L. 1998. The focus group guide book. Thousand Oaks, 
Calif. ; London: SAGE Publications.: 62. 
1542 See, for instance, Cliff, Tony, and Donny Gluckstein. 1988. The Labour Party: a Marxist history. 
London: Bookmarks.: 349-55 and Crouch C. 1999 ̀The Parabola of Working-Class Politics', in Gamble, 
Andrew, and Anthony Wright. 1999. The new social democracy. Oxford ; Malden, MA: Blackwell.: 79. 
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supported industrial democracy at this time -a cause, of course, central to activist 
demands on press participatory democracy. '543 Yet, the leadership discarded this even 
before the Policy Review itself, as we have seen. The most extensive survey of the 
relationship between the beliefs of party members and voters, by two professors, Patrick 
Seyd and Paul Whiteley, indicates that on some salient domestic issues, activists, Labour 
voters and the electorate as a whole shared many similar positions in this period. These 
included increasing spending on eradicating poverty and on the NHS, their policy 
towards troops in Ireland and on private medicine. On another, public spending, although 
there was a divergence, this indicated an inconsistency in voter views. 1544 Like the 
activists, three-quarters of the adult population supported progressive taxation in the 
years 1985 to 1990 and two-thirds of respondents believed it was the responsibility of 
government to reduce income difference. '545 And a poll carried out for the party in 1990 
showed that three-quarters of people would support a party investing in industry, hospital 
and education, even if it meant paying more tax. 1546 
Thus, the leadership assumption that a justification for the switch to press and media 
work from activist campaigning, because of the- complete divergence between the 
activists and the electorate, is not entirely borne out by the evidence. Although there were 
significant areas of divergence, important areas showed similarities. ' 547 Any idea that the 
1543 Social, and Research Community Planning. 1991. British social attitudes cumulative sourcebook : the 
first six surveys.: A-32, Seyd and Whiteley: 54. 
1544 Seyd and Whiteley: 212-6 
1545 Edlund, J., 'Progressive taxation farewell' in Taylor-Gooby, Peter, and Stefan Svallfors. 1999. The end 
of the welfare state? : responses to state retrenchment. New York: Routledge.: 116. 
146 NOP Poll, November 21 1990, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
1547 Areas of divergence between the activists and the voters included the three key areas identified where 
the Policy Review shifted the party's position - on union law and renationalisation and unilateral 
disarmament. But even on the last of these there was some ambiguity. With unions, voters were indeed in 
favour of tightening legislation while Labour activists were not. (Seyd and Whiteley: 212-6). As for 
renationalisation, a majority of party members wished for more public ownership, while survey evidence 
shows that voters wanted the status quo to remain and more take-overs would be unpopular. (Seyd and 
Whiteley: 54, Social, and Research Community Planning. 1991. British social attitudes cumulative 
sourcebook : the first six surveys.: 11-1). On unilateralism, there was an overwhelming demand by voters 
for the retention of weapons until other countries reduced them, unlike the activists. (Heath, A. and 
McMahon, D. `Changes in values' in Jowell, Roger, Social, and Research Community Planning. 1992. 
British social attitudes : the 9th report. Aldershot, Hants: Dartmouth.: 118-9). Yet, like Labour members, a 
majority also saw the installation of American nuclear missiles as making Britain less safe. (Young K., 
`Living under threat' in Jowell, Roger, Sharon Witherspoon, Lindsay Brook, Social, and Research 
Community Planning. 1990. British social attitudes : the 7th report. Aldershot, England: Gower.: 95). 
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electorate shared the Conservative tabloids' prescription of a low tax, non-interventionist 
economic policy is not borne out by the evidence. 
Even members of the leader's office became concerned that damage had been caused as 
Labour substituted press and media work for activist election campaigning. In 1991, Neil 
Stewart, a Kinnock aide and a link between the leaders' office and the SCA, outlined his 
fears in a secret briefing. He expressed concerns that: "... in some by elections our press 
work was the campaign and in reality little else was delivered to a high level". Stewart 
believed that this overemphasis provided "... a sharp reminder that the spoken word or 
personal contact remains the most powerful and appreciated forms of communications ... 
and that getting people in to carry the message... " was as important as press and media 
campaigning. 1548 Yet, according to Labour's general secretary, in an internal assessment 
of the 1992 campaign, much of the spending went into the Millbank press centre. '549 
Research has seemed to back up these fears. Seyd and Whitely regard the SCA 
conception of campaigning as having been dominant because little analysis has been done 
of the effect on voting of the actions of local parties. '55° Their research, comparing the 
1983 and 1987 election, challenges this view and shows a large active campaigning 
membership as key to improved electoral performance. The highly active Labour 
constituencies showed the larger swing. In fact, from their calculations, the researchers 
tentatively estimate that if Labour had doubled its membership, then it would have won 
the 1987 election. 1551 Thus, they indicate, the emphasis on a centralised press and media 
campaign is "... far too one-sided ... ". 
1552 
1548 Neil Stewart, 'Briefing Note; By Election Organisation, April 1991', Neil Kinnock personal archive 
Churchill Archives. 
1549 Larry Whitty, 'The General Election 1992', June 21 1992: 50, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, 
Churchill Archives. 
1550 Seyd and Whiteley: 175. 
iss Ibid.: 186-198. See also Shaw, 1979: 191. 
1552 Ibid.: 199,207. See also Taylor, Labour's renewal?: 194-5. 
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The SCA after 1987: Power Increases 
In the period after 1987, leading up to 1992, as the commitment to newspaper ownership 
intervention waned, so the SCA became more sophisticated in their dealings with the 
press. They improved their presentation to broadcasters and became more forceful in 
news management, for example by intervening to structure programmes. They also 
developed new techniques in agenda-setting with regard to newspapers. For instance, 
they supplied newsworthy copy and photo-opportunities on what they regarded as Labour 
issues. 1553 
As we have noted, Wring indicates that the marketing approach led to the leadership's 
influence increasing)554 And with this, the SCA's power also increased. As we saw, the 
SCA was central to Labour's policy adaptation after the 1987 defeat, conducted primarily 
through the Policy Review. Often, this influence was at the expense of the PLP and even 
the Shadow Cabinet. This was because, along with the SCA's role in interpreting opinion 
research, there was a concern to provide policies that would go down well in the press 
and media. An indication of this was how the broadsheet newspapers promoted the 
review findings. '555 
The SCA and Hewitt, from the leaders' office, were involved in rewriting and drafting 
parts of the Policy Review's reports. '556 While Philip Gould underplays this point of the 
SCA's influence, he still suggests that it helped shape policy on defence. And the leader 
of the party he reported to was much more forthright in applauding the SCA's influence. 
Kinnock later noted that it gave "... presentations which emphasised Labour's strengths 
and weaknesses and assisted in the efforts to sustain the review in the desired direction. I 
would not impugn Philip Gould's integrity by saying that more emphasis was put on 
1553 Franklin, Packaging politics: 144, Tait, R. 'The parties and television' in Crewe and Gosschalk: 62, 
Shaw, 1979: 127,128. 
1534 Wring, Political marketing and the Labour Party: 183. 
1555 Heffernan and Marqusee: 221, See also Gould, The unfinished revolution: 98, Anderson and Mann: 
387. 
1556 Hughes and Wintour: 166-175, Shaw, 1979: 112. See also Taylor, Labour's renewal?: 57-8,103. 
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some things rather than others, but I saw to it that meetings were conducted in such a way 
as to make the people remember the weaknesses far longer than they remembered the 
strengths. "1557 
The SCA's power culminated at the time of the 1992 election. The SCA and Philip 
Gould, together with Hewitt, who had left the leaders' office for the Institute of Public 
Policy Research, but was still closely linked, effectively ran the 1992 campaign. '558 
(Mandelson had by now left his post in order to become an MP, to be replaced first by 
John Underwood and then David Hill). '559 Separation between the campaigning and the 
policies advocated in the campaign was wafer-thin. An example of this was the 
concentration on proportional representation as an issue towards the end of the campaign, 
which emanated from Hewitt. '560 
According to Philip Gould, the campaign was run in secret. The formal group, which 
oversaw the SCA, the Campaign Management Team, had been superseded in the period 
leading up to the election by a secret group, which included two members of Kinnock's 
office and Hewitt, the director of communications and Whitty. The SCA worked in 
tandem with this. 1561 The SCA, thus, wielded great power along with the leaders' office. 
Although Shadow Cabinet member Jack Cunningham, as campaign co-ordinator, was a 
member of the secret group, according to Gould "... senior politicians were never fully 
involved. "1562 An indication of this was that deputy leader Hattersley says that he had 
no involvement even in planning his own election programme. '563 Unaccountable 
outsiders were also influential, such as the media entrepreneur Clive Hollick, who would 
isr Kinnock, N. (1994) ̀ Reforming the Labour Party', Contemporary Record, 8 (3), pp. 535-54,544. Also 
cited in Panitch and Leys: 320. 
i Gould, The unfinished revolution: 108-10. 
"" ibid.: 101-14, Heffernan and Marqusee: 227-9,231. 
1560 However, how important it became seems to have been a case more of accident than design. (Gould, 
The unfinished revolution: 150-1). 
1561 This was a criticism made by the soft left after the 1992 election. In his memoirs, Gould admits this to 
be the case. Hattersley's view by 1991 was that the politicians were not controlling campaigning. (Roy 
Hatersley ̀Letter to Neil Kinnock April 8 1991, Gould, The unfinished revolution: 108-10. See also Shaw, 
1979: 146-8). 
1562 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 109. See also Heffernan and Marqusee: 315. 
1363 Hattersley, Who goes home?: 305. 
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later become a press businessman! 564 Examples of the problems with the SCA's 
domination included the debacle over a broadcast dubbed ̀the war of Jennifer's Ear' and 
the self-congratulatory election-eve Sheffield Rally. 
'565 
Yet, it is important to note that the SCA were by no means all-powerful in policy 
development by 1992. The leaders' office was centrally involved in the campaign, as we 
have seen. The manifesto, also, had been drawn up by the leader's office and was merely 
ratified by the Clause V discussion of the NEC and Shadow Cabinet. The involvement of 
Hewitt in this is frankly described by deputy leader Hattersley as that of "... the 
leadership's hatchet person who rewrote the manifesto to reflect the fears of the Shadow 
Cabinet rather than the hopes of the rank and file". '5 Also, old right-wingers, such as 
John Smith, challenged the SCA. He intransigently refused to follow its demands on tax 
in 1992.1567 
In contrast, the NEC's influence had waned. But this was not predetermined. To a 
sizeable extent, it was because a majority of its members had chosen not to challenge the 
shifts in policy and the changes in the power over policymaking. 
Indeed, the NEC involved itself in a particular shift in the influence of the party's 
communications officers. This indicated that the NEC still had the potential to influence 
events, even if it did not always exercise this. After Mandelson made clear that he was 
leaving, the NEC appointed Underwood in 1989. Those on the left had made clear their 
disquiet at the stream of hostile briefings provided by unelected party officers. 1568 After 
the NEC's selection, there was some shift. Underwood wanted to be impartial in his 
dealings with the Shadow Cabinet and to promote a wider selection of senior politicians 
1564 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 109, David Blunkett, 'Letter to NEC members', June 16 1992, 
`Letter to Lary Whitty' 28 March 1992, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
1565 Cook, R., ̀ The Labour campaign' in Crewe and Gosschalk: 15, Gould, The unfinished revolution: 130- 
41. See also Shaw, 1979: 141, Franklin, Packaging politics: 139, Heffernan and Marqusee: 310-1. Gould, 
Goodbye: 250, Gould, The unfinished revolution: 148. 
" Hattersley, Who goes home?: 222, Heffernan and Marqusee: 307. See also Shaw, 1979: 215. 
1567 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 117-30, Shaw, Wilderness: 127. 
1568 For instance, Benn had indicated his disquiet at a NEC Communications Committee meeting (Labour 
Party NEC, NEC Minutes, September 27 1989). 
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than just those who were associated with Kinnock and Mandelson. '569 However, he 
resigned within a year of taking full control after failing to gain Kinnock's support in a 
battle with Underwood's deputy Colin Byrne. He felt that Byrne, along with the SCA, 
had undermined him. 1570 
As a most perceptive chronicler of this period, Eric Shaw paints a picture of the rise of 
the influence of the SCA, particularly during the Policy Review, as related to the 
weakening hold of the soft left. He views that the Bennite left "... was hardly engaged at 
all". '57' While this is true, it downplays the fact that the Bennite left saw the NEC as the 
policymaking body and so challenged the policy drift and the SCA domination there. As 
for that body, the private briefings from the leaders' office to Kinnock in his archives 
considering the NEC, showed as much concern about motions coming from the Bennite 
left as from the soft left. ' 572 
1569 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 106, McSmith, Faces: 265-6, Franklin, Packaging politics: 133. 
""John Underwood, ̀Letter to Larry Whitty', June 5 1991, Gould, The unfinished revolution: 105-7. 
1571 See, fot instance, Shaw, Wilderness: 126-7. 
1572 Examples include the notes for the NEC on September 27 and October 25 1989, Neil Kinnock personal 
archive, Churchill Archives. Benn notes that he and Dennis Skinner moved 48 different amendments to the 
five review sections presented to the NEC in May 1990, for instance. (Benn, The end of an era: 590-1). An 
example of when he challenged the role of the communications officers is noted in the minutes for the NEC 
of September 27 1989 (Labour Party NEC, NEC Minutes of September 27 1989. ). 
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How effective was this new strategy on influencing the newspapers and the 
newspapers on the strategy? 
In the both the 1987 election and 1992 elections, despite the work to shift the press by the 
new press and media strategy, the press still displayed a huge bias against the Labour 
Party. 
In 1987, the daily tabloids' partiality was "... so obvious, so blatant ... ", with the obvious 
exception of the Labour-loyal Daily Mirror. Overall, among the press, in terms of 
circulation, 67% of the national press, that is 12 daily and Sunday titles, backed the 
Conservatives and five supported Labour. Of these, three were part of the Mirror stable, 
one was the News on Sunday and the other was the Guardian. 1573 There has also been 
research that points to the agenda-setting effect which the Conservative press had on 
broadcasters, which the press and media coverage was supposed to influence. 1574 
Despite the SCA's efforts, the party was defeated at the polls in both elections. A number 
of observers saw the 1987 campaign as a success, despite this failure. This was because 
the effective campaign, despite the party's poor position at the start of it, enabled Labour 
to beat the Alliance. 1575 While being a failure regarding policy and personalities, "... it 
was a public relations triumph". 1576 However, to see it in these public relations terms 
would be to regard it, as McSmith puts it, like one of those advertising campaigns that 
wins awards but fails to sell the product, "... as if in video tieritas". 1577 Poll levels 
changed little from before the start of the election campaign. Research indicates that the 
attempts at agenda setting had little influence on voters and respondents mainly voted for 
15" MacArthur, B. `The national press' in Crewe and Harrop: 96-7, British Politics, Newspaper 
Endorsements 1964-97, www. ukpol. co. uk. See also Negrine: 172-3. 
1574 Negrine: 178, MacArthur, B. `The national press' in Crewe and Ilarrop: 97, McKie, Fact is free: 124. 
1575 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 74,80, Webb: 56-7, }iewitt P. and Mandelson P. ̀ The Labour 
campaign' in Crewe and Harrop: 50,53, Miller et. al., `Political change in Britain during the 1987 
campaign', in Crewe and Harrop: 109. See also Shaw, 1979-. 79. 
1576 Hattersley, Who goes home?: 293. See also Franklin, Packaging politics: 133. 
1577 McSmith, Faces: 249, Elliott: 171. 
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the party they identified with at the start. 1578 Labour failed to cut into the Conservatives' 
share of the vote, which very slightly increased. '579 
Equally, as we saw earlier, the SCA-led approach did not quell press hostility to Labour 
in 1992. Kinnock highlighted this concern in his attack on the Conservative newspapers 
after the election. Former Conservative party treasurer Lord McAlpine dubbed the tabloid 
editors the campaign's `heroes', appearing to back up Kinnock's claims on his 
resignation with regard to press bias. 1580 As it was, Labour could only rely on national 
dailies with less than 30% of the circulation. 1581 However, an important pointer for how 
Labour's relationship. with the press would map out was that the Sun, was "... not so 
much pro-Tory as anti-Labour... ", while some of the tabloids did not formally back the 
Conservatives. 1582 As was seen, the vitriolic hostility against Labour, was, nevertheless, 
evident, particularly in the final days of the campaign. Labour's general secretary, in a 
confidential assessment, later viewed that the newspapers simply ignored the SCA's 
efforts. ' 583 
In contrast to Labour influencing the press, there has been much discussion as to whether 
the press influenced Labour, particularly with regard to the attacks on Militant and the 
reaction to the spate of tabloid stories pillorying the `loony left'. There is evidence that 
1578 Miller, How voters change, Miller et. at, 'Political change in Britain during the 1987 campaign', in 
Crewe and l larrop: 111,113. 
1579 Panitch and Leys: 222. Gould, P. et. al., 'The Labour Party's campaign communications' in Crewe and 
Harrop: 74,86, Negrine: 157-8. 
1580 Labour's general secretary Whitty even accused newspapers as having attempted to disrupt the party's 
campaign to "... a degree which is probably unprecedented and must have cost millions of pounds. "(Larry 
Whitty, 'The General Election 1992', June 21 1992: 53, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill 
Archives). For references to Kinnock and McAlpine, see McKie, D. "Fact is free but comment is sacred'; 
Or was it The Sun wot won it? ' in Crewe and Gosschalk: 121-135, Chippindale, Peter, and Chris Horrie. 
1999. Stick it up your punterl : the uncut story of the Sun newspaper. London: Simon & Schuster.: 434, 
Franklin, Packaging politics: 220-1, Berry S. ̀ Party strategy and the media - the failure of Labour's 1992 
election campaign' Parliamentary Affairs, Oct 1992, Vol. 45, No. 4: 565-6, Negrine: 177. 
1381 Nossiter T., Scammell M. and Semetko, H. 'Old values versus news values: The British 1992 General 
Election campaign on television' in Crewe and Gosschalk: 86, Negrine: 177. See also Franklin, Packaging 
politics: 215. 
1582 Chippindale and llorrie, Stick it: 432, McKie, Fact is free: 121-135. 
1583 Larry Whitty, `The General Election 1992', June 21 1992: 50, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill 
Archives. 
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strategists attempted to "... recast the Party in the image preferred by the media...,, 1114 
As the soft left employment secretary Michael Meacher considered, the most important 
effect of the "... relentless pressure... " of the press was on those creating party policy: 
"Can the policy makers in the Labour Party read wall-to-wall criticism of established 
Labour policies and traditions without being affected? I don't believe they can, " he told 
the CPBF in 1989.1585 
The SCA did indeed accept the premise that the press advocated in the mid-1980s. They 
considered there was a `loony left', typically associated with the municipal socialists. 
This `loony left', through advocating policies to end discrimination against women, black 
people, lesbians and gays and disabled people was seen by both the newspapers and the 
SCA to be hampering the Labour Party. Thus, strategists influenced the image and the 
policies of the party in an attempt distance it from this tag. So, for instance, one member 
of the SCA referred in a memo just after the election to the "... loony left... " (which he 
did not describe in quote marks), as one of Labour's "... electoral skeletons... " which had 
been neutralised. 1586 Philip Gould himself viewed that Labour had to distance itself from 
the GLC, which he also saw as "... loony left... ") 587 That others close to the SCA also 
accepted this premise soon became public knowledge, when a memo from Kinnock's 
press secretary Patricia Hewitt was leaked, indicating that she accepted the existence of a 
`London effect'. 1588 
One reflection of this press assault on the `loony left' in local government was the 
communications-led approach's failure to capitalise on the party's potential over the 
community charge. The poll tax, as it was known, had been a key component in the 
downfall of Mrs Thatcher, with demonstrations across ̀Middle England' attesting to its 
unpopularity. Even after Major came into office with talk of reform, Labour's internal 
1584 Heffernan and Marqusee: 206, Negrine: 9-10,160, citing Curran, James, Anthony Smith, Pauline 
Wingate, and Trust Acton Society. 1987. Impacts and in, Jluences : essays on media power in the twentieth 
century. London ; New York: Methuen., Heffer: 61,74, Panitch and Leys: 217, 
1585 Meacher, Michael. 1989. ̀The Labour Party and the Media', Free Press 55, October 1989. 
1586 Ed Straw, ̀Opposition into Government -A Strategic Framework', 26 June 1987, Neil Kinnock 
Personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
sal Gould, The unfinished revolution: 71. 
1988 Memo from Patricia Hewitt, February 26 1987. Also cited in Gould, The unfinished revolution: 71 
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polling showed that the poll tax was seen as the second most important problem for 
government, after improving the NHS. It was also the second most positive consideration 
about Labour that it was going to change the tax. 1589 Yet, the priorities that were seen to 
flow from this sort of information did not include campaigning on the community 
charge. ' 590 
Instead, it was seen as a negative. There were disagreements about what to replace it 
with, but what was seen as an important problem was that campaigning would have 
associated the party with the significant movement against non-payment. 1591 Despite 
recognising early on that the tax was deeply unpopular and seen as unfair, members of 
the SCA viewed that non-payment could be associated with tax evasion. 1592 ̀Senior 
Labour figures' told journalists that non-payment threatened to "... dispel the moderate 
new image ... " which 
had led to by-election success. 1593 Part of this defensive strategy 
was that a member of the leaders' office was despatched to identify the non-paying 
MPs. 1S94 Labour was not threatened with becoming part of a non-payment campaign. Yet, 
rather than have any association with such a campaign and thus possibly face being tarred 
with a `loony left' brush by the press, the SCA judged that it was better to forego 
campaigning on an issue which polls indicated was electorally popular. 
L9 The NOP poll indicated that 64% of the respondents believed this. (NOP Poll, 21 November 1990, Neil 
Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives). 
190 SCA, 'Summary of Polling, Post Major National NOP Poll', no date, Neil Kinnock personal papers, 
Churchill Archives. 
/9' An indication of the disagreements is provided by the leaders' office in private notes to Kinnock. 
(Leader's Office, 'Notes to Neil Kinnock for the National Executive Committee', January 24 1990, Neil 
Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives). 
1592 Christopher Riley, 'Labour Party Advertising: Notes on Two Group Discussions', November 1987: 13- 
6, Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
""i This is what 'senior Labour figures' had made clear to a sympathetic journalist. (Smith, David and 
Andrew Grice. 1990. 'Tories scorn Major's poll tax concession', Sunday Times, 25 March 1990). 
"" Neil Kinnock personal papers, Churchill Archives. 
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Appendix 2 to Chapter 6: The Right of Reply 
The upsurge of militancy surrounding the miners' strike saw some of the last successful 
attempts at gaining an industrial right of reply. 1595 However, in 1984, the TUC for the 
first time clearly identified that the right of reply should be a legal requirement. 1596 A 
series of concerned Labour Party MPs took this up in the House of Commons, taking as 
their cue a commitment to such a measure in the 1983 manifesto. 1597 Supported by the 
Labour leadership and the CPBF, Max Madden first took up the baton, followed by 
Austin Mitchell in 1984, Ann Clwyd in 1987 and Tony Worthington in 1989.1598 
In the course of these attempts, although the principle remained of public participation in 
challenging centralised editorial control, this issue was somewhat obscured as other 
themes were also introduced. By the time Mitchell introduced a Bill, the question was as 
much about standards as inaccuracy and bias. This was also a feature of Labour 
frontbench support for the Worthington Bill. Returning to an earlier theme, 
popularisation of the press was denounced as sensationalisation and trivial isation. 1s99 
Rather than challenging the strict libel laws, used by figures such as Maxwell in order to 
suppress investigation of his actions, Clwyd's Bill wished to extend them so that there 
`Jones, David, Press Campaign for, and Freedom Broadcasting. 1986. Media hits the pits : the media 
and the coal dispute. London: Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom. 
1596 Richardson, Alan. 1984. 'Make it Legal', Free Press 25 September/October 1984. 
1597 Labour, Party. 1983. The new hope for Britain : Labour's manifesto 1983. London: Labour Party.. 
1598 Allaun, Frank. 1984. 'Right of reply marches on', Free Press 22, January/February 1984. Allaun, 
Frank. 1988. Spreading the news :a guide to media reform. Nottingham: Spokesman.: 91-2. See also 
Baistow T., 'A notice-board for the faithful' in CPBF, Labour daily?: S. HOC 3 February 1989, col. 546- 
609, HOC 21 April 1989, col. 605-623, Tunstall, J. 1995. Newspaper power : the new national press in 
Britain. Oxford New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press.: 399. The former BBC employee 
and Guardian journalist Ann Clwyd became an MP in 1984. She had been a member of the 1972-1974 
Labour Party study group on the media. From 1987 until 1995, she was, variously, Labour's spokesperson 
on women, education, overseas development, Wales, media and national heritage, employment and foreign 
affairs. She was a member of the Shadow Cabinet from 1989-1993. (2001.11 ho's who : an annual 
biographical dictionary. London: A&C Black.: 411). Former lecturer Tony Worthington was elected an 
MP in 1987. He has been a Labour spokesman for oversees development foreign affairs, Northern Ireland. 
From 1997 to 1998, he was a minister in the Northern Ireland office. (2000. Dods parliamentary 
companion 2001: 168th year. London: Vacher Dod.: 331,2002.117io's who 2002: an annual biographical 
dictionary. London: A. & C. Black.: 2352-3). 
15" HOC 21 April 1989, col. 614, White, Aldan. 1984. 'MP in bid for right of reply law', Free Press 24 
July/August 1984. 
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would be legal aid for those wanting to sue for libel. ' 600 Worthington also supported such 
an approach. 1601 
The Labour Party was again divided over the problem of which body would oversee such 
a right of reply. Clwyd advocated a more democratic alternative to a court procedure. She 
argued for a Media Complaints Commission. Under proposals drawn up by the CPBF, it 
would be an independent body funded from the public purse, with a membership drawn 
from "... as broad and representative a sample of the population as possible". 1602 However, 
by the time of the debate over Worthington's Bill, this procedure had been rejected for 
less democratic alternatives. 
Worthington advocated that the Press Commission oversaw replies and, acting as a 
tribunal, would adjudicate on complaints. 1603 It was planned that the commission would 
be responsible to the Home Secretary and the House of Commons. Rather than any direct 
democratic mandate, the Home Secretary would appoint its members. 1604 In the debate on 
the Bill, however, the Labour frontbench advocated a different approach. Mark Fisher 
was concerned that the Press Commission would be government-appointed. This was 
because of his unease over how the Thatcher government had made such appointments 
and patronage generally. Nevertheless, rather than embracing broadening the franchise 
for such posts, he denounced such procedures as "... cumbersomely democratic ...... 
1605 
Fisher's answer was that the integrated ministry for arts and the media would oversee the 
right of reply. It is not clear, however, how this would answer the problem of government 
interference. 
1600 Allaun, Spreading the news: 91-2., Tom Baistow, ' The Predator's Press' in Buchan, Norman, and Tricia 
Sumner. 1989. Glasnost in Britain? : against censorship and in defence of the word. London: Macmillan.: 
68, Anon. 1987. 'Stop Press', Free Press 43, October 1987, Anon. 1988. 'Tories talk out Right of Reply', 
Free Press 45, February 1988, Trades Union Congress. Annual, Conference. 1988. Report of the 120th 
annual Trades Union Congress. London: T. U. C.. 
1601 HOC 3 February 1989, col. 546,579. 
1602 Anon. 1987. 'Right of reply could be law', Free Press 44, December 1987. 
1603 HOC 3 February 1989, col. 554. 
1604 HOC 21 April 1989, col. 605-6. 
1605 HOC for 3 February 1989, col. 601, HOC 21 April 1989, col. 622-3. 
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So, as Labour rejected direct democratic involvement in press decisions, the only method 
for any participation was through the right of reply. Yet, by the end of this period, the 
body to oversee the opportunity for such a right was still being debated. It would either 
be through the Press Commission responsible to the government or through the 
government itself. Although more democratic than being in the gift of the editor or 
proprietor alone, neither avoided the problem of state interference. 
Most importantly, though, the right of reply commitment did not make its way into the 
1992 manifesto. This was despite the fact that no party forum had explicitly rejected it. 
However, it would not be the last that would be heard of it. 
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Appendix 3 to Chapter 6: The municipal left and the cultural 
industries 
At the same time that, nationally, Labour politics was shifting to the right, another form 
of municipal socialism from that of Militant had developed at a local level. The upsurge 
of demands from the women's movement, the black community, lesbian and gay people 
and the disabled for equality, as a democratic requirement, influenced this. At its most 
distinctive, the municipal politics reflected the New Left's willingness to reconsider the 
relationship between local democracy, public participation and economic planning. 
Most notably associated with London's GLC, from 1981, Labour councils across the 
country had pursued radical policy priorities in areas including economic development 
and employment provision. These would affect press policies. 1606 The same Keynesian 
crisis which opened the ground for the whole party to make a short-term shift to the left 
nationally, as we saw in the last chapter, led to a slightly more prolonged left-wing move 
in local government - as socialists questioned the old social democratic certainties. 
There may not have been any identifiable municipal socialist programme. 1607 Yet, like 
other left-leaning forces we explored in the previous chapter, the majority of its adherents 
shared a democratic scepticism about, on the one side, the existing state's effectiveness 
and 1970s-style Labour corporatism, and, on the other, the right's belief in the market. 1608 
They attempted to challenge the Government's strategy of rolling back the state. But they 
1606 It was developed also in other areas including Manchester and Sheffield, as well as some London 
boroughs. In Liverpool, as well, another form of left leadership, which included Militant supporters, 
enacted a programme which successfully fought homelessness, but without wider public participation. 
(Wainwright, Hilary. 1987. Labour :a tale of two parties. London: Hogarth.: 127-36). The Government 
had stripped the flagship GLC of many of its former powers, such as housing and transport, in 1983. This 
left the municipal socialist councils to justify themselves through their grant-making function, in which job 
creation was a key part. (Sheldrake, John. 1989. Municipal socialism. Avebury, Aldershot: Avebury.: 56- 
7). 
1607 See Cochrane, Allan. 1993. Whatever happened to local government? Buckingham: Open University 
Press.: 29,40-1,42. 
1608 Wainwright, Labour: 95-6, Cochrane: 43, Chandler, J. A. 1991. Local government today. Manchester, 
Manchester U P, 1991.: Manchester University Press.: 242. Some leading advocates developed what we 
can now see as a forerunner of New Labour's `communitarian' thrust in this state scepticism. (Blunkett, 
David, and Keith Jackson. 1987. Democracy in crisis : the town halls respond. London: Hogarth Press.: 
214, cited in Chandler: 242). 
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showed some commitment to wider participation in decision-making and popular 
democratic involvement. As a leading proponent David Blunkett put it, they wanted to 
enable people to "... run their own affairs... " - at least in theory. 
' The extent of this 
commitment was mixed, even with the GLC. 
161° However, the GLC consciously 
attempted to increase democratic participation within the organisations to be financed, by 
encouraging co-operatives. 
Cultural Industries 
The municipal socialists' democratising initiatives, inadequately indicated by the News 
on Sunday, was related to the `cultural industries' approach. Two leading proponents, 
Ken Worpole and Geoff Mulgan, helped the conception enter mainstream Labour Party 
thought. 1611 They had worked at the GLC Community Arts Sub-Committee and then at 
the GLEB Cultural Industries Unit. 1612 
To a degree, this cultural industries approach represented a policy transfer from both 
investment strategies pursued by the French government and Northern Italian 
1609 Blunkett and Jackson: 5, quoted in Cochrane: 43. See also Wainwright, Labour. esp. 95-126, Gyford, 
John, and Mari James. 1983. National parties and local politics. London ; Boston: G. Allen & Unwin. - 
191-2. David Blunkett was a politics and industrial relations tutor and was leader of Sheffield City Council 
from 1980 to 1987, when he became an MP. He was a member of the NEC from 1983 to 1998. Blunkett 
was Labour spokesperson on health, education and employment. lie was Minister for Education and 
Employment from 1997-2001 and has since been Home Secretary. (Dod's parliamentary companion 2001 : 
168th year. London: Vacher Dod.: 97,2002. Who's who 2002: an annual biographical dictionary. London: 
A. & C. Black.: 205-6). 
1610 Hilary Wainwright convincingly looks to the diverse local lefts' historical development to explain this 
variation. It manifested itself in two ways. Some council structures were opened up to wider participation. 
The GLC's Women's Committee and some Manchester initiatives notably employed direct democracy. 
There was also some direct participation in the GLC's Industry and Employment Committee. Unions were 
consulted and some community groups were involved. Of particular note was the job creation strategy 
enacted by the Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB), with smaller similar initiatives by other councils. 
(Wainwright, Labour: 95-126). 
16" Geoff Mulgan worked for the GLEB before returning to academia and becoming a lecturer. lie was 
special adviser to Gordon Brown from 1990-2. He was co-founder and director of the think-tank Demos 
from 1993-1999 and member of the Prime Minister's policy unit from 1997-2000. Since 2000, he has been 
Director of the Performance and Innovation Unit at the Cabinet Office. 2001. Duo's who : an annual 
biographical dictionary. London: A&C Black.: 1493. 
'6'Z Mulgan, Geoff, Ken Worpole, and Group Comedia Publishing. 1986. Saturday night or Sunday 
morning? : from arts to industry: new forms of cultural policy. London ; Littlehampton, W. Sussex: 
Comedia Pub. Group : Distributed in the UK by G. Philips.: 13. 
453 
administrations linked to the Italian Communist Party. 1613 These ideas had been imported 
to Britain by the fertile minds of those involved with Marxism Today in Britain, who 
gave a positive appraisal of the market's role. 
There were two aspects to this approach. Firstly, the traditional social market position 
was to intervene to correct market failure. One difference with the cultural industries 
approach was what its advocates considered as the market's deficiencies. They were not 
only interested in dealing with deficits in diversity. Replicating other policies, they were 
also concerned with the market's failure to provide sufficient investment for the media 
industries to compete. 1614 The GLC theorists considered that bolstering the cultural 
industries would provide a potential engine of economic success. 1615 Thus, the traditional 
left conception of economic activity had been turned on its head. The superstructure had 
become the motor for the base. '616 
Again replicating broader notions, cultural industry advocates saw a greater role for the 
market to articulate the public's views. Market inadequacies in providing diversity did 
not lead to the market's replacement per se. Instead, they considered that state provision's 
problem was its insulation from the market, which made it unable to react to changes in 
public tastes and attitudes. ' 617 Thus, instead of answering the problems of top-down 
public involvement in the media by democratising access and provision and encouraging 
1613 Garnham, Nick and Epstein, Joyce. 1985. ̀Cultural Industries, Consumption and Policy', in The state of 
the art or the art of the state?: Strategies for the cultural industries in London, edited by Department for 
Recreation and the Arts Greater London Council. London: Greater London Council.: 162, The PCI was 
involved in coordinating co-operative artisan production, through the regional authority in the area around 
Bologna. (Mulgan and Worpole: 31, Greater London Enterprise Board. 1986a. Altered images : towards a 
strategyfor London's cultural industries. London: Greater London Enterprise Board.: 6, Freedman, 2000: 
197). 
1614 Thus, they viewed that if an outside state agency targeted investment, it would potentially lead to there 
being a more competitive media industry. Therefore, they regarded the media much more as a market form 
and for intervention to be justified in terms of competitiveness. 
1615 Thus, the GLEB's task was to work "... in and against the market: against the market's narrowing 
commercialising tendencies, but in the market place which is currently the main site where cultural needs 
are met or ignored". (GLEB, Altered Images: 4-5). Proof of this was indicated by the fact that printing and 
publishing was by then London's biggest manufacturing sector. The role of the cultural industries in the 
world competition for exports was also regarded as key. (Council, Greater London. 1985. London 
industrial strategy : the cultural industries. London: Greater London Council.: 14-5). 
1616 Mulgan and Worpole: 10. 
1617 Ibid. 
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user participation in production decisions, the adherents indicated that the market would 
play this role. Borrowing from liberal pluralist notions, through the market, the consumer 
could be king. 1618 
Yet, secondly, nevertheless, the ̀ cultural industries' approach had less influence than on 
broadcasting in shifting newspaper ownership policies in a pro-market direction. 1619 This 
was because the press was entirely in private hands and the public service ethos did not 
influence it in the same way as broadcasting. 1620 So, the cultural industries approach was 
as much a radical affirmation of previous Labour Party policies, at least on press 
diversity. When Mulgan at the GLEB considered advertising in the newspaper industry, 
he advocated solutions in line with previous interventionist policies. 1621 However, even 
here, he emphasised the market's beneficent role. He justified intervening by arguing that 
1618 In fact, adherents even saw a market controlled by "... right-wing populist businessmen... " would 
provide a more appetising alternative to a Labour movement press. This was because Labour movement 
newspapers had a "... habit of talking down to their audience in a way that the right does not seem to". 
(Mulgan, Geoff, and Ken Worpole. 1986. 'Selling the paper' in Curran, Bending reality: 139). Although 
they did not go by any means as far, other Marxists who had been involved in earlier Labour Party policy 
development in the Bennite times now also emphasised a positive role for the market, albeit tentatively. 
They highlighted the failure of the market's historic alternative, the public service media, to be populist, 
democratic and accessible. And they downplayed the potential option of public democratic accountability. 
Nick Garnham, along with Joyce Epstein, in a GLC blueprint for the cultural industries, echoed the market 
socialist conceptions we discussed earlier. The two detached the market per se from the "... capitalist mode 
of production". They saw that the important areas to concentrate on were to reduce ownership power and 
inequality of access to resources by consumers. If this was done, then in relating consumers, distributors 
and producers of cultural goods and services "... the market has much to recommend its. Indeed, they 
argued that even within a capitalist system, at such crucial moments as the creation of newspapers in the 
18th century, the market acted "... as a liberating cultural force". (Garnham, Nick and Epstein, Joyce. 1985. 
`Cultural Industries, Consumption and Policy', in The state of the art or the art of the state?: Strategies for 
the cultural industries in London, edited by Department for Recreation and the Arts Greater London 
Council. London: Greater London Council.: 151,152). 
1619 The Labour leadership shifted broadcasting policies more dramatically in a pro-market direction, as 
Freedman indicates. (Freedman, 2000: 197). 
1620 Mulgan makes a similar point to this. Mulgan, Geoff. 1985. ̀Advertising' in The state of the art or the 
art of the state?: Strategies for the cultural industries in London, edited by Department for Recreation and 
the Arts Greater London Council. London: Greater London Council.: 95. Another possible reason it was 
less influential could well have been that it emphasised the state's role in enhancing international 
competitiveness. This would have had less effect on the national and regional press. This was because 
international sales would rarely be key to a newspaper's success. (An exception is the Financial Times. At 
the time of writing, the majority of its sales were from outside of the UK). Certainly, the arguments about 
investing in cultural specificity in order to provide an internationally competitive edge would have little 
purchase. 
62' He proposed an advertising levy to subsidise newsprint and distribution and fund new publications. 
Mulgan also advocated that public authorities provide capital to groups without market access, as was the 
case with the News on Sunday, and legally guarantee newspaper distribution. (Mulgan, 'Advertising': 94). 
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advertisers' power interfered with the public accountability that the responsive market 
afforded. ' 622 
The Municipal Socialists and Their Legacy 
As with the cultural industries approach, the municipal socialists' legacy was mixed. In 
the event, the councils' effect was not huge. 1623 Yet, they did influence Labour's national 
strategy and media policy advocates of both right and left. Through the auspices of 
Marxism Today and the soft left, the cultural industries approach became "... very much 
the buzz thing. .. ". 
1624 
On the one hand, the municipal socialists' early influence was radical. As already 
indicated, the GLEB was at the forefront of the GLC's strategy to confront the Thatcher 
government's neo-liberal marketisation. Municipal socialism also provided an explicit 
challenge to old-style Keynesianism. Keynesianism was seen as "... not so much wrong 
as inadequate". 1625 Municipal socialists attempted to address the tension within the AES, 
which answered Keynesianism's deficiencies with increased centralisation and also 
democratic participation, by emphasising the latter. They argued that Keynesianism did 
not address the supply side sufficiently. However, the GLEB's strategy was unlike later 
forms of supply-side socialism that would be championed by the end of Kinnock's time 
as leader. The GLEB directly encouraged democratic co-operative ownership within the 
1622 Advertisers impeded consumers' ability to "... 'vote' albeit within the clear limitations of `consumer 
sovereignty' with their money". (Ibid.: 93-4). 
1623 Overall, the amount that the GLC spent was not enormous and "... the cultural industries strategy was 
unable to buck either the market or the government". (Freedman, 2000: 197). 
1624 Tricia Sumner interview with author, February 6 2002. Tricia Sumner was secretary to Labour Party's 
media and arts spokesman Norman Buchan and to the Labour Party arts committee. As she remembers it, 
Labour's media and arts policy under Buchan was "... very much... " influenced by the cultural industries 
approach by then. An early indication of this influence was that Geoff Mulgan was seconded from the GLC 
to prepare a large proportion of the national Labour Party's submission to the Peacock Committee. And 
Buchan provided a very positive introduction to the book written by Mulgan and Worpole, endorsing its 
cultural industries approach. In it, the authors advocated that Labour institute various boards. Part of their 
remit would be to finance commercial market ventures and public/private partnerships. (Mulgan and 
Worpole: 5-7,119-129). 
1625 GLEB, Altered Images: 5. 
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organisations it financed. 1626 Its influence was felt in the radical emphasis on co- 
operatives, democratic control and intervention to aid diversity. 1627 
On the other hand, it also embraced the market, with calls for commercial market 
ventures and public/private partnerships. In some ways, this was a precursor to the social 
ownership ideas taken up by the soft left nationally and embraced by the Labour 
leadership. This again would have more effect on broadcasting, as Freedman indicates. 
Nevertheless, shorn of its radical politics, the Labour leadership later shared this principle 
with regard to the press. It was at first happy to embrace this soft left approach, as part of 
its more pro-market attitude. The frontbench promoted the view that the Government 
should invest in the media and arts in order to provide for the nation's economic well- 
being. It increasingly ignored the argument that provision might be for the nation's 
democratic health, through greater diversity and democratic access. Yet, as we sawv, a 
later shift in press policy occurred, in tandem with that in overall economic strategy. At 
the same time that the commitment to Keynesian intervention waned and soft left 
influence on economic policy collapsed, the leadership rejected even the more marketised 
cultural industries approach to intervention. 
With regard to overall democratic control, the emphasis on the market, rather than public 
participation, in decisions over production and distribution, also influenced the soft left in 
accommodating to the party leadership's pro-market thrust. Democratic control had 
always been regarded with particular suspicion due to the powerful hegemony in British 
society of pro-market liberal pluralist nostrums of press freedom. With only weak support 
1626 Public ownership was seen "... not just as an end in itself, but as a means of extending the principle of 
socially useful production and the involvement of the workforce in planning that process". (GLEB, Altered 
Images: 6). The GLEB also wanted to increase diversity by encouraging production for and by women and 
black groups. (Greater London Enterprise, Board. 1986b. Printing matters : towards a strategy for the 
London printing industry. London: Greater London Enterprise Board.: 31-3,38-9). 
1627 Again, while its emphasis on market socialism may have indicated a shift towards the market in terms 
of overall national policy, such was the private nature of newspaper production that any emphasis on social 
ownership represented a radicalising trend. This can be identified in the book written by Mulgan and 
Worpole, which advocated policies for the national Labour Party from the GLC experience. In it, they 
advocated radical national policies for Labour, including the break-up of the 'Murdoch empire' and other 
multinationals in newspaper production, an advertising tax to fund new initiatives and an explicit 
commitment to democratic accountability. (Mulgan and Worpole: 119-129). 
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for participative democracy, as enthusiasm for state intervention diminished, there was no 
other choice. The market alternative increasingly became dominant. 
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 7: Labour's Political Communications 
Policy 
Blair's political communication policy was clear from the start. To a significant extent, it 
reverted to the later Kinnock period. On becoming leader, Blair reinstalled the key 
strategists Mandelson and Philip Gould to key positions of power. Gould once again 
oversaw the focus groups. The period up to the 1997 general election saw Blair appoint 
the MP Mandelson to a central media co-ordinating role in the new headquarters at 
Millbank. 1628 Policy was centralised around the leadership. There was ferocious attention 
to keeping the party on-message. Press relations would no longer even be nominally 
under NEC control. 1629 
However, there were divergences from the Kinnock years. There is sense in which the 
revised press and media strategy was particularly attractive under New Labour. Franklin 
is among those who have perceptively chronicled the broader commitment of parties and 
politicians in government to using the media to market their politics and the centrality of 
New Labour to this. 1630 But in one particular respect, New Labour's politics could appeal 
to the different layers of the media hierarchy, not just the senior press management and 
owners, in a way that Labour, at least in the recent past, could not. The Labour left had 
made much of the way that the SDP was said to be particularly attractive to 
journalists. 1631 New Labour's politics had a similar pull. One disillusioned moderniser 
Bryan Gould describes a grouping that was found markedly in the national media, which: 
"... are the people who had always wanted a party that would salve their consciences 
1628 Gould, The unfinished revolution: esp. 299-304. The focus group approach had continued to a limited 
extent after 1992 when focus group results that blamed the unions for electoral defeat shaped the strategic 
debate in the Smith era, despite evidence to the contrary. (Wring, Political marketing and organisational 
development: 16). As we saw, however, other areas of political communications diverged under Smith. 
1629 The arrangements tipulated that a new Joint Campaigns and Elections Committee would oversee 
"... strategic responsibility for campaigns and message delivery. " (Labour Party National Executive, 
Committee. 1997. Partnership in power. London: National Executive Committee, Labour Party, 1997. ). 
1630 Franklin, Packaging Politics, 2004. 
1631 See Benn, The end of an era and Stephenson, Hugh. 1982. Claret and chips : the rise of the SDP. ' 
London: Joseph, 1982. 
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... without threatening the comfortable privilege which they enjoyed and expected... 
")632 
New Labour appealed to this layer. 
An indication of Blair's attraction to the media world was the way that media executives 
were at the centre of Blair's party leadership campaign. It was millionaire media bosses 
Barry Cox and Greg Dyke and who linked up with their ex-LWT employee Mandelson in 
the campaign. 1633 Cox, as the Blair team's treasurer, was said to have raised much of its 
funding from other senior media executives. 1634 Indeed, the support of Greg Dyke, who 
was to become BBC director general, could have said to be emblematic of Labour's 
shift. 1635 
A similarity of Blair with Kinnock was how the broadsheet press initially treated them. 
The difference was that Blair's honeymoon was far lengthier. 1636 Another key difference 
from Kinnock's time was that Blair was more naturally in tune with the instincts of the 
press and media agenda. Unlike Kinnock, who had to adapt, to some extent 
unsuccessfully, Blair was at ease with the soundbite culture. 
1632 These people had always had a problem with Labour... " - until New Labour was born. Conduits, such 
as Mandelson, before his fall from grace, inhabited and understood this small world, which had been, 
nonetheless, "... disproportionately important in shaping the political agenda.... ". (Gould, Bryan. 1999. 
'The long retreat from principle', New Statesman, January 29 1999). Other writers in the US have made a 
similar point about national journalists' political leanings. The Conservative right in America has long 
denounced the liberal bias of the press. In terms of individual journalists, they can point to surveys that 
show that a large majority of the Washington press corps voted for the Democrats. Yet, as McChesney 
indicates their liberalism is of a similar kind - liberal on social issues but more conservative on economic 
ones. (McChesney, Corporate media: 55-7). 
1633 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 202. 
1634 Cohen, Nick. 2000. Cruel Britannia : reports on the sinister and the preposterous. London: Verso, 
2000.: 236. 
1635 Dyke was a left-wing journalist who became a millionaire through his involvement with LWT. He was 
quoted as saying after making his money and attending American business courses that he had changed his 
view to consider that "... it was possible to run capitalism with a social conscience". (Horrie, Chris, and 
Steve Clarke. 2000. Citizen Greg : the extraordinary story of Greg Dyke and how he captured the BBC. 
London: Simon & Schuster, 2000.: 245,248). 
1636 Blair's sympathetic biographer noted of his leadership election campaign that it: "... was remarkable for 
two things: the utter blandness of his platform, and the favourable media coverage it received". (Rentoul: 
393). Blair's first conference as party leader in 1994 was striking for the laudatory comments heaped on 
him. Simon Jenkins in the Times, the old Tory warhorse but Major sceptic Simon Heifer in the Telegraph 
and, less surprisingly, the Financial Times were all effusive in their praise. (Culf, Andrew. 1994. 'Tory 
papers salute Blair as prime minister in waiting', The Guardian, October 6 1994). 
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However, a most significant change from the pre-Smith days was the targeting of the 
tabloid press. Campbell, whose background was on the tabloids and had worked on News 
Corporation title Today, provided a vital link and became the central figure in the new 
media strategy. As former senior journalist Nicholas Jones told the author, Campbell 
superseded Mandelson from the time he became Blair's press secretary. 
1637 
Now, the Sun was in Labour's sights. In Kinnock's time, Mandelson had primarily 
considered the broadsheets as necessary to target, to set the agenda for the all-important 
broadcasters. Campbell saw that the tabloids also set the agenda for broadcast journalists 
-a correct assessment, as the former broadcaster Jones confirmed to the author. 
1638 In 
addition, as we have seen, Kinnock had believed that `it was the Sun wot won it'. 
Academic research by a journalist who was to become a Blair-sympathising MP gave 
important support for this view. The tabloids had influenced sufficient voters. '639 
Whether this was an accurate assessment or not is not the important point at this juncture. 
Other studies had questioned whether the newspapers had had a sizeable effect. 1640 The 
1637 Jones told the author in 2002: "He and Blair were working as a partnership... Campbell is the one with 
the flair, he will be the one who will be thinking ahead... Of course Mandelson and Gould were 
phenomenally important. But I think it was Campbell who from the very word 'go' was working out ... the 
projection of Blair. Where Campbell is so good is in understanding the needs of the media some way down 
the track... So, he will be thinking ahead to how they are going to exploit something, and that is something 
that he picked up and they did very very quickly - whether we are talking about the World Cup, whether 
we are talking about the next summit meeting... So, if... you think of how Campbell orchestrated the 
defections of Tory MPs ... they were always timed to coincide with the start of the Tory conference. They 
know just what they were doing. If you were thinking about how they got top people, to declare their 
support for Labour, that was always done on the eve of critical moments... I think Campbell's strength.., is 
that whole inner ability to be able to predict to Blair how the popular papers are going to react, because.., of 
the impact that the popular papers and the broadsheets, the newspapers as a whole, have on this agenda 
setting in the media. " (Jones interview). 
1638 "If one of the populars has a really big story ... we would pick it up. Have their headlines, 
have their 
story directions influenced us? Yes, they have. If you listen to any interview on the Today Programme, and 
one of the papers is running a big campaign, and the minister is in there, once you have seen today's 
papers, now we don't say 'the Mirror' or 'the Sun', but you have only got to listen to the interviews, they 
are reflecting the newspapers. " (Jones interview). 
1639 Linton was to spend a year researching the influence of the tabloids on the 1992 election. Ile concluded 
that the tabloids, particularly, did influence the election. lie insisted that the "... main recruiting sergeant for 
John Major in the last few months before the election was the Sun... " and that the Daily Mail and the 
Express group were also important allies. (Linton, Martin. 1995. Was it The Sun wot won it? Oxford: 
Nuffield College, 1995.: esp. 29-31). 
"40 Martin Harrop and Margaret Scammell in Butler, David, and Dennis Kavanagh. 1992. The British 
general election of 1992. Basingstoke: Macmillan., John Curtice and lioli Semetko, 'Does it matter what 
the press say? ' in Heath, A. F., Roger Jowell, and John Curtice. 1994. Labour's last chance? : the 1992 
election and beyond. Dartmouth, Aldershot: Dartmouth Pub. Co.. Even Kinnock may have been mislead by 
Lord McAlpine's assertion. McAlpine wanted to belittle Conservative Chris Pattern's role in the campaign. 
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more important question is whether Labour would have won without the tabloids in 1997 
-a question which cannot be satisfactorily answered without consulting a crystal ball. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Labour was leading in the polls before the rapprochement with 
the tabloids and held on to that lead is salient in this regard. 
What is important is that this assessment confirmed the judgment that had already been 
made. That was that the Labour Party needed the support of the tabloid newspapers, and 
particularly the Sun, if it was to be elected. Despite the claim that his wife would not 
allow the title in the house, it became clear that the Sun was Labour's prize after Blair 
took over the leadership. 1641 Both Campbell, who experienced the press's drubbing of the 
former party leader at first hand, as both a frontline journalist and a Kinnock ally, and 
Blair shared this view. 1642 After the election, such was Blair's gratitude that he wrote to 
the Sun's then editor "... to thank you for your magnificent support... " which "... really 
did make the difference". '643 
(Oborne: 140). In praising the editors, he could strike a right-wing blow against the more patricianary Tory. 
The Sun's former chief leader writer was another sceptic about the claims. (Spark, Ronald. 1997. ̀ It was 
Rupert Murdoch wot done it', Daily Telegraph, March 19 1997). For other positions in this debate see also 
the discussion in Franklin, Packaging Politics, 2004: 219-220 and in Greenslade: Press Gang: 606-7. 
164 Anne Robinson wrote in her Sun column that Cherie Blair had told her at a journalist reception that she 
did not allow the Sun in her house. (Glover, Stephen. 1995. ̀This bogus love affair', Evening Standard, 
December 13 1995). 
164Z Peter Mandelson, when asked on behalf of the author, said that, in planning for the 1997 election, 
Labour strategists had researched the 1992 treatment of Kinnock. Their view was "... one of horror, that 
any party could have been subjected to such horror in a country ... Tony Blair, reading all this, said: ̀ I 
would not have voted Labour myself. "' (Mandelson, Peter, Lecture at the London School of Economics, 
February 25 2003). As for Campbell: "Ile has always made it clear that that was the thing that has driven 
him, was the way in which the tabloids destroyed Kinnock, that was the thing that he was determined never 
ever should happen to Blair... That is of fundamental importance. "(Jones interview). According to 
Campbell's biographer, Blair and Campbell believed that the Sun's support "... was a necessary, and 
possibly a sufficient precondition for Labour victory at the General Election. " Blair called on MPs after 
being elected leader to "... pay 'more attention to the tabloids'. " This particularly focused on the ̀ Murdoch 
press': "Alastair Campbell was profoundly affected, well before becoming Downing Street Press Secretary, 
by two visceral experiences. One was the way the media destroyed Neil Kinnock as a credible Leader of 
the Opposition. The other was the Media Class's destruction of John Major as Prime Minister. He is 
determined the same fate should not afflict Tony Blair. Everything he has done as Press Secretary is 
designed to prevent that - including the bullying, the manipulation, the distortion and above all the 
cultivation of News International. " (Oborne: 140-1,194). 
164' Interview with Greenslade, Roy. 1997. 'Nice one Sun, says Tony', The Guardian, May 19 1997. Also 
cited in Draper, Derek. 1997. Blair's hundred days. London: Faber and Faber, 1997.: 129 and Freedman, 
2000: 225. 
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The tabloids, Murdoch and democracy 
This feting of the tabloids was termed by one perceptive commentator as an aspect of 
"... a ruling ideology of elite populism... ". 1644 However, this could be seen as, more 
accurately, a tension between facilitating a specific elite, a business elite, and populism. 
One aspect of the speech at the Hayman Island particularly likely to appeal to the self- 
styled pro-market ̀ anti-elitist' Murdoch was Blair's opposition to the Establishment and 
the old-boy network. 1645 In this sense, both Blair and Murdoch shared a market populist 
outlook, particularly identified with the United States. 1646 
In Thomas Frank's fascinating work, he chronicles the development of this market 
populist phenomenon in the United States, as part of a new neo-liberal consensus. In the 
market populist world, markets express the will of the people through demand and 
supply. The entrepreneur, rather than being part of an elite, represents the people's will. 
Therefore, any union or party, profession or expert wanting to criticise or regulate 
business is, de facto, anti-democratic. They are the elite. Borrowing from Hayek's 
analysis, they egotistically ignore the people. Thus, an influential US text saw the 
supposed triumph of market-dominated globalisation as a victory for democracy, as 
markets were "voting machines". By buying goods or even watching commercials, 
people were voting for the market. Others argued that, in financial markets, popular stock 
ownership meant people were voting `every hour'. 1647 
Thus, this view challenged what we can term the traditional social democratic conception 
of economic democracy - that state intervention, i. e. regulation, could be justified on 
behalf of the people. Some corporate gurus linked such arguments to the view that there 
1644 Certainly, Cohen is correct to point out what would be the problems for New Labour of the potential 
takeover of Manchester United by News Corporation's BSkyB, torn between being populist backers of the 
supporters and 'Murdoch's facilitator'. (Cohen, Cruel Britannia: 234). 
1645 McKie, Clingers: 117. 
1646 This was also a possible inspiration for the Blair's later 'forces of conservatism' theme. While there is 
undeniably snobbery and elitism shown in criticisms of the Sun, a relevant notion runs through the 
argument of Matthew Parris that to criticise Rupert Murdoch shows a 'fear of democracy'. (Parris, 
Matthew. 1998. ̀How Murdoch interferes less than other propreitors', New Statesman, March 14 1998. ) 
1647 Frank: 29-31,43,56,55,93. 
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was a New Economy based on new management ideas. They. hoped that the stock 
exchange would carry on rising as it had got rid of these old tools of economic 
democracy. For workers, this New Economy conception saw unions - instruments of this 
old economic democracy - being replaced by flattened anti-hierarchical organisations 
where all people were market agents. Thus, even `downsizing' was argued as a 
democratic measure. People freed from the constraints of corporate life - i. e. fired - 
would now be ̀ free agents' able to take advantage of the market. 1648 
The thinkers of Demos who became Blair's No. 10 advisers were conduits for these ideas 
entering New Labour's consciousness. Leadbetter and Mulgan wrote on New Economy 
and market populist themes, some criticising regulatory state control and praising the 
democracy of the market. These works attracted praise from Blair and Mandelson among 
others. 1649 
However, this view of market populism - of one dollar, one vote - was plutocracy, not 
democracy. As indicated before, people neither voted for Rupert Murdoch nor Bill Gates. 
Also, the view that the retreat of intervention was a motor of prosperity was exposed by 
the stock market falls in the US and latterly Britain, which highlighted the need for such 
1650 
regulation. 
1648 Ibid.: 169,179-80,203-4. 
`9 Mulgan, for instance, cited Hayek's critique that the market was "... more democratic than the formal 
institutions of democracy... ". He argued that Hayek's conception of the inferiority of the state to the 
market had become ̀devastating' in the era of new management techniques. (Mulgan, Geoff. 1994. Politics 
in an antipolitical age. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.: 127). This was linked with the implausible claim 
that taxation and interventionist regimes "... can all be traced back to absolutism and monarchical rule... ". 
This is an assertion clearly questioned by the history of the United States. (Leadbetter, Charles, and Geoff 
Mulgan. 1997. 'Lean Democracy and the Leadership Vacuum', Pp. 246-259 in Life after politics : new 
thinking for the twenty-first century, edited by Geoff Mulgan and Demos. London: Fontana, 1997.: 256, 
Frank: 351). When Mulgan and another person who was to be employed as a No. 10 adviser Andrew 
Adonis wrote, they considered a major threat to democracy was "... democratic bureaucracy... " - or 
regulatory state control - and ignored the problem of business power. (Adonis, Andrew and Mulgan, Geoff. 
1997. ̀Back to Greece: The Scope for Direct Democracy' in Mulgan, Life: 232). According to Frank, 
although the works seemed impressive; "... what Leadbetter and Mulgan had done was simply round up 
various cliches from popular management literature and, adopting a tone of extreme historical 
righteousness, recast them as political advice. It was all there: The flattened, antihierarchical corporation as 
the way of the future, attacks on Taylorism, breathless praise for the ̀ learning organization', the magic of 
`networks', even talk about ̀ free agents'. " (Frank: 347-8) 
1650 Ibid.: 86-7,97,93,366-9. 
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Focus groups and the party 
Nevertheless, marketplace techniques, when applied to politics, were seen thus to be part 
of the same ̀democratisation'. Rather than trying to democratise business, the view was 
that not only should government be pro-business, democracy should learn from a market 
model, as we saw in the last chapter. New Labour thinkers used similar arguments to 
champion an aspect of political communication strategy we discussed previously - the 
use of polling. Its use was seen as part of "... the demise in the faith of the efficacy of 
representative democracy... ", a notion made famous by Mandelson and applied equally 
to the use of focus groups and other PR-based techniques. 
1651 
This notion, often only tentatively expressed, was, typically, more stridently outlined by 
Philip Gould. He argued that such market research techniques were not just an aspect of 
campaigning. They were "... an important part of the democratic process: part of a 
necessary dialogue between politicians and people, part of the new approach to 
politics". 1652 
As is famously known, the use of both the qualitative and quantitative polling techniques 
identified in the last chapter were redeployed in a similar way as under Kinnock, in an 
approach not seen under Smith. 
They were part of a strategy which led to further party centralisation along the lines 
identified previously. While disagreeing about much, Peter Mair and Anthony Barnett 
concur that what New Labour has attempted to provide is a Partyless Democracy. There 
has been an attempt to eliminate inner party dissent and intra-party democracy. The party 
as a level of mediation between government and citizen is dispensed with. The strategy is 
1651 Leadbetter, Charles, and Geoff Mulgan. 1997. ̀Lean Democracy and the Leadership Vacuum' Pp. 246- 
259 in Mulgan, Life.: 256. Mandelson argued that "... the era of pure representative democracy is slowly 
coming to an end... ". (Traynor, I., `Peter's Passions', The Guardian, 16 March 1998, cited in Franklin, 
Hand of History: 143). 
1652 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 297-8. "Focus groups and market research are an essential part of 
this dialogue. This is the new people's democracy - "... involving them in the political process". (Gould, 
The unfinished revolution: 328). 
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undemocratic in the sense that the potential for choice and debate is done away with. 1653 
In this sense, this view shares the dangers of the ̀ end of politics' notion we considered in 
Chapter 1. This is `corporate populism' where there is attachment to big business, at 
times in conflict with `the will of the people'. ' 654 
In this sense, it can be seen as part of the same market populism that married Blair's 
instincts with those of Murdoch. As the remarkable television documentary series on the 
use of Freudian techniques, marketing and modern politics, The Century of the Self 
explained, it was part of a conception that saw voters as individualised marketised 
consumers. Moreover, the focus group technique had been employed since earlier on in 
the last century by PR agencies and advertisers, under the influence of Freudians, to 
unmask unconscious desires, which could then be satiated. People were encouraged not 
to talk rationally in the groups organised by political strategists, but to discuss their 
feelings. This replicated what had happened in advertising-based groups. 1655 
New Labour saw the focus groups' use as a triumph of a new form of democracy and the 
end of elitist politics. What the elitist slant of the TV documentary emphasised was that 
'b" Mair, Peter. 2000. "Partyless Democracy. " New Left Review.: 21-35, Barnett, Anthony. 2000. 
"Corporate Populism and Partyless Democracy. " New Left Review.: 81-9. 
16S° This work's definition of this does not entirely accord with Barnett's. (Barnett: 81-9). 
1653 This method was regularly employed in focus groups regularly prior to 1992, along with the 
psychological dissecting of the results. So for one instance among a number, one report discusses the 
"... desire for strong, decisive and visible leadership ... (Parent-child relationship)". (Butterfield et al). This 
method was also employed after 1992. So Gould's records of a focus group taken in January 1997 in the 
run up to election indicates such comments as "I am frightened about a leap in the dark" and "I feel 
comfortable now. " (Gould, ̀ Top-Line Findings' January 9 1997, quoted in Gould, The unfinished 
revolution: 283, my emphasis). Another example of this process was a Labour practitioner's case study of 
the Falkirk by-election in 2002, considering focus group work which Labour campaigners embarked on 
before the election. The appeal of the ̀ product', Labour candidate Eric Joyce, was moulded to respond to 
the strong support of focus groups for the previous left Labour candidate Dennis Cannavan. However, this 
did not mean that his position shifted to support Canavan's policies. In a campaign video produced partly 
responding to the feelings of those expressed in the focus groups, he merely showed his appreciation for 
Canavan and controversially implied that he himself was in the traditional Labour mould. As the Labour 
Party press officer involved with the campaign said: "A lot of this is not rational ... It is about getting a 
good feeling from voters. " (Brind, Don. 2002. The Labour Video Project, Presentation given to the 
Bournemouth University/London School of Economics Promotional Practices and Political Participation 
conference, 22 November 2002). 
466 
the problem for New Labour was that such techniques only amplified focus groups 
participants' `maze of contradictory desires'. 
'656 
However, what the documentary's fascinating analysis ignored was that what was being 
offered group participants was not a democratic process. In encouraging these 
"... unelected and unaccountable groups of individuals... """ to express their feelings, 
they were not being given the chance to provide their own rationally and consciously 
developed alternatives and to select between them. Instead, the focus group staff 
interpreted the deliberately undeveloped desires. Equally, as Franklin makes clear, 
through its news management techniques, Labour was shaping the information on which 
these focus groups were forming their ideas. 1658 This mode of consultation, rather than 
decision-making, had echoes, albeit bereft of its Freudian implications, in what was now 
happening in the local Labour Party policy forums. 
Representation, press policy and the unions 
As indicated in the chapter, Labour's press ownership policy did not face the concerted 
opposition within the party from the unions that such a policy shift would have 
encountered in the past. One reason for this was that it was not one of the TUC's 
priorities. The TUC told press activists that its limited resources were to be channeled 
into other concerns. '659 
According to Mike Smith, the then head of the TUC's Press and Information Department, 
the feeling was that attempts to set up a Labour movement newspaper and change press 
ownership policies had `run their course'. 1660 One reason was that the TUC was 
paralleling the party by concentrating on getting better representation for itself, rather 
1656 The Century of the Self, Part Four, RDF Media, BBC Two. 
1657 Franklin, Bob, and Trust Catalyst. 1998. Tough on soundbites, tough on the causes ofsoundbites : New 
Labour and news management :a Catalyst paper. London: Catalyst Trust, 1998. 
1658 Ibid. 
1659 Granville Williams interview. 
1660 Other reasons cited were that the unions themselves were more involved in campaigning on press 
ownership and that it was felt with a hostile government in office there was little purchase in attempting to 
develop policy in this area. (Mike Smith, interview with author, October 12002). 
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than by following the media union's demands to concentrate on attempting to increase 
diversity. They were following a strategy of engaging with the existing press rather than 
challenging it. 
As Aeron Davis' work makes clear, the unions had shifted from a position of supporting 
alternative newspapers as a key strategy, to professionalising their PR operations. The 
end of the TUC's Media Working Group "... appeared to coincide with a new attitude 
towards the media". The TUC relaunched itself as a `campaigning and public affairs 
organisation'. 1661 Spin pundit and broadcaster Nicholas Jones had advised the unions in 
his 1986 book Strikes and the Media to engage rather than enrage the media. 1662 Jones 
agreed with the author that, subsequently, the unions had followed this path in a "... real 
charm offensive". 1 663 Davis shows that unions heeded Jones' call. They increased media 
contact and communication resources in the 1990s and improved their attitudes towards 
public relations. 166 As Williams puts it: "Gradually trade unions moved towards setting 
up their own press and PR departments to try and get their views across in the media. 
And so, they had moved as well towards a policy of accommodation rather than structural 
reform. 991665 One senior media union official concluded, the TUC was "... very much 
establishing good relations with existing power, rather than challenging power ... I think, 
like the Labour Party, they had become much more interested in good relations with the 
mass media". 1666 
In 1994, the TUC relaunched its communications organisation - along similar lines to the 
Labour Party before and after Smith. Almost ten years after Labour, it set up a 
Campaigns and Communications Department which included, as part of its remit, 
166' Davis, Aeron. 2002. Public relations democracy : public relations, politics, and the mass media in 
Britain. Manchester: Manchester University Press.: 114-5,122,125-149. 
"Z Jones, Nicholas. 1986. Strikes and the media: communication and conflict. Oxford: Blackwell. 
'663 Jones interview. 
1664 Davis, Public relations democracy: 179). 
1665 Granville Williams interview. As a senior NUJ official told the author: "It was a response to the 
political decline of the Labour movement ... the unions started to develop their modem media strategies, 
and it was an attempt to win public acceptance of the trade unions. " (Tim Gopsill interview). 
'666 Tim Gopsill interview. 
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renewing media relations and engaging in opinion research. 
1667 This shift in emphasis 
prompted the NUJ's general secretary to voice fears that the TUC was trying to stifle 
dissent, like the Labour Party "... in case they might upset the media or their political 
friends... ". He suggested this was counterproductive, even in terms of getting 
coverage. 1668 
One reason for this collapse of enthusiasm for diversity may have been the demise of the 
News On Sunday. As we saw, sizeable parts of the trade union leadership invested large 
sums of money in the project. Along with members of the Labour Party, from Kinnock 
downwards, they saw the News on Sunday as a vehicle for Labour representation and 
diversity. As was also indicated, some of those closer to the project were profoundly 
demoralised. And unions cited its failure as the reason not to campaign for proposals to 
democratise and diversify the press. Williams, of the North West regional council of the 
TUC and the CPBF, agreed that it affected the most committed unions' view to 
campaigning on press diversity: "It did have a very important effect, if you want, in 
closing down that.. . idea of a radical ... solution. s1669 The demoralisation, as a senior NUJ 
official told the author, added to the feeling among union leaders that they were not 
"... interested at all in running their own media. I think they are interested in good 
relations with existing media... ". 1670 
166' Mike Smith, interview with author, October 1 2002, Trade Union, Congress. 1996. General Council 
report: Congress 1996: the 128th annual Trades Union Congress, 9-13 September, Blackpool: Trade Union 
Congress, 1996.: 138. 
1668 Foster, John. ̀ The TUC is dying of boredom', The Journalist, October 1999. 
1669 "They put their money in and they thought there would be some expertise there to make it work. That is 
the sad thing - it didn't.... It was the Labour daily but in a different, mutated form.... There were big 
meetings and there were big personal commitments - both in putting money in and also in supporting a 
paper, which each week that it came out, your heart sank further and further. So I think you are right... I 
don't think there was ever a wide debate - it was a kind of silence. You would get some meetings where 
people would say: ̀ What are the lessons of the News on Sunday? '. But most people thought it was like a 
dear friend that had died...: `Don't talk about it': ' (Granville Williams interview). 
1670 Tim Gopsill interview. 
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THE PRESS COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY IN GOVERNMENT 
This is, primarily, a study of policy formation in the Labour Party. However, it would be 
remiss to not further consider how the state and state actors influence Labour in 
government. This links both to the question of Labour representation in the press and 
press ownership policy. This is, of course, a huge analytical question, of which this 
theory-testing work as a whole touches upon. At this stage, however, we can make a few 
points, both about approaching this study and about how in practice Labour acted on 
coming into office. The first is that Labour confronted an administration that had been 
significantly centralised and it centralised the process further, as we shall see in a 
moment. 
The second is that we are studying party policy formation, rather than government 
implementation. 1671 Here, despite Michael Hill's questioning of this approach to studying 
state policy creation, it is appropriate to consider the state policy process as a series of 
stages, albeit with complex feedback flows, of which party policy creation need only be 
considered in relation to some. 
1672 Hill, himself, usefully creates a typology of the whole 
state policy creation process, as having a party political, a bargaining and an 
administrative thread, which we will adapt. '673 
'671 The two can be confused. If we were considering a state policy process, we would need to take into 
account implementation as well as formation. The development of party policy in government is not the 
same. 
1672 One study identifies the stages as initiation, information, consideration, decision, implementation, 
evaluation and termination. Of these, only the first four need concern us. (Hill, Michael. 1997. The policy 
process in the modern state. London: Prentice Hall, 1997.: 18-27). 1673 
Party Political Bargaining Administrative 
Key actors Parties Pressure groups Civil servants 
Stage - space Public Public and private Private 
Key stage - time Early Middle End 
(Ibid.: 111). This is perhaps over-rigid in its delineation -a point Hill tacitly acknowledges later. (Ibid.: 
116). This rigidity is ironic considering Hill's concern over other stagist typology. 
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Party Politics 
Even those theorists of the Labour Party considered in Appendix 1 to Chapter 1 who 
placed the largest stress on external factors in Labour government policy formation, saw 
the creation of party policy as important to consider. What the Marxist and elitist 
theorists emphasised was the dominance of the leadership. As we saw earlier in this 
chapter, the leadership under the new right further strengthened its hold on the party. So, 
in a sense what we are considering now in analysing the influence of the party on 
government policy is that of the leadership on state policies. 
Hill notes that, while journalists tend to exaggerate the party political influence on the 
state policy process, political scientists tend to underplay them. 1674 Nevertheless, past 
comparative studies both of central government - at least with regard to Europe and 
Australia - and local government have shown that policy outputs have been affected by 
having different parties in political control. 1675 Particularly, while Castles is guarded 
about making huge claims for political parties' power, from his research we can argue 
that parties have some influence in policy development. 1676 
Nevertheless, this influence is proscribed by significant limits. We have referred to other 
extra-party influences on the policy formation of globalisation in this chapter and the 
constraints of capitalist accumulation on policy development in Chapter 1. At this stage, 
we will touch on the influences of the bargaining process, with the role of interest or 
lobbying groups and that of the administrative process, including that of civil servants. 
1674 Ibid.: 113. 
1675 L. J. Sharpe and Kenneth Newton's comparative study of local government (where a number of other 
variables can be brought under control) indicated this. (Sharpe, L. J., and Kenneth Newton. 1984. Does 
politics matter? : the determinants of public policy. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984.: esp. chapter 9, cited in Hill: 
36) 
1676 Ibid.: 36, citing Castles Francis, G., and Research European Consortium for Political. 1982. The Impact 
of parties : politics and policies in democratic capitalist states. London: Sage. While such studies might 
disprove a more crude Marxist analysis, for instance, it is questionable to include these as a variant of 
pluralism, however, as Hill does. 
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Bargaining1677 
It was made abundantly clear that there would be no return-to the 1974 government-style 
corporatism on Labour's return to office. 1678 Instead, as we have seen, Blair's offer of 
`fairness not favours' meant that beer and sandwiches at No. 10 were exchanged for 
minimal guarantees on union representation. In government, in contrast to the pluralist 
notions, adapted into corporatism, union influence was much reduced compared to the 
previous Labour administration. 1679 
Instead, business was the dominant force in policy bargaining. An example of this was 
provided by the use of task forces. 1680 Richards and Smith see that trade unionists were 
involved in these. 1681 And it would be a mistake to ignore the role of such pressure 
groups such as NGOs on individual policy determination, away from the task forces. 
However, there was little representation of users and consumers. 1682 Instead, ̀corporate- 
ism' of a new sort became the order of the day. Among those task forces created in 1997, 
167 The extent to which the bargaining process - or as it is now better described, the lobbying process, is 
overt, according to Hill, depends on the extent there is `public controversy' on an issue. (Ibid.: 117) This 
points to a perennial problem with media policy analysis. The degree to which there is public controversy 
is, largely, gauged by the media. During the lobbying by the BMIG, the members' newspapers gave the 
BMIG relatively uncritical coverage. (Goodwin, Peter, and Institute British Film. 1998. Television under 
the Tories : broadcasting policy, 1979-1997. London: BFI Publishing, 1998.: 144) Thus, press ownership 
questions may be an example of where 'public controversy' is more difficult to assess. This may indicate 
that that press ownership lobbying could remain more covert than other equally controversial issues. 
However, competition between newspapers and between the newspapers, and other printed media and 
broadcasters, while more muted, provides a limited counterbalance to this. 
1678 See Middlemas, Keith. 1980. Politics in industrial society : the experience of the British system since 
1911. London: Deutsch, 1980. and Coates, David. 1980. Labour in power? :a study of the Labour 
Government, 1974-1979. London ; New York: Longman. 
1679 One indication of this was that, in his first term in office, Blair spent far less time with the unions than 
under the previous Wilson and Callaghan governments. Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon explain this 
shift as primarily caused by changes in party management: "Reforms of the party under Kinnock and Blair 
have reduced the problems posed by the unions, conference and NEC. " (Kavanagh, Dennis, and Anthony 
Seldon. 2000. ̀ Support for the Prime Minister; the Hidden Influence of No. 10' in Transforming 
government, edited by R. A. W. Rhodes, Economic, and Council Social Research. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
in association with Economic and Social Research Council.: 78) 
1690 The numbers of these are unclear. Part of the problem is the terms ̀ task force', review' and ̀ advisory 
group' have been used interchangeably. (Burch, Martin, and Ian Holliday. 2000. 'New Labour and the 
machinery of government' in Lawler and Coates: 72). 
1681 Richards, David , and Martin J Smith. 2001. New Labour, the Constitution and Reforming the State. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001.: 153. 
1682 Morrison, John, and Reuters. 2001. Reforming Britain : New Labour, new constitution? London: 
Pearson Education, 2001.: 288-9 
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the industrialist Lord Haskins chaired the one on regulation. 1683 The concerns expressed 
in the trade union movement about business influence were so stark that it led even a 
normally level-headed and comparatively moderate union leader to describe the DTI as 
"... acting as the provisional wing of the CBI". 1684 
Administration 
Given that the bargaining process in government was more significantly weighted to 
business, we can explore the influence the Labour leadership has had on policy-making in 
government. We will argue that policy-making has greatly centralised around the Labour 
leadership in Labour's time in office. Ministerial influence, but particularly Prime 
Ministerial influence has increased. Methodologically, this is important because it 
suggests that Labour policy, by now dominated by the leadership, would direct 
Government policy. But also, we shall argue that this was in part a product of the 
continued strategy to provide Labour press representation in office. 
The traditional `Whitehall model', in which career civil servants served varying political 
regimes impartially, was questioned by leading Labour actors in the 1970s. Benn was the 
most prominent critic of a civil service culture hostile to radical thought. 1685 However, 
1683 Richards and Smith: 153. This may have been another case of style rather than substance, with a 
Labour government determined to placate business interests by seeming to put them in at the heart of 
government. But the Labour leadership eagerly declared its enthusiasm for business from before entering 
office. Two examples of this need suffice. One was Labour's claim, based on its commitment to low 
business tax, and reduced business and labour market regulation, that: "... far from being in conflict, the 
interests of the Labour Party and business are in harmony. " (Labour, Party. 1997b. Labour's business 
manifesto : equipping Britain for the future. London: Labour Party, 1997.: 1). The second was the fact that 
during its re-election campaign, one of its slogans was ̀ Labour, the Party of Business'. While standing 
under this banner, Brown announced that in Labour's second term, the classroom should be the next target 
of the pro-business message. He wanted "... every teacher to be fluent in the language of enterprise". 
(Johnson, Frank. 2001. ̀ Election Sketch', Daily Telegraph, May 15 2001). 
1684 T&G News Release. 2002. `Judge's attack confirms T&G view of no confidence in DTI', T&G, 
January 18 2002. 
1685 Benn, Against the tide: esp. 329,505,508-9. A rather instrumentalist Marxist analysis from Ralph 
Miliband, following the radical elitists, had implicitly ascribed this traditional hostility partly to the social 
composition of the civil service. (Miliband, The state in capitalist society. 46-7). This had been criticised 
by Nicos Poulantzas. (Poulantzas, Nicos. 1973. The problem of the capitalist state. London: Heinemann 
Educational, 1973. )
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this model had been challenged in 1980s. The Thatcher regime effectively broke this 
mould by: 
" dissolving the civil service monopoly of advice to ministers 
" weakening senior civil servants' policy-making power, through a new 
`managerialism', which made them managers rather than policymakers 
developing a central policy unit to help contest civil service advice. '686 
Thus, civil service policymaking power has been eroded. One aspect of the Conservative 
introduction of managerialism was that policy-making either went upwards to the 
ministers or has been devolved to lower ranking civil servants. 1687 Thus, this is one way 
that ministers have increased their power at civil servants' expense. They "... have less 
autonomy than they used to... ". 1688 
However, none of these changes are such that one can simply accept the view that Britain 
had New Labour in Power after 1997.1689 Civil servants in Blair's administrations still 
had an important policy-making role. They still had a key position in what we can call 
agenda setting in decision-making - that is setting the terrain for Labour politicians' 
decisions. 1690 Nevertheless, the influence of Labour leadership policy on the New Labour 
government is extensive and change in the Government's machinery strengthened this. 
Secondly, decision-making has centralised more around No. 10. Some question that there 
has been an onset of presidentialism in government decision-making, emphasising the 
1686 Wilson Graham, K., and Colin Campbell. 1995. The end of Whitehall : death of a paradigm? Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995. cited in Ibid.: 83, Smith, Martin J, David Richards, and David Marsh. 2000. ̀ The 
Changing Role of Central Government Departments' in Rhodes, Transforming government: 160, Morrison: 
274. 
1687 Smith and Marsh: 160, Morrison: 274. 
1688 Smith and Marsh: 160,156,163. Philip Norton's research also suggests that senior ministers still have 
power, yet much of his research covers the period before 1997. (Norton, Philip. 2000. Barons in a 
Shrinking Kingdom: Senior Ministers in British Government. Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with 
Economic and Social Research Council, 2000.: 101- 124). 
1689 This was a surprising title for a book co-edited by David Coates - an extremely learned Marxist writer 
who previously delineated between Labour being in office and being in power. (Lawler and Coates, Coates, 
Labour in power? ). 
1690 Smith and Marsh: 156. 
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greater role for ministers, that has just been alluded to. 1691 However, developments since 
1997 have questioned that assessment, leaving one former senior civil servant to join with 
academics in seeing a continuing demise of Cabinet government under Blair. 1692 The 
leadership have reorganised policy-making control in government in a similar fashion to 
that in the Labour Party. In the same way that, in opposition, the party leadership had 
used the Short money to develop a centralised research base, so in government, it focused 
policy creation, while contradictorily wishing to disperse power. ' 693 
Thirdly, and related to this, the special advisers' function has been important. In the 
context of our concerns, they have played a dual role. They have helped facilitate the 
Government's centralisation and have had a key position in press relations and ̀ spin'. 
Special advisers are not new. Prime Minister Lloyd George appointed temporary 
ministerial advisers. Harold Wilson systematised the process. He appointed 30 `political 
advisers' in 15 departments, including No. 10, in 1974. For 20 years, the numbers did not 
vary much. Yet, they steeply rose after Labour entered office again. At the end of the last 
century, there were 74.1694 By 2002, there were 81 - two and a half times the earlier 
figure. '695 The amount spent on them doubled in Labour's time in office. '696 
1691 Ibid : 160. Philip Norton's research also suggests that senior ministers still have power, yet much of his 
research covers the period before 1997. (Norton: 101- 124). 
1692 The former head of the civil service Robin Butler is among those who view that there has been a 
demise of cabinet government. (Morrison: 277-81). 
1693 Richards and Smith: 148, Morrison: 277-81. This notably involved one of Ralph Miliband's sons, 
David, who headed the Policy Unit. Not to overplay the point, but continuing the Miliband theme, there 
was also an attempt to change the social composition of the civil service through recruitment in some 
departments, notably the Foreign Office. The Prime Minister's Office has also continued to expand, since 
Blair has emphasised his own role in policy creation. (Kavanagh and Seldon: 63-78, Richards and Smith: 
151). The Prime Minister's Policy Unit expanded. The Government appointed a minister without portfolio, 
with the role of policy coordination. Interestingly, its first incumbent was Mandelson. The Cabinet Office 
was strengthened in 1998, with the development of the Performance and Innovation Unit, reporting to 
Number 10, under the aegis of Geoff Mulgan. Again, this has strengthened the political centre at the 
expense of `the departmental view'. (Richards and Smith: 151. See also Kavanagh and Seldon: 72 and 
Burch and Holliday: 68). 
1694 Committee on Standards in Public Life. 2000. Sixth Report: Reinforcing Standards. HMSO.: Section 
6.5-6.7. See also Select Committee on Public Administration, Fourth Report: Special Advisers: Boon Or 
Bane, December 13 2001: Section 1, 
http: //www. publ ications. parliament. uk/pa/cm200I 02/croselect/cmpubadm/463/46302. htm 
1695 WilsonSir Richard ̀ The Civil Service in the New Millennium', 26 March 2002. 
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For Blair, the special advisers have been crucial in policy coordination. There is a clear 
communication line between these appointees and the departments. 1697 According to one 
senior civil servant interviewed by the author, after the minister, "... [t]hey are the second 
most influential people in the department. " 1698 Equally, important in government 
centralisation was that the number of No. 10 advisers increased from eight to 25 by the 
end of 1999.1699 
The role of special advisers is controversial in a number of respects. One, less 
commented on, has been their function in policing relations between the Labour Party 
and the government. An indication of this was the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, 
drawn up in July 2001. One important aspect of this is that it legitimates publicly-funded 
special advisers intervening to wrest control of the Labour Party's democratically- 
decided policies. The code argues thus: 
It would be damaging to the Government's objectives if the Party took a different 
approach to that of the Government, and the Government therefore needs to liaise 
with the Party to make sure that Party publicity is factually accurate and 
consistent with Government policy. 1700 
In other words, it was not only legitimate to use taxpayers money to have advisers 
working to see that the party's public face was "accurate", as the Government leadership 
saw it. Advisors could also operate to make sure the party's line was at one with 
16' The estimated amount spent on special advisers had doubled to nearly £4million a year, according to 
official estimates. (Committee on Standards in Public Life. 2000. Sixth Report: Reinforcing Standards. 
HMSO.: Section 6.8). 
1697 Richards and Smith: 151. See also Morrison: 281-3. 
1698 Personal interview with a senior civil servant, September 13 2002. 
1699 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Sixth Report: Reinforcing Standards, January 2000, HMSO.: 
Section 6.5-6.7. As the departing cabinet secretary Sir Richard Wilson put it in 2002: "... the role of 
Number 10 and the size of Number 10 and the concentration of special advisers in Number 10 are different 
from what they have been before. " Select Committee on Public Administration Minutes of Evidence, 
Question 357, March 14 2002, 
httn: //www. publications. parl iament. uk/pa/cm200I 02/croselect/cmpubadm/303/2031401. htm 
Cabinet abinet Office. 2001. Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, http: //www. cabinet- 
otlice. gov. uk/central/2001 /codconspads. htm, paragragh 13. 
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Government. The code saw special advisers as having the legitimate role of providing 
this "... channel of communication in these areas of overlap... ". 1701 
Spin, the press and News Corporation 
Another major change was the press and media role for such advisers and the role of the 
chief `spinner' Campbell, as part of the renewed bid for Labour representation. Despite a 
popular misconception, not all advisers are ̀ spin doctors'. However, after Labour entered 
government, such was the concentration on press and media management, that more than 
half of the advisers worked on presentation to the press and media, as at least part of their 
work. 1702 This was despite the fact that their formal role was to give ministerial 
advice. 1703 As the retiring cabinet secretary Sir Richard Wilson admitted: "I think the fact 
is that there are more people than there have been in the past who are there to deal with 
the press. " 1704 
The Labour administration reorganised government and the civil service along the lines 
that it had reshaped the Labour Party. The operation of what has been called the 
`Millbankisation' of government has been chronicled elsewhere in eloquent detail. '705 
This work shall merely attempt to identify a few salient points. There was a centralisation 
of control around No. 10, as has been mentioned, with a special emphasis on press and 
news management. Labour instigated a Strategic Communications Unit (SCU). 1706 This 
had shades of the SCA. Equally, within departments, special advisers have been 
101 Cabinet Office. 2001. Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, http: //www. cabinet- 
office. P-ov. uk/central/2001/codconspads. htm, paragraph 14. Harold Wilson kept the role of the party 
separate by having a Parliamentary Liaison Officer, Gerald Kaufman, funded by the party. (Seymour-Ure, 
Colin. 1996. The British press and broadcasting since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell.: 212). 
1702 Grannatt, Mike, Evidence, Select Committee on Public Administration Minutes of Evidence, February 
28 2002, http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm200I02/croselect/cmpubadm/303/202280l. htm , Sir Richard Wilson, `The Civil Service in the New Millennium', 26 March 2002. The most notorious example 
of this was with the political appointee Jo Moore. 
1703 Dr Tony Wright, Select Committee on Public Administration Minutes of Evidence, March 14 2002, 
http: //www. publications. parl iament. uk/pa/cm200I 02/croselect/cmpubadm/303/2031401. htm 
Sý0 it Richard Wilson, Select Committee on Public Administration Minutes of Evidence, March 14 2002, 
Question 360, http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm200I02/croselect/cmpubadm/303/2031401 htm 
1705 Franklin, Packaging Politics, 2004: Chapters 3 and 4. 
1706 Ibid.: 60-1. 
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important in their role in `spinning'. Departments were now much more conscious of 
news management. 1707 
A particular feature of Labour's emphasis was, as in opposition, on providing exclusive 
access to News Corporation's titles. As the senior broadcaster and writer on spin 
Nicholas Jones told the author, the Sun's exclusive on 2001 election date, the deal made 
between Downing Street and the News of the World's former editor Phil Hall over Robin 
Cook's marriage breakdown and the particularly extensive briefing by special advisers in 
the Times were examples of this. 1708 
McNair, in his spirited defence of spin and PR's role in politics, argues that: 
"... journalists need spin... ". They required the spin doctors to fill the increased acres of 
space in newspapers and other media. 1709 However, this is to ignore the. shift in 
journalistic production. As noted previously, employers had cut journalist numbers, 
making overworked reporters more susceptible to spin. Journalists may not have wanted 
it, but factors outside their control made it increasingly difficult to avoid being ̀ spun'. 
McNair is correct that Labour did not pioneer spin in government. Bernard Ingham, for 
one, was adept at media management and prefigured Campbell in some areas. 1710 
However, under Labour there has been crucial differences, as part of a move towards 
increased Labour representation in the press. As McNair acknowledges, what is different 
with spin, than merely the accurate supply of information, is the politicisation or 
partisanship. What is marked is that, rather than supplying politically dispassionate 
"07 Personal interview with a senior civil servant, September 13 2002. 
1708 "If you look at the Times now, you can find out the whole page of the Times will have these sources, 
these stories without a single attribution... Now, on the one hand, Blair and Campbell criticise this, but on 
the other hand they perpetuate the system. " (Jones interview). For details of Campbell's negotiations over 
Robin Cook and other discussions over Sun stories see Jones, Nicholas. 2001. The control freaks : how new 
Labour gets its own way. London: Politico's, 2001.: 200-4. For Labour's links with the Times and the Sun 
see Oborne: 174-176. 
109 McNair, Journalism and democracy: 135-6. A similar argument is put by Pippa Norris. (Pippa Norris, 
`Political Communications in Post-Industrial Democracies', in Dowding Keith, M., James Hughes, Helen 
Margetts, and Association Political Studies. 2001. Challenges to democracy : ideas, involvement, and 
institutions, the PSA yearbook 2000. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave : in 
association with Political Studies Association.: 100-117: 111). 
110 Ibid.: 128,133, Williams, Get me a murder a day!: 254-5. 
478 
information, a spin doctor provides information that puts the Government in the best 
possible light. '71' Party campaigning has been transferred to Whitehall with many of the 
same methods. 1712 As one senior civil servant interviewed by the author in 2002 put it: "I 
think it is much more politicised than five years ago... I think they have tried to have too 
much news management and relentless spin and the production of good stories. And I 
think there is more of a blurring of what civil servants should and shouldn't do. " 1713 
In Government, Chief Press Secretary Alastair Campbell became the most important 
figure in press and media management. Crucially, although McNair indicates that 
Campbell was merely following in the footsteps of Haine and Ingham, he admits that he 
was different to Ingham in the important respect that he was not a career civil servant. 1714 
While this may indeed make his role more transparent, it is part of a major shift, where a 
political appointee is in control. 1715 
The important difference from previous administrations was that revised rules on special 
advisers left him, along with the Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell, with power over career 
civil servants and the ability to give them orders. 1716 Thus, the Labour leadership's 
control over the information given out by the `impartial' civil service was unheralded. 
The politicisation of information and the ability to spin information increased 
significantly. 
1711 Seymour-Ure describes Ingham as only formally non-partisan; breaching the "... partisan-non-partisan 
boundary... ". (Seymour-Ure, Prime ministers: 145,148,166). Yet McNair accepts there was a difference. 
(McNair, Journalism and democracy: 126-7). 
1712 Margaret Scammell, ̀New Media, New Politics', in Dunleavy, Patrick. 2002. Developments in British 
politics 6. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.: 169-184,180. 
1713 Personal interview with a senior civil servant, September 13 2002. 
1714 McNair, Journalism and democracy: 133. A similar point is made in Oborne: 150-1. 
171' Ibid.: 133. An example of the political nature of Campbell's contribution was his description of 
Conservative policies as ̀ Mickey Mouse'. (Sir Richard Wilson, Select Committee on Public 
Administration Minutes of Evidence, March 14 2002' 
http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm200I 02/croselect/cml2ubadm/303/203140l . htm, Sylvester, Rachel. 2002. ̀ Laying to rest the ghost of Sir Humphrey', Daily Telegraph, July 29 2002). This was 
followed by a complaint by the Cabinet Secretary Sir Richard Wilson. However, this was the exception 
rather than the rule. For a discussion on this extra power, within the context on a discussion on the 
similarities between Campbell and Ingham see Franklin, Packaging Politics: 41. See also Chapters 3 and 
4). 
1716 Sixth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Reinforcing Standards, January 2000, 
HMSO, Section 6.12. 
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This is especially important when one considers the extent of Campbell's control over 
civil service information. He commanded the traditionally impartial Government 
Information and Communication Service (GICS). He also ran the SCU and from 
February 2002, the co-ordination of government publicity campaigns of the Central 
Office of Information, which handles all press and media advertising and marketing 
campaigns for the Government. '717 This has prompted one commentator to describe him 
as "... the government's unacknowledged Minister of Information". 1718 Another aspect of 
the revised rules has strengthened the special advisors' politicised press management 
role. It is understood that senior civil servants cannot sack them. 1719 
The motivation of all these changes was that New Labour's policies would be more 
positively reported in the press and media. This had a fortuitously symbiotic relationship 
with its press and cross-ownership policies. Information would be politicised - the civil 
service would be manipulated to provide New Labour's policies in their best light to the 
press and media. Meanwhile, maybe coincidentally, its media ownership policies were, 
for the most part, positively received by media businesses. Linton indicates that this 
would be one way the Labour strategists considered that they could ensure that the 
newspapers remained receptive to their ideas. 1720 
Latterly there was a transfer of personnel from one field to the other. Bill Bush had been 
the head of a new version of Milbank's' `prebuttal' unit, anticipating press reaction in 
"" This point is also made in Franklin, Packaging Politics, 2004: esp. 78. For further discussion on this 
aspect of the Labour government's media relations and Campbell's role see Seymour-Ure, Prime ministers: 
20,135-6,154. 
11$ Professor Stuart Weir, Democratic Audit, `Memorandum', submitted to the Select Committee on Public 
Administration, February 28 2002, 
http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm200102/croselect/cmpubadm/303/202280l . htm. Although, he delegated lobby briefing to his deputy Godric Smith and former Northern Ireland information officer Tom 
Kelly in June 2000. (Franklin, Packaging Politics, 2004: 50). 
119 Sir Richard Wilson, Select Committee on Public Administration Minutes of Evidence, March 14 2002. 
1720 Linton interview. 
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preparing government responses. 172' He then became a special advisor to the DCMS, 
prior to the drawing up of the Communications Bill. 1722 
The representational strategy starts to unravel? 
However, opposition to Labour's press policy was to come from another source. We have 
seen that the Labour leadership believed that this strategy would be more effective in 
getting Labour support, as for a time it was. The 2001 election, for instance, saw all News 
Corporation titles come out for Labour. As we have seen, importantly, in the Labour 
Party, the unions and the members, who understood its worth in electoral support, did not 
openly challenge this strategy. However, aspects of Labour's representational focus 
started to be questioned. 
McNair denounces the `demonisation' of spin, which he sees in a positive light. He 
argues that New Labour spin doctors, rather than being all-powerful, have become more 
transparent, by their own volition. He also indicates that they have been subject to press 
deconstruction. 1723 However, this has happened under pressure from a journalist minority 
who have become weary of the news' conscious manipulation, which had become 
Labour's stock-in-trade. Contrary to McNair's rosy interpretation, these were not 
indications of spin playing a positive role. These were pointers that Labour's strategy was 
encountering serious difficulties. 
The story of the latter stages of Blair's first term and the second term's start was that, 
rather than the news being spun, the spinning was the news. This undermined Labour's 
presentation. Central to creating this view was the news coverage by journalists who 
1721 Scammell, New Media: 182. 
1722 He had learnt his old tricks well however. Acting as Tessa Jowell's special adviser, he told Nicholas 
Jones that when the Bill would be announced ".... there will be no story in the newspapers as we have got 
Puttnam on board". (Information from Nicholas Jones, November 25 2002). This worked. So, when it was 
unveiled, newspapers reported that Puttnam had had his concerns answered. (Gibson, Owen. 2002. ̀ Let the 
fun begin', The Guardian, November 20,2002, Leader ̀New model media', The Guardian, November 21, 
2002). However, this was not true. Puttnam was still opposed to significant parts of the Bill at this stage. 
1723 McNair, Journalism and democracy: 132-5. 
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resented the Labour government's carrot and stick approach to journalists, in order to get 
better representation in the press - with more nasty stick than carrot. 
1724 
The carrot took the form of newspapers, particularly the Sun being given preferential 
treatment over stories, as has been mentioned. For instance, the Sun was first made aware 
of the 2001 general election date. 1725 Even those who were subject to the carrot approach 
became more resentful of their own newspaper groups' quiescence in the news 
management techniques. One Sun journalist told the author of his colleagues' fear that 
New Labour's influence had deflected the Sun's traditional news values, for instance in 
reporting the Blair family. 1726 A more senior figure in News Corporation, Sky News 
political editor Adam Boulton, also indicated his concern in 1998: "On a bad day I feel 
soiled, when we end up seeing the press conniving in our own manipulation. " 1727 And 
there was still the tension in News Corporation titles over the euro. 1728 
The stick attracted hostility from two sides. Questioning journalists were ostracised and 
believed"that government special advisers were trying to get their colleagues dismissed if 
they did not submit to the bullying and toe the line. Even editors were believed by other 
journalists to be targeted by this process. Andrew Man, a New Labour sympathiser, was, 
nonetheless, said to have lost his job at the helm of the Independent after an intervention 
by Campbell, just before the 1997 election, after criticising Blair's nationalism. 1729 
Among those journalists who put their heads above the parapet to chronicle this process 
were the senior broadcaster Nicholas Jones and the Observer correspondent Nick 
1724 Franklin, Hand of History: 135-7, Franklin, Packaging Politics, 2004: 63. 
1721 Jones interview. 
'726 Sun journalists widely believed that their editor, David Yelland, had originally sat on the story that 
Blair's son Euan had been involved in a drunken escapade, despite having the story confirmed, because of 
his closeness to No. 10. In a sense, whether this was true, or was because of an intervention higher up in 
News Corporation, or was due to an inability to confirm the story was less important. The perception was 
that the editor had "bottled it" in the face of No. 10. (Personal information) Peter Oborne and Simon 
Walters also chronicle Yelland's "... almost star-struck admiration of Blair... ". (Oborne, Peter and Simon 
Walters. 2004. Alastair Campbell, London: Arum). 
1727 Kevin Toolis, 'The Enforcer', The Guardian, April 4 1998. Also mentioned in Franklin, Packaging 
Politics, 2004: 65. He was even more forthright in 2002, writing that: "Top figures in New Labour 
increasingly regard journalists as "scum"... ". (Boulton, Adam. 2002. `Lobby out of the loop', 
www. ePolitix. com, October 15 2002). 
1728 See Oborne: 175. 
'729 Cohen, Cruel Britannia: 153-4, Oborne: 182-3. 
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Cohen. 1730 The latter described the journalists' revolt was such that under New Labour: 
"... the label ̀ control freak' ... had been turned ... 
from an insult from the hippy fringe to 
the platitude of choice for mainstream pundits". 1731 
As importantly, newspaper rivals and broadcasters picked up on this spin story, notably 
those angry at being excluded from Campbell's carrot strategy, particularly the Daily 
Mail and Daily Telegraph to the right and The Mirror to the left. 1732 Thus, both spin and, 
particularly, the strategy of targeting News Corporation's titles had its problems. Former 
Daily Mirror editor Greenslade, said to be close to Campbell, also recognised this 
phenomenon, viewing that press concerns about Labour spin had "... turned Labour's 
great plus into a minus". 1733 As the seasoned commentator Jones put it to the author, 
speaking in the summer of 2002: "Certainly they have fallen out with the papers at a 
quicker pace than I would have thought was possible. The newspaper proprietors 
remained loyal to Thatcher and Major in a way that has not happened with Blair to the 
same degree... The Government is worried about, for example, the destabilisation of 
1730 Jones, Nicholas. 2000. Sultans of spin : the media and the new Labour government. London: Orion, 
2000., Jones, Nicholas. 2001. The control freaks : how new Labour gets its own way. London: Politico's, 
2001. Cohen says he knew several journalists who New Labour tried to get fired. "Editors are gently told 
that X and Y get it wrong constantly and ̀ no one takes them seriously'. " (Cohen, Cruel Britannia: 146-7, 
156) 
4731 Cohen, Cruel Britannia: 157. 
1732 Nicholas Jones told the author: "There was a genuine grievance on the part of the Mail and the 
Telegraph and those other papers. They believe they are promised access and then it is suddenly withdrawn 
and it is given to the Times or whatever it might be.... My brother George is on the Telegraph, I am not in 
any way speaking for him, but I know the people on the Telegraph and the Mail, and they see these stories 
as a marvellous way of getting at the Government.... I am afraid there is a little bit of an agenda setting 
feeling there ... and they see Campbell and spin as one of the useful ways to get at Blair.... 
There is a 
genuine grievance there with the broadcasters too because. .. think of our point of view. One of the reasons 
why you see programmes like the World at One, which really go for this, is because we you see we are in 
the position where we have to take these stories from the national newspapers. We have to follow the 
national newspaper agenda. Nobody will tell anything to us, and then we will see it in the newspaper, with 
all of these unattributed quotes. Perhaps there might be an interview, perhaps there might be a signed article 
by a minister, so that we know that we too are having to follow the agenda. We too are being used, and that 
again has led to this sort of backlash. " (Nicholas Jones interview). See also Roy Greenslade, ̀True 
Colours', The Guardian, May 8 2000. Oborne and Walters chronicle how the Sun was later feted with 
exclusives to the detriment of its tabloid rival the Daily Mirror, which despite its increased hostility carried 
on grudgingly supporting Labour electorally. (Oborne and Walters: esp. 191-5). For a claim about the 
reason for the Mirror's disillusionment, which involved Clinton and the peace process, see Oborne: 176-7 
and Oborne and Walters: 192-3. Campbell later admitted that personal animosity between himself and the 
lobby was one of the reasons he decided to withdraw from regular briefing in 2001. (quoted in Seymour- 
Ure, Prime ministers: 140,147). 
1733 Greenslade, True Colours 
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someone like John Prescott. My own interpretation of the scene at the moment is that it is 
more fractious than it was at the same point under the Thatcher regime. "1734 
1734 (Nicholas Jones interview). 
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Initiatives, initiatives, initiatives 
One aspect of spin, which was eventually damaging to New Labour, was its recurrent 
announcements of initiatives and of new money that had been already promised. 
Labour's senior communications staff considered that ideas would only impinge on the 
public's consciousness if they were repeated constantly through the press and media. This 
was also a response to the heightened demands of expectant people, who believed Labour 
would deliver on health and education, despite the tight spending limits the new right 
leadership had imposed in Labour's first term. However, this ploy started to backfire as 
some parts of the press and media began to get wise to it. Some press and broadcasters 
started uncovering examples of spun initiatives and figures. 
On health, for example, it was uncovered that Labour figures were subject to triple 
counting and that initiatives had been announced up to four separate times. Money said to 
be allocated was never spent and claims on spending were misleading. New Labour 
claims that an extra £21 billion would be invested in the NHS in three years, announced 
in its first Comprehensive Spending Review, were based on triple accounting. Figures 
were counted for more than one year. The amount to be invested was, in fact, £10.3 
billion - by no means inconsiderable, but less than half the headline figure. According to 
the chief economist of the independent health think tank, the King's Fund, if such 
accounting were used to consider all the increases in spending since the NHS was 
founded in 1948, then more than 80% of the nation's GDP would be spent on health. 
On four separate occasions the Government had both announced that £30 million would 
be spent on refurbishing accident and emergency units and that a time-saving £20 million 
instant hospital booking system would be installed. Three times it was stated that lottery 
money would help pay for radiotherapy equipment. Claims were made about recruiting 
extra doctors, which were to be trained anyway and an announcement made in February 
2000 of £400 million of additional funds, was merely repeating an allocation made two 
year's previously. 1735 A sizeable proportion of the much-trumpeted capital spending 
1735 Panorama. 2000. ̀ Spin Doctors', BBC 1, March 13 2000. 
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never materialised as these were based on PFI schemes delayed by the lack of private 
funding. 1736 Blair's announced target to match the European Union average on health was 
misleading. It became clear Blair merely meant matching an average taken of all EU 
states, rather than the weighted average, taking into account the huge differences in 
population between different states. The difference would be more than 1% of GDP - 
billions of pounds. 1737 Labour claims in 2001 that it would have saved £1 billion on NHS 
bureaucracy by 2002 were again based on multiple accounting. Without this, the figure it 
claimed to have saved would be £264 million. And even this was calculated on figures 
that had been revised to exclude some managers - whose numbers, Department of Health 
figures showed, were rising. 1738 
This was also the case in other key areas for New Labour. On education, transport and in 
the tackling of poverty there was also triple accounting and misleading claims. It was 
reported that Blair in 1998 had triple-counted increased education spending to make 
planned investment look like £19 billion. The figure, without this accounting sleight, was 
said to be closer to £10 million. 1739 On transport, similarly to health, it was found that the 
much-promoted £180 billion 10-year plan would only set to provide £110 billion, 
because of a shortfall of private cash. 1740 Gordon Brown had claimed during the 2001 
general election that Labour had raised 1.2 million children out of poverty. But it was 
reported that household income figures released in April 2002 indicated that the figure 
was closer to half a million - below Labour's original target figure of 700,000.1741 
There was also a significant amount of spinning when it came to New Labour claims of 
success in achieving the five much-lauded keynote pledges made in the 1997 election. 
New Labour pitched these as important markers by which the incoming government was 
to be judged at its administration's end. Yet, on these, the press and broadcasters exposed 
'"6 Halligan, Liam. 2001. ̀ Fact and fiction of Labour's performance', Daily Telegraph, June 3 2001. 
1737 Grice, Andrew. 2001. ̀ Health spending must rise by £45bn to hit target, think-tank tells Blair', 
Independent, December 10 2001. 
138 Panorama. 2001. ̀ The Labour Years', BBC 1, June 3 2001. 
1739 Panorama. 2001. ̀ The Labour Years', BBC 1, June 3 2001. 
140 Halligan, Liam. 2001. ̀ Fact and fiction of Labour's performance', Daily Telegraph, June 3 2001. 
"" BBC News. 2002. ̀ Labour ̀ struggles to beat child poverty", April 112002, bbc. co. uk, George Jones, 
`Blair sets out mission to end child poverty within a generation', Daily Telegraph, March 19 1999. 
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the spin cloaking the failure to unambiguously achieve more than two of these. Behind 
this, was an attempt to mask the low levels of spending on health and education. The 
Government's own figures had indicated that expenditure on health in Labour's first four 
years was less as a percentage of GDP than under the last Conservative administration. 
Education fared worse. It had fallen from 5% of GDP to 4.6%. 1742 
The health pledge was that the Government would cut hospital waiting lists by 100,000. 
However, the press and broadcast media identified problems with the claim made at the 
2001 election that this target had been achieved. The difficulty was that this pledge was 
said to only apply to inpatients. However, it was noted that this was achieved at the 
expense of those waiting for a hospital appointment, figures for which were rapidly 
increasing. 1743 Also, some patients were said to have been reclassified, to massage the 
figures. Newspaper reports detailed the pressure on NHS managers regarding this 
spinning. It was reported that nearly one in four hospital chief executives had admitted to 
the National Audit Office changing treatment definitions, which mostly shortened their 
waiting lists. Investigations had discovered that thousands had `disappeared' from 
waiting lists. 1744 
On education, the pledge to cut school class sizes for five, six and seven-year-olds to 30 
and under was simply not achieved. 1745 However, the Government emphasised that infant 
class sizes had fallen. Yet, against this spin, it was reported that this was leading to larger 
classes for older children and that the class reduction was because pupil numbers were 
falling. 1746 When the Labour government trumpeted figures just before the 2001 election 
indicating that the pupil-teacher ratio in secondary schools had fallen for the first time in 
1742 Denny, Charlotte and Larry Elliott. 2001. 'Labour fails to match Tory era spending', The Guardian, 
March 21,2001. 
1743 Panorama. 2000. 'Spin Doctors', BBC 1, March 13 2000, Panorama. 2001. ̀ The Labour Years', BBC 
1, June 3 2001. 
1744 Hall, Celia. 2001. 'Hospitals ̀ move the waiting list goalposts" Daily Telegraph, June 5 2001, Martin, 
Nicole. 2001. ̀ Where patients vanished from the queues', Daily Telegraph, June 5 2001. 
1745 Grice, Andrew. 2001. 'Ministers admit key pledges will not be met', Independent, January 11200 1, 
Grice, Andrew. 2001. 'The Labour Party', Independent, April 12 2001, Curtice, John. 2001. 'Public's 
doubts grow over Labour record', Daily Telegraph, January 14 2001. 
1746 Russell, Ben. 2000. ̀ Heads warn of backlash over rising class sizes', Independent, April 10 2000, 
Panorama. 2001. 'The Labour Years', BBC 1, June 3 2001. 
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a decade, its spin triumph was short-lived. Within a day, it was recognised that this was 
not the whole picture. It was reported that the ratio was still higher than when Labour 
came into office. 1747 
On law and order, the pledge was to halve the time it took for young offenders to be 
processed through the judicial system. The Government also failed on this. 1748 At first 
Government spin doctors claimed that this target would be achieved "... some time in 
2001 ". 1 749 Then newspapers were told that the pledge on this and education were for a 
full five-year term, rather than by the date the election was called. 1750 
This was part of a broader trend. Government officials informed journalists who were 
traditionally more sympathetic to the Labour leadership that many of the dozens of 
formal targets it had set were now `moving targets'. So, treasury officials announced that 
the some goals set in 1998 had been superseded by new 2000 targets, which would last to 
2004.1751 A print journalist noted another ploy. A failed pledge from the 1997 election - 
to raise the share of national income spent on education - was repackaged by Blair as a 
target for the second term. 1752 
If such tactics were creating a backlash against New Labour among journalists, the 
unveiling of such spun figures was leading the electorate to see through them as well. The 
Jo Moore case was emblematic in this regard. In both constituencies, as the Labour 
1747 Duke, Elizabeth. 2001. ̀ Government gets election boost as class sizes fall', Independent, April 6 2001, 
Cassidy, Sarah. 2001. 'Fall in class sizes fails to overturn four-year increase', Independent, April 7 2001. 
1748 Verkaik, Robert. 2001. ̀ How Straw's pledge on youth crime crumbled', Independent, January 5 2001, 
Grice, Andrew. 2001. ̀ Ministers admit key pledges will not be met', Independent, January 112001, Grice, 
Andrew. 2001. ̀ The Labour Party', Independent, April 12 2001, Curtice, John. 2001. ̀ Public's doubts grow 
over Labour record', Daily Telegraph, January 14 2001. 
149 Verkaik, Robert. 2000. ̀ Labour may fail to meet target on young offenders', Independent, April 29 
2000. 
1750 Grice, Andrew. 2001. ̀ Ministers admit key pledges will not be met', Independent, January 11 2001, 
Schaefer, Sarah. 2001. 'Labour under fresh pressure over its pledge on crime', Independent, January 13 
2001. 
1751 Russell, Ben and Andrew Grice, 2002. ̀ Ministers are judged and cursed by targets', Independent, 
January 14 2002. 
1752 Leader. 2001. ̀ Such brilliance in the art of politics has one defect: it insults our intelligence' 
Independent, April 14 2001. 
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loyalist Tony Wright put it: "... just as the last Government had the word "sleaze" 
" 1753 attached to it, this Government has got the word ̀ spin' attached.... 
Polls started to indicate that the public considered Blair as more interested in spin than 
substance. It can be argued that this accusation, was in a sense, inaccurate because the 
New Labour government had been prepared to court unpopularity to achieve its wider 
goals. Nevertheless, concerns that "... the problem with such brilliance at the art of 
politics is that it insults the intelligence of the voters" seemed to be borne out by one 
electors' poll. 1754 A study by John Curtice concluded that, although voters still would 
vote Labour, they were not convinced that Labour had met more than one of its five 
keynote pledges - that of not raising income tax. More believed waiting time delays had 
increased than either they had stayed the same or been reduced. 1755 In other words, the 
spin wasn't working. 
Another poll conducted in 2000 revealed that a strong majority saw Blair as more 
concerned with image than issues. 1756 Pollsters were seeing spin as 
`counterproductive'. 1757 Hostility to spin was also blamed for a dramatic turnaround in 
how honest and trustworthy the Labour government was seen by people polled. In 1988, 
a clear majority saw Labour as honest. By 2002, the figure had halved, while nearly two- 
thirds regarded the Government as lacking in trust. Two-thirds also viewed Alastair 
Campbell as dishonest - this was a higher percentage than his leader. Yet, a majority also 
believed Blair to be dishonest to some degree. '758 
It is certainly the case that New Labour government was not the first British 
administration accused of `fiddling the figures'. But the repetition of announcements was 
"s' Tony Wright, Liaison Select Committee, July 16 2002. 
httn: //www publications parliament uk/pa/cm200I02/croselect/cmliaisn/l065/106501. htm 
1754 Leader. 2001. ̀ Such brilliance in the art of politics has one defect: it insults our intelligence' 
Independent, April 14 2001. 
1755 Curtice, John. 2001. ̀ Public's doubts grow over Labour record', Daily Telegraph, January 14 2001. 
1756 60% of those in a national poll in 2000 viewed that Tony Blair was "... more concerned with image 
than with dealing with the real issues. ". (MORI poll, July 23 2000, conducted for the Mail on Sunday. 
Mori. com). 
'757 MORI, The Bubble Bursts, June 2000, www. mori. com 
1758 King, Anthony. 2002. ̀ Labour viewed as ̀ sleazy and disreputable', Daily Telegraph, June 20 2002. 
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something it became known by. This undermined Labour's claims to have put `clear blue 
water' between itself and the Conservatives by its spending priorities in its first term. It 
could also add to the scepticism when new money was announced, as happened in the 
second year of Labour's second term. The boy could only cry wolf so often. As a senior 
civil servant told the author: 
The public had become saturated with it... The idea was that figures sounded 
much better than percentages. For instance, with NHS funding there would be 5% 
growth, which, after inflation, would be 2% more. It sounds much better to say 
that there would be a £20 billion increase over three years. But it started to 
rebound on them. 1759 
This `spin difficulty' was implicitly recognised by Blair. He defended the Government's 
behaviour to the Liaison Select Committee in July 2002, in an implicit mea culpa: 
When you are in Opposition for 18 years-there was a tendency... that you 
believe the announcement is the reality. In many ways in Opposition it is, because 
what matters is the policy you are announcing; you are not actually in a position 
to deliver anything on the ground. I think for the first period of time in 
Government there was a tendency to believe, as it were, that the same situation 
still applied. It does not, in fact. For Government the announcement is merely the 
intention; the reality is what you have to go on and deliver on the ground. 1760 
However, this disavowal may have sounded hollow to a public who had before heard the 
Labour government distancing itself from spin and saw the claim undermined by Jo 
i Personal interview with a senior civil servant, September 13 2002. Granville Williams put it to the 
author that: "... in the end, people have not been given what you would term ̀ straight bat, straight 
reporting'... People will say ̀ this really does stink, what has been done here with figures on health, and 
money for the hospitals etc'. But it also works in silly little ways... this... fiasco... about Blair wanting to 
have a prominent role at the [Queen Mother's] funeral.. . It demeans what seemed to be a quite credible 
strategy. " (Granville Williams interview). 
1760 Tony Blair, Liaison Select Committee, July 16 2002. 
http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm200102/crose lect/cml iaisn/ 1065/ 106501. htm 
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Moore's infamous email. At the end of 2002, it was not clear whether Labour's 
representational strategy had been permanently harmed. 
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Appendix 2 to Chapter 7: The Right of Reply 
The last statutory attempt to provide a right of reply came with the Labour MP Clive 
Solely's Freedom and Responsibility of the Press Private Members' Bill. Consistent with 
her earlier position, on this occasion it was supported by the then Labour frontbench 
media spokeswoman, Clwyd. 1761 
Published in June 1982, it was more tightly drawn on the right of reply than the some of 
the earlier Bills. 1762 It concentrated on accuracy rather than bias and ignored libel. In 
other ways, it was more far reaching. It was similar to previous attempts to provide a 
statutory right of redress. However, it sought to link this with a call for press freedom. It 
provided for an Independent Press Authority (IPA), which would monitor press freedom 
and report to parliament on any new means to advance this. 1763 The new authority would 
investigate questions such as ownership and control of the media, which the Press 
Council had been charged with, but earlier critics had judged that it had ignored. 1764 
The conception of this new authority was in both the social democratic and radical 
alternative traditions. It would be nominally independent and representative. The minister 
involved would seek nominations from "... bodies which appear to him to be 
interested... " and it would be demographically representative of the British population 
regarding gender, race, sexuality, disability and region. 1765 However, it followed the 
social democratic tradition in its attachment to the state. A minister would appoint the 
authority. It would not be elected. 
Solely took the unusual step for a Private Members Bill of setting up a series of cross- 
party hearings to consider the Bill and voluntary regulation's effectiveness. The hearings 
16' Dawnay, Ivo. 1993. ̀Pressure grows for press laws', Financial Times, January 12 1993. 
1762 Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, `Statement of Evidence, December 15 1992', in Mike 
Jempson, ed. 1993. Special Parliamentary Hearings on Freedom and Responsibility of the Press. London: 
Crantock Communications.: 144. 
1763 Ibid.: 99. 
1764 O'Malley and Soley: 95,105,117. 
1761 Jempson: 101. 
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again attracted the press editors' irritation. It was particularly pointed out, borrowing 
from a classical ' liberal model, that a state-appointed body could not advance press 
freedom. This argument was based on an implicitly narrowly-defined definition press 
freedom as the freedom of editors and proprietors, in part against an overbearing state. 
'766 
Yet, more powerfully, an independent journalists' group, which included both former MP 
and media activist Phillip Whitehead and prominent investigative journalists, attacked it. 
Following a similar argument to that pursued when we first addressed the legal right of 
reply two chapters ago, the journalists considered the authority threatened becoming a 
"... government appointed quango... ". They saw that it could be used by a Maxwell-style 
figure to "... tie up journalists in costly, time-consuming litigation... ". 1767 O'Malley and 
Solely note the journalists' objections but argue that the fact that a law could be abused is 
not enough reason for excluding it. It would need to be properly framed. 
1768 The concern 
in this would be for a broader franchise to be involved in this decision-making than a 
court or state-appointed body. At the very least, working journalists should be strongly 
represented on such a body if the concerns of investigative reporters were to be allayed. 
Without a broad challenge to the wider assumptions about press ownership and an 
attempt to broaden out the democratic representativeness of the IPA, the Bill's advocates 
could not entirely refute the editors' criticisms. Equally, the journalists' critique pointed 
to the wider power relations in society, which were not focussed on in solely attempting 
to redress inequalities in press reporting. 
This was the last attempt to introduce a right of reply. As already implied, the 1997 
manifesto did not include the demand, although it was still Labour Party policy. 
1766 As the editor of The Observer, Donald Trelford, put it: "I object to the very idea that 21 people set up 
by a government will overrule the judgement of an editor as to what he is to publish in his newspaper. I 
think that that in itself is a breach of freedom of the press. " ('Evidence of Mr Donald Trelford, editor, The 
Observer, ' in Jempson: 89). 
1767 The Cross-Media Group, 'Statement of Evidence', in Jempson: 66,70. 
"'O'Malley and Soley: 180-1. 
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Appendix 3 to Chapter 7: The curious cases of Lord Hollick 
and Richard Desmond 
The media focus on New Labour and the Express group has been most noticeably on how 
the pornographer Richard Desmond bought the Express titles, hired the former Labour 
Party general secretary and gave a substantial donation to the party. Curran and Seaton 
focus on Desmond as the Express group's architect of a New Labour newspaper 
realignment. ' 769 
However, another press and media figure perhaps had a more interesting and pivotal role 
in the realignment of the Express titles. Interestingly, his tale indicates that one of New 
Labour's coterie had considered new ways of tackling the press ownership question. 
Rather than strengthening ownership rules as the way to provide greater representation, 
one figure close to New Labour branched out into owning national titles and, in a 
personally failed venture, provided greater Labour representation for the period we are 
considering. The tale of Lord Hollick and the Express newspaper group indicated the 
interest of those around New Labour in representation and provided a potential challenge 
to the traditional bipolarisation problem. Greenslade saw Hollick's involvement as more 
by accident than design. 1770 Yet, insiders have indicated that for a time, at least, it was 
part of a definite strategy to advance Labour in the press. 
As we noted in the last chapter, Lord Hollick was a central figure in the 1992 election 
campaign, in a way that is not always appreciated. '77' He had previously advised 
Kinnock and had founded the IPPR, of which he was a trustee. He was also a key 
Clintonisation advocate, which was broadly rejected by Smith. 1772 
1769 Curran and Seaton, 2003: 75-6. 
1770 Greenslade, True Colours. 
1771 Seymour-Ure, for instance, rather underplays his political connections and influence. (Seymour-Ure, 
Prime ministers: 118. 
1772 Gould, The unfinished revolution: 177. 
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Importantly, when Labour came to office this influential media figure became a key 
media business influence on policy after joining the Government. He became a special 
advisor at the DTI, advising it on the key area of competition law and regulation, 
alongside a policy task force headed by Lord Haskins. This gave Hollick what was 
described at the time as an "... unrivalled hearing at the centre of Government. "1773 
As if this was not enough, he also took a leading role as manager of one of the top four 
national newspaper groups. Hollick had had his first taste of senior newspaper 
management when he briefly became a Mirror Group director in the early 1990s. 1774 In 
February 1996, Hollick's company MAI merged with United News and Media (UNM), 
the Express newspapers group's owners, headed by the Tory peer Lord Stevens. This left 
the press group in the strange position of having two politically antagonistic managers. It 
soon became clear that, under Hollick as chief executive, the Daily Express' direction 
was changing. The media mogul connected to Blair adviser Philip Gould, whose 
company he had an interest in and whose office was to be in the Express building, was 
slowly shifting the traditionally Tory loyalist newspaper to the left. Lord Stevens elected 
to take a backseat role and go part-time later in 1996.1775 
By the start of the 1997 election, in hardly a ringing endorsement for the party it 
traditionally supported, the Daily Express announced: "In the weeks to come, the Express 
will make its preference known. But today we are content merely to celebrate the call to 
democratic action. " 1776 By election day, the Express titles still supported the 
Conservatives, albeit without the brazen confidence of old. '777 And soon after the 
173 Business Comment, ̀View looks good from Lord Hollick's chair', Independent, September 11 1997. 
See also Freedman, 2000: 267. 
174 Routledge, Mandy: 142, 
"'s Robinson, Philip. 1996. 'Back-seat role for Lord Stevens', Daily Telegraph, November 14 1996, 
Bennett, Neil. 1999. `The Odd Couple, Sunday Telegraph, November 28 1999. See also Cohen, Cruel 
Britannia: 145-6. 
1776 Quoted in Hughes-Onslow, James. 1998. 'Boycott may be too much of a maverick', Independent, 
September 22 1998. 
177 McKie, Clingers: 127. 
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election, the editor of the Daily Express, Richard Addis, announced that it now approved 
of the Blair government, which he saw was in a conservative tradition. 1778 
The stage was set for Hollick to introduce Rosie Boycott as the Daily Express's new 
editor. This signalled an important change in the editorial direction of the daily and 
Sunday titles - now part of an integrated operation. Recruited personally by Hollick, 
according to one insider she was recommended for the job by Phillip Gould! 779 Whatever 
the truth of this, others testify that Hollick, in this period, saw the Express titles', r'ole was 
to back New Labour and increase his political influence. As one former reporter told the 
author: "He definitely bought the paper in order to turn it into a New Labour paper. 
Hollick got the newspaper because he thought there would be a payback in terms of 
honours and recognition. " 1780 Boycott's former deputy noted: "Hollick ... loved owning 
newspapers. They gave him political and social cachet "1781 
In the past, Labour had denounced press management's power to influence political 
debate. Now one of New Labour's own was using press management in order to change 
the direction of a major newspaper - to influence the political discourse. 1782 
178 Interestingly, he wrote: "One of the never-written headlines of the election was ̀ Vote conservative - 
vote Blair'. For many people, the words and deeds of this young government are reminders of a longer- 
lived form of conservatism than that produced by the lightning storms of Margaret Thatcher's 1980s. "
(Addis, Richard. 1997. ̀A red rose blooms in Blackfriars', Independent, June 9 1997). 
1779 The insider was former Express journalist James Hughes-Onslow. Although he famously had a grudge 
against Boycott, the claim has more validity from the fact it is the context of an article arguing that the 
problem with Boycott was her distance from the political influence of the Labour leadership. (Hughes- 
Onslow, James. 1998. 'Boycott may be too much of a maverick', The Independent, September 22 1998). 
See also Cohen, Cruel Britannia: 146 and Gapper, John and Cathy Newman. 1998. 'Editor moves to Express 
titles', Financial Times, April 22 1998. 
180 Author interview with a former Daily Express, November 12,2000. 
"81 Blackhurst, Chris. 2001. ̀ Bad days at Blackfriars', The Guardian, January 29,2001. 
1782 An early indication of the political direction the paper was now going to take was that Boycott 
originally wanted to employ a Blair critic and Brown supporter and biographer Paul Routledge as political 
correspondent. Whatever the circumstances, which have been the subject of speculation, the offer was 
withdrawn and Anthony Bevins, a favourite of Alastair Campbell, was offered the post. (Baldwin, Tom. 
1998. ̀ No 10 accused of blocking Express job for journalist', Daily Telegraph, May 10 1998, Cole, Peter. 
1998. ̀A labour of love at the new Express', Independent, July 7 1998). Although Number 10 denied 
involvement at the time, Campbell subsequently admitted that he had been asked "... who I rated... " and he 
identified Bevins. (Interview with Hagerty, Bill. 2000. ̀ Cap'n spin does lose his rag! ', British Journalism 
Review, vol. 11, no. 2,2000). The paper also employed the New Labour associate Derek Draper as a 
columnist, who said that he let Mandelson vet his writing. The paper then sponsored the Labour Party's 
information packs and had a stand for the first time at the 1998 Labour Party conference. (Viner, Katherine. 
1998. ̀Window dressing', The Guardian, October 5 1998). A further consolidation of New Labour 
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Importantly, there was also perceived to be a business and advertiser motivation for this 
move towards New Labour. On acquiring the Express papers, Greenslade quotes Hollick 
as suggesting that it would not make commercial sense for them to become Labour 
titles. 1783 Yet, the mandate given to Boycott and her deputy Chris Blackhurst was for the 
papers to go "... upmarket, to make them appeal to a younger, progressive audience", 1784 
This linked with making the paper appeal to a New Labour readership. If we remember, 
the problem of Labour readers in the past was that they were unattractive to advertisers 
because they were, simplistically put, poorer and older. Now the demographic position of 
New Labour readers was said to attract advertisers. It could be now convincingly argued 
that, at least for the niche market of New Labour's core supporters, the traditional 
problem of Labour representation no longer existed. The social strata which the other 
Gould, Bryan, had described as we saw, was attractive to advertisers. There was a 
business logic in a newspaper that was both aspirational and campaigning. The Express 
titles were explicitly aimed at readers who mixed neo-liberal market economics with a 
small dose of "... social justice which provides opportunity". "" Those close to Labour's 
new right deemed a middle market title with a non-traditional Labour readership as a 
financially attractive proposition. 
influence in the Express titles came when the Sunday Express editor left two months after the paper ran a 
story alluding to Mandelson's sexuality. Again, whatever the truth about Mandelson and the government's 
influence in the sacking was beside the point. What most actors from different perspectives did not deny 
was that her views were out of line with the political direction Hollick and Boycott wanted to go. Both 
sides recognised that the woman who was going to go on to become Hague's press secretary did not 
approve of the political direction Hollick and his overall editor were taking the Express titles when she left. 
(Greenslade, Roy. 1999. 'Boycott sacks Platell. But will it save the paper? ', The Guardian, January 25, 
1999, Gapper, John and David Wighton. 1999. 'Sunday Express chiefs quit in Mandelson row', Financial 
Times, January 20 1999, Anon. 1999. 'Protest motion on press 'sackings", Independent, January 21 1999). 
Examples of the political direction the paper took with Hollick at the helm include over Europe - the major 
problem New Labour had with News Corporation's tabloids. Under the previous editor Richard Addis, 
though they were generally loyal to Major, the newspapers backed the Conservative Eurosceptics. In 1998, 
Hollick left the government to head a pro-Euro campaign Britain in Europe, working again with Phillip 
Gould. (Culf, Andrew. 1996. ' PM's allies turn nasty over Europe', The Guardian, April 24 1996. BBC 
News Online. 1998. ' Hollick to head euro campaign', BBC News Online, October 9 1998, MacAskill, 
Euan. 1998. 'Referendum foes await starting gun', The Guardian, December 18,1998). Under Hollick and 
Boycott, the Daily Express took a strongly pro-EU stance. 
183 Greenslade, Press Gang: 634. 
184 Blackhurst. See also Hagerty, Bill. 1999. 'Citizen Clive. Interview with Lord Hollick', British 
Journalism Review, Volume 10, Number 1,1999: 19-28. 
1785 Hagerty, Citizen Clive. 
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However, this was not going to last long. What Paul Foot had earlier suggested - that, if 
challenged, the media barons could let their power be used against New Labour - was 
proven, albeit in a curious way. By 2000, the Daily Express's line had abruptly changed 
again, this time to New Labour's left. As the paper's deputy editor explained later, 
Hollick was angry the Competition Commission applied existing minimal media 
ownership rules, which did not affect his press interests, yet left his ambitions to become 
a major media player in tatters. The commission put conditions on his planned merger of 
UNM with Carlton Television to become the largest ITV broadcaster, which undermined 
the financial rationale for merger. Angry with the Government, and with advice 
suggesting that further spending on his newspapers could not be justified in terms of 
shareholder profit, Hollick lost interest in the titles. 1786 As one former journalist told the 
author, he saw that New Labour had not rewarded him for his efforts. As she put it: "I 
don't think he realised that when Tony Blair came into office that he would have to court 
the likes of the Daily Mail. It was a case of not having to ... care about the Express 
because that was already on board. That was something that had been dealt with. "787 
This gave Boycott free rein to attack a government, which she was already to the left 
of. 1788 It also made Hollick open to offers for the title, which was sold to Desmond in 
November 2000. 
This seemed to pose a dilemma for New Labour. Richard Desmond was the owner of a 
range of pornographic magazines. They objectified women, angering a sizeable section of 
the party. This posed a potential clash between New Labour's pro-business and anti- 
sexist values. It was thought by some to have similarly led to a potential regulatory 
problem for the Labour government. Labour MPs, including the then Home Affairs 
Committee chair Robin Corbett and trade and industry committee chair Martin O'Neil 
called for Desmond's takeover to be referred to the Competition Commission. 1789 The 
Monopoly and Mergers' Commission in 1990 had stopped David Sullivan, owner of 
186 Blackhurst. See also Greenslade, Press Gang: 666. 
187 Author interview with a former Daily Express reporter, November 12,2000. 
"$g Glover, Stephen. 2000. ̀ It was a dreadful picture; but it spoke for humanity', Spectator, October 14 
2000. For an indication of Boycott's politics see Hughes-Onslow, James. 1998. ̀Boycott may be too much 
of a maverick', The Independent, September 22 1998. 
-. 1789 Maguire, Kevin. 2000. ̀ Byers urged to block Express buyout', The Guardian, December 23 2000. 
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pornographic magazines and the Sunday Sport, from gaining a controlling interest in the 
Bristol Evening Post newspaper group. This was on the basis that it would be against the 
public interest, as defined by the 1973 Fair Trading Act. It was believed Sullivan's 
ownership would "... harm both the accurate presentation of news and the free expression 
of opinion". 1790 
Yet, the trade and industry_ secretary Stephen Byers refused to recommend an inquiry on 
public ° interest - grounds. He could ' argue that, as Desmond owned no newspapers at the 
time of the buy-up, the act need not apply. 1791 Nevertheless, he had the option of an 
inquiry. Further concerns were expressed when it later became clear Desmond had been a 
sizeable Labour Party donor. Soon after the ruling, Desmond's company donated 
£100,000.1792 Under his ownership, the paper predominantly supported New. Labour in 
the period we are considering. For New Labour, media business' support and press 
representation was once again seen to be the overriding concern. 
190 The Monopoly and Mergers Commission, Mr David Sullivan and the Bristol Evening Post PLC: A, ' 
Report on the Proposed Transfer of a Controlling Interest as defined in section 57(4) of the Fair Trading 
Act 1973, MMC, 1990: 1. 
1791 Milmo, Dan. 2002. ̀ Desmond deal never under threat from competition watchdog', The Guardian, 
May 13,2002. 
192 Ahmed, Kamal and Antony Barnett. 2002. ̀ The deal that put a porn baron in favour with No 10', The 
Observer, May 12,2002, Hodgson, Jessica. 2002. ̀ Blair contacted Desmond minutes after Express 
takeover', The Guardian, May 13,2002. 
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